Judgment M. Y. Eqbal, J. 1. This revision application at the instance of the judgment-debtor is directed against the order dated 15th December, 1995, passed by Munsif 2, Bhagalpur, in Misc. Case No.11 of 1992, Where by the objection purported to have been filed under Sec.47 of the Code of Civil procedure was rejected. 2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass. The plaintiff decree-holders, who were opposite party, filed Title Suit No.145 of 1964 in the Court of Munsif, Bhagalpur II for eviction of the defendant-petitioner and others on the ground of default and personal necessity. The suit was eventually decreed in terms of compromise by the learned Munsif by an order dated 19.2.1968. A copy of the joint petition of compromise is annexed with the civil revision application and marked as Annexure 1. The petitioners alleged that, in terms of the compromise, the petitioners did not give vacant possession of the house in question, as a result of which the decree holder opposite party executed the decree by filing an execution proceeding, the petitioners filed an objection under Sec.47 of the Code of Civil procedure challenging the decree on various grounds. According to the petitioners, while passing the decree on the basis of compromise, no finding was recorded by the learned Munsif with regard to the existence of any of the grounds available to the plaintiffs for sustaining the decree for eviction. The petitioners further claimed that, in absence of any of the grounds for eviction the decree is a nullity. The said objection filed under Sec.47 of the code of Civil Procedure was opposed by the decree-holders opposite party by filing rejoinder. The learned Court below, by the impugned order rejected the objection filed by the petitioners. Hence, this revision application. 3. Mr. Hare Krishna Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submitted that the impugned order is illegal and against the principle laid down by this court in various decisions. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel relied on a decision in the case of sureshwar Prasad Singh and another V/s. Kedarnath Verma and Others (A. I. R.1972 Patna 222) 4. On the other hand, Mr. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel relied on a decision in the case of sureshwar Prasad Singh and another V/s. Kedarnath Verma and Others (A. I. R.1972 Patna 222) 4. On the other hand, Mr. Ram balak Mahto, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party, submitted that the compromise decree was acted upon by the petitioners by handing over part of the suit premises within the date fixed in the decree and on their failure to hand over the remaining portion of the suit premises within the date fixed in the decree was put in execution. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the petitioners cannot be allowed to challenge the decree as being a nullity. In support of this submissions, he relied on two decisions of the Supreme court in the case Smt. Nai Babu V/s. Lala ramnarayan and others (A. I. R.1978 s. C.22) and in the case of Suleman noormohammed V/s. Umarbhai Janubhai (AI. R.1978 S. C.952 ). 5. Before appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, it is worth to quote clauses 1, 2 and 3 of the compromise petition which are as under:- "1. That the Hall which is the part of that suit property shall be divided into two parts by raising a wall with plaster in the hall running North to South and the defendant shall vacate the Eastern portion of the Hall so divided latest by the 31st July, 1968; and put the plaintiffs in possession thereof. The dividing wall shall be constructed by the defendants and the plaintiffs shall pay rupees 1800/- as cost including second and third wall mentioned in para 2 below which will be adjusted in rent payable by the defendants. The defendants can open six doors towards east in the wall at their own cost-the shutters will open inside the Hall. "2. That the aforesaid wall dividing the Hall in two parts will run North to south upto the Southern wall of the Hall and a second wall of 8/2" length North to south and a third wall with 710" in length on the North side six feet high both outside the Hall, and its position has been shown in a plan drawn on scale which forms part of this petition, and to the portion to be vacated by the defendants latest by the 31st July, 1968; has been shown in red colour. In case, the defendants fail to vacate the portion mentioned in this para within the date specified i. e.1.8.1968 the plaintiffs shall be entitled the date specified to compensation of Rs.50/- (fifty) per day. "3. That the portion shown in red in the plan of the suit premises shall remain in occupation of the defendants as month to month tenant till the 30th day of Sep.87 and the defendants shall quit and vacate the same and put the plaintiffs in possession thereof on the day following i. e. on 1.10.87, failing which the plaintiffs shall be entitled to a compensation of Rs.50/- Rs. fifty per day and to take possession through court. Plaintiffs have to give one notice, 3 months prior to 1.10.87, and a lind notice one month prior to 1.10.87 to vacate the said premises to the defendants. " 6. It is not disputed by the petitioners that in terms of the compromise decree the portion of the suit premises was handed over by the petitioners to the decree-holders opposite party on 1.3.68 in terms of clause (2) of the compromise petition. The only dispute is with regard to remaining portion of the suit premises possession of which, according to the compromise petition, was 19 be delivered on 1.10.87. Since the petitioners failed to deliver the vacant possession of the remaining portion of the suit premises on 1.10.87 the plaintiff-decree holders levied execution proceeding. 7. In Sureshwar Prasad Singh V/s. Kedamath Verma (A. I. R.1972 Pat.222), a bench of this Court, while deciding a similar question after considering the decision of Supreme Court in Firozi Lal Jain V/s. Man Mal (A. I. R.70 s. C.794) has observed as under:- "i respectfully agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge of andhra Pradesh in Firozi Lal Jains case or other cases, the Supreme Court never intended to lay down that a decree or order for eviction passed on the basis of a compromise is a nullity in all cases. Where the order recording a compromise does not expressly mention that the Court was satisfied as to the existence of one or more of the grounds for eviction, but there are materials on the record from which it can be gathered and presumed that the court must have been so satisfied, the decree or order for eviction based on com promise cannot be said to be nullity. But in case like the one before the Supreme court, where the Court "at no stage" appears to have applied its mind to the existence or absence of the ground for eviction, the order has to be held as a nullity. " The learned Counsel also relied on a decision in M/s. Bhairo Bux chiranjilal V/s. Chhedi Lal Goenka and another (1979 PLJR 372), in support of his submission. 8 In the light of aforesaid decision, if the compromise petition itself discloses the existence of one or more of the grounds required for eviction decree then the decree cannot be said to be the nullity. On reading clause (6) of the compromise petition, it appears that the defendants agreed to pay rent of the entire suit property at the rate of Rs.171/- per month till 31.7.68. From Clause (9v of the said compromise petition, it further appears that the defendants had paid rent upto the month of January, 1968, after adjustment of the rent so deposited by the defendants under the orders of the court in that suit and withdrawn by the plaintiffs. On reading these two clauses, it is apparent that the rent of the suit premises for the period prior to and after the institution of the suit was due and all those rents were paid by the defendants after the institution of the suit either before or on the date of compromise petition. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the decision relied on by the petitioners do not help them in any way for holding that the decree was nullity. 9. As noticed above, by the said compromise which was entered into between the parties on 19.6.1968, the defendants petitioners agreed to hand over the part of the suit premises by 1.8.1968 an the rest portion of the suit premises by 1.10.1987. There is no bar under law for such compromise in an eviction suit. In Konchada Ramamurty subudhi V/s. Gopinath Naik and others (A. I. R.1968 S. C.919), question was raised before the Apex Court as to whether such a compromise creates a lease or merely a licence to the tenant to continue in possession for a certain period. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment are worth to be quoted. They are as under:- "9. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment are worth to be quoted. They are as under:- "9. Lord Denning, speaking for the judicial Committee of the Privy Council in isack V/s. Hotel Do Paris, 1960-1 All ER 348-352 observed:- There are many cases in the books where exclusive possession has been given of premises outside the Rent restriction Acts and yet there has been held to be no tenancy. Instances are errington V/s. Errington and Woods 1952-1 All er 149 and Cobb. V/s. Lane, 1952-1 All ER 1199, which were referred to during the argument. It is true that in those two cases there was no payment or acceptance of rant, but even payment and acceptance of rent- though of great weight-is not decisive of a tenancy where it can be others explained :see Clarke V/s. Grant, 1949-1 All ER 768. A Lord Greene, M. R. said ir. Booker V/s. Pamer, 1942-2 All ER 674-677. There is one golden rule which is of very general application, namely, that the law does not impute intention to enter into legal relationship where the circumstances and the conduct of the parties negative any intention of the kind. " "10. Keeping in mind the above observations, what was the intention of the parties? It seems to us that the fact that the decree holder had brought a suit for ejectment of the judgment debtor and that a compromise was entered into in that suit is important. It is difficult to impute to him an intention to create a fresh tenancy while the fact that he brought the suit shows that his intention was to eject the judgment-debtor after having purported to terminate the tenancy. " 10. In Suleman Noor-Mohammad v. Umarbhai Janubhai (A. I. R.1978 S. c.952), the Supreme Court, while deciding the question with regard to the validity of the decree, has held that it is not necessary for the Court to say in express terms in the order that it was satisfied that the compromise was a lawful one. It will be presumed to have been do so unless contrary is shown. It will be presumed to have been do so unless contrary is shown. It was further observed that the eviction suit under the Rent Control Act was disposed of on compromise between the parties, the tenant having either expressly or impliedly suffered a decree for eviction is being liable to be evicted under the Act, and was abundant intrinsic material in the compromise itself to indicate that the decree passed upon its basis was not in violation of the Act but in accordance with it, the compromise decree was not a nullity and could be executed on non-compliance. Their lordships reiterated the same view in Nai Baku V/s. Lala ramnarayan and others (A. I. R.1978 S. C.22)and observed as follows:- "when a compromise decree is the executing Court can examine relevant materials to find out whether statutory grounds for eviction existed in law. If the pleadings and other materials on the record make out a prima facie case about the existence of statutory grounds for eviction a compromise decree cannot be held to be invalid and the executing Court will have to give effect to it. " 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioners could not point out any material to show that the ground for eviction was infact not available at the time the suit was instituted or even the date when the suit was decreed in terms of compromise. On the contrary the compromise petition indicates that the rent of the suit premises was laving due and all arrears of rent were paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs-opposite party when the compromise petition was signed by the parties. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that the decree cannot be said to be a nullity and the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent. I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order passed by the learned Court below who has rightly rejected the petition filed by the petitioners under the S.47 of the C. P. C. 12. This civil revision application is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Revision Dismissed.