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1996 DIGILAW 513 (PAT)

Girilal & Company, Gun Factory, through one of its Partner Sudhir Prasad Sharma v. Union of India

1996-08-16

NAGENDRA RAI

body1996
JUDGMENT Nagendra Rai, J. The only question involves in this writ application is as to whether the establishment of the petitioner is covered by the provision of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 7.6.95 passed by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Bhagalpur (respondent no. 2) contained in Annexure-7 by which he has held that the petitioner's industry is covered by the provisions of the Act and thereafter has determined the amount payable by the petitioner under the provisions of the Act and the scheme framed thereunder in exercise of power under Section 7A of the Act. 3. The facts, which are not in dispute, are that the petitioner is a partnership firm and was established in the year, 1948 and is engaged in manufacturing single and double barrel shot guns under a valid licence granted under the Arms Act. It has been registered as a Small Scale Industry Unit by the State of Bihar. In the year, 1966 one Sri M.K. Bhatnagar an employee of the provident fund office visited the gun factory of the petitioner and other factories situated in the town of Munger and found twenty eight persons working in the factory of the petitioner and, accordingly, he submitted a report on 29.11.1966 vide Annexure-A to the counter affidavit and thereafter the provision of the Act was made applicable to the petitioner's industry w.e.f. 13.11.1966 and he was allotted BR/1474 as Code number and the petitioner continuously paid the money under the Act and the Scheme upto 1990. There was default in payment of the money due from the petitioner's employer and a prosecution case was launched against partners of the firm under Section 14A of the Act and by judgment dated 3.4.90 they were acquitted on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against them. While acquitting them the trial Court held that the Act is not applicable to the gun factory of the petitioner. A copy of the said judgment has been annexed as Annexure-3 to the application. Thereafter, the petitioner stopped the payment of money due under the Act and the Scheme. While acquitting them the trial Court held that the Act is not applicable to the gun factory of the petitioner. A copy of the said judgment has been annexed as Annexure-3 to the application. Thereafter, the petitioner stopped the payment of money due under the Act and the Scheme. On 28.12.93 a notice was issued to the petitioner' by the respondent authority to appear under Section 7 A of the Act to determine the amount due under the Act and the Scheme framed thereunder. The petitioner filed a show cause on 20.1.94 alleging inter alia that the Act is not applicable to the establishment in question as it is not an industry which is covered by Schedule-I of the Act and the number of persons employed in it is less then twenty. Thereafter, after hearing the parties the impugned order has been passed holding that the Act is applicable and the petitioner has been directed by the said order to pay the amount due under the Act and scheme framed thereunder. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Act is not applicable in the case of the petitioners' establishment as it is not a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule-I of the Act. Secondly, it is submitted that even if it is assumed that the petitioner's establishment is covered by Schedule I of the Act cannot be made applicable as members of the employees engaged by the petitioner is less than 20 which is the minimum number to attract the provisions of the Act. Thirdly, it is submitted that no sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner by the authority while passing the impugned order. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand combated all the submissions and submitted that the Act is applicable with regard to the establishment of the petitioner. As back as in the year, 1966 on inspection it was found that more than 28 persons were employed and thereafter the petitioner went on paying the money as employer under the Act till 1990 and at this stage it cannot be allowed to say that the Act is not applicable to its' establishment because number of employees has reduced to less than 20. It was also submitted that enough opportunity was given to the petitioner. The petitioner had appeared and was heard. It was also submitted that enough opportunity was given to the petitioner. The petitioner had appeared and was heard. If it did not file any document in support of its claim then for that the respondent no. 2 cannot be blamed. On the other hand he on the basis of the materials available on the record including the report submitted in the year 1990 the authority has determined the amount which is to be payable by the establishment of the petitioner under the Act. 6. The primal question for determination in this case is as to whether the Act is applicable to the establishment of the petitioner. To decide this point it will be useful to refer to some of the provisions of the Act which have a bearing on the said question. Sub-section (3) (a) of Section 1 provides that subject to the provisions of Section 16 Act applies to every establishment, which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which twenty or more persons are employed. Sub-section (3) (b) of said section provides that it will apply to any other establishment, where twenty or more persons are employed if the same is notified in the official gazette by the Central Government in this behalf. Sub-section (5) of Section 1 of the Act provides that once the Act applies to the establishment then the establishment will be continued to be governed by the Act notwithstanding that the number of persons employed therein at any time falls below twenty. 7. Section 2(g) of the Act defines factory, which means premises including the precincts thereof, in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is originally so carried on, whether with the aid of power or without the aid of power. Section 2(i) defines industry which means any industry specified in Schedule I and include any other industry added to the Schedule by notification under Section 4. Section 4 empowers the Central Government to add to Schedule I. 8. Schedule I contains the list of industry with regard to which the Act is applicable. It is not necessary to re-produce all the entries. The relevant entry which is relevant in this case is an industry engaged in manufacturing of electrical, mechanical or general engineering products. Section 4 empowers the Central Government to add to Schedule I. 8. Schedule I contains the list of industry with regard to which the Act is applicable. It is not necessary to re-produce all the entries. The relevant entry which is relevant in this case is an industry engaged in manufacturing of electrical, mechanical or general engineering products. An explanation has been added in 1983 to the aforesaid subject which provides that without prejudice to the ordinary meaning or expression the said expression electrical, mechanical or general engineering products will include items detailed in the said explanation. The gun manufacturing is not mentioned as one of the items in the aforesaid explanation. 9. From the reading of the aforesaid provision it is clear that the provisions of the Act will apply to only an establishment which is an industry engaged in manufacturing any of the items included in Schedule I or to any other establishment with regard to which a notification is made by the Central Government regarding the applicability of the Act. It further appears that the industry must be engaged in manufacturing of the items though the manufacturing process may be carried on either with the aid of power or without the aid of power. 10. According to the petitioner the manufacturing of gun is not one of the products enumerated in the entry. It is not covered by entry electrical, mechanical or general engineering products read with explanation added subsequently. 11. The Act is of a piece of social security enactment and it is beneficial enactment for the purpose of providing benefits to the industrial workers in case of their retirement or to their dependants in case of their untimely death. The provision should be interpreted in such a way as to advance the cause for which the Act has been enacted. It is elementary rule of interpretation that if two reasonable views are possible with regard to any provision then which advances the object of the Act should be accepted and not the view, which frustrates the object of the Act. 12. It is elementary rule of interpretation that if two reasonable views are possible with regard to any provision then which advances the object of the Act should be accepted and not the view, which frustrates the object of the Act. 12. The head electrical, mechanical and general engineering products in Schedule-I was the subject matter of interpretation by the apex Court in AIR 1965 SC 1076 (The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Punjab vs. Shibu Metal Works) and the apex Court held that while construing the relevant entry in Schedule I the Court should keep in mind two aspects, namely, that entry occurs in the Act which is intended to serve a beneficent purpose. The object which the Act purports to achieve is to require that appropriate provision should be made for the employees employed in the establishment to which the Act applies and secondly that the interpretation should not concentrate on the word products used in the entry. 13. After taking into consideration the aforesaid aspects the apex Court with regard to the aforesaid entry held as follows: "The proper way to determine the content of this entry appears to us to be to hold that all products which are generally known as electrical engineering products, or mechanical engineering products, or general engineering products, are intended to be covered by the entry, and the object of Sch. 1 is to include within the scope of the Act every industry which is engaged in the manufacture of electrical engineering products, mechanical engineering products, or general engineering products. It is the character of the products that helps to determine the content of the entry; can the product in question be reasonably described as an electrical engineering product, or a mechanical engineering product, or a general engineering product? That is the question to ask in every case, and as we have already indicated, in considering the question as to whether the product falls under the category of general engineering product, general engineering should be construed in the limited sense which we have already shown. It may be that in a large majority of cases, the products included within the entry may be produced by electrical or mechanical or general engineering process; but that is not the essence of the matter. The industrial activity which manufactures the three categories of products already enumerated by us, brings the industry within the scope of Sch. It may be that in a large majority of cases, the products included within the entry may be produced by electrical or mechanical or general engineering process; but that is not the essence of the matter. The industrial activity which manufactures the three categories of products already enumerated by us, brings the industry within the scope of Sch. 1, and therefore, attracts the application of the Act." 14. Thus, it is clear that all the products which are generally known as electrical engineering products, mechanical engineering products or general engineering products are intended to be covered by entry and any industry which is engaged in manufacturing of the aforesaid three products is covered by the aforesaid entry. It is not disputed that the petitioner is an establishment and is a factory engaged in manufacturing of gun. Gun manufacturing is not included in the explanation but the explanation is not exhaustive, and it does not included all the items covered by the aforesaid entry. It is only added to clarify the content of the entry in question in Schedule I. The manufacturing of gun is done by the mechanical process. In other words, the product, namely, gun is mechanical engineering product, even if it is manufactured in a small scale unit. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the observation made in Criminal Appeal No. 79/1981 by learned single Judge of this Court in support of the fact that the Act is not applicable with regard to the establishment in question. A copy of the judgment has been annexed as Annexure-8 to the writ application. 16. From perusal of the aforesaid judgment it appears that against the judgment of acquittal under Section 14A of the Act an appeal was filed by the department and the said appeal was dismissed on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove the allegation against the accused of the case. While holding an observation has been made at one place that as gun industry is not included in the explanation the industry is not within the ambit of the provision of the Act. In my view, this question was not directly in issue in that case and as such the casual observation made in that judgment cannot be treated as a law laying down that the Act is not applicable in the case of gun industry. 17. In my view, this question was not directly in issue in that case and as such the casual observation made in that judgment cannot be treated as a law laying down that the Act is not applicable in the case of gun industry. 17. In my considered view, the establishment of the petitioner is engaged in product which is known as mechanical engineering products and the Act is applicable in the case of the petitioner. 18. So far the second submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner is concerned, the establishment was inspected in 1966 and 28 persons were found employed and the petitioner went on depositing the monies under the Act and it did not challenge at any point, of time about the number of persons employed. In that view of the matter, even if it is assumed that number of employees has reduced to less than 20 subsequently, the Act will not cease to operate in view of the specific provision contained under Section 1 (5) of the Act. 19. So far the third submission is concerned, it is to be stated that the impugned order shows that the petitioner appeared before, the authority and the case was adjourned on several dates and the matter was heard on merits. It is asserted in the counter affidavit that after giving sufficient opportunity and on the basis of the enquiry report of 1990 the impugned order has been passed determining the liability. 20. No doubt, the enquiry under Section 7A of the Act is in the nature of judicial enquiry, which requires that sufficient opportunity should be given to the person concerned to lead evidence and the Court has also power to summon witnesses etc., as in this case sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner and the case was adjourned on several dates and the petitioner did not produce any evidence it cannot be said that order has been passed without affording an opportunity of hearing. The order itself shows that on the basis of the materials collected during the enquiry in 1990, the authority has determined the liability. The order itself shows that on the basis of the materials collected during the enquiry in 1990, the authority has determined the liability. This apart once the Act is held to be applicable and the petitioner did not challenge the employment of 28 persons in 1966 and went on complying with the provision of the Act even if at any point or time the number of employees have been less than twenty that will not be a ground to interfere. 21. Accordingly, after having considered the case from the different angles I do not find any merit in this application and the same is dismissed.