JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– In this writ petition the petitioner challenges his superannuation from service with effect from the afternoon of the 29th February, 1992. The dispute centres round the date of birth of the petitioner. The petitioner while serving as a workcharged employee under the Damodar Valley Corporation since 1962 was appointed in the regular establishment of the said Corporation in the post of Technician (Welder) along with others as per combined order of absorption/appointment dated 6.7.1976. The petitioner as an employee of the Damodar Valley Corporation has to retire on completion of 58 years of age. It is the case of the Corporation that the petitioner's date of birth, according to his service record, is 1st March, 1954 whereas the petitioner's case is that his date of birth is 2nd February, 1939 and that being so be could not have been validly retired on the 29th February, 1992 as he did not yet attain 58 years of age on that date. It is the contention of the respondents that in the service book of the petitioner the petitioner's date of birth has been recorded as 1.3.1934 as per medical assessment and the said date was accepted by the Corporation vide D. P's No. PL-57/2889-2744 dated 19.4.1978 as noted in the service book of the petitioner, a copy of the relevant page of which is annexure-G to the affidavit-in-opposition. It is the case of the respondents that as the petitioner could not submit any documentary evidence in support of his age, his age was assessed by the Medical Officer-in-charge on the 28th February, 1970 and on that date his age was assessed as 36 years and accordingly his date of birth comes to 1st March, 1934. It is also the case of the respondents that after appointment of the petitioner in the regular establishment in 1976 the petitioner's age was again assessed by the Medical Officer-in-charge as 43 years on 13th July, 1977 as would appear from the physical fitness certificate issued by the Medical Officer-in-charge and on back calculation his date of birth comes to 1st March, 1934. Actually however, if it is taken that according to the medical assessment the petitioner's age was 43 years on 13.6.1977 even then his date of birth does not exactly come to 1st March, 1934. Actually however, if it is taken that according to the medical assessment the petitioner's age was 43 years on 13.6.1977 even then his date of birth does not exactly come to 1st March, 1934. Be that as it may, as regards the evidentiary value of the age mentioned in the said medical fitness certificate dated 13.6.1977 it cannot be taken as sacrosanct, firstly because that certificate was a physical fitness certificate and not a certificate for age determination and secondly because that was not a certificate issued by any Medical Board constituted for the purpose of the determination of the age of the petitioner. As regards the alleged medical assessment of the petitioner's age in February 1970 by the Medical Officer-in-charge the same has been denied by the petitioner. No such medical report has also been produced by the respondents regarding the assessment of the age of the petitioner in 1970. But even according to the respondent's case such assessment was made; if at all, by the Medical Officer-in-charge and not by any Medical Board constituted for the determination of age. In this connection we may refer to the circulars issued by the Damodar Valley Corporation at different times regarding determination of age of an employee which are annexure-B to the supplementary affidavit affirmed by the petitioner. In the Corporation's circular dated the 15th June, 1965 relating to the question of age emphasis has been laid on the Matriculation/School. Final/School Leaving Certificate as well as on the certificate from the Head Master of the school in which the candidate studied. In the Corporation's circular dated the 9th July, 1975 also emphasis has been laid on such certificates. Medical assessment has been envisaged, rather in the cases where such a certificate may not be available. Then again, in view of the said circular dated the 9th July, 1975 which has been made applicable not only to new recruits but also to 'existing employees', the determination of age is required to be done by a Board consisting of Chief Medical Officer and two other Medical Officers. Medical assessment of age by any single Medical Officer-in-charge has not been envisaged therein. Admittedly there was no medical assessment of the petitioner's age at any point of time by any Medical Board consisting of Chief Medical Officer and two other Medical Officers as required under the relevant circular. 2. Medical assessment of age by any single Medical Officer-in-charge has not been envisaged therein. Admittedly there was no medical assessment of the petitioner's age at any point of time by any Medical Board consisting of Chief Medical Officer and two other Medical Officers as required under the relevant circular. 2. It is the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner was never informed that his date of birth was accepted by the authorities concerned as 1st March, 1934. Indeed there is nothing to show that such alleged acceptance dated 19.4.1978 as recorded in the petitioner's service book was ever communicated to the petitioner. The Director of Personnel also, in his order dated 21.4.1992, annexure-A to the supplementary affidavit, has noted that it was not found from the records whether the project authorities brought the same to the notice of the petitioner. As we have already seen, the petitioner's case is that his date of birth is 2nd February, 1939. Admittedly in support of that, the petitioner also submitted a school leaving certificate in the form of transfer certificate which is annexure-B to the writ petition purporting to have been issued by the Head Master of the school on 10.8.1976 wherein the petitioner's date of birth was recorded as 2.2.1939. The said transfer certificate shows that the petitioner read in that school, namely, Public High School, Sahibgunj from January 1950 to July 1953 and he was reading in Class-VII when he left the school in July 1953. The said transfer certificate/school leaving certificate, as I have mentioned, was issued purportingly by the Head Master of the school on 10.8.1976 and it also contains an endorsement that it was verified by the Assistant Inspector of Schools. The petitioner heavily relies on that school leaving certificate in proof of his date of birth. It may be mentioned here that admittedly this school leaving certificate in proof of his date of birth was submitted to the Director of Personnel, D. V. C. as an enclosure to the representation dated 16th September, 1976 which is annexure B to the writ petition. The respondents however contend that while the petitioner was working as workcharged employee he submitted an attestation form on 17.6.1965 which is annexure-E to the writ petition wherein he had stated in column 10 that be read upto Class-X in R. B. H. E. School. The respondents however contend that while the petitioner was working as workcharged employee he submitted an attestation form on 17.6.1965 which is annexure-E to the writ petition wherein he had stated in column 10 that be read upto Class-X in R. B. H. E. School. The petitioner however denies that he made those entries in the said attestation form which was filled up by the Office staff and there might have been incorrect recording regarding the school in the said attestation form. It is however to be noted in this connection that in column 10 of the said attestation form what were required to be noted were the educational qualifications showing the places of education with years in schools and colleges since 15th years of age. Evidently therefore the educational years of the petitioner in the Public High School, Sahibgunj were not required to be included in the said column No. 10 because in the said Public School at Sahibgunj he appears to have read upto certain age when he was yet to complete 15 years. Consequently, his education in the Public School, Sahibgunj was not required to be shown in that column 10 of the attestation form. In this connection it is however to be noted that even in column 7 of the said attestation form the petitioner's age has been recorded as 27 years. This shows that in June 1965 the petitioner's age was recorded in the attestation form as 27 years. If the petitioner's date of birth is 2.2.1939 as claimed by him in that case in June 1965 the petitioner was running the age of 26/27 years and therefore in a way the age recorded in the said attestation form substantially conforms to the date of birth as claimed by the petitioner. It is also an admitted fact that in the descriptive roll submitted under the signature of the petitioner in 1977 the petitioner's age was recorded as 2nd February, 1938. The petitioner's contention is that although he stated the date of birth as 2nd February, 1939 the Office staff who recorded the same in the descriptive roll mistakenly recorded it as 2nd February, 1938. The petitioner's contention is that although he stated the date of birth as 2nd February, 1939 the Office staff who recorded the same in the descriptive roll mistakenly recorded it as 2nd February, 1938. It is to be noted in this connection that although admittedly the petitioner submitted his school leaving certificate before the D. V. C. authorities in 1976 and although the respondents claim that the petitioner's age on the basis of medical assessment was accepted by the authorities concerned on 19.4.1978 as recorded in the service book there is nothing to indicate that before accepting the age or date of birth of the petitioner in 1978 on the basis of alleged medical assessment the authorities concerned at all took into consideration the school leaving certificate admittedly produced by the petitioner as far back as, in September 1976. 3. During the pendency of the writ petition by an order of this Court the representation of the petitioner regarding age was directed to be considered by the concerned authority and pursuant to that the Director of Personnel by his order dated 21.4.1992 considered and rejected the representation, vide, annexure-A to the supplementary affidavit. The concerned authority was, it seems, relying on the medical assessment by the Medical Officer-in-charge. I have already mentioned that this medical assessment was not by any Medical Board as required under the circular of the Corporation. There is also a controversy about the surname of the petitioner. The petitioner's name in the office records was written as Gyan Chandra whereas in the school leaving certificate his name has been written as Gyan Chandra Bhagat. It is the contention on behalf of the petitioner that initially the petitioner did not use to write his surname Bhagat after his name but then he made an application to the respondent authorities as far back as in 1976, annexure-B to the writ petition, for inclusion of his surname Bhagat after his name. Simultaneously prayer for recording his date of birth as 2.2.1939 was also made. Having regard to the facts and circumstances I am however of the clear opinion that the surname should not have created any insurmountable difficulty in the matter of accepting the school leaving certificate produced by the petitioner as far back as in 1976. The petitioner's father's name is Mohar Bhagat. In the school leaving certificate that name has been recorded. Having regard to the facts and circumstances I am however of the clear opinion that the surname should not have created any insurmountable difficulty in the matter of accepting the school leaving certificate produced by the petitioner as far back as in 1976. The petitioner's father's name is Mohar Bhagat. In the school leaving certificate that name has been recorded. In the attestation form submitted on 17.6.1965 annexure-E to the affidavit-in-opposition which has been relied on by the respondents, although the petitioner's name has been recorded as Gyan Chandra, his father's name in column 5 has been recorded as Mohar Bhagat. That attestation form was submitted as far back as in 1965. There therefore cannot be any dispute that the petitioner belongs to a family and parentage carrying the surname Bhagat. Therefore by inheritage and parentage the petitioner's surname is Bhagat. The mere fact that subsequently for sometime he did not use that surname after his name does not and cannot change his identity as a person connected with that surname. That being so there is no reason to discard the school leaving certificate produced by the petitioner simply on ground of surname. The petitioner, by religion, is Christian. He has produced his baptism certificate obtained in April 1993 annexure to the affidavit-in-reply where his date of birth has been recorded as 2.2.1939 and the date on which he was baptized has been recorded as 10th August, 1939. The baptism certificate of his elder brother also has been filed therewith. The baptism certificate of the petitioner produced with the affidavit-in-reply rather supports and corroborates the date of birth of the petitioner as stated in his school leaving certificate which was produced by him as far back as in 1976. 4. The picture that emerges may be summarised thus. Soon after the absorption of the petitioner in the regular establishment in 1976 the petitioner produced his school leaving certificate showing his date of birth therein as 2nd February, 1939 and the petitioner made an application before the appropriate authority, while producing the certificate, for recording his date of birth accordingly in his service records. He also simultaneously made prayer for inclusion of his surname Bhagat after his name. It appears that no notice of that application of the petitioner and of the school leaving certificate filed therewith by the petitioner was taken by the concerned authorities. He also simultaneously made prayer for inclusion of his surname Bhagat after his name. It appears that no notice of that application of the petitioner and of the school leaving certificate filed therewith by the petitioner was taken by the concerned authorities. Instead, it was noted in the service book that the petitioner's date of birth was accepted in 1978 as 1st March, 1934. In the service book the date of birth has been recorded as 1st March, 1934 as per medical assessment'. I have already mentioned that according to the relevant circular medical assessment about age is required to be made by the Medical Board consisting of the Chief Medical Officer and two other Medical Officers. Admittedly no such Medical Board ever examined be petitioner about the determination of age. Consequently, any medical assessment, even if made on any occasion by the Medical Officer-in-charge cannot, in view of the respondents own circular, be taken to be a proper determination of age of the petitioner for recording his date of birth. Again, as we have seen, there is nothing to show that the alleged acceptance of the petitioner's date of birth as recorded in the service record in 1978 was ever communicated to the petitioner. It also does not appear that the petitioner's representation for recording his date of birth on the basis of school leaving certificate which was submitted by him in 1976 was at all considered by the concerned authorities before the alleged acceptance of the petitioner's date of birth in 1978 on the basis of alleged medical assessment. The service record also does not contain any signature of the petitioner. It was evidently not proper to accept the date of birth which was not assessed by proper medical authority, namely, Medical Board in accordance with the concerned circular, totally ignoring the school leaving certificate which was produced by the petitioner for recording his date of birth. As we have seen, even the declaration of age recorded in the attestation form in 1965 as 27 years substantially corroborates the date of birth as claimed by the petitioner. In the subsequent descriptive roll filed in 1977 also the petitioner's date of birth was recorded as 2nd February, 1938. The petitioner's case is that by mistake that date was recorded by the concerned staff as 1938 in place of 1939. In the subsequent descriptive roll filed in 1977 also the petitioner's date of birth was recorded as 2nd February, 1938. The petitioner's case is that by mistake that date was recorded by the concerned staff as 1938 in place of 1939. This plea seems to be plausible in view of the fact that the petitioner as far back as in 1976 filed school leaving certificate to substantiate his claim that his date of birth was 2.2.1939 and to support this, the baptism certificate also has been produced by the petitioner. Having regard to the facts and circumstances when it appears that there was no proper medical assessment for determination of date of birth of the petitioner in terms of the circular issued by the Corporation and when it appears that there is document like school leaving certificate which is also now supported by the baptism certificate it must be held that the authorities acted arbitrarily in ignoring the school leaving certificate without application of mind thereto and in accepting a different date of birth thereafter on the basis of alleged medical assessment which also for reasons discussed by me is not a determination by the appropriate Medical Board. In the circumstances in my opinion justice demands that the petitioner's date of birth should be accepted as recorded in his school leaving/transfer certificate and the same should be recorded in his service book also and be taken into consideration in determining his date of superannuation. It may be mentioned here that subsequently the petitioner's surname has been accepted by the authority concerned also. Be that as it may, the petitioner's date of birth should be accepted as that as recorded in his school leaving certificate. 5. The learned Advocate for respondents have relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Union of India v. Harnam Singh, 1994(1) LLJ 318 as well as (2) Secretary and Commissioner, Home Dept. v. R. Kirubakaran, 1994(1) LLJ 673 in support of his argument that no plea for alteration of the date of birth of an employee can be entertained on the eve of superannuation if the matter was not taken up by the employee concerned earlier. v. R. Kirubakaran, 1994(1) LLJ 673 in support of his argument that no plea for alteration of the date of birth of an employee can be entertained on the eve of superannuation if the matter was not taken up by the employee concerned earlier. In my humble opinion those decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the present case the petitioner applied for recording his date of birth in accordance with his school leaving certificate as far back as in 1976 but that was totally ignored by the authorities without any application of mind. Since be applied for recording his date of birth on the basis of his school leaving certificate it was quite natural for the petitioner to think that the authorities concerned either has accepted the same or will accept the same in due course when even according to the circulars of the Corporation itself the date of birth has to be determined with reference to such document. As we have seen, at no stage the petitioner was informed that the school leaving certificate produced by him for the purpose of recording his date of birth was not accepted or cannot be accepted. Ultimately however when the superannuation list was released the petitioner felt that the school leaving certificate produced by him for the purpose of recording his date of birth was not being acted upon by the respondents and thereafter he approached the Court. It is also to be noticed that the date of birth which the respondents want to give effect to so far as the petitioner is concerned is or was not a date declared by the petitioner. The petitioner's date of birth as recorded in his service book was not based on his own declaration. In the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the petitioner was guilty of undue latches or delay in the matter. In the decision of the Supreme Court in (3) Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dinabandhu Majumder, AIR 1995 SC 1499 also the petitioner wanted at a belated stage to alter his date of birth recorded on the basis of his own declaration voluntarily made at the time of his appointment. In the decision of the Supreme Court in (3) Burn Standard Co. Ltd. v. Dinabandhu Majumder, AIR 1995 SC 1499 also the petitioner wanted at a belated stage to alter his date of birth recorded on the basis of his own declaration voluntarily made at the time of his appointment. As we have seen, in our present case the date of birth of the petitioner which the respondents wanted to rely upon is or was not based on any declaration or voluntary statement of the petitioner. 6. It has been submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondents that the school leaving certificate is not a reliable document unless it is shown that the source on the basis of which the petitioner's date of birth was recorded in the school register was authentic and admissible in evidence. In support of his this argument he also relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in (4) Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purchit, AIR 1988 SC 1796 . In my opinion that decision is not applicable to our present case inasmuch as even the circular issued by the respondent Corporation speaks of the admissibility of school leaving certificate for the purpose of recording the date of birth of its employee. Therefore, the respondents cannot now taken a plea that the school leaving certificate is not a relevant document for the purpose of determination of the date of birth of the petitioner so far as service under the Corporation is concerned. 7. The only other point taken at the time of hearing on behalf of the respondents is that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. No such plea was however taken in the affidavit-in-opposition. The learned Advocate for the respondents relies on the decision of this Court (5) In re: Rajendra Prasad Agarwal, 99 CWN 307. The said decision is not applicable to the facts of our present case. In the present case the notice of superannuation of the petitioner was issued from the Head Office of the D. V. C. which is situated within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. That being so plainly the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the plea of lack of jurisdiction as taken on behalf of the respondents at the time of hearing is therefore not tenable. In the result the writ petition succeeds. That being so plainly the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and the plea of lack of jurisdiction as taken on behalf of the respondents at the time of hearing is therefore not tenable. In the result the writ petition succeeds. The respondents are directed to accept the petitioner's date of birth as 2nd February, 1939 on the basis of the school leaving certificate produced by him earlier which is also now supported by his baptism certificate, and record this date in the service book of the petitioner by deleting the contrary entry therein and give effect to such corrected date of birth of the petitioner for all service purposes including the superannuation of the petitioner. The concerned superannuation notice and release order of the petitioner are hereby set aside and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service within four weeks from this date and also pay him all arrear salary for the period till reinstatement as if he was on duty during this period, within eight weeks from this date. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly. No cost is ordered.