JUDGMENT A. K. MATHUR, C.J. - This petition and all other petitions mentioned in the appendix annexed with this order are disposed of by a common order as they involve a common question of law. For convenient disposal of all these petitions, facts given in M.P. No. 1137 of 1991 are taken into consideration. 2. The petitioner set up a small-scale industry for manufacture and processing of various mild steel and iron steel materials from scrap and other materials. It applied for registration certificate as small-scale industrial unit to the District Industries Centre, Durg and registration certificate under the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (for short "the Act of 1958") and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for short "the "Central Act"), in which the nature of manufacturing and production work to done and the raw materials required therefor were mentioned. After due enquiries and verification as to the nature of business and raw materials required, registration certificates under the State Act and Central Act have been issued by the Sales Tax Officer, Circle-II, Durg. The certificates described the nature of manufacturing carried on, viz., iron steel processing, fabrication, ferrous and non-ferrous casting and ribbed bar twisting. Various raw materials and and incidental goods have been specified as per the list enclosed with the certificates. The petitioner also applied for grant of recognition certificate, dated May 18, 1990 was issued which was valid with effect from April 24, 1990. In this certificate also, the nature of industrial activity carried on i.e., the goods manufactured and also the raw materials and incidental goods required therefor have been specified as per the list enclosed with the registration certificate. 3. The petitioner also applied to the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Durg, for grant of eligibility certificate for exemption from tax under the State Act and the Central Act. The District Level Committee consisting of Collector, Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax of Raipur Division and the Joint Director of the Industries at the District, approved the petitioner-industry for grant of eligibility certificate after due enquiry and verification and the eligibility certificate was issued on June, 12, 1990. The eligibility certificate grants exemption to the petitioner from payment of tax under the State Act and the Central Act for the period from April 19, 1990 to April 18, 1993 under the notification dated October 16, 1986. The eligibility certificate grants exemption to the petitioner from payment of tax under the State Act and the Central Act for the period from April 19, 1990 to April 18, 1993 under the notification dated October 16, 1986. The State Government issued a notification on October 16, 1986 granting exemption from payment of tax under the Act of 1958 to a class of registered dealers who have established eligible industrial units in the State of Madhya Pradesh and who hold an eligibility certificate issued by the officers authorised by the State for the purposes, which in the case of the petitioner is the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Durg. As the petitioner fulfilled all the conditions requisite, eligibility certificate was granted to it. By virtue of eligibility certificate issued by the Government of Madhya Pradesh, District Industries Centre, Durg, the petitioner was eligible for exemption from payment of tax under both the Acts. 4. On September 17, 1990 the Sales Tax Officer, Durg, served two notices on the petitioner. By the first notice, the petitioner was called upon to show cause why the raw materials specified in the registration certificate under the State Act and the Central Act be not deleted retrospectively from April 11, 1990. By the second notice, the petitioner was directed to show cause against deletion of such raw materials from recognition certificate retrospectively, i.e., April 24, 1990. The petitioner submitted a representation, pursuant to both the notices stating the Commissioner of Sales Tax had by this decision dated December 5, 1989, communicated to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, that processing undertaken by an industry does not lead to the manufacture of any goods within the meaning of the expression "manufacture" as defined in section 2(j) of the Act of 1958, therefore it would not be entitled for exemption from payment of tax under the notification. The petitioner therefore filed a writ petition challenging show cause notices issued by the Sales Tax Officer before this Court and it came to be registered as M.P. No. 2895 of 1990. Thereafter the Director of Industries, Tax Benefit Section, Directorate of Industries, Madhya Pradesh, by a notice dated December 22, 1990, directed the petitioner to appear before the State Level Committee at Bhopal on 7th and 8th January, 1991 and to show cause why the eligibility certificate of the petitioner be not cancelled from the date of issue. Thereafter the Director of Industries, Tax Benefit Section, Directorate of Industries, Madhya Pradesh, by a notice dated December 22, 1990, directed the petitioner to appear before the State Level Committee at Bhopal on 7th and 8th January, 1991 and to show cause why the eligibility certificate of the petitioner be not cancelled from the date of issue. The petitioner appeared before the State Level Committee from time to time and filed written and oral submissions. The petitioner was informed by letter dated March 7, 1991 by the Director of Industries, Bhopal, that the eligibility certificate was reconsidered in 44th meeting of the State Level Committee held on February 11, 1991 and the committee cancelled the eligibility certificate with effect from April 19, 1990, i.e., the date of commencement. The State Level Committee held that for entitlement of exemption, it is an essential condition that new and different goods should have emerged and that mere processing does not entitle the petitioner for eligibility certificate. It was further observed that the industrial undertaking, i.e., the petitioner was granted eligibility certificate for fabrication, whereas it was not carrying on fabrication nor had it the necessary facilities and machineries for he said work. It was accordingly held that the petitioner was not carrying on the work of manufacture and hence it was not entitled to eligibility certificate. Thus, the eligibility certificate was erroneously granted and the same was cancelled from April 19, 1990 by order dated March 7, 1991 (exhibit P14). 5. The Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Raipur, also issued a notice in form No. 28 under sub-section (2) of section 39 proposing to the sales tax registration certificate so as to delete the word "manufacturing" and the raw materials specified therein. Copy of notice is on record as annexure P15. In these circumstances, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing this writ petition and it has challenged the orders annexures P6, P14 and P15. 6. In short the question involved is whether or not processing of scrap which is purchased by the petitioner and then reprocessed by it amounts to manufacture or manufacturing process. The petitioner has in this petition stated that in the fabrication work, defective angles, flats, channels, steel tubes, defective coils, purchased from the Bhilai Steel Plant and private parties and certain fresh materials also are cut, straightened and bent, cut to sizes for use as tubular structurals. The petitioner has in this petition stated that in the fabrication work, defective angles, flats, channels, steel tubes, defective coils, purchased from the Bhilai Steel Plant and private parties and certain fresh materials also are cut, straightened and bent, cut to sizes for use as tubular structurals. It has also been stated that in the work of processed slabs, blooms, billets, etc., slabs, blooms and billets are worked up in shearing machine or with gas cutting. The slab of 8" to 10" thickness is cut into 2 x 2 or 3 x 3 or 4 x 4 and other sizes which is essential to convert them into rolling materials according to the requirement of different rolling mills and forging parts manufacturers, geat and opinion manufacturers and dye-block manufactures. 7. It is further stated by the petitioner that with the help of shearing machine, which is run with the help of a heavy duty electric motor, the M.S. plate up to 2.5" thickness and of various widths from 2' to 5' are cut into strips of desired sizes of 2" to 3" for the use in various other manufacturing industries. These strips are altogether different in form, shape and utility having distinctive name, character and use. M.S. materials, such as M.S. iron scrap, cast iron, alloys, mild steel and chilled steel rolls of large sizes, which are auctioned by Bhilai Steel Plant are machined on lathe and other machines to obtain rolls of desired smaller shapes and sizes according to the requirement of different machines installed in different re-rolling mills. Such sizes are of 2", 3" and 4", etc. Defective ribbed bars in straight length and in coils are auctioned by Bhilai Steel Plant. These are also twisted and converted into C.T.D. bars commonly known as for steel with cold twisting process. The tor steel and twisted bars are different commodities than ribbed bars and other materials. The tor steel is used in civil construction. 8. It is also stated by the petitioner that in the manufacture of processed cast iron, scrap is used as raw materials. Bhilai Steel Plant sells cast iron scrap of 30 M.T. to 60 M.T. in single pieces. Similarly bottoms, plates, iron skulls and other scrap materials in huge sizes are sold. These are worked upon with the help of dropped hammers run with the aid of powers. Bhilai Steel Plant sells cast iron scrap of 30 M.T. to 60 M.T. in single pieces. Similarly bottoms, plates, iron skulls and other scrap materials in huge sizes are sold. These are worked upon with the help of dropped hammers run with the aid of powers. With the help of various machines, these are converted into saleable steel of required shape, size and dimensions for use in various other industries as per the capacity of their rolling machine or foundry. 9. The petitioner has therefore submitted that these processes were duly verified and enquired by the Sales Tax Department before accepting the goods as raw materials and entering these items as raw materials required in the manufacture of particular items specified on the registration certificate as also by the Industries Department before the grant of eligibility certificate. It is contended that the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax is also a member of the District Industries Centre and remains present in the meeting for grant of eligibility certificate. It is submitted by the petitioner that the whole process was taken into consideration by the State Level Committee and on that basis the Committee was satisfied and found that the process involves manufacturing and accordingly the eligibility certificate was granted. Therefore, it was submitted by the petitioner that the withdrawal of eligibility certificate is not warranted. 10. A reply has been filed by the respondents. The respondents have taken the position that as it does not fall within the Urla Growth Centre developed by Madhya Pradesh Audyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam, it is not covered by sub-item (vi) of item 2 of the Schedule to notification which provides that exemption shall be available to manufacturing/processing industries. It is contended that it is true that according to the petitioner, it is carrying on processing industry, but it does not result in manufacture of goods. Therefore the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit of exemption. It is contended that it is true that according to the petitioner, it is carrying on processing industry, but it does not result in manufacture of goods. Therefore the petitioner is not entitled to any benefit of exemption. The notification dated October 16, 1986 issued by the State Government in exercise of power under section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, which is relevant for our purpose reads as under : "Notification No. A-3-11-86(74)-ST-V, dated the 16th October, 1986 : In exercise of the powers conferred by section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (No. 2 of 1959), the State Government hereby exempts the class of dealers specified in column (1) of the Schedule below other than the dealers specified in paragraph 1 below who - (i) are registered under the said Act; (ii) having established an eligible industrial unit in any district in Madhya Pradesh have commenced commercial production on or after 1st August, 1986; and (iii) hold and eligibility certificate issued by an officer authorised for the purpose; from payment of tax under section 6 of the said Act to the extent specified in column (2) for the period specified in column (3) subject to the restrictions and conditions specified in column (4) of the Schedule and the general conditions specified in paragraph 2 below : SCHEDULE --------------------------------------------------------------------- Class of dealers Extent of Period Restrictions and exemption conditions subject to which exemption has been granted. --------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) (2) (3) (4) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Dealers registered Whole For an as small-scale of industrial unit industrial units tax. established with the Industries in a district Department of the specified Government of Madhya in - Pradesh and who have (i) Part I made a capital of annexure investment in fixed I - Three assets of above years. rupees ten lakhs. (ii) Part II of annexures I - Category A - Five years. Category B- Six years. 2(i). Dealers Whole For an registered with of industrial unit the Director-General tax. established of Technical Development, in a district Government of India specified in as an industrial Part II of unit or registered as annexure I - industrial unit by an authority duly Category A - Five empowered to do so years. by the State or Category B - Six Central Government or years. holding a licence Category C - Seven under the Industries years. by the State or Category B - Six Central Government or years. holding a licence Category C - Seven under the Industries years. (Development and Regulations) Act, 1951, other than those specified at serial No. 1 above. (ii) to (v)....... (vi) Dealers Whole For an industry The exemption specified in of established shall be (i) above who have tax. in a growth available only to established an centre in a a manufacturing industrial unit with district or processing an investment of specified in industry. Rs. 10 lakhs or more Part II of in fixed assets annexure I, - in a growth centre Category A - developed by Seven years. Audyogik Kendra Category B - Vikas Nigam. Eight years. Category C - Nine years (vii) Dealers Whole Eleven (1) This exemption specified in (i) of years. shall not be above who have tax. available to made a capital industrial unit investment in fixed which have been assets of rupees given special five crores or facilities on more and have account of any established an special industrial unit circumstances. in a growth (2) If an centre developed industrial unit by Audyogik Kendra having been accorded Vikas Nigam located special pioneer in a district status has already specified on Part II been established in of annexure-I the tehsil on which which is the first, the growth centre second or third is located then industrial unit only two, i.e., the with such investment. first and second industrial unit shall be given exemption. If any such industrial units have been set up before the 1st August, 1986, they would also be reckoned against the three industries referred to in column (1). (3) The exemption shall be available only to be manufacturing or processing industry. 2. The exemption under this notifications shall be available subject to the following general conditions, namely :- (i) The exemption shall be available only in respect of the sales of the goods which the dealer is licensed to manufacture and which are manufactured by him as also waste and by-products obtained in the course of manufactured." 11. In short the connection of the State is that altering into shape or size or physical appearance of a particular goods does not amount to "manufacture" as the basic remains the same. In short the connection of the State is that altering into shape or size or physical appearance of a particular goods does not amount to "manufacture" as the basic remains the same. It is contended that merely cutting, sizing, twisting or straightening of goods of the goods being disposed of to foundries or rolling mills, the activity of the petitioner does not in any manner bring about any change in physical composition by the petitioner. The basic composition of the material in question i.e., scraps whether in the form of defective slabs, billets, bars, blooms, etc., remains the same. It is contended that the scraps purchased and is through disposed of in different shape and size the physical appearance remains the same and therefore it cannot be said to be manufacturing process and it is not covered by the notification so as to entitle the petitioner for exemption from sales tax as aforesaid notification. 12. We have heard learned counsel counsel for the parties and perused the record. Shri Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner has invited our attention to definition of the word "manufacture" as defined in section 2(j) of the Act of 1958 : "2(j). 'manufacture' includes any process any process or manner of producing, collecting, extracting preparing or making any goods, and in respect of trees which have been severed from the land or which have been felled, also the process of lopping the branches, cutting the trunks or converting them into logs, poles or ballies or any other articles of wood, but does not include such manufactures or manufacturing processes as may be notified. Learned counsel submitted the word "manufacture" has too wider expression and the activity involved by the petitioner is fully covered by the definition of "manufacture" because the petitioner purchases scraps from Bhilai Steel Plant and private manufacturers and converts this scrap with the help of machinery into different sizes and sells them to the various units. Therefore, they are entitled to the benefit of exemption as the process converts this scrap into a new marketable commodity. Therefore, they are entitled to the benefit of exemption as the process converts this scrap into a new marketable commodity. In support of this, learned counsel has invited our attention to a large number of cases, namely, [1984] 56 STC 133 (All.) (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Kaderul Sehat Dawakhana), [1990] 79 STC 149 (MP) [FB] (Kher Stone Crusher v. General Manager, District Industries Centre), [1993] 88 STC 433 (Guj) (Variety Steel Industries v. State of Gujarat), [1994] 93 STC 280 (Raj) (A.C.T.O. v. Girrota Silica Udyog), [1986] STC 102 (MP) (Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer), [1978] 41 STC 169 (Bom) (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Indian Metal Traders), [1966] 17 STC 313 (SC) (State of Madhya Bharat v. Hiralal), [1990] 79 STC 331 (Bom) (Kisangopal Shrikisandas Damani v. State of Maharashtra), (1992) 25 VKN 419 (Shastri Stone Polishing Udyog v. State of M.P.), [1991] 80 STC 249 (SC); AIR 1991 SC 378 (Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Coco Fibres), [1993] 91 STC 450 (SC); AIR 1993 SC 2529 (Commissioner of Income-Tax v. N. C. Budharaja & Company) and (1994) 1 MPJR 251 [S. N. Sunderson (Minerals) Ltd. v. Superintendent, Central Excise Head Quarters]. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent-State also invited our attention to cases reported in [1966] 17 STC 313 (SC); AIR 1966 SC 1546 (State of Madhya Bharat v. Hiralal), [1967] 20 STC 430 (SC); AIR 1967 SC 1895 (Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab), [1976] 37 STC 319 (SC); AIR 1976 SC 800 (State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra), [1981] 47 STC 124 (SC); AIR 1981 SC 1014 (Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India), [1993] 91 STC 408 (SC); (1994) 1 SCC Suppl 413 (Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Association v. State of Rajasthan), [1995] 99 STC 83 (SC); (1995) 5 SCC 527 (Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jagannath Cotton Company), [1988] 70 STC 314 (SC) [Collector of Central Excise v. Kutty Flush Doors and Furniture Co. (P) Ltd.], [1983] 142 ITR 306 (Bom) (Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Rashtriya Metal Industries Ltd.), [1988] 69 STC 226 (SC) (Collector of Central Excise v. Kiran Spinning Mills), [1980] 46 STC 394 (Mad.) (Arkay's National Engineering and Foundry Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu) and [1984] 55 STC 62 (Mad.) (K.A.C. Trading Corporation v. State of Tamil Nadu). (P) Ltd.], [1983] 142 ITR 306 (Bom) (Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Rashtriya Metal Industries Ltd.), [1988] 69 STC 226 (SC) (Collector of Central Excise v. Kiran Spinning Mills), [1980] 46 STC 394 (Mad.) (Arkay's National Engineering and Foundry Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu) and [1984] 55 STC 62 (Mad.) (K.A.C. Trading Corporation v. State of Tamil Nadu). Learned counsel also submitted that the exemption notification should be strictly construed and in support thereof, learned counsel invited our attention to [1996] 102 STC 476 (SC) supra; (1995) 4 SCC 473 (Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise). 13. Learned counsel Shri Shrivastava, appearing for the petitioner also submitted that once a certificate of exemption has been granted and the petitioner acted thereon, it cannot be revoked or cancelled as the principle of estoppel would be applicable. Secondly, it is submitted that the certificate of exemption cannot be revoked from retrospective effect in the light of various decisions cited before us. No useful purpose would be served by referring to all those cases as all the cases have their own peculiar features and in some cases, the activity is found to be manufacturing and in some cases, it is some cases, it is not found to be manufacturing process. Therefore, we would only examine those cases in which direct question of iron and steel has come up for consideration. As a matter of fact, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what process is involved in the manufacturing process. It depends upon case to case and the manufacturing process involved. In this context, it would be useful to refer the case of State of Madhya Bharat v. Hiralal [1966] 17 STC 313 (SC); AIR 1966 SC 1546 . In this case the question was whether iron and steel scrap when re-rolled into bars, flats and plates, are entitled to exemption or not. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that they did not in the process lose their character as iron and steel. It was held as under : ".........Iron and steel used as raw material for manufacturing other goods were exempted from taxation. So long as iron and steel continue to be raw materials, they enjoyed the exemption. Scrap iron purchased was merely re-rolled into bars, flats and plates. They were processed for convenience of sale. It was held as under : ".........Iron and steel used as raw material for manufacturing other goods were exempted from taxation. So long as iron and steel continue to be raw materials, they enjoyed the exemption. Scrap iron purchased was merely re-rolled into bars, flats and plates. They were processed for convenience of sale. The raw materials were only re-rolled to give them attractive and acceptable forms. They did not in the process lose their character as iron and steel. The dealer sold 'iron and steel' in that shape. Therefore the bars, flats and plates sold by the assessee were iron and steel exempted under the notification." 14. Similarly in the case of Devi Dass Gopal Krishnan v. State of Punjab [1967] 20 STC 430 (SC); AIR 1967 SC 1895 , dealing with Punjab General Sales Tax Act, a question arose in Civil Appeal Nos. 39 to 43 of 1965 that whether scrap iron undergoing vital change and converted into different commodities by way of process loses its identify and process certainly being one of manufacture. In this case, the conversion was out of iron ingot changed by way of processing into a roll steel sections and therefore it was found that a new article with different identity emerges and it becomes a new marketable commodity. Hence, it was held that this process involved was one of manufacture. But that is not the case here before us. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra [1976] 37 STC 319 (SC); AIR 1976 SC 800 also under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, section 14, clause (iv) of the Central Sales Tax Act came up for consideration - whether the object is to tax sales of goods of each variety and not the sale of substance out of which they are made. In this context, their Lordships of honourable Court held : "The more natural and normal interpretation which follows plainly from the fact of separate specification and numbering of each item in section 14 is that, each item so specified forms a separate species for each series of sales although they may all belong to genus : 'iron and steel'. In this context, their Lordships of honourable Court held : "The more natural and normal interpretation which follows plainly from the fact of separate specification and numbering of each item in section 14 is that, each item so specified forms a separate species for each series of sales although they may all belong to genus : 'iron and steel'. Hence, if iron and steel 'plates' are melted and converted into 'wire' and then sold in the market, such wire would only be taxable once so long as it retains its identity as a commercial goods belonging to the category 'wire' made of either iron or steel. The mere fact that the substance or raw material out of which it is made has also been taxed in some other form, when it was sold as a separate commercial commodity, would make no difference for purpose of law of sales tax. The object appears to be to tax sales of goods of each variety and not sale of the substance out of which they are made [1966] 17 STC 313 (SC); AIR 1966 SC 1546 distinguished. In the law dealing with the sales tax, the taxable event is the sale and not the manufacture of goods. Nevertheless, if the question is whether a new commercial commodity has come into existence or not, so that its sale is a new taxable event, in the sales tax law, it may also become necessary to consider whether a manufacturing process, which has altered the identity of the commercial commodity has taken place. The law of sales tax is also concerned with 'goods' of various descriptions. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine when they crease to be goods of one taxable description and become those of commercially different category and description." After considering the earlier decision of the honourable Supreme Court, their Lordships have taken the view that when the goods of one taxable description ceases to exist, a new item of commercially different category and description emerged that it involves manufacturing process. In case of Arkay's National Engineering and Foundry Co. [1980] 46 STC 394 (Mad.), question was regarding the single point tax and in that context their Lordships of High Court observed : "What is necessary for the benefit of a single point taxation is either the retention of the identity of the goods or its identity as commercial commodity in trade. [1980] 46 STC 394 (Mad.), question was regarding the single point tax and in that context their Lordships of High Court observed : "What is necessary for the benefit of a single point taxation is either the retention of the identity of the goods or its identity as commercial commodity in trade. Merely because the goods undergo the process of cutting, it may not follow that goods have lost their identity. But when they are scrap, they goods are identical or not will have or not will have to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances." 15. From they survey of these relevant cases on the subject, what emerges is that if by processing or by manufacturing, substantially new identity does not emerge, then that will not amount to manufacture by processing. Section 2(j) of the Act of 1958 which defines "manufacture" is a widely worded definition and it clearly says that it includes any process or manner of producing, collecting, extracting, preparing or making any goods; but the idea of this definition is that something new should emerge out of it. The manufacture has various shades and meanings in context of sales tax legislation and if the goods to which some labour is applied remains essentially the same, then that commercial article cannot be said to be the final product is the result of manufacture. Innumerable examples can be quoted to show that notwithstanding by processing, new identity has emerged still it cannot be said to be manufacture as it has not changed its essential character. Series of decisions have been quoted before us to throw light on each subject which is peculiar of its own kind. Instead of referring to all those cases, we have referred only those cases which are nearer to the issue before us i.e., relating to iron and steel. All these cases referred to above show that their Lordships were conscious that when some new thing is made out by fabrication or by twisting, but if essential element remains the same, then that item would not be treated to be an item prepared by processing or manufacturing. 16. All these cases referred to above show that their Lordships were conscious that when some new thing is made out by fabrication or by twisting, but if essential element remains the same, then that item would not be treated to be an item prepared by processing or manufacturing. 16. In American case of East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express 100 L Ed 917 question before the US Supreme Court was whether the dresses and frozen chicken was not a commercially distinct article from the original chicken and it was pointed out that : "Killing, dressing and freezing a chicken is certainly a change in the commodity. But it is no more drastic a change than the change which takes place in milk from pasteurising, homogenising, adding vitamin concentrates, standardising and bottling." In another U.S. decision in the case of Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. United States 52 L Ed 336, 338 their Lordships observed : "Manufacture implies a change, but every change is not manufacture, and yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary.......... There must be transformation; a new and different article must emerge 'having a distinctive name, character or use'." 17. What emerges from the above discussion is that simply because iron scraps are purchased and are cut in a manner required by various customers, that will not change the basic character of iron scraps and it is only the processing by twisting, fabricating or giving it a particular shape required by customers. Such type of processing will not change the identity of the material and that will not amount to a manufacturing or processing of the same. As the definition of "manufacture" given in the Sales tax Act includes processing; therefore, such transformation of basic iron material into various shapes will not be treated to be manufacture so as to entitle for exemption under the exemption notification. 18. In another case of honourable Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt & Sons [1992] 84 STC 497; AIR 1992 SC 692 with regard to batteries, the assessee purchased the batteries and put the plates and add electrolyte and pass electric current through the plates for a substantial period of time so that they can be sold for the purpose of being used in vehicles. According to the assessee, that dry batteries purchased by the dealers are practically unfit for the purpose of sale unless they undergo this process of re-charging. The question was whether this processing means manufacture or not. Their Lordships negatived the contention and held that : "...........the process applied by the dealers was not a process contemplated by the definition of 'manufacture' in section 2(17) and the sale by them of such batteries was not resale. Even before the dry batteries were manufactured, the plates were immersed in electrolyte and completely charged, a process which was described as 'formation charge'. They were also kept immersed in electrolyte. Only, before the goods were actually delivered to the dealers the electrolyte was thrown out because it consisted of an acid component and there may be risks involved if it were to split in the process of transportation. All that the dealer did was to reintroduce this electrolyte into battery it was purchased and, where efflux of time made it necessary, also to re-charge it so that it may serve the purpose for which it was required. Basically speaking, therefore, the goods produced by the manufacturers as well as goods sold by the dealers were one and the same, viz., batteries falling under entry 58." 19. Upshot of above discussion is that the State is right in its submission that purchase of iron scrap and its conversion into various shapes according to the requirement of the customers would not amount to a process of manufacture so as to entitle the petitioner for the benefit of exemption under the notification dated October 16, 1986. There is no gainsaying that the exemption notification has to be strictly construed. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Rajasthan Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. [1966] 102 STC 476 (SC) supra; (1995) 4 SCC 473 in which Lordships have held : "In a case of exemption from duty, there is no question of any liberal construction to extend the term and the scope of the exemption notification. Such exemption notification must be strictly construed and the assessee should bring himself squarely within the ambit of the notification. No extended meaning can be given to the exempted item to enlarge the scope of exemption granted by the notification." 20. Such exemption notification must be strictly construed and the assessee should bring himself squarely within the ambit of the notification. No extended meaning can be given to the exempted item to enlarge the scope of exemption granted by the notification." 20. Shri Shrivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the competent authority granted exemption from sales tax after due verification and the same is now being revoked on account of change of opinion; therefore, this should operate as estoppel against the respondents. There is no question of estoppel involved in the matter. It is that the exemption was granted by the competent authority but later, on realisation that the exemption was wrongly granted, the error was rectified by revoking the eligibility certificate. The authority granting eligibility certificate for exemption from tax has also power to revoke it, as is apparent from the notification itself. In the general conditions which have been enumerated in the notification vide condition No. 2(iii) which clearly says that if eligibility certificate has been issued to the dealer on false information furnished by him, certificate shall be liable to be revoked from the date it was issued and thereupon exemption under the notification shall stand withdrawn and the entire exemption of tax shall be recoverable from the dealer in one instalment. Clause 2(iii) of the notification read as under : "(iii) If an eligibility certificate has been to a dealer due to misrepresentation of facts or on the basis of incorrect or false information furnished by him, the certificate shall be liable to be revoked from the date it was issued and thereupon the exemption under this notification shall stand withdrawn and the entire amount of tax exemption which has been availed of up to the date of cancellation shall be recoverable from the dealer in one instalment." 21. On the basis of appreciation of facts, the authority realised that grant of exemption in the present case was not warranted and hence, the same has been revoked and the principle of estoppel cannot operate in such a case. However, one thing is clear that the eligibility certificate for exemption from tax was given by the Committee on April 19, 1990 and the same has been withdrawn/revoked by order dated March 7, 1991 with effect from April 19, 1990. However, one thing is clear that the eligibility certificate for exemption from tax was given by the Committee on April 19, 1990 and the same has been withdrawn/revoked by order dated March 7, 1991 with effect from April 19, 1990. This cannot be permitted because it will amount to causing greater hardship to the assessee because the assessee has acted upon the eligibility certificate issued by the competent authority and on the basis of the appreciation of facts, the authority has now changed its opinion and wants to withdraw the certificate. If the authority wants to withdraw the eligibility certificate, then the effectivity of withdrawal shall be with effect from the date of order and it cannot be made retrospective. To this extent submission of learned counsel is correct that the order of withdrawal of eligibility certificate cannot be given retrospective effect and the petitioner is entitled for the relief to this extent. 22. In the result, this writ petition and other writ petitions as per Schedule annexed herewith are dismissed except that the effectivity of withdrawal of eligibility certificate shall be from the date of issue of order and not from retrospective effect. There shall be no orders as to costs. Security if any shall be refunded to the petitioner. SCHEDULE (List of cases governed by judgment/order dated May 13, 1996 passed in M.P. No. 1137 of 1991 - K.P. Enterprises v. Divisional Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, Raipur and others) ----------------------------------------------------------------- Sl Case No. Names of parties Counsel for No. parties ----------------------------------------------------------------- 1. M.P. 2745 of 1990 Ashirwar Ispat Udyog B. L. Nema v. S.T.O. and others R. K. Gupta, Dy. A.G. 2. M.P. 1077 of 1991 Corporative Ispat P. K. Jaiswal, Alloys v. State and Dy. A.G. others 3. M.P. 1133 of 1991 Oswal Iron & Steel H. S. Shrivastava, Pvt. Ltd. and Dy. A.G. another v. Director of Industries and others 4. M.P. 1193 of 1991 Dinesh Steel do. Industries v. GM, District Industries 5. M.P. 1237 of 1991 Agrason Industries v. Abhay Sapre, State of M.P. and Dy. A.G. others 6. M.P. 1327 of 1991 M.P. Agrico Pvt. Ltd. H. S. Shrivastava, & another v. State Dy. A.G. and others 7. M.P. 1333 of 1991 Ashirwad Ispat Udyog B. L. Nema, v. State Level Dy. A.G. Committee & others 8. M.P. 1352 of 1991 Swastik Steel v. H. S. Shrivastava, State of M.P. and Dy. A.G. others 6. M.P. 1327 of 1991 M.P. Agrico Pvt. Ltd. H. S. Shrivastava, & another v. State Dy. A.G. and others 7. M.P. 1333 of 1991 Ashirwad Ispat Udyog B. L. Nema, v. State Level Dy. A.G. Committee & others 8. M.P. 1352 of 1991 Swastik Steel v. H. S. Shrivastava, State of M.P. and Dy. A.G. others 9. M.P. 1390 of 1991 Batra Bandhu v. B. L. Nema, State Level Committee & Dy. A.G. others. 10. M.P. 1418 of 1991 Mahadevi Steel Pvt. H. S. Shrivastava, Ltd. v. State of Dy. A.G. M.P. and others 11. M.P. 1422 of 1991 Anil Ispat Udyog v. B. L. Nema, State Level Committee Dy. A.G. & others 12. M.P. 1430 of 1991 Balaji Loda Pvt. Ltd. H. S. Srivastava, and others v. State Dy. A.G. & others 13. M.P. 1435 of 1991 Orient Steel Re-rolling do. Mills v. State & others 14. M.P. 1436 of 1991 Kakku Steel Mills v. do. State and others 15. M.P. 1504 of 1991 Om Steels v. State do. & others 16. M.P. 1505 of 1991 Ajanta Ispat Udyog do. v. State of M.P. and others 17. M.P. 1833 of 1991 Mahavir Iron & Steel do. Ind. v. State of M.P. and others 18. M.P. 2143 of 1991 Laxmi Ispat Ind. do. v. State and others. 19. M.P. 2200 of 1991 Vandana Rolling Mills do. v. State and others 20. M.P. 2686 of 1991 Jhakotiya Ispat do. Udyog v. State and others 21. M.P. 561 of 1994 Maheshwari Rolling do. Mills v. State of M.P. and others 22. M.P. 4265 of 1995 Agarwal Steel do. Processors v. State of M.P. and others ----------------------------------------------------------------- Writ petitions dismissed.