M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) A rather unusual difficulty arose in this proceeding which has thrown up an interesting aspect of the law namely the question as to whether the provisions of Section 151, Civil Procedure Code can be pressed into service in order to get over certain other insurmountable legal hurdles, one of which is the bar of limitation. The petitioner before me is the original judgment-debtor and it is pointed out that a decree came to be passed against her on 20-10-1978. In respect of that decree, execution proceedings were taken out as late as 15-1-1990 which is almost on the eve of the decree getting time-barred. Undoubtedly, the proceedings were technically in time and the court entertained them but the record indicates that for one-and-half years thereafter the necessary procedures were not compiled with and ultimately the executing Court dismissed the application. On 10-7-1991, i. e. after 33 days, an application was made under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code for restoration of the proceedings which by implication meant setting aside the order dated 7-6-1991. The lower Court passed a short order mentioning that the applicant could not reinstitute the execution proceedings as the period of limitation was over and that even though numerous opportunities were given and the needful had not been done earlier, that the Court proposes to give the applicant one more chance. Therefore the proceedings were restored. Notice being issued to the original judgment-debtor, she filed an application styled as objections before the lower court pointing out that the application filed under Section 151, civil Procedure Code was not maintainable in law because it cannot be termed as an application for setting aside the dismissal order and more importantly, on the ground that such an application was not maintainable because the period of limitation within which an order of dismissal could be set aside namely 30 days had already elapsed and that therefore, even assuming the decree-holder desired to apply for setting aside the dismissal order dated 7-6-1991, that it was condition precedent for an application for condonation of delay to be first filed and that none of these applications could have been granted without notice to the judgment-debtor and that consequently, the order dated 12-7-1991 restoring the original proceeding should be reconsidered and set aside. The lower Court after hearing the parties negatived the objection that by restoring the matter, the period of limitation had virtually been extended and that the legal requirements had been by-passed and observed that the inherent powers vested in the Court under Section 151, Civil procedure Code were wide enough to permit the Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and restore the original proceedings. The Court had occasion to observe that the question of limitation did not arise because the original proceeding was not in any case a time-barred one. The present civil revision petition is directed against that order. ( 2 ) THE petitioner's learned Advocate submits that there has been a wholesale breach of almost every conceivable provision of law including the procedural requirements of law and that therefore, the order of the lower Court must be set aside. He points out to me that in the first instance the execution application having been dismissed and the application for restoration having been filed after the period of limitation, that it could not have been entertained unless it was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. Learned Advocate also assailed the invocation of the provisions of Section 151, Civil procedure Code by pointing out that it is only under the provisions of Order 9, Civil Procedure Code that an application for setting aside the order of dismissal could have been made and that therefore, the application itself was misconceived. His further submission was that since the period of limitation had expired, that rights have accrued in favour of his client and since this is a money decree it is virtually a right of immunity against execution of that decree and in these circumstances that such a right could never have been taken away without his client's being given notice which was condition precedent. Lastly, learned Advocate submitted that a perusal of the application made would indicate that even on merits, the present respondent who is the original decree-holder has not made out any case because it is only contended that he could not attend the Court on 7-6-1991 because he was admitted to the nursing home for one day and that he was advised rest of four weeks thereafter. Learned Advocate submits that this does not explain the total negligence and non-compliance for one-and-half years prior to that nor does it explain validly any reason as to why it became impossible for the application for setting aside to be filed under his instructions within the requisite period. In sum and substance, the learned Advocate submits that this is a case in which the order passed by the lower Court will have to be quashed. As an additional submission, he adds that the lower court has observed that this case involves extraordinary circumstances. Learned Advocate submitted that there are no such extraordinary circumstances that are made out and that therefore, even the exercise of discretion was unjustified. ( 3 ) THE respondent's learned Advocate raised a preliminary objection in so far as he submitted that the order dated 12-7-1991 is the order whereby the original proceeding was restored. He submits that the petitioner has not made any formal application either for recalling that order or for setting it aside instead of it, she has followed the peculiar procedure of filing what was called objections to that order which objections have been filed long after the order has taken effect. It is after hearing the parties that the lower Court has rejected the objections and the learned Advocate submits that the restoration order dated 12-7-1991 therefore subsists in so far as this civil revision petition is not directed against that order and that it is consequently not maintainable. Between the two sides, I notice that almost everything has gone wrong at all stages but I am not prepared to uphold this objection because to my mind it is hyper-technical. It is true that what was styled as objections was nothing other than an application to the Court to either reconsider or set aside the order dated 12-7-1991. It is unfortunate that the matter was conducted in this fashion before the Trial Court and it is hoped that the persons responsible for it will take note of the views expressed by this Court and ensure that such things do not recur in either this or any other case. It is unfortunate that the matter was conducted in this fashion before the Trial Court and it is hoped that the persons responsible for it will take note of the views expressed by this Court and ensure that such things do not recur in either this or any other case. The fact remains that an application was made and on that application necessary orders were required to be passed in respect of the restoration order dated 12-7-1991 and therefore, it will have to be treated as an application either for reconsideration or for setting aside. It is essential to my mind that these matters be decided on merits rather than on the basis of technical objections. ( 4 ) RESPONDENT's learned Advocate then draw my attention to a decision of the Madras High Court in Megharaj v Deshraj kasturjee and Another. The Court was dealing with a case where there was a delay of one day and the lower Court had refused to condone it in the absence of an application for condonation of delay. The court observed that the view was not only too techanical but too harsh and that it was only fair that the party be afforded an opportunity of filing the necessary application. The Madras High Court had relied on two earlier decisions in Mt. Kulsoom-un-Nissa v Noor Mohamed and Firm kaura Mal v Firm Mathra Dass. It would be difficult to subscribe to this view because the parties in these proceedings are represented by Advocates arid it is not a question of ignorance of law but these are situations in which the provisions of law are well-known and under these circumstances it is not for the Courts to advise the parties as to what their duties are more so, in situations are where by virtue of the operation of the bar of limitation certain rights accrue to the opposite party. Under these circumstances, it would, not be correct in law to hold that if applications for condonation of delay which can be filed are not filed, that the Courts are still relaxing the provisions to the extent of either directing the parties or allowing the parties as an afterthought to once again avail of that right. Under these circumstances, it would, not be correct in law to hold that if applications for condonation of delay which can be filed are not filed, that the Courts are still relaxing the provisions to the extent of either directing the parties or allowing the parties as an afterthought to once again avail of that right. What needs to be remembered is that condonation of delay is an exception to the rule of limitation and a special provision whereunder some relaxation or lenience is shown in favour of a party who has been prevented from acting within the prescribed time. The provisions of law take effect automatically and if one were to plead exceptions it is only at the instance of the party asking for the indulgence that the time can be extended and it is not for the court to either direct it and to thereafter shower indulgence when this facility has not been exercised. ( 5 ) AS regards the secondary submission which the respondent's learned Advocate has advanced on the basis of the aforesaid decision, namely that if in the application for restoration the grounds for non-compliance within the prescribed period have been set out and if the averments are contained therein, that a separate application for condonation for delay was unnecessary. It is true that the Madras High Court had occasion to observe that such a separate application may not be necessary if even an oral application is made and if there is sufficient material in the restoration application itself. As far as this is concerned, what that Court had overlooked was the important fact that the relief which a Court can grant under an application for setting aside or restoration is under a different provision of law altogether and is in a situation whereunder the party is able to explain the default. The time factor within which this action is required to be completed gives rise to a different cause of action altogether and the consequences are far more serious because of the provisions of the Limitation Act. The time factor within which this action is required to be completed gives rise to a different cause of action altogether and the consequences are far more serious because of the provisions of the Limitation Act. These provisions provide for a final death of the proceeding itself and thereby immediately trigger off rights in the opposite party and it is this aspect of the matter which makes it absolutely essential for a separate application to be made" in respect of this cause of action which has nothing to do with the aspect of restoration. The two therefore cannot be merged or equated even if some of the grounds may be common. To this extent therefore the petitioner's learned Advocate is justified in pointing out that it is an inflexible procedural requirement that if the time period has been overstepped, that the proceeding for restoration cannot be considered unless the delay is first condoned. I am in agreement with this proposition because the two defaults are distinct and separate and both of them cannot be cured in one and the same application. ( 6 ) THERE is one more aspect to the controversy which requires to he taken into account. The respondent's learned Advocate submitted that the provisions of 0. 9 basically take care of a situation where decrees have been passed or suits have been dismissed and he submitted that there was some ambiguity with regard to the legal position as a result of which, his counterpart in the Trial Court felt that since there is no other specific provision in relation to restoration of execution proceedings that the provisions of Section 151, Civil Procedure Code would have to be invoked. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, again the petitioner's learned Advocate has raised an interesting point namely the question as to whether through such an omnibus application under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code, the other requirements such as a proper application for setting aside or restoration and more importantly, a formal application for condonation of delay can both be bypassed on the ground that section 151 is wide enough to entitle a party to reliefs under both these situations. The position in law is quite unambiguous in so far as under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code undoubtedly inherent powers are conferred on Civil Courts to pass orders in all those situations where the interest of justice so require which pre-supposes the fact that there are no other specific provisions under which the parties concerned can apply. Since the position was rather fluid and since the respondent was advised that the provisions of 0. 9 may not be able to come to his assistance, the application under Section 151, Civil Procedure Code was perhaps not a wrong remedy. To that extent, there is no question of contending that Section 151, Civil Procedure Code has been used to either bypass or override the other provisions. Though I do uphold the objection with regard tot requestion of limitation where Section 151, Civil Procedure Code cannot be used to override the provisions of the Limitation Act, it is a well-settled law that Section 151 can be utilised in situations where specific provisions did not exist but that this provision of law cannot be pressed into service to overcome a hurdle particularly where some other provision of law prescribes a specific bar. If those provisions prescribe a bar or a prohibition, that cannot be overcome by resort to Section 151, Civil Procedure Code. ( 7 ) IN the light of the aforesaid position in law, the order passed by the lower Court is most certainly erroneous and will have to be set aside. The learned Judge was certainly in error in observing that by entertaining one composite application and restoring the proceeding ex parte that he was not extending the period of limitation. This is precisely what he was done and that too in the absence of any application for condonation of delay. This was quite impermissible and more so, in a serious case like this one where after the period of limitation had expired and immunity had arisen in favour of the judgment-debtor who is the petitioner before me, that immunity could not have been taken away without hearing the party concerned. Under these circumstances, even the procedure followed by the Trial Court was erroneous. Under these circumstances, even the procedure followed by the Trial Court was erroneous. ( 8 ) THE last aspect of the matter that arises for consideration isthat the respondent's learned Advocate submitted that if in the facts and circumstances of this case it was essential that the respondent should have filed a formal application for condonation of delay but having regard to the reasons set out in the application filed before the lower Court that there is a possibility that the Court would have, had such an application been filed and had the notice been issued to the opposite party, still condoned the delay. Undoubtedly, the condonation of delay is a discretionary power but that discretion is required to be exercised judiciously and in the totally of the facts and circumstances of the case learned Advocate submitted that the considerations which would have weigh with the lower Court can equally be examined by this Court because the short question before me is to whether the respondent's learned Advocate's application that the matter to be remanded for this limited purpose could be granted at all. ( 9 ) THIS is a proceeding in which the decree was passed on 20-1-1978. For reasons best known to the decree-holder for almost 12 years right upto 15-1-1990, the decree was not executed. Thereafter though an application for execution was made, right upto 7-6-1991 no steps were taken for purposes of putting the decree into execution in so far as even the notice to the opposite party was not taken out. Thereafter, the Court dismissed the application on 7-6-1991 and even after the period of limitation for restoration of the proceeding had elapsed, no application was made until 10-7-1991 in which the only ground given is that the respondent was in the nursing home for one day and there is a handwritten addition that he was advised rest for four weeks thereafter. This aspect will have to be taken with a large pinch of salt and having regard to the overall complexion of the case, a Court cannot close its eyes to it. I do not visualise, on these facts, any Court exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent. If this be the position, no useful purpose will be served by remanding the matter to the Trial Court merely for reconsideration of this aspect of the case. I do not visualise, on these facts, any Court exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent. If this be the position, no useful purpose will be served by remanding the matter to the Trial Court merely for reconsideration of this aspect of the case. I have considered the position in law very carefully and I have also evaluated all the facts and circumstances of the case and to my mind it is too late in the day now for any more correctives. Having regard to this position, it would be worthless to remand the matter to the Trial court and hence, that request must necessarily be turned down. ( 10 ) THE civil. revision petition accordingly succeeds. The impugned order is set aside. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .