M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THOUGH the issues involved in these two civil revision petitions centre around the simple question as to whether the petitioner-wife should be impleaded in the suit that has been filed against her husband for specific performance after the grant of an amendment to that effect, the competence with which the issues concerned have been debated has given rise to perhaps a new facet of law that has hitherto not been highlighted in situations of this type. Undoubtedly, the principles relating to situations in which amendments can be granted or occasions on which a party who applies for being added on to a legal proceeding should either been impleaded or not are by and large well-crystallised, there is always scope for an added dimension or angle when sufficient and deep thought is bestowed on the controversy in question. The facts are quite simple in so far as the first respondent field a suit against the 2nd respondent for specific performance in respect of an agreement to sell. The case of the plaintiff was that the defendant-husband had agreed to sell the premises to her under an agreement to sell and that he has not thereafter performed his obligations by completing the sale and that therefore, she is entitled for a decree of specific performance. It is of some consequence for me to mention that the suit premises are one in which the plaintiff is running a hotel. The written statement was filed wherein 'the plea of the defendant was that he has not entered into the agreement in question or in other words, it is a defence of denial. The evidence started and after taking several adjournments, an application was made by the defendant-husband for amendment of his written statement and correspondingly an application was made by the wife for being impleaded. The grounds are common in so far as it was contended that the husband has no absolute right to alienate the property even though it constitutes that part of the family property which came to his share, because the wife contended that as the spouse, she has certain subsisting rights which according to her specifically included the right to residence and maintenance and that consequently, the husband could not have entered into an. agreement to sell. agreement to sell. Effectively, it is some sort of a challenge with regard to the basic right to alienate as also a case where the party sets up some interest in the property in dispute. The learned trial judge after considering the objections raised by the plaintiff who basically contended that the application is not maintainable because a fresh and entirely new case is being set up and more importantly, that this is a stand that is very different to the original defence that was pleaded, as also the ground that the defendant-wife was not a necessary party and finally, the trial court passed an order rejecting both the applications. These two civil revision petitions assail the orders in question. They have been heard together and the two learned counsel have argued the matter with a considerable difficulty of incisiveness. ( 2 ) SRI shankar, learned counsel who appears on behalf of the petitioner has submitted that his challenge to the order is very well-defined in so far as in the first instance the applicant who is asking for impleading is not in the category of a traditional third party but happens to be very closely connected with the defendant in so far as she is the spouse. His submission is that the trial court overlooked the significance of the grounds set-out in support of the two applications and he contended that the property in question is effectively a family asset and ipso facto therefore, the wife can at all times claim to have a valid and genuine interest in that property. He submits that in this case, the couple have no children and that in the unlikely event of the husband's demise, that the applicant-wife would have to virtually fall back on whatever real assets or property she has and that therefore, the plea put forward by her is a very genuine one. He also demonstrates to me that the wife has very specifically contended that the husband had unfortunately got into the company of persons whose intentions were not too good and that it was they who induced him to enter into all sorts of transactions which would virtually have the effect of divesting them of whatever little property and assets they have and the contention was that in this background, she as the wife desires to attack the validity of the original transaction. Sri shankar submitted that in this background, two things have been demonstrated firstly, that it is necessary for the court to examine these aspects of the matter because they are intricately connected with the validity of the original agreement to sell which is in dispute and secondly, that the party who desires to join the litigation has a very deep seated interest and will undoubtedly be seriously affected by the outcome of the litigation and that therefore, having regard to the principles that are now well-settled, the trial court ought to have granted both the applications. Sri shankar has anticipated the argument of the other side when he submitted that the plea which is now taken is undoubtedly different to the original one set-out in the written statement but it is his submission that if the law of pleadings permits the parties to take up inconsistent pleas, that then this is perfectly legitimate. For this purpose, he relied on a recent decision of the supreme court in the case of G. Nagamma and another v Siromanamma and another, wherein the Supreme Court did observe that in a given situation it would be permissible even for the plaintiff to take up inconsistent pleas. Learned counsel therefore submitted that the nature of the defence which is now pleaded cannot stand in his way as far as the granting of the application is concerned. As regards the original contentions which have been taken in the written statement which cannot now either get dilated or would to some extent be withdrawn if the applications were to be granted, the learned counsel relied on another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Panchdeo Narain Srivastava v Kumari Jyoti Sahay and another, wherein, the Supreme Court was dealing with an amendment application and the Supreme Court held that in the overall interest of Justice it is not impermissible to allow even an admission to be withdrawn. In sum and substance, learned counsel therefore submitted that both on facts and in law he has made out a case for the grant of the two applications. ( 3 ) SRI shetty, learned counsel who represents the respondent original plaintiff has vehemently opposed the grant of any relief. In sum and substance, learned counsel therefore submitted that both on facts and in law he has made out a case for the grant of the two applications. ( 3 ) SRI shetty, learned counsel who represents the respondent original plaintiff has vehemently opposed the grant of any relief. In the first instance, he submitted that the Supreme Court as early as in the case of Haridas Aildas Thadani and others v Godrej Rustom Kermani, while dealing with interference with permission to amend that had been granted by trial court had occasion to observe that where a discretion has been validly exercised, interference in exercise of revisional powers is uncalled-for. His first submission was that the application has come at a belated stage and secondly, that the wife was neither a proper party or for that matter a necessary party and thirdly on facts he submits, that the plea with regard to right of residence is down right false because the premises are not residential premises and as regards the question of right of maintenance, his submission is that there are no legal or other proceedings pending inter se between the parties nor is this property the subject-matter of an order in any such proceeding and that therefore, this plea is absolutely illusory. Even as regards the challenge to the right to alienate, Sri shetty submits that there is no dispute at all about the fact that the defendant is the full and absolute owner of that property and that the so called rights which the wife is referring to, are not only unreal but are legally unenforceable. Having pointed out these aspects, the learned counsel submitted that the trial court which is the best judge of the matter in such situations has validity exercised its discretion and held that this is not a case in which the applications should be granted and that in the absence of being able to show that the order is legally valid or for that matter perverse, that no interference is called for by this court. As far as the scope of interference is concerned, I only need to observe that this court did consider that the case requires a second look which was why it was admitted and the debate that has subsequently ensued in the course of the hearing would require that this court must carefully examine both the facts but more importantly, the law on the point and if it is demonstrated that the trial court has erred in law, then the scope for interference would still arise. It is not only in cases where an order is perverse but there could be cases where the court has in good faith arrived at a decision which is inherently unsustainable in law and such a decision would still be revisable in a proceeding of the present type. ( 4 ) SRI shetty's first ground of attack proceeds on the footing that quite apart from the application being belated and therefore vitiated by legal mala fides, that the pleas that are put forward are inherently inconsistent with the original case made out by the defence and that therefore, they cannot be granted. He relied on the well-known decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. , Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Limited and another v M/s. Ladha Ram and Company, wherein the court laid down the principle that an amendment which introduces an entirely different and a new case which seeks to displace the plaintiff completely from admissions made by the defendants in the written statement was liable to be rejected. Learned counsel submitted that the decision would squarely apply to the facts of the present case but I need to observe here that even though a new case is being pleaded, that it does not in any way detract or destroy the original defence that was put forward by the defendant-husband. Undoubtedly, an attempt is made to graft on more material and whether or not this is permissible will be looked into by me but the pleas now taken do not in any way, to my mind, substantially harm or affect the plaintiffs case and therefore, the aforesaid principle would not be applicable in the present instance. ( 5 ) WITH regard to the propriety of the exercise itself, the learned counsel has advanced certain further submissions which I shall briefly recount. ( 5 ) WITH regard to the propriety of the exercise itself, the learned counsel has advanced certain further submissions which I shall briefly recount. Firstly, he has relied on the decision in the case of Anil Kumar Singh v Shivnath Mishra Alias gadasa guru, wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to point out that there is no right to be joined as a party unless the applicant came within one of the two categories namely the necessary or proper party. Learned counsel submitted that the applicant-wife is certainly not a necessary party in a suit for specific performance and he also submitted that having regard to the nature of the litigation and the well-settled law that the dispute has to be confined to the parties to the contract alone. He contended that she can never come within the category of proper party and that therefore, the application is totally misconceived. Next, learned counsel relied on a decision of this court in the case of M/s. Chitalia Bros, v South Indian Bank, wherein a division bench of this court had occasion to point out that in a suit for specific performance, the court cannot expand the scope of the proceeding by admitting to the litigation parties other than those who are strictly necessary merely on the ground that there were some inter se disputes between the defendants. The court drew the line by pointing out that such an inter se disputes were completely outside the ambit and scope of the proceeding that the court was seized of Sri shetty also placed reliance on another earlier decision of this court in the case of Gundu Baballi Banajwade v Raghavendra Hari Kale and others, wherein this court while considering the scope of an amendment application had occasion to observe that a court requires to guard itself against situations whereby, through amendments or impleading applications the simple issue that was originally placed for adjudication before the court gets unnecessarily complicated because the controversy gets dragged into other avenues. Another decision relied on by Sri shetty in support of his submission in the case of Sri Vardaman Stanakvasi Jain Sravak Sangh v Sri Swami Sangli Muneswara Temple Trust (regd.) And another, wherein, this court had occasion to focus the attention on another aspect of the law namely the interpretation of the term "questions involved in the controversy" and laid down the salutary principle that the court must convince itself to the questions which concern the parties alone and not any third parties. Again, with regard to the scope of such applications, Sri shetty drew my attention to another earlier decision of this court in the case of Basavanneppa Yellappa Angadi v Shivappa Mallappa Hooli, wherein, the court had occasion to consider one more facet of the law in such situations where a party claims to be affected by the judgment by pointing out that such effect that is pleaded must be real and direct and that it should not be a situation where the party can be incidentally affected by the judgment. One of the tests in such an impleading application that was applied was the question as to whether the presence of that party was necessary to the extent that the questions involved in the suit cannot be completely decided without the presence of that party. I need to observe here as an by way of amplification of the aforesaid principle that a court cannot take into account distant and remote possibilities and an anticipatory situation whereby a party contends that in the event of a particular order being passed that the party would be distantly affected. It is on the basis of these principles that Sri shetty has contended that viewed at from any angle, the rejection of the two applications is fully justified both on facts and in law. ( 6 ) IT is on the basis of the application of these principles that the orders passed by the trial court will have to be reviewed. I need to observe here that undoubtedly the petitioner's learned Advocate has demonstrated certain closeness between the defendant and the applicant who desires to be impleaded as also a certain community of interest. The applications go to the extent of making out a case whereby the very right of the defendant who is alleged to have alienated the property is being to some extent called into question. The applications go to the extent of making out a case whereby the very right of the defendant who is alleged to have alienated the property is being to some extent called into question. In this background, under normal circumstances a court would have erred on the safer side by granting the applications because this is not a case where the pleas that have been taken up are in any manner destructive of the plaintiffs right or the case made out by her. It is not unusual that inconsistent pleas are taken up even at the earliest point of time in a written statement without prejudice inter se and therefore, merely because the case made out is virtually an amplification of the new one it need not be shot down on this ground. The application is undoubtedly belated in so far as it has been made after the evidence has proceeded to some extent. Even as far as this is concerned, having regard to the nature of the applications and the fact that even at a later stage such applications are permissible provided good ground is shown for the delay in making the applications, a court could permit them. In this case however, the parties are husband and wife, they are living together and under these circumstances, the fact that the application is made at a very belated stage namely after the evidence of the plaintiff has been recorded and one year has passed would be a factor that would go very must against the applicant. Firstly, not even a single attempt has been made to justify the belated applications which is a requirement of law but more importantly, in the aforesaid circumstances it would appear that they are in the nature of an afterthought and in the circumstances of the case, an attempt to put a spoke in the way of the disposal of the suit. Even though the learned trial judge has not focussed much attention on this aspect of the case, it is well-settled law that in the absence of very cogent and valid grounds being put forward, that belated applications of this type ought not to be granted by the court. ( 7 ) APART from the principles which have been culled out by me earlier, there is one other aspect of the matter which does assume significance and which has hardly been highlighted hitherto. ( 7 ) APART from the principles which have been culled out by me earlier, there is one other aspect of the matter which does assume significance and which has hardly been highlighted hitherto. The principle that often induces a court to make a concession in such cases is essentially governed by the need to avoid multiplicity of proceedings because refusal of an amendment or an impleading application could easily give rise to one more litigation and the courts invariably feel that it would therefore be prudent to short circuit such a procedure by deciding the controversy once and for all in the interest of justice. To my mind, such an approach is rather dangerous without going into the deeper aspects. Where pleas have been put forward that a party is interested in the litigation or that the party will be affected by the decision thereof, the error often committed by the courts is to mechanically accept this plea. This is one of the cases where the respondent's learned Advocate has highlighted the all important aspects of the matter namely that these pleas require to be tested. If the pleas are substantial, in the sense if the amendment is genuine and valid and is not a mere afterthought or an attempt to elongate or dilate the proceedings, the question is different. Similarly, where it is demonstrated that the passing of a decree would seriously affect and prejudice the rights of a party who is not before the court, undoubtedly the applications would be granted. The question arises as to what is the position where the pleas are carefully examined, which to my mind is necessary, and the court finds that the pleas put forward are not substantial enough and that they are devoid of deep merit and that therefore, no real prejudice would result. As an illustration in the present case, the question as to whether the defendant is the owner of the property and the question as to whether he has had the right to alienate it or not could be decided by the court if that issue is raised without the presence of the wife. The plea that she has a right of residence is hardly sustainable because she is not residing in those premises. To my mind, in any event, they are not residential premises. The plea that she has a right of residence is hardly sustainable because she is not residing in those premises. To my mind, in any event, they are not residential premises. As regards the so-called right of maintenance, the plea appears to be rather hollow in so far as the parties are residing together and nothing has been brought on record that the wife has either been deserted or that her economic circumstances are such that she would have to fall back on this property for her maintenance. In sum and substance therefore, Sri shetty is right when he points out that all these contentions are extraneous and absolutely remote to the cause of action in the present proceeding and that on a deeper consideration of the law, the applications have been rightly rejected. I need to add here that this is one of the situations where averments in keeping with well-defined principles have undoubtedly been made in the two applications but the duty of the court goes a stage further to carefully test the correctness of these averments as also the effect of whether the proceeding can be correctly adjudicated even if the applications are turned down and if the answer is in the affirmative, then the rejection of the applications must be sustained. As regards the last contention that there is possibility of multiplying the litigation by giving scope for one more proceeding, to my mind the simple answer is that if that proceeding-were to arise because of a default situation in this case, then the court must grant the application. That unfortunately is not the position here. Where a complete legal and proper adjudication is possible and permissible without the presence of the applicant-wife and without permitting the amendment, then to my mind the orders in question require to be upheld. ( 8 ) HAVING regard to the total consideration of the entirecontroversy, I am of the view that this is one of the case wherein the orders passed by the learned trial judge were justified and consequently, require to be upheld. The civil revision petitions accordingly fail and stand disposed of. The interim orders to stand vacated. No order as to costs. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 30-9-1996 when the matter shall be placed before that court for further orders. --- *** --- .