TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) IN this Writ Petition the petitioner calls in question two orders one dated 16th December, 1991 and the other 23rd January, 1992. By the first order the petitioner has suffered a punishment of removal from service whereas by the 2nd his appeal preferred against the said order has been dismissed. ( 2 ) THE facts in brief may be stated first. ( 3 ) THE petitioner was working as Junior Management Grade Scale-I, at Gouribidanur Branch of the Respondent Bank. He was charged with misconduct in terms of a chargesheet dated 25th of october, 1990 ANNEXURE-B, to the Writ Petition. The chargesheet enumerated five distinct charges based on different transactions that took place at different points of time, which according to the Respondent-Bank tantamounted to commission of misconduct on his part. The petitioner was asked to file his reply in which the petitioner pleaded riot guilty and claimed a detailed enquiry into the matter. In the course of the enquiry proceedings however, the petitioner made a statement which the Enquiry Officer has re-produced verbatum and reads thus: "on careful examination of the exhibits and the subject matter of enquiry, I have nothing but to plead quality of all the charges levelled against me. However I may kindly be permitted to make a statement on the circumstances leading to the charges. I have put in a service of 22 years as an employee out of which 5 years as an Officer in the Bank. You will kindly observe that throughout my service, I have got an unblemished record of service. I have served the institution with utmost devotion and commitment to the Bank. Unfortunately during 1989-90, I developed some problem domestically, which had upset my reasoning and thinking capacities. I was in depressed state of mind throughout and infact I was not knowing what I am doing due to the deep depression I suffered in this period. It is in this period these lapses have taken place for which I deeply regret. In view of the small sums involved in the purchases of cheques and other levelled charges, you will appreciate that I had no intention of defaulting the Bank, least to secure and undue temporary or pecuniary gains, measuring my official position. It is in this period these lapses have taken place for which I deeply regret. In view of the small sums involved in the purchases of cheques and other levelled charges, you will appreciate that I had no intention of defaulting the Bank, least to secure and undue temporary or pecuniary gains, measuring my official position. The very fact to providing funds for meeting the cheques relatedly goes to evidence of my good intentions of not landing the Bank in any financial loss on account of these transactions subject matter of enquiry. Sir, as it is not my intention to explain away things deeply regretting for the lapses. I humbly requesting you to condone the lapses as a very special case and provide me an opportunity to establish my bonafides by good conduct. In lieu of my honest intentions to make submissions to the disciplinary authority to view the said lapses as a solitary case in my otherwise good record of 22 years. I have not venture to offer an explanations to each of the charges individually. " ( 4 ) ON an evaluation of the available material, the submissions made by the Presenting Officer as also the defence representative appointed on behalf of the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer by his report dated 18th of September, 1991, came to the conclusion that all the charges framed against the petitioner were proved. The Report when submitted to the competent authority, found favour with it resulting in the passing of an order dated 16th December, 1991 imposing upon the petitioner the punishment of removal from service with immediate effect, in terms of Regulation 67 (g) of the State Bank of Mysore, Officers Service Regulations 1979. The Competent Authority held that the findings returned by the Enquiry Officer were perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case particularly keeping in view the fact that the petitioner had clearly admitted the charges and offered no defence against the same except claiming a lenient view in the matter. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED the petitioner preferred an Appeal before the Managing Director of the Bank who is the Appellate Authority in terms of Regulation 17 (1) and (2) of the Regulations mentioned above. ( 5 ) AGGRIEVED the petitioner preferred an Appeal before the Managing Director of the Bank who is the Appellate Authority in terms of Regulation 17 (1) and (2) of the Regulations mentioned above. In the Appeal the petitioner urged that the Disciplinary Authority had not given any weightage to the honest admission of guilt made by him nor had he given any consideration to his blemishless record of 22 years or the domestic problems that had upset the reasoning and thinking capacity of the petitioner during the relevant period. Upon consideration of the grounds urged in the appeal, the Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the misconduct committed by the petitioner amounted to misappropriating Bank's funds and deriving undue pecuniary gain for himself which acts were committed with mala fide intention resulting in the loss of confidence of the Bank in the petitioner. The Appellate Authority accordingly did not find any reason to interfere with either the findings returned against the petitioner or the punishment imposed upon him, resulting in the dismissal of his appeal by order of the Appellate authority dated 23rd January, 1992. It is against the aforesaid two orders, that the present Writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner as already pointed out earlier. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the petitioner a multi pronged attack was mounted against the impugned orders. It was urged that the allegations made against the petitioner did not constitute misconduct within the meaning of the said expression and the contemplation of the State Bank of Mysore Officer employees Regulations. The acts of omission and commission alleged, it was contended, could at best be said to be irregularities and not misconduct. Secondly it is argued that the chargesheet served upon the petitioner was not accompanied by a statement of imputations of misconduct which according to the petitioner was mandatory thereby vitiating the enquiry proceedings as also the ultimate result thereof. Thirdly it was contended that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was totally disproportionate to the gravity of the charges framed against him. Thirdly it was contended that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner was totally disproportionate to the gravity of the charges framed against him. Reliance was placed in this connection upon the Judgments of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1982 sc 454, AIR1985 SC 772 , 1985 (33 )BLJR340 , [1985 (51 )FLR68 ], 1985 Lablc590 , (1985 )II LLJ184 SC , 1985 (1 )SCALE391 , (1985 )2 SCC358 , [1985 ]3 scr163 , 1985 (2 )SLJ454 (SC ) and AIR1987 SC 2386 , 1988 crilj158 , JT1987 (4 )SC 93 , (1988 )I LLJ256 SC , 1987 (2 )SCALE773 , (1987 )4 SCC611 , [1988 ]1 SCR512 , 1989 (1 )SLJ109 (SC ). Fourthly it was urged that the Appellate Authority ought to have made an independent assessment of the material on record and that having failed to do so the order passed by it was legally unsustainable. ( 7 ) HAVING given my thoughtful consideration to the grounds urged against the impugned orders I find no substance in any one of them. ( 8 ) THE question as to whether an act of omission or commission with which an employee is accused amounts to a mere irregularity or is misconduct within the meaning of the relevant service Rules depends entirely upon the nature of the act committed, the nature of the duties entrusted to the employee and the possible prejudice which the employer has or could suffer because of the same. The allegations made against the petitioner in the instant case are that even when he did not have sufficient funds in the saving bank account held by him in the Bangalore branch of the Respondent-Bank the petitioner had deliberately and with mala fide intentions purchased cheques drawn on his account and failed to despatch the purchased instruments to the drawee branch thereby securing an undue pecuniary advantage for himself. The incidents referred to in the chargesheet show the repetition of this conduct on more than one occasion in respect of different amounts drawn at different points of time. Looking to the nature of the acts committed by the petitioner and the duties he was charged with it is difficult to accept the plea raised that the same would amount only to an irregularity and not misconduct particularly when the acts are proved to have been committed with malafide intentions. Looking to the nature of the acts committed by the petitioner and the duties he was charged with it is difficult to accept the plea raised that the same would amount only to an irregularity and not misconduct particularly when the acts are proved to have been committed with malafide intentions. That apart the petitioner having admitted the allegations made against him and having offered no explanation for the same except undergoing deep mental depression during the relevant period, it is difficult to uphold the submission that the acts of omission and commission of which he was accused and which he admitted were mere irregularities not amounting to misconduct. I have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the first ground urged in support of the petition. ( 9 ) COMING then to the second ground, the same too is without any substance. The chargesheet served upon the petitioner clearly sets out the details and the basis of the charges framed against him. The petitioner even though had initially submitted a reply denying the charges had all the same admitted the correctness thereof in the course of the enquiry. Having done so it is not open to him to turn round and question the result of the enquiry or wriggle out of the effect of his admission on the tenuous ground that the chargesheet was not accompanied by the statement of imputations of misconduct even assuming that the said allegation was factually correct. Admission of the charges framed unequivocally implied that he had fully appreciated the background in which the same were framed as also the context in which the accusations were being made. The second ground of attack urged by the petitioner must also therefore fail. That brings me to the question of quantum of punishment imposed upon the petitioner, ft is now well settled that the quantum of punishment is a matter which entirely rests in the discretion of the disciplinary Authority and that the High Court cannot in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution substitute its own opinion about the reasonableness of the punishment for the opinion recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. In V. K. GOPAL v. THE H. M. T. LTD AND anr, ILR1994 KAR 3018 , 1995 (1 )Karlj15 upon an elaborate review of the Case Law on the subject the two exceptional situations in which the High Court would be justified in interfering with the quantum of punishment were identified as under :i) cases where punishment is imposed otherwise than on the basis of an enquiry namely penalties imposed upon the employees on the basis of convictions recorded by the Criminal courts; ii) Cases in which the punishment imposed is such an outrageous defiance of logic to shock the conscience of the Court. In B. C. CHATURVEDI v. UNION OF INDIA, 1995 (6) SCC 750 their Lordships summed up the legal position thus: "a review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High court/tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High court/tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof. " Respectfully following the view expressed by Their Lordships I have no hesitation in rejecting the submission made by the petitioner since, the punishment imposed when seen in the context of the persistent course of misconduct, of the petitioner cannot be said to shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of his misdemeanour. The test to be applied in such cases is as to whether no reasonably prudent person would have imposed a punishment like the one imposed upon the employee and dot whether a lesser punishment could also have been imposed. It is the total irrationality and impropriety of an order of punishment that alone can be said to be shocking the conscience of the Court and not just a feeling that the punishment is or may be excessive. It is the total irrationality and impropriety of an order of punishment that alone can be said to be shocking the conscience of the Court and not just a feeling that the punishment is or may be excessive. What is significant is to bear in mind that the High Court does not sit in appeal over the order of punishment so that even the possibility of a different view on the quantum of punishment may be enough to call for its interference. On the contrary it is only when the punishment appears to the Court to be so out rageously disproportionate as to look arbitrary or whimsical that the Court would interfere to do complete justice. ( 10 ) THAT brings me to the last and only other submission made in support of the Petition that the appellate Authority ought to have independently evaluated the material and recorded its independent findings on the basis thereof. Even assuming that the submission is based on a sound proposition of law inasmuch as the Appellate Authority is supposed to independently assess the material and record its own findings, I see no error in the Appellate Authority's order which has passed a fairly well considered and reasoned order while rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner. Nothing more was in fact required to be done beyond what the Appellate authority has actually done. That apart, it is now well settled that an Appellate Authority is supposed to record its own reasons and evaluate the available material independently only in case it proposes to reverse the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority or those recorded by an Inquiry Officer in cases where the Appellate Authority only affirms the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority recording of independent findings or evaluation of evidence is not required nor does the failure or omission on the part of the Appellate Authority to record such findings or resort to such evaluation vitiate the order passed by it. Reference may in this connection be made in NAGENDRA RAO v. INDIAN BANK, ILR1995 KAR 3599 where the position has been summarised thus : "the obligation to record reasons applies more vigorously to authorities whose orders are subject to appeal or revision before a higher authority. Reference may in this connection be made in NAGENDRA RAO v. INDIAN BANK, ILR1995 KAR 3599 where the position has been summarised thus : "the obligation to record reasons applies more vigorously to authorities whose orders are subject to appeal or revision before a higher authority. In such cases the requirement of recording reasons, not only ensures proper consideration by the authorities concerned of the relevant facts but also introduces clarity in the decision and minimises the chances of arbitrariness in the making of the said decision. Since any such order is appealable before a higher authority, the recording of reasons becomes necessary even to enable the Appellate Authority to appreciate the process of reasoning by which the lower Authority has arrived at its conclusions. The obligation to give reasons however, may be dispensed with by the provisions of a statute or the Rules either expressly or by necessary implication, if it is so excluded the obligation to record reasons disappears, as in the case of Court Martials exercising their jurisdiction under the provisions of the Army Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The obligation to record reasons disappears even in cases where the Appellate Authority passes an order of affirmances in which event it is not necessary for the Appellate Authority to marshal the evidence and record independent conclusions or reasons for the same. Where however the Appellate Authority reverses the findings recorded, it must disclose the reasons for doing so and demonstrate that the reversal is based on proper application of mind. The reasons recorded required to be recorded by an authority dealing with the matter need not be elaborate as is usually customary in the judgments delivered by the ordinary Courts. It is enough if what is recorded indicates due and proper application of mind to a matter in controversy. " ( 11 ) IN the result, there is no merit in this Petition which fails and is accordingly dismissed.