JUDGMENT- R.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---Regular Civil Suit No. 155/75 was initiated by the present petitioners against the respondents on the file of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Udgir, for declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents alleging that the present petitioner happened to be the tenant initially on Field Survey No. 49, situated at Handergulli, tq. Udgir, district Latur, of which the original owner was one Ramrao Ganpat Patil. It was the case of the present petitioner, who happened to be the plaintiff in the suit that this Survey No. 49 was with an area of total 22 acres and 17 gunthas, out of which he had already purchased 10 acres from Ramrao vide two sale-deeds, in the name of his sons i.e. petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, which were dated 1-8-1974. Remaining area of 12 acres and 17 gunthas, according to the petitioner, was in his possession as a tenant thereon and there was also an agreement, according to him, to purchase the same from the said Ramrao. It was also the case of the petitioner that he was cultivating the land as a tenant in pursuance of the agreement between himself and the original owner-Ramrao Ganpat Patil, right from the year 1973. It was further the case of the petitioner that the respondents 1 and 2 got their names introduced in the revenue records as tenants on the field in question with the connivance of the original landlord owner Ramrao Ganpat Patil and these respondents 1 and 2 started obstructing in the cultivating possession of the petitioner. There were certain proceedings initiated between the two parties, however, for the present purposes, the same has no relevance as the present petition arises out of a reference made by the Civil Court in the abovesaid suit. As stated above, since the respondents started obstructing the petitioners and started interfering in his possession, the abovesaid Regular Civil Suit No. 155/75 was filed by the present petitioners for declaration and permanent injunction. In this suit, the present respondents raised a point through their written statement that they were in cultivating possession of the field in question as tenants in pursuance of a Batai Patra i.e. lease deed executed by Ramrao Ganpat Patil in favour of the respondents on 19-3-1972 and according to the respondents they were claiming the tenancy rights over the field in question. Since the question as regards tenancy was raised in the suit on the basis of the abovesaid lease deed, which is at page 51 of the record of the revenue Court, reward which is before this Court at the time of hearing. Since the issue was raised, naturally the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Udgir, framed issues and one of the issues was : "Does defendant No. 1 prove that he is in possession of the suit land on the basis of lease deed executed by Ramrao on 19-3-72 ?" The learned Civil Judge, therefore, in accordance with the provision of section 99-A of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, referred the said issue to the Tahsildar, Udgir. This letter of reference is at Ex. 56, record page 27, which is dated 5-5-1977. From the arguments before this Court, it is clear that till the reference was answered the civil suit was stayed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Udgir. 2.On reference, the matter was proceeded before the learned Naib Tahsildar, Udgir, by registering the same as File No. 77/TNC/0/99-A/1. After allowing the parties to lead the evidence and to produce the documents, the learned Naib Tahsildar, who dealt with the matter, reached to the conclusion that the present respondents were not in possession of the field in question in pursuance of the lease deed executed by Ramrao on 19-3-1972. 3.The present respondents, dissatisfied with the judgment of the Naib Tahsildar, approached by way of an appeal before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Osmanabad, vide Appeal No. TNC-A-43/79 and the learned Deputy Collector, Osmanabad, concurred with the findings given by the Naib Tahsildar, Udgir and dismissed the appeal filed by the present respondents, by his judgment and order, dated 25-11-1981. The present respondents, therefore, approached before the learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Aurangabad, by filing a revision application numbered as 16/B/1982-Osmanabad and the learned Member of the Revenue Tribunal, who dealt with the matter, set aside the orders passed by the Revenue Authorities below and reached to the conclusion that the present respondent No. 1 was in possession of the suit land on the basis of the lease deed by Ramrao on 19-3-1972. The learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal further directed the lower Authority to inform the Civil Court accordingly. The learned Member of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal further directed the lower Authority to inform the Civil Court accordingly. The petitioners, therefore, have approached this Court by way of present writ petition challenging the order of the Revenue Tribunal, dated 10-12-1984. 4.The learned Counsel Shri Solshe, appearing on behalf of the petitioner assailed the order on the grounds that the learned Member of the Revenue Tribunal did not appreciate the evidence properly nor did he consider the evidence at all and according to the learned Counsel, the decision arrived at by the learned Member, Revenue Tribunal is on some extraneous considerations. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further argued that the alleged lease deed, dated 19-3-1972 was not at all proved and, therefore, according to the learned Counsel, no decision could have been given by the Revenue Tribunal on the basis of said document as regards the possession by the respondents on the field in question on 19-3-1972. The learned Counsel has also pointed out that the genuineness of the document i.e. the alleged lease deed, dated 19-3-1972, since was not made out beyond doubt, the learned Revisional Authority did commit a mistake in relying on the same. Shri Solshe, the learned Counsel further pointed out that the respondents were at no point of time in possession of the field in question and particularly because there was no proof to show that on the day of alleged Gudi Padwa of 1972, the respondent was put in possession by the original owner-Ramrao. It would be just and proper at this stage only to refer to one important point, which the learned Counsel has argued in the present matter, which pertains to the interpretation of section 99-A read with section 104 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). I will be dealing with this point in the concluding paragraph of this judgment and before that I would give the judgment on merits of the present case. 5.The record of the case clearly indicate that lease deed was executed by Ramrao in favour of the present respondent on 19-3-1972 in pursuance of which it was the case of the respondents that the field in question was put in possession of the respondents as a lessee. 5.The record of the case clearly indicate that lease deed was executed by Ramrao in favour of the present respondent on 19-3-1972 in pursuance of which it was the case of the respondents that the field in question was put in possession of the respondents as a lessee. Necessary entries from the 7/12 extract are also produced on the record for the years 1974-75 along with the certified copy of the order, passed by the Additional Collector, Osmanabad, on 21-10-1975, whereby the order of the Tahsildar, dated 26-2-1974 was confirmed as regards sanctioning of the mutation in favour of the present respondent-Vyankatrao. A copy of the order, dated 9-5-1977, passed by the Deputy Collector is also produced on the record, wherein it is clearly observed that there was no need to change the record in the cultivation column and the possession of the respondents was upheld. The entries which were permitted by the Tahsildar on 26-2-1974 as regards mutation in the name of Vyankatrao was also thus upheld. There was also evidence in the nature of an oral testimony of Vyankatrao. He has narrated in specific terms about his possession in pursuance of the lease deed and one Sopan, who happened to be a attesting witness, who was also examined for corraboration of his testimony. On the basis of these documents, the learned Member of the Revenue Tribunal reached to the conclusion that the lease deed in favour of Vyankatrao was proved. The learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to show that the said document would not be a document of lease at all, particularly when it does not refer to the exact terms and conditions of lease. The learned Counsel tried to point out that in the said lease deed, it is only said that the field in question is put in possession of the respondents on the day of Gudi Padwa and that the respondents shall reach the produce in the field in question whatsoever that might have been at the cost of the respondents to the place of the original owner Ramrao Ganpat Patil. From the contents, it was tried to suggest that this appears to be a document just to defeat the rights of the present petitioners. Unfortunately, before none of the Authorities below this point was raised as regards the genuineness of that transaction and genuineness of the document referred to above. From the contents, it was tried to suggest that this appears to be a document just to defeat the rights of the present petitioners. Unfortunately, before none of the Authorities below this point was raised as regards the genuineness of that transaction and genuineness of the document referred to above. I do not think it proper at this stage to allow the petitioner to raise the doubt as regards genuineness of the said document. 6.The learned Member of the Revenue Tribunal also appear to have given due consideration to the findings given by the Naib Tahsildar, as also by the Deputy Collector in appeal and also has tried to find out whether the conclusions arrived at by the Authorities below could be said to be right. At this point, the learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to argue that it was not open for the Revenue Tribunal to reappreciate the evidence. I do not think that there is any wrong in this argument. However, it cannot be forgotten that in appropriate cases, it is open for the Revenue Tribunal in its revisional power to read the evidence if the findings arrived at by the Revenue Authorities below are found to be inconsistent with the evidence which has resulted in perversity of finding. However, in the present case, I do not find that the Revenue Tribunal has committed any mistake in weighing the judgments of the Authorities below on the basis of the evidence on record. 7.The only point, which was supposed to be answered by the Revenue Authority was as to whether the present respondent was in possession of the field in question in pursuance of the alleged lease deed dated 19-3-1972. The Revenue Tribunal, therefore, has reached to the conclusion that the record did show that the respondent was having possession of the field in question in pursuance of the lease deed, dated 19-3-1972, which was executed between Ramrao and the present respondent. The Revenue Tribunal, therefore, did direct the Revisional Authority below to communicate the decision or to communicate the answer to the reference accordingly to the Civil Court. 8.So far as the necessary reference to the Court and answer is concerned, I do not find that there is any illegality or mistake in the same and I do not find it necessary to interfere in the same. 8.So far as the necessary reference to the Court and answer is concerned, I do not find that there is any illegality or mistake in the same and I do not find it necessary to interfere in the same. 9.I feel that the very question, which was referred by the Civil Court to the Tenancy Court was not properly framed. In fact, no question as regards the tenancy of the respondents, appear to have been framed and referred to the Revenue Court. The question referred is only as to whether the respondent was in possession of the field in question in pursuance of the lease deed, dated 19-3-1972. If this was the only question, which was required to be referred, in fact, according to this Court, the Civil Court itself could have answered that question as it had nothing to do with the tenancy. If the question would have been that whether the defendant was a tenant on the field in question or not and whether the tenancy was in pursuance of the lease deed, dated 19-3-1972 or not, only then there would have been an occasion for the Civil Court to refer the question. However, since in pursuance of the reference answered, Civil Court has already decided against the present petitioner and I am told by both the learned Counsel that the Regular Civil Appeal before the District Court and the Second Appeal before the High Court against the said decision have also been dismissed. In view of that, I do not want to make any further comments on this point, as it was only the question as regards possession of the respondent. The learned Counsel Shri Solshe further tried to impress on this Court that under section 99-A of the Act, it was for the Revenue Authorities to communicate the answer and only thereafter it was for the Civil Court to reopen the proceedings and proceed further. According to Shri Solshe, it was the respondent, who produced the certified copy before the Civil Court of the judgment passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and, therefore, the Civil Court did commit a mistake in proceeding further in the matter. According to Shri Solshe, it was the respondent, who produced the certified copy before the Civil Court of the judgment passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and, therefore, the Civil Court did commit a mistake in proceeding further in the matter. Shri Solshe, therefore, wanted this Court to hold that the proceedings by the Civil Court on the basis of the certified copy produced by one of the parties only could be said to be vitiated as, according to him, the provision of section 99-A r/w section 104 of the Act is mandatory and not directory. The point raised by Shri Solshe no doubt did deserve certain consideration, however, unfortunately the proceedings of the Civil Court are in no way under challenge before this Court, nor could the petitioner produce any stay order before the Civil Court through the present petition, whereby the learned Civil Judge would have stayed the proceedings. 10.The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that Civil Judge should not have proceeded unless there was a communication by the Revenue Authority itself on the answer to the reference, also does not arise in the present case, particularly when the certified copy was produced by the respondent and the present petitioner in so many words before the Civil Court had stated that the said judgment was under challenge in writ petition. However, the present petitioner, who was a plaintiff in the suit, even did not pray the Civil Court to stay the proceedings till the decision in the writ petition. On the other hand, when the civil suit was dismissed, he preferred First Appeal before the District Court and Second Appeal before the High Court and unfortunately was unsuccessful in both those Appeals. I do not find that in view of the conclusion of the litigation on that front, anything survives in the present petition on that count. Shri Solshe again insisted on the point that the Civil Court did commit a mistake in proceeding only on the basis of certified copy produced by the respondent and in fact, according to him, the Civil Court should have waited for the communication from the Revenue Authority. Shri Solshe again insisted on the point that the Civil Court did commit a mistake in proceeding only on the basis of certified copy produced by the respondent and in fact, according to him, the Civil Court should have waited for the communication from the Revenue Authority. On being put a specific question as to whether the certified copy which was produced by the respondent was not the copy of the judgment passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Shri Solshe had frankly admitted that he had at no point of time challenged the same. Shri Solshe could not dispute that the order produced by the respondent was the copy of the order of the Revenue Tribunal. It is, therefore, clear that whether it was communicated by the Revenue Authority or by one of the parties concerned, would not have made any change so far as the merits and the decision of the case is concerned. At the most strictly for the purposes of the present case, I call it to be a procedural defect, but definitely not a fatal one. I restrain myself from making any comments on the point as to whether the provisions of section 99-A r/w section 104 of the Act are mandatory or not and more so in view of the conclusion of the Civil litigation between the parties. 11.In the result, petition fails. Rule is discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. Petition fails.