M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition involves a point of procedural law which is of considerable consequence. Invariably, when civil proceedings are instituted and a simultaneous application in made for the grant of interim relief in urgent cases, the court may sometimes grant ad interim relief for a short duration until the opposite side appears but invariably, the court directs notice to the other side and after a summary appraisal of the material before the court an interim Order is either granted or refused. In those cases where an ad interim Order has been granted, it may be confirmed or it may be vacated. The provisions of Order 39 rules 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code basically invest a court with the power to pass interim orders which are essentially necessary to protect the interests of the parties or more importantly to avoid damage or injustice from occurring or from continuing. Undoubtedly, as happens in most cases, issues before the court are disputed and in situations such as this, it is invariably necessarily to resolve the matter completely at the stage of the trial when the evidence is recorded. There are two distinct phases in such proceedings. The first one being the stage at which the interim relief is granted and the second being the stage at which the matter is finally adjudicated. With the pressures on the courts the final hearing of a suit invariably takes a long time and therefore, the interim orders are of immense consequence and it is for this reason that the law makes provision for an in-between stage when the interim orders may be reviewable and can also be modified. The fact remains however that the first stage of the proceeding is not to be confused with and equated with the final decision when the trial takes place. Experience has unfortunately shown that a wrong practice has grown particularly where the trial courts are concerned, whereby the contesting parties and their learned advocates overload the court with a very heavy record consisting of affidavits, documents and the like and the result is that even at the interim stage such deep seated contentions on facts and law are raised that the courts are required to not only spend huge amount of judicial time but decide the matter through lengthy orders which run into 50 to 100 pages. This invariably gives rise to an appeal which is as good as a regular first appeal and ends with an equally lengthy Order and then comes the third stage when irrespective of whether the findings are concurrent or otherwise, a revision is filed which is virtually analogous to a second appeal. It is necessary to recount this because the issue that falls for determination in this civil revision petition is directly concerned with such a situation. The question therefore arises as to whether the trial court is required to draw a line while deciding interim applications. In the present civil revision petition one more dimension has arisen because the defendants in the course of a property dispute wherein the plaintiff has asked for certain interim relief which was granted, produced a whole lot of documents through the village accountant and also filed his affidavit which deals with certain factual aspects of the matter other than mere production of document. The plaintiffs' learned Advocate made a oral application to the court stating that it would become impossible for him to deal with this material unless he is permitted to cross-examine the witness concerned and the learned trial judge after hearing the parties passed an Order directing that the witness should be cross-examined. This Order is the subject-matter of the present civil revision petition. As indicated by me this case presents a new dimension because the practice of producing unlimited quantities of material at the interim stage and virtually subjecting the court to a decision on merits at that stage itself has now been sought to be expanded on the basis of the plea that cross-examination should also be permitted at that point of time. Briefly stated, the petitioners have approached this court on the ground that the Order is inherently erroneous, that such a procedure ought not to have been permitted or sanctioned and that therefore, interference is called for. Briefly stated, the petitioners have approached this court on the ground that the Order is inherently erroneous, that such a procedure ought not to have been permitted or sanctioned and that therefore, interference is called for. ( 2 ) THE respondents' learned Advocate has assailed the maintainability of this civil revision petition because he submits that even adopting a technical approach whereunder it is only in relation to a case decided that a revision would lie, that in fact in the present proceeding it is only an Order for producing a witness for cross-examination that has been passed, that this Order is purely discretionary, that it is permissible in law and that therefore, no revision lies against that order. The subsidiary argument canvassed is that the cross-examination of the village accountant is not going to prejudice anybody but that on the other hand it was absolutely essential if the plaintiffs were to be able to assail that evidence and that therefore, there is no ground for interference at the interim stage. On the point of maintainability, respondents' learned Advocate drew my attention to three decisions: 1. Smt. Alexandreta maria crispina de aguiare mendes of Chinchinim Salcete v Sham Roulu Naik and another; 2. Prabhakar Fotu Porob Dessai and another v Constancio Xavier Jose Joaquim Joao de'cruz and another; and ( 3 ) NINGAWWA v Hanumappa, wherein the courts have taken the view that such an Order is, not revisable. The petitioners learned Advocate submitted that insofar as the Order is inherently incorrect and sanctions something which the court ought not to have and should not have permitted, that it is necessary that this court should intervene and the subsidiary argument is that the Order is an unusual ones insofar as normally the trial court does not sanction cross-examination at an interim stage that it would be a totally wrong precedent that is being set if such a procedure were to be permitted and that therefore, in the interest of the working of the courts it is necessary that this court should intervene and cor- rect the Order in question. I do not need to labour much on this point because the revisionary powers of this court are undoubtedly limited but they would certainly extend to a situation where an Order is erroneous and the consequences are far-reaching and in such a situation, irrespective of the stage at which the Order is passed the revisionary powers of this court could be exercised. 3. The petitioners' learned Advocate has relied on an earlier decision of this court in Viswanath Singh B. R. v Shivalingeuah, wherein this court under somewhat similar circumstances had occasion to interpret the law and this court took the view that the trial court's at the interim stage must confine themselves to affidavit evidence indicating very clearly that the court will have to stop there and not permit cross-examination of witnesses at that stage. Undoubtedly, parties are free to produce supportive materials such as documents, certified copies, records etc. , but the issue was as to whether cross-examination should be permuted. This court had occasion to consider the law in some detail and to refer to two earlier decisions in Sher Singh v Jitendranath Sen and B. N. Munibasappa v Gurusiddaraja Desikendra Svamigal and others. The court examined the provisions of Order 19, rules 1 and 2 which deals with proof by affidavits and the court also considered the proviso to Order 19, rule 1 whereby the power is invested in the trial court to direct cross-examination of a witness if such a situation becomes necessary. The court however clarified that a clear distinction will have to be made between the initial stage of the proceeding and the final proof stage and pointed out that the question of cross-examination could only arise at the latter stage. Relying on this decision, petitioners' learned Advocate submitted that it was erroneous on the part of the learned trial judge to have directed cross-examination of the village accountant and that on the basis of the ratio of this decision the Order is liable to be set aside. ( 4 ) THE respondents' learned Advocate submitted that there is no bar whatsoever to the cross-examination of a witness even at the initial stage, though lie accepted that such a procedure may be unusual and may be resorted to only in exceptional cases. ( 4 ) THE respondents' learned Advocate submitted that there is no bar whatsoever to the cross-examination of a witness even at the initial stage, though lie accepted that such a procedure may be unusual and may be resorted to only in exceptional cases. He conceded that in the normal course it would not be either practicable, feasible or for that matter correct to cross-examine witnesses for resolving every disputed point but his argument proceeded on the footing that as far as there is no bar to resort to such a situation that this court would have to look into the situations under which the Order was passed by the trial court. He demonstrated that the village accountant has not merely produced the record in this case but that he has filed an affidavit in which he refers to the presence of the plaintiff at a certain point of time and he submitted that these facts would seriously affect the grant of interim relief or the continuance thereof and that the plaintiff had no option except to ask for cross-examination so that this material could be refuted. Learned Advocate drew my attention to two decisions of the andhra pradesh high court, the first of them in C. Srinivasa Rao and another v K. Manohar Rao and others and the second one in in re. Ali bin aifan, in both of which cases, the andhra pradesh High Court has taken the view that the jurisdiction is vested in the trial court to direct cross-examination in appropriate cases even at the interim stage and secondly that the trial court is within its rights to exercise the power of summoning a witness if that becomes necessary or desirable at the interim stage. Mr. Ashok kalyanshetty ultimately submitted that even assuming that this petition is maintainable in law that it would have to be confined to the narrow aspect of examining as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the trial court exercised judicial discretion correctly or otherwise. In this regard, he also submitted that the view taken by this court in viswanath singh's case supra, referred to by me earlier, is that such a discretion does vest in the trial court and he submitted therefore that in totality, no interference is called for in the present situation. In this regard, he also submitted that the view taken by this court in viswanath singh's case supra, referred to by me earlier, is that such a discretion does vest in the trial court and he submitted therefore that in totality, no interference is called for in the present situation. ( 5 ) I have at the beginning of this judgment briefly recounted the situation that is arising as a result of the scope being grossly expanded at the interim stages and the results thereof. It is in this background that it becomes absolutely essential for this court to lay down very clearly once again that the grant of interim relief in law is to be done on the basis of a solitary appraisal of the material placed before the court at that stage undoubtedly, the Order is on the basis of prima facie findings and it is well-settled law that lengthy procedures must be avoided at that point of time. The consequences to the working of the courts apart, the main aspect of the matter is the interests of the parties concerned and if the present State of affairs is to be permitted, merely by insisting on lengthy pleadings the production of all sorts of documents and as has happened in this case, by cross-examining all witnesses, it would be open to a party to not only overload the trial court but ensure that interim relief is not granted for months and years together. Conversely, it would also be open to a party who had secured interim relief to involve itself in all these procedures and carry on not only for years but for decades with that interim relief to be followed by an inevitable appeal, revision, etc. Such a procedure is contra-indicated. It is not in the interest of either of the parties or those who represent them nor is it permissible, having regard to the abnormal pressures on judicial time. It is for these reasons that this court in the decision referred to by me very clearly laid down that cross-examination is not to be permitted at the interim stage. The powers do vest in the court but those powers are to be used at the stage of the trial. The question really arises as to whether there is a total and absolute bar of summoning witnesses for cross-examination at the interim stage. The powers do vest in the court but those powers are to be used at the stage of the trial. The question really arises as to whether there is a total and absolute bar of summoning witnesses for cross-examination at the interim stage. Undoubtedly, no court can lay down that the inherent jurisdiction which vests in the trial court is to be either curtailed or taken away. As a rule of procedure, however, that the power should not be exercised at the interim stage barring the rarest of rare cases where for very valid reason the learned trial judge comes to the conclusion that there is no other option available. It is very necessary to lay this down, because as indicated by me earlier, experience has shown that the scope of the proceeding at the interim stage is being grossly and unduly expanded and elongated and it is therefore necessary to put the brakes on such a situation. It is not the intention of the law that cross-examination should be permitted at the interim stage because one needs to take into account the consequences thereof quite apart from the time factor in so far as the court would not only have to record evidence but the applications would thereafter be endless because the party who has led some evidence would want to lead more evidence and the opposite party demand a chance to refute that evidence and the situation becomes endless and the court will have to conduct the entire trial at the interim stage itself. This is not the scheme of the law and it is therefore very necessary to lay down in no uncertain terms that the cross-examination of a witness should invariably be prohibited at the interim stage. ( 6 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid position, the trial court in the present instance was in error in having directed cross-examination. I need to clarify that it is certainly open to the opposite party to request the court either to disregard or to water down the material that has been produced by the opposite party. If that material is being seriously disputed the court will take cognisance of these objections. Beyond this to my mind, it is unnecessary to insist on cross-examination at that stage. ( 7 ) THE civil revision petition accordingly succeeds. The impugned Order is set aside. The interim Order is vacated. If that material is being seriously disputed the court will take cognisance of these objections. Beyond this to my mind, it is unnecessary to insist on cross-examination at that stage. ( 7 ) THE civil revision petition accordingly succeeds. The impugned Order is set aside. The interim Order is vacated. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court on. 23-9-1996 when the trial court shall take up the matter for further orders. No Order as to costs. ( 8 ) IT is clarified that in view of the observations made by this court, the respondents shall be free to file their objections or counter before the trial court before it passes further orders. --- *** --- .