Judgment : M. Karpagavinayagam, J. This is a most cruel and unfortunate burning case, in which the appellant/husband set fire to his wife Thangam and caused her death, merely for the reason that she gave birth to only female children and not, male children. The facts of the case and the manner of occurrence really cause ripples in the pool of the conscience of this Court. Nothing could be more barbarous, nothing could be more heinous than this sort of crime. 2. In Sessions Case No. 71 of 1985 on the file of learned Sessions Judge, Kanniyakumari Division, Nagercoil, the appellant was charged for the offence under Sec. 302, I.P.C., on the allegation that on 28. 1985 at about 6.00 p.m. at the house of the appellant in Therkurichi Village, the appellant poured Kerosene over his wife, lighted the match and threw it on her and set her ablaze, due to which she died on 30:8.1985 at 10.30 a.m. at the Government Head Quarters Hospital, Nagercoil. 3. After elaborate trial, the learned trial Judge convicted the appellant for the offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo for life imprisonment. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses, filed 16 exhibits and marked 4 material objects. .4. The case of the prosecution shortly is as follows: Deceased Thangam, the unfortunate wife, aged about 29 years at the time of death, was married to the appellant ten years ago. They were residing in Therkurichi Village. Of their wedlock, four female children were born. The appellant began to show hatred towards his wife, the deceased, since she was not able to give birth at least to one male child. So, the appellant after consuming liquor used to come back home and beat and ill-treat, his wife day in day out. 5. P.W. 1 Palthangam, a woman, is the local resident of the said Therkurichi village. Her house is situate at a distance of 75 feet from the house of the appellant. P.W.2 Padmavathy, the elder sister of the appellant also was residing nearby. P.W.3 Pandiyan is also residing in the same village. P.W.5 Duraimani, the elder brother of the deceased is the resident of Pillaiyarvilai village. He is running a hire cycle shop at Rajakkamangalam. 6. On the date of occurrence, i.e., on 28. P.W.2 Padmavathy, the elder sister of the appellant also was residing nearby. P.W.3 Pandiyan is also residing in the same village. P.W.5 Duraimani, the elder brother of the deceased is the resident of Pillaiyarvilai village. He is running a hire cycle shop at Rajakkamangalam. 6. On the date of occurrence, i.e., on 28. 85 at 6.00 p.m. When the appellant and the deceased were inside their house, the appellant suddenly took the kerosene tin, poured the kerosene over the deceased, then lighted the match and threw it on her body. When she got ignited and screamed the appellant ran away from the house. Since the fire fully engulfed her, she cried and rolled down on the floor of the verandah. On hearing the hue and cry. P.Ws.1 to 3, the neighbours came and tried to extinguish the fire. Thereafter, P.W. 1 Palthangam, arid P.W.2 Padmavathy requested P.W.3 Pandiyan to bring a taxi. Then P.W.1 Palthangam asked the victim Thangam, as to how she sustained “burning injuries.” The victim Thangam told her, that her husband poured kerosene and set her ablaze. P.W.1 Palthangam further, asked, as to why her husband did this. Then the victim replied that her husband did not like her, since she delivered only female children, and not a single male child. P.W.3 Pandiyan came there with a taxi driven by P.W.4 Jayakumar, P.Ws. 1, 2 and others took the victim in the taxi to Selvin Hospital at Nagercoil, a private nursing home. 7. P.W.16 Dr.Selvin Julious, practising, in that private nursing home, examined the victim at 8.30 p.m. on 28. 1985 and found burn injuries all over her body and the victim Was conscious. When P.W.16 Dr.Selvin Julious questioned the victim about the injuries, the victim told him that her husband (Appellant) poured keronsene and set her ablaze. Since her condition was serious, P.W.16 Doctor, instructed that the victim should be taken to the Government Head Quarters Hospital, Nagercoil. .8. On receipt of this news from P.W.3 Pandiyan, P.W.5 Duraimani, the brother of the victim closed his cycle shop at Rajakkamangalam and rushed to Therkurichi village. On being informed that the victim has been taken to Selvin Hospital, he went there and saw the victim in conscious state. As advised by P.W.16 Doctor, P.W.5 and other took her in a taxi to Government Head Quarters Hospital, Nagercoil. 9. On being informed that the victim has been taken to Selvin Hospital, he went there and saw the victim in conscious state. As advised by P.W.16 Doctor, P.W.5 and other took her in a taxi to Government Head Quarters Hospital, Nagercoil. 9. At 10.00 p.m., the victim was brought to the Government Head Quarters Hospital, Nagercoil. P.W.7 Dr.Shanmugham who attended on her, found her conscious. When she was questioned by P.W.7 Dr.She told him, that she was set ablaze by her husband (appellant) at 6.00 p.m. on the same day. Since P.W.7 Doctor found her in a serious condition with extensive burns all over her body, he admitted her as an in-patient, and immediately he sent Ex.P-2 requisition to the Magistrate for recording dying declaration and Ex.P-4, intimation to the Kottar Police Station. After giving initial treatment, P.W.7 Doctor issued wound certificate Ex.P-5. 10. At 10.15 p.m., P.W.10, Herbert Raj, Head Constable attached to Kottar Police Station received Ex.P-4, the intimation sent by P.W.7 Dr. He immediately rushed to the Government Head Quarters Hospital, Nagercoil, where he saw the victim in a conscious condition. He recorded Ex.P-1 statement at 10.25 p.m., which was reduced into writing and he obtained the left thumb impressions of the victim. P.W.5 Duraimani, the brother of the victim who was present then, attested the statement Ex.P-1. P.W. 10 Head Constable came to the police station and registered the case in Cr.No. 1150 of 1985 of Kottar Police Station under Sec.326, I.P.C. against the appellant. Ex.P-10 is the printed F.I.R. P.W. 10, despatched them to the jurisdictional Police station, viz., Rajakkamangalam police station. 11. On the same night on 28. 1985 at 11.25 p.m. P.W.6 Muthuraj, Special Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nagercoil, went to the Hospital, on receipt of Ex.P-2 requisition sent by P.W.7 Doctor. At 11.40 p.m. he reached the hospital and saw the victim in a conscious condition. Before recording dying declaration, he put a question to the victim, in order to satisfy himself as to whether she was conscious and whether she was in the state mind to give a statement. On being satisfied, he recorded her dying declaration in question and answer form, in Ex,P-3. Thereafter, the statement who admitted the same to be correct. In between 11.40 and 11.45 p.m., P.W.6 Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration given by the victim. On being satisfied, he recorded her dying declaration in question and answer form, in Ex,P-3. Thereafter, the statement who admitted the same to be correct. In between 11.40 and 11.45 p.m., P.W.6 Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration given by the victim. The duty doctor made an endorsement in Ex.P-3 dying declaration, certifying that the victim was conscious during the time of her statement. 12. At 2.00 a.m. on 27/28. 1985 early morning, P.W.11, Ganesan, Head Constable, Rajakkamangalam received the copy of F.I.R. despatched by P.W. 10. Head Constable at Kottar Police Station, he registered the case in his station new Crl.No.206 of 1985 and despatched the copies of F.I.R. to the court and to the higher officials. 13. At 2.30 a.m. on 27/28. 1985, P.W.13, Manikumar, Sub-Inspector of Police, Rajakkamangalam received the copy of F.I.R. and straightaway went to the Government Head Quarters Hospital, Nagercoil at 3:00 a.m. and examined the victim Thangam, P.W.5 Duraimani and P.W.1 Palthangam. Thereafter he went to the place of occurrence and inspected the spot. He prepared Ex.P-12 observation mahazar and Ex.P-13 rough sketch. He also examined P.W.2 Padmavathy, P.W.3 Pandiyan, P.W.4 Vijayakumar at the venue of the crime. At 5.00 a.m. he recovered M.O.I burnt hair, M.O.2 burnt saree pieces M.O.3 kerosene tin and M.O.4 ash of the leaf of the Palmyra. 14. On 30.8.1985 at 10.30 a.m. the victim Thangam died. P.W.8 Doctor Alagesan, attached to Govern-ment Headquarters Hospital, Nagercoil sent the death intimation Ex.P-5 to Kottar Police Station. Ex.P-7 is the hospital case-sheet, containing the particulars of treatment given to the deceased at various stages upto her death. At 11.00 a.m. on 30.8,1985, P.W.12, Aruldoss, Police Constable, attached to Kottar Police Station received the death intimation and went to Rajakkamangalam and handed over Ex.P-6 at 1.10 p.m. to P.W.13, Sub Inspector of Police. P.W.13, altered the case into Sec.302, I.P.C. and despatched the altered F.I.R. Ex.P-15 to court and his superior officers. 15. On receipt of Ex.P-15 a copy of altered F.I.R. on 30.8.1985, P.W.15, Manoharan, Inspector of Police, took up investigation and went to Government Head Quarters Hospital, Nagercoil on 38. 1985. Between 7 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. on 38. 1985 he conducted inquest. He examined P.W.5 Duraimani and another, Ex.P-16 is the inquest report. He sent requisition Ex.P-8 through P.W.14, Manickam, Police Constable, requesting the doctor to conduct post-mortem. 16. At 11.30 a.m. on 38. 1985. Between 7 a.m. and 10.30 a.m. on 38. 1985 he conducted inquest. He examined P.W.5 Duraimani and another, Ex.P-16 is the inquest report. He sent requisition Ex.P-8 through P.W.14, Manickam, Police Constable, requesting the doctor to conduct post-mortem. 16. At 11.30 a.m. on 38. 1985, P.W.9 received the requisition Ex.P-8. On the same day at 2.30 p.m. P.W.9, Doctor Saradha, commenced post-mortem and she found extensive burns all over the body of the deceased. During post-mortem P.W.9, Doctor, found the following appearances on the body of the deceased, “Dry, charred, skinned, moderately nourished body having no external injuries. Extensive burns seen on the whole body except the areas lumbar region (back), buttocks and foot both side and dorsom. Rigor mortis passed off. Eye lids closed. Tongue inside the mouth. Heart: 150 grams empty. On Cut section lungs; congested Rt. 400 grams Lt. 350 Grams. Hyoid bone intact. Stomach congested 150 gms. Empty. On cut section liver congested 1100 gms. spleen 125 gms. congested. Kindneys 125 gms each congested. Bladder empty, uterus enlarged 8 to 10 cm. size Empty. On cut section congested. Brain 1400 gms. congested on c/s.” She issued Ex.P-9 post-mortem certificate. She opined that the death was because of the shock due to extensive burns. 17. On 38. 1985 at 2.15 p.m., P.W.15 Inspector of Police arrested and appellant. After examining some more witnesses and after completion of the investigation, he filed the charge sheet. .18. When the appellant was questioned under Sec. 313, Crl.P.C. by the trial court to afford him an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in evidence, he denied his complicity in the crime. He went on to add, that P.W.5 Duraimani, the brother of the deceased insisted the appellant for the transfer of landed property standing in his name to the name of the deceased; for which the appellant replied that he would not do so and that the deceased was on an earlier occasion, while attempting to hang herself, rescued by the appellant and that she was mentally a deranged person and was kept in a temple for one month and that again when she attempted to commit self-immolation the appellant alone rescued her and that on 28. 1985, the appellant went to the house of his mother-in-law at Peruvilai and on returning home at 9.00 p.m., he was informed that his wife was taken to the hospital and that when he went to the hospital, he saw the victim in an unconscious stage, and there the police arrested him and took him into custody. However, the appellant did not chose to adduce any defence evidence. 19. On an appreciation of the evidence, oral and documentary, the trial court accepted the prosecution case and dealt with the appellant in the manner stated in the earlier part of this judgment. 20. Miss. J.Sundarakanchani, learned counsel for the appellant submitted, that the conviction cannot be based merely on the dying declarations and that the appellant has stated in his statement under Sec.313, Crl.P.C, that the deceased was a person of unsound mind and that several times the appellant saved her from her attempts to commit suicide and that this aspect of the statement has been admitted by P.Ws.1 and 2 in their cross-examination. Learned counsel further submitted that P.W.16 Doctor has admitted that he was informed by the relatives of the deceased who took the deceased to the hospital, that she caught fire accidentally due to the fall of chimney of kerosene lamp and that the dying declaration was not properly recorded by P.W.6, Special Judicial First Class Magistrate, and that the doctor who attested Ex.P-3 dying declaration has not been examined in court and the doctor who recorded the case-sheet admits that she was Semi-conscious and so the deceased could not have been in a position to give any dying declaration and that Ex.P-3 dying declaration reached the court very belatedly, i.e., only on 9. 1985 and as such, the conviction, which was solely based on dying declarations was not correct and so the learned counsel claims that the appellant should be acquitted. 21. 1985 and as such, the conviction, which was solely based on dying declarations was not correct and so the learned counsel claims that the appellant should be acquitted. 21. Mr.B. Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor, while countering the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the truth and effectiveness of these dying declarations cannot be easily sought to be shaken, since all the dying declarations are consistent in material particulars and the courts have time and again held that dying declarations alone could be the basis for conviction and that the contents in dying declarations have been fully affirmed by the medical evidence and as such the conviction recorded by the lower court cannot be said to be not justified. In short, he pleaded for upholding of the verdict of the learned trial Judge. He drew support for his submissions from various citations, which we will refer to later. .22. On the facts narrated in detail, it will be apparent that in respect of this crime, which had taken place in the house of the appellant, there cannot be any ocular witness, the appellant did not choose to place before court, the nature of occurrence that had taken place inside the house. However, the prosecution would rely upon the version of the deceased herself, which is now in the form of oral and documentary dying declarations. In effect, the guilt or otherwise of the appellant, will have to be decided, purely on the basis of such dying declarations, coupled with other circumstances and medical evidence. 23. The various pieces of evidence which are available in this case are as follows: .(i) The oral dying declaration given by the deceased to P.W. 1 Palthangam, at the earliest point of time, viz., at 6.15 p.m. on 28. 1985. .(ii) The oral dying declaration given by the deceased to P.W. 16, Doctor Selvin Julious, who initially treated the victim Thangam at 8.30 p.m. on the same day. (iii) The dying declaration given by the victim Thangam to P.W.7 Doctor Shanmugham at 10.05 p.m. in Government Head Quarters Hospital, Nagercoil. .(iv) Ex.P-2, the requisition for recording dying declaration to Magistrate, Ex.P-4, the intimation to police and Ex.P-5, the wound certificate issued by P.W.7, all containing the factual details recorded by P.W.7 Doctor, on the victim being questioned by him. .(v) The dying declaration given by the victim on 28. .(iv) Ex.P-2, the requisition for recording dying declaration to Magistrate, Ex.P-4, the intimation to police and Ex.P-5, the wound certificate issued by P.W.7, all containing the factual details recorded by P.W.7 Doctor, on the victim being questioned by him. .(v) The dying declaration given by the victim on 28. 1985 at 10.25 p.m. to P.W. 10, Head Constable, which was reduced into writing in Ex.P-1. on which the victim had put her left thumb impression, attested by P.W.5 Duraimani. .(vi) The dying declaration given by the deceased to P. W.6, Special Judicial First Class Magistrate on 28. 1985 between 11.40 and 11.45 p.m. in Ex.P-3. (vii) The evidence of Doctors, P.Ws.7 to 9 and P.W. 16 showing that the deceased was treated for her burn injuries caused by her husband on 28. 1985 at 6.00 p.m. which resulted in her death on 30.8.1985 at 10.30 a.m. 24. As referred to earlier, this is a case, where the basis of conviction of the appellant is on the five dying declarations. The principle on which dying declarations are admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim; “A man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth.” The situation in which a man is on death bad is so solemn and serene. When he is dying the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. There can be no scope for recording the statement on oath or for cross-examination of the maker. Besides, should a true and credible dying declaration, were to be excluded, it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of that statement, would leave the court without any scrap of evidence. 25. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worth-while to note that the accused has no scope for cross-examination. This is the reason, the courts also insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its credibility. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. This is the reason, the courts also insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its credibility. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. 26. The law on dying declarations is well settled by now. Under Clause (1) of Sec.32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Statement made by a person, who is dead, as to the cause of his death or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of his death comes into question, is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence. Thus, Sec.32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule that hear-say evidence is not admissible or that unless evidence is tested by Cross-examination, it is not credit-worthy. 27. However, the reliability of such statement/ declaration should be subjected to a close scrutiny, considering that it was made in absence of the accused/ appellant who has no opportunity to test its veracity by cross-examination. If there are more dying declarations than one that the court has also to scrutinise all the dying declarations to find out if such one of them passes the test of being trustworthy. The court must further find out whether different dying declarations are consistent with each other immaterial particulars before accepting and relies upon the same. Once the statement of the dying person and the evidence of the witness or witnesses testifying to the same is found reliable on careful security, it becomes a very important and reliable piece of evidence and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and free from any impediment, such a dying declaration by itself can be sufficient for recording a conviction even without looking for any corroboration. 28. 28. We have a few decisions of the Apex Court and a few by other High Courts and one by our High Court. Let us now have a quick look at the case law available on this subject: 29. The Supreme Court in Khushal Rao v. State of Bomaby, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 22, chose to lay down the following tests, in order to determine as to whether the dying declaration is truthful: .(a) declaration to a Magistrate is preferable to an oral declaration; .(b) Opportunity of dying man of observation; .(c) Capacity to remember remained unimpaired; .(d) a consistent statement; .(e) an early statement; and .(f) no tutoring. 30. The following significant factor arises out of the observations of the Supreme Court in Lallubhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1776: “The person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the dying man is making a conscious and voluntary statement with normal understanding.” 31. It will be now necessary to notice the observations of the Supreme Court in Jayaraj v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1519: “When the dependent was in severe bodily pain, while making his dying declaration, his words were scarce, his natural impulse would be to tell the Magistrate, withom wasting his breath on details. The very brevity of dying declaration, in the circumstances of the case far from being a suspicious, circumstances was an index of its being true and free from the taint of tutoring, more so when the substahtum of the dying declaration was fully consistent with the ocular account.” 32. In Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1994: 1996 S.C.R. (Supp.) 542, the Supreme Court emphasised that the court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination and the deponent was in a fit state to make the declaration. It was further stressed by the Supreme Court in Kundula Babasubramanyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1993 S.C.C. (Crl.) 655, that if there are more than one dying declarations then the court has also to scrutinise all the dying declarations to find out if each one of these passes the test of being trustworthy. The court must further find out whether the different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and relying upon the same. .33. The court must further find out whether the different dying declarations are consistent with each other in material particulars before accepting and relying upon the same. .33. Now, our attention will have to be focused to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Habib Usman v. State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1979 S.C, 1181: 1979 Crl.L.J. 708: (1979)3 S.C.C. 601: 1979 S.C.C. (Crl.) 735: .“Great weight must naturally and necessarily be attached to a dying declaration recorded very shortly after the occurrence. Merely because some friends and relatives happened to be with the deceased before the statement was recorded, the statement cannot be thrown out as tutored.” .34. On the aspect of ‘absence of independent corroboration.‘law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rabi Chandra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1738, will be very relevant. They are extracted hereunder: .“If after searching scrutiny the court is satisfied that the dying declaration represents a truthful version of the occurrence in which the deceased received injuries which led to his death, then even in the absence of any independent corroboration a conviction can be founded therein.” 35. It will be appropriate to extract the observations of the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Chet Ram, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1543: 1989 Crl.L.J. 1785: (1989) 2 S.C.C. 425 : (1989)2 Crimes 13, on the aspect of consciousness of the deceased, while making dying declaration: “The initial registration of the case under Sec.307, I.P.C., and its alteration to an offence under Sec.302, I.P.C. after Kishori’s death is an additional factor to accept the prosecution case that Kishori had remained alive and conscious till she reached the bus stand at Banda. There was thus over-whelming evidence on the case to prove that Kishori was fully conscious and mentally alert when she gave the statement.... When the doctors say that Kishori could have retained her consciousness and been able to make a statement, there is no reason why the statement should be disbelieved merely because it contains the details of the motive for the attack and the manner in which the occurrence had taken place... The medical evidence corroborates her statement in full measures... When the doctors say that Kishori could have retained her consciousness and been able to make a statement, there is no reason why the statement should be disbelieved merely because it contains the details of the motive for the attack and the manner in which the occurrence had taken place... The medical evidence corroborates her statement in full measures... A dying declaration, it is needless to say, does not require any corroboration as in the case of an accomplice or a confession.” In Thumallapally Koti Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993)2 Crimes 179, Sivaraman Nair, J. of Andhra Pradesh High Court, speaking for the Bench, observed as below: “Presence of Medical Officer during the period when Magistrate recorded dying declaration and signature of Medical Officer was obtained on it are sufficient indication that Magistrate had satisfied himself that the declarant was fit to make the statement.” 36. In Rajakkani v. State, (1991)1 M.W.N. (Crl.) 104. one of us (Arunachalam, J.) has observed as follows: “The medical evidence affirms the contents of the dying declarations regarding the cause of death of the deceased, adding sufficient weightage to the truth of the dying declarations. Added to these circumstances, the conduct of the appellant at or after the occurrence will also be a relevant tact to be taken note of under Sec.8 of the Evidence Act.” 37. In Padmaben Shamalbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 1991 S.C.C. (Crl.)275, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the fact of ‘state of mind’. The relevant portions read as hereunder: “The mere fact that the deceased had suffered 90 percent burns and her general condition was poor is no reason to discard the testimony of both the medical men when they say that she was in a fit state of mind and was able to make the dying declaration in question.” In Goverdhan Raoji Ghypre v. State of Maharashtra, 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 15, also, the same view is repeated by the Apex Court in the following words: “Even after recording such dying declaration, the learned Magistrate obtained a further certificate from the doctor that the deceased was in fit state of mind to make the statement. The distinction sought to be made out by the learned Sessions Judge that ‘fit state of mind’ and”conscious state of mind’ were not the same thing, is too hypertechnical in the facts and circumstances of the case. The distinction sought to be made out by the learned Sessions Judge that ‘fit state of mind’ and”conscious state of mind’ were not the same thing, is too hypertechnical in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Magistrate put the questions to the deceased and then recorded the statement. It will be wholly unjustified to hold that simply because the Magistrate did not put a direct question to the deceased as to whether she was in a fit state of mind that make the statement, the dying declaration was required to be discarded. There is no manner of doubt that the deceased was suffering from great physical pain because of extensive burn injuries but on that score alone it could not be presumed that she was not in a fit state of mind to make the statement particularly when the Doctor had certified both before and after the statement that she had a state of mind to make the statement.“ In Ganpat Mahadeo Mane v. State of Maharashtra. 1993 S.C.C. (Crl.) 491, it was held by the Supreme Court as below: ”The contention that deceased having suffered 97 per cent burn injuries would not have made so many dying declarations is not sustainable. Because of the mere fact that the entire thing is not recorded by way of separate questions and answers, the value of the dying declaration is not detracted. The Executive Magistrate in his evidence has clearly stated that this is the version given by the deceased. The other dying declarations are also to the same effect. None of these dying declarations suffer from any infirmity. They are also corroborated by medical evidence and other circumstantial evidence." 38. In Mafabhai N.Raval’s case, 1992 S.C.C.(Cri) 810, the following observations were made by the Supreme Court: "It is in the medical evidence that 99 per cent of the body of the deceased was affected by extensive burns and that the clothes of the deceased were also burnt to ashes. In Mafabhai N.Raval’s case, 1992 S.C.C.(Cri) 810, the following observations were made by the Supreme Court: "It is in the medical evidence that 99 per cent of the body of the deceased was affected by extensive burns and that the clothes of the deceased were also burnt to ashes. Therefore, the learned Judge thought that it was not at all possible to believe that the lady might have developed the shock only at 4 a.m. and he gave his firm opinion that the moment the deceased had seen the flames she must have sustained mental shock and these circumstances convinced him that right from the very beginning she must have been under a mental shock and on that ground the learned Judge disbelieved the doctor. Likewise he has pointed out certain circumstances purely based on surmises and on his inferences. It is needless to say that the doctor who has examined the deceased and conducted the post-mortem is the only competent witness to speak about the nature of injuries and the cause of death. Unless there is some-thing inherently defective the court cannot substitute its opinion for that of the doctor. The entire attack of the defence was on the mode of recording the dying declarations and on the ground that the condition of the deceased was serious and she could not have made the statements. On these aspects as noted above, the evidence of doctor is relevant and important. We have gone through the evidence of the doctor as well as that of the Executive Magistrate. We find absolutely no infirmity worth mentioning to discard their evidence. It therefore emerges that both the dying declarations are recorded by independent witnesses and the same give a true version of the occurrence as stated by the deceased. They dying declarations by themselves are sufficient to hold the appellant guilty." 39. We are bond to refer to the Judgment of Supreme Court in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, (1992)1 Crimes 1180, wherein the theory of suicide’ has been rejected as below: "We are clearly of the opinion the High Court was fully justified in accepting the dying declarations because they answer every test which is required to be applied for such acceptance.....The theory of suicide has been rightly rejected by the High Court. As was pointed out a tender loss after only five years of married life with an affectionate husband and a young daughter to foster could not have resorted to that rash act, merely because there were quarrels between her and her mother-in-law. In every house it is proverbial that such quarrels do take place. It is impossible to contend that the deceased was so much frustrated in life so as to commit suicide." 40. A Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Imran Khan v. State of M.P., (1984)2 Crimes 174 , after dealing with Sec.32 of the Indian Evidence Act has held that if the deceased is not proved to have died as a result of the injuries received in the incident propounded by the prosecution, her statement cannot be said to be statement as to cause of her death or to any of the circumstances which resulted in her death. 41. Now we would recapitulate the facts in a nutshell. On 28. 1985 at 6.00 p.m. P.Ws.1 and 2 who were neighbours, on hearing the screams from the house of the victim Thangam went there and found the victim in flames and after putting out the fire, P.W. 1 asked the deceased as to how she caught fire, for which the victim Thangam replied that her husband set her ablaze, since she was not able to give birth to any male child. Then P.Ws. 1 and 2 took the victim in a taxi to P.W. 16, Selvin Julious, a doctor practising in a private nursing home. While giving the treatment at 8.30 p.m. on the same day, P.W. 16 doctor questioned the deceased and ascertained from her that her burn injuries were due to the act of her husband. On the advice of P.W. 16, Doctor, P. W.5, the brother of the deceased took her to the Government Headquarters Hospital, Nagercoil, where P.W.7 Doctor Muthuraj, questioned the victim at 10.05 p.m., to which the victim Thangam replied that her husband poured Kerosene and set her ablaze. He noted down the injuries and reasons and sent Ex.P-2 requisition for recording dying declaration to P.W.6, Judicial Magistrate and Ex.P-4 intimation to Police and he issued Ex.P-5 wound certificate. At about 10.25 p.m. P.W. 10, Head Costable recorded the statement Ex.P-1 from the Victim Thangam. He noted down the injuries and reasons and sent Ex.P-2 requisition for recording dying declaration to P.W.6, Judicial Magistrate and Ex.P-4 intimation to Police and he issued Ex.P-5 wound certificate. At about 10.25 p.m. P.W. 10, Head Costable recorded the statement Ex.P-1 from the Victim Thangam. P.W.6, Special Judicial First Class Magistrate, recorded the dying declaration Ex.P-3, of the victim Thangam between 11.40 and 11.45 p.m. On 30.8.1985, at 10.30 a.m. the victim Thangam died. P.W.9 Doctor saradha conducted post-mortem and issued Ex.P-9 post-mortem certificate. She opined that the deceased would appear to have died, because of shock, due to extensive burns. 42. Therefore, the cumulative effect of the evidence adduced through P.Ws. 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 16 would clinchingly establish that the deceased Thangam was set ablaze by her husband, the appellant on 28. 1985 at 6.00 p.m. resulting in serious injuries, due to which she died on 30.8.1985 at 10.30 a.m. As such, the cause of death has been clearly established by the prosecution. 43. In the light of the principles laid down in the decisions referred to earlier, we will consider the five dying declarations one by one and ascertain the truth with reference to the said dying declarations given by the deceased Thangam. 44.The first oral dying declaration given by the deceased to P.W.1 Palthangam, just a few minutes after the occurrence. We have to carefully scrutinise the evidence of P.W. 1, who happened to see and listen the victim Thangam at the place of occurrence at the earliest point of time, i.e., at or about 6.15 p.m. On 28. 1985. The evidence of P.W. 1 as referred to earlier has been fully corroborated by the evidence adduced by the other witnesses. P.W.2, though did not refer about the oral dying "declaration given by the victim to P.W.1, for the obvious reason that P.W.2 happened to be the sister of the appellant, has clearly fixed the presence of P.W. 1. P.W.2, whose house is situate at a distance of ten feet from the house of appellant and the deceased, was taking tuition to her children inside her house. At that time, P.W.2 heard the scream, came out and saw the victim found in flames. Along with others, she also helped to extinguish the fire by pouring water on the victim. P.W.2, whose house is situate at a distance of ten feet from the house of appellant and the deceased, was taking tuition to her children inside her house. At that time, P.W.2 heard the scream, came out and saw the victim found in flames. Along with others, she also helped to extinguish the fire by pouring water on the victim. Then P.W.3 Pandiyan came with a taxi and then the victim was taken to Selvin Hospital, Nagercoil, by both P.W. 1 and P.W.2, where P.W. 16 Doctor gave her the first aid. On these aspects, P.W.1’s evidence has been fully corroborated by P.W.2. 45. Regarding the evidence of consciousness of the deceased from the beginning, as adduced by P.W. 1, we get the confirmation from the evidence of P.W.5, who is the brother of the victim. At 8.30 p.m. on the date of occurrence, P.W. 16 Doctor questioned the victim and referred her to Government Headquarters Hospital, Nagercoil. P.W.7, Doctor at Government Headquarters Hospital, Nagercoil who gave treatment to the victim at 10.00 p.m. questioned her. Then, P.W. 10, Head Constable, also recorded the statement of the victim Ex.P-1 at 10.25 p.m. Even in Ex. P-1 statement given by the victim, to P.W. 10, Head Constable, it is mentioned that the neighbours also came, helped and took her to the hospital, from this, it is clear that the evidence of P.W.1, who is the neighbour, relating to the oral dying declaration gets credence. The reason for setting fire to the victim by the husband/ appellant is also mentioned in Ex.P-1 as well as in the oral dying declaration as referred to P.W. 1. 46. P.W. 1 also states that at the time of occurrence, the victim was found wearing nylon saree. She further states that the palmyra leaves kept near the house also caught fire. The wearing of nylon saree by the deceased is also mentioned in Ex.P-1, complaint given by the victim. P.W. 13, Sub-Inspector of Police, came to the spot and recovered M.O.1 burnt hair, M.O.2 half-burnt cloth piece, M.O.4, ash of the leaf of palmyra from the venue of crime, Thus, P.W.l’s evidence has been corroborated fully by other evidence, especially with regard to the time and place of occurrence and the consciousness of the victim throughout, as referred to earlier. 47.The second Oral Dying Declaration given by the deceased to P.W. 16, Doctor Selvin Julious, at 8.30 p.m. on the same day. Even at that time, the victim Thangam was groaning and crying she was fully conscious. She answered to all the questions put by P.W. 16, Doctor. P.W. 16 questioned as to how she sustained injuries. The victim Thangam replied that her husband, the appellant poured kerosene on her, lighted the match and threw it on her body, and her saree caught fire and then she sustained all the burn injuries. P.W. 16, Doctor also found half-burnt nylon saree on her body. He gave first-aid and then referred the victim to Government Headquarters Hospital, Nagercoil. P.W. 16 Doctor says that the examined the victim Thangam at 8.30 p.m., just two and half hours after the occurrence. The evidence of P.W. 16 is so natural and inspires confidence. His having offered immediate first-aid and having instructed the relatives to take her to the Government Headquarters Hospital, Nagercoil, is to be highly appreciated, inasmuch as he did not shirk his duties in giving immediate treatment to save the victim by refusing to attend on her, due to the reason that it was a medicolegal case. As a matter of fact the Doctor, who was duty conscious, was also anxious to know the cause of burn injuries from the mouth of the victim Thangam who was fully conscious. P.W. 16, a Doctor in a private nursing home is an independent witness and he need not speak falsehood against any person, that too against the husband of the victim, viz., the appellant. He has neither affinity towards the victim nor any animosity against the appellant. As referred to earlier, P.W.16’s evidence relating to consciousness of the victim daring the second dying declaration has been fully corroborated by the other evidence as found in other dying declarations. More so, the manner of occurrence, as given in the second oral dying declaration is fully in consonance with the first dying declaration given to P.W.1. 48.The Third dying Declaration given by the deceased to P.W. 7 doctor Shanmugham, Government Headquarters Hospital, Nagercoil at 10.00p.m. on The same day, as referred in Exs.P-2, P-4 and P-5: On 28. 1985, at 10.00 p.m. the victim Thangam was brought to the casualty ward. 48.The Third dying Declaration given by the deceased to P.W. 7 doctor Shanmugham, Government Headquarters Hospital, Nagercoil at 10.00p.m. on The same day, as referred in Exs.P-2, P-4 and P-5: On 28. 1985, at 10.00 p.m. the victim Thangam was brought to the casualty ward. The Victim told P.W.7, Doctor that she was set ablaze by her husband/ appellant on the same day at 6.00 p.m. P.W.7 found that she had extensive burns all over her body. She was also conscious. Immediately, he sent Ex.P-2 requisition to P.W.6, Judicial Magistrate for recording her dying declaration, since she was in a serious condition. Simultaneously he sent another intimation to Kottar Police Station Under Ex. P-4. According to P.W.7, she could have sustained burn injuries by pouring of Kerosene on her body and setting fire to her at or about the same time as alleged by the prosecution. P.W.7 doctor also gave treatment to the victim and issued Ex.P-5 wound Certificate. The entries found in Exs.P-2, P-4 and P-5 are quite relevant. A perusal of Exs.P-2 and P-4, the earliest documents, show that these documents have been prepared by P.W.7 at 10.05 p.m. on 28. 1985. In both the documents, the doctor (P.W.7) made entry as ‘homicidal burn’. The action of P.W.7 doctor in sending Ex.P-2 requisition to P.W.6 Judicial Magistrate recording dying declaration at 10.05 p.m. on the same day discloses two factors: (1) urgency to record the dying declaration, since her condition was so serious; and (2) the victim was conscious enough to give a dying declaration. That is why in column No.8, “Whether dying declaration necessary”, the doctor, P.W.7, has put his answer as ‘yes’. This entry assumes great significance to establish that she was conscious then. Another important document is Ex.P-5, which was recorded at 10.00 p.m. on 28. 1985, P.W.7 has specifically stated in Ex.P-5, wound certificate as follows: “Thangam, wife of Appadurai aged 29 years an inhabitant of Thikkarichi accompanied by relatives for report at injuries caused on 28. 1985 at 6.00 p.m. and to be due to set ablaze by her husband.... Another important document is Ex.P-5, which was recorded at 10.00 p.m. on 28. 1985, P.W.7 has specifically stated in Ex.P-5, wound certificate as follows: “Thangam, wife of Appadurai aged 29 years an inhabitant of Thikkarichi accompanied by relatives for report at injuries caused on 28. 1985 at 6.00 p.m. and to be due to set ablaze by her husband.... I am of opinion that patient is conscious.” These three documents marked through P.W.7 would clearly show that the victim was fully conscious at the relevant time, when she gave the dying declaration to the Doctor, P.W.7, who has no axe to grind against the......appellant and so we have no hesitation to accept his evidence with reference to the third dying declaration also. More over his evidence has also been corroborated by P.W.10. the Head Constable, who received Exs.P.4 intimation from P.W.7 at 10.15 p.m. and P.W.6, the Special Judicial First Class Magistrate, who received Exs.P.2 requisition at 11.25 p.m. 49.The Fourth dying declaration given in the form of complaint by the victim to P. W. 10. Head constable at 10.25 p.m. on the same day: P.W. 10, Herbert Raj, Head Constable attached to Kottar Police Station received Ex.P-4 intimation at 10.15 p.m. from P.W.7. at 10.25 p.m. he went to the Government Headquarters Hospital and recorded the complaint from the victim, who was conscious then, attested by P.W.5, the brother of the victim. Then he came back to the police station and registered Ex.P-1 complaint and Ex.P-10 F.I.R., and despatched the same to the Officers. Of course, he deposed that he did not find any kerosene smell on her body, but it does not affect the case of the prosecution, since we are able to smell the fragrance of truth form his evidence. The first Doctor, who attended on her was P.W. 16. He gave first-aid and removed the nylon saree from her body. Moreover, the victim sustained 90% of the burn injuries on her body. 50. It is worthwhile to note that there was no suggestion to P.W.7 Doctor that the victim was no conscious at the time of giving dying declaration to him. It is also relevant to notice that the statement recorded at 10.25 p.m. on 28. 1985 by P.W. 10 in Ex.P-1 contains more details, while all the other dying declarations are in a short form. It is also relevant to notice that the statement recorded at 10.25 p.m. on 28. 1985 by P.W. 10 in Ex.P-1 contains more details, while all the other dying declarations are in a short form. However, a reading of Ex.P-1 would clearly show that the contents of Ex.P-1 are fully in consonance with the other dying declarations. The thumb impression, which is found in Ex.P-1 was obtained by P.W. 10 from the victim. Since the occurrence had not taken place within his jurisdiction, he despatched the same along with Ex.P-10 to Rajakkamangalam police station, which were received by P.W. 11, Head Constable at 2.00 a.m. on 28. 1985. Due to the swift action taken by P.W. 10, immediate investigation was taken up by the jurisdiction police at 2.30 a.m. itself, viz., by P.W. 13, Sub Inspector of Police. 51. To suggestion put to him P.W. 10, answered as follows: This suggestion also lacks basis. Of course, the evidence of P.W.7, Doctor in his cross-examination, shows that both hands and fingers of the deceased were completely charred. But there was no question put to the Doctor, P.W.7, in the way of eliciting from him that no thumb impression could be obtained from the deceased, because of the above fact. But on perusal of the thumb impression found in Ex.P-1 we could notice that the found in Ex.P-1 we could notice that the found in Ex.P-1, we could notice that the round portion of the thumb alone is clear, but not the middle portion. This also would be a corroborative piece to the evidence of P.W. 10 and P.W.7, who say that the victim was murning and groaning due to pain at the relevant time. There is no suggestion to P.W. 10, that the victim was not conscious at the time of recording the First Information Report. Of course, it is true that P.W. 10 did not get any attention from the duty Doctor, certifying her consciousness at that time. But it does not affect the evidentiary value of P.W. 10, on the peculiar facts of this case, for the victim was conscious even latter when the Magistrate, P.W.6 recorded her dying declaration. There is no material or even a suggestion put to P.W.10, to show that the dying declaration was due to the prompting and tutoring by P.W.5, the brother of the de-ceased. There is no material or even a suggestion put to P.W.10, to show that the dying declaration was due to the prompting and tutoring by P.W.5, the brother of the de-ceased. As such, the fourth dying declaration as recorded by P.W. 10 also would go to show that it was given by the deceased with full consciousness. Even if we eschew this declaration due to lack of medical attestation on consciousness, still we have overwhelming evidence. 52.The Fifth and Last dying declaration (Ex.P-3) given by the deceased to P.W.6, Special Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nagercoil? at 11.40 p.m. on the same day. On receipt of Ex.P-2, the requisition for recording dying declaration from P.W.7, Doctor, at 11.25 p.m.. P.W.6 immediately rushed to the hospital and recorded the dying declaration, Ex.P-3 from the victim at 11.40 p.m. on the day of occurrence and the same was attested by a Doctor. Ex.P-3 is the most crucial document, in which it is stated as follows: This declaration by the deceased reflects three important aspects: (1) Recording has been done in question and answer form; (2) The 1st question would show that the Magistrate before recording the dying declaration tried to know whether she was in a fit or conscious state of mind to give dying declaration; and (3) The dying declaration in Ex.P-3 is so short and brief, which contains only three lines. The important feature in this declaration is that it was certified by the Doctor, even before recording of the same. Of course, the said Doctor was not examined. Moreover, after recording the statement, the Magistrate read over the contents to the victim, which was admitted by her to be correct and thereafter he obtained her thumb impression thereon, Ex.P-3 dying declaration was recorded between 11.40 p.m. and 11.45 p.m. Recording time also has been mentioned in Ex.P-3. In his evidence, P.W.6, Judicial Magistrate states that he put a question in order to satisfy himself as to whether the victim was in a fit and conscious state to give the dying declaration. It is also necessary to note that in the cross examination, he stated. There is no suggestion put to P.W.6, Judicial Magistrate, that the victim was not in a fit or conscious state of mind so as to give her dying declaration. It is also necessary to note that in the cross examination, he stated. There is no suggestion put to P.W.6, Judicial Magistrate, that the victim was not in a fit or conscious state of mind so as to give her dying declaration. In the absence of any motive attributed against P.W.6, Judicial Magistrate, we do not find any difficulty in accepting the evidence of P.W.6, who has made a prompt visit to the Hospital. The non-examination of the Doctor, who attested Ex.P-3 will not in any way affect the credibility of the evidence of P.W.6. 53. Thus all the five dying declarations (even if the fourth is omitted) are quite consistent with the material particulars and it has also been established that all the dying declarations were recorded, while the victim was fully conscious. P.W.7 in his cross-examination, of course, admits that her pulse was very feeble and her general condition was very poor. P.w.8, another Doctor, who sent the death intimation also deposed that when the victim was admitted her pulse was feeble. The half hourly report also mentioned that the patient was semi-conscious. P.W.9, the Doctor who conducted the post-mortem deposed in his cross-examination that the scalp was completely charred and such burning could affect the brain and if the brain was affected, the patient would become unconscious. Taking advantage of this, it was argued before us by learned counsel for the appellant, that the victim could not have made these dying declarations. But it is relevant to note that the evidence of P.W.8, Doctor clearly shows that even when the pulse was feeble, the patient could talk. P.W.9 says that there was only congestion of the brain and the brain was not damaged. Ex.P-7 case-sheet shows various entries which disclose that the victim was fully conscious (details noted half hourly) during the period i.e., from 10.05 p.m. on 28. 1985 upto 28. 1985. Only at 10.30 p.m. on 28. 1985, the victim became semiconscious, as referred in half-hourly report. Thus, pulse became feeble and the victim became semiconscious only from 10.30p.m. on 28. 1985. But all the five dying declarations were made by the deceased between 6.00 p.m. and 11.40 p.m. on 28. 1985, whereas the victim became semi-conscious only from 28. 1985 onwards. 1985, the victim became semiconscious, as referred in half-hourly report. Thus, pulse became feeble and the victim became semiconscious only from 10.30p.m. on 28. 1985. But all the five dying declarations were made by the deceased between 6.00 p.m. and 11.40 p.m. on 28. 1985, whereas the victim became semi-conscious only from 28. 1985 onwards. So, this part of the evidence relating to the semi-consciousness as mentioned in half hourly report referred to by P.W.8 does not in any way help the defence. 54. In the light of the above evidence adduced by prosecution, we have to consider the defence case as put forward by the accused, while he was examined under Sec.313, Crl.P.C. The appellant has stated that P.W.5, the brother of the deceased compelled him to settle the properties in the name of the deceased and that since he refused to do so, his wife tried to commit suicide on two occasions and he saved her and that she also was a mentally deranged person and so she was taken to a temple and kept therefor one month and that on 28. 1985 when he came back from Peruvilai village to his house at 9.00 p.m. he came to know that his wife was already taken to the hospital and then he went to hospital and saw the deceased in an unconscious stage and there, the police arrested him. To substantiate this defence, he has not produced any evidence. This defence theory deserves outright rejection, for the following reasons: .(i) If actually the deceased was a mentally deranged person, P.W.5, could not have compelled the appellant to settle the property in her name: .(ii) If there were actually suicide attempts made by the deceased and if the appellant saved her twice, certainly, P.W.5 must have known about this. If this is true, there could have been at least some suggestion to P.W.5. There was no cross-examination or any suggestion on this aspect put to P.W.5. (iii) There was no reason as to why in all her dying declarations the wife has to falsely implicate her husband in the case of murder, especially when she was allegedly saved by the appellant. Of course, in the cross examination, P.Ws. 1 and 2 admit that there was a suicidal tendency, and the deceased was a mentally deranged person. (iii) There was no reason as to why in all her dying declarations the wife has to falsely implicate her husband in the case of murder, especially when she was allegedly saved by the appellant. Of course, in the cross examination, P.Ws. 1 and 2 admit that there was a suicidal tendency, and the deceased was a mentally deranged person. But a perusal of the evidence adduced by these two witnesses coupled with the evidence of P.W. 16, doctor, shows that there was an attempt by these witnesses to create a make-believe affair, as if that incident took place due to accidental fall of the kerosene lamp. P.W. 16, stated that this sort of statement was made by the witnesses who accompanied the victim, but however he has categorically stated that in the dying declaration given by the victim to him, she clearly Stated that she was set ablaze by her husband, by means of lighting match stick. As such, we need not give much importance to the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 with reference to the defence case, for the obvious reasons that P.W.1 is the local resident staying very near to the house of the appellant and P.W.2, happened to be his sister. 55. To sum up, the conclusions arrived at on the foregoing analysis and appreciation of evidence are given below: .(i) On a careful scrutiny, we find that each one of the dying declarations have passed the test of being trustworthy, they do not suffer from any infirmity, whatever and they are not the result of either tutoring, prompting or product of imagination, but they are true, voluntary and consistent in the material particulars. .(ii) Having minutely examined the evidence of P.W. 1 Palthangam, P.W.6 Judicial Magistrate, P.W.7 Doctor attached to Government Hospital, Nagercoil, P.W. 10, Head Constable and P.W. 16, Doctor practising in a private nursing home, who heard and recorded the dying declarations relating to the consciousness of the deceased and the contents of the respective dying declarations, we are of the view that their testimony is consistent and reliable which could be fully acted upon. (iii) Ex.P-3 the dying declaration recorded by P.W.6, Judicial Magistrate assumes significance, which is so short and crisp. (iii) Ex.P-3 the dying declaration recorded by P.W.6, Judicial Magistrate assumes significance, which is so short and crisp. The shortness itself indicates the guarantee of the truth and the very brevity of the dying declaration itself is an index of its being true and free from the taint of tutoring. This was made, when the victim was in a severe bodily pain, without wasting her breath on details. Significantly, P.W.6 has obtained the certificate of fitness from the Doctor in Ex.P-3 itself before recording the dying declaration. P.W.6 himself was satisfied about the physical and mental conditions of the victim. The non-examination of that doctor does not detract the testimony of P.W.6, in any manner, since he has no motive to record a false statement. .(iv) Though no corroboration is necessary, since all the dying declarations are truthful and acceptable, the medical evidence available in this case fully corroborates and lends support to the dying declarations, more particularly, to the manner in which the deceased was set on fire. Further more, the evidence of doctors affirms the contents of the dying declarations, regarding the cause of death of the deceased, and their opinion that those injuries resulted in her death, adding sufficient weightage to the prosecution case. .(v) The initial registration of the case on the complaint of the wife-deceased against her husband for setting her ablaze and the subsequent alteration of the case under Sec.302, I.P.C., after the death of the deceased, lends further support to the case of the prosecution. .(vi) The presence of P.W.5 the brother of the deceased, who attested Ex.P-1, could not affect the sanctity of the statement of the deceased, since nobody saw the deceased talking with P.W.5 before recording Ex.P-1, nor any suggestion was put to P.W.5, that he attempted to tutor her. Even before the arrival of P.W.5, the oral dying declarations were made to P.W.1 Palthangam and P.W.16 Doctor by the deceased and the details found in those dying declarations are fully in consonance with the other dying declarations subsequently recorded. Even before the arrival of P.W.5, the oral dying declarations were made to P.W.1 Palthangam and P.W.16 Doctor by the deceased and the details found in those dying declarations are fully in consonance with the other dying declarations subsequently recorded. (vii) The proof of the consciousness of the victim, while she was making all these dying declarations has been well established by the oral evidence of P.W. 1 Palthangam, P.W.6, the Judicial Magistrate, P.W.7 Doctor, P.W.10 Head-Constable and P.W.16 another Doctor and the documentary evidence through Exs.P-1 to P-5 but on the contrary there is no material to indicate that the victim was not in a position to make dying declarations. Merely because the victim suffered from severe burns and her condition was poor, the testimony of the doctors about the consciousness of the deceased as supported by the documentary evidence cannot be discarded, especially P.W.9, the Doctor who conducted post-mortem, deposed that there was no damage in the brain. (viii) It is impossible to contend that the deceased was so much frustrated in life, so as to commit suicide. The theory of suicide as projected by the defence deserves outright rejection, when there is no reason or material available on record, for the wife to implicate her husband in a case of burning, immediately after the occurrence, especially when the appellant claimed in his statement under Sec.313, Crl.P.C. that he saved her from the suicide attempts made by her earlier. (ix) The act of pouring kerosene over the deceased and setting her ablaze, in our opinion, necessarily implies in intention on the part of the appellant to cause her death. The medical evidence as spoken to be P.W.9, who conducted post-mortem and as referred in Ex.P-9 post-mortem certificate would clinchingly prove that those injuries were fatal. 56. So, we are satisfied that the appellant has been correctly found guilty of murder by the learned trial Judge. We concur with the said finding by adding our own reasons detailed above. Conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant shall stand confirmed. This appeal, which has no merit, is dismissed.