Judgment :- BALAKRISHNAN, J. Deceased Raveendran and PW-2 Maniyan are brothers and they were staying in a single house but with separate hearth. The place is in the sub-urb of Trivandrum city within the jurisdiction of Fort Police Station. On the previous day of the incident, appellant Seethamaniyan had a confrontation with the wife of PW-2 and he slapped on her face. On the next day, i.e. on 4-8-91 at about 9.30 p.m. when deceased Raveendran and his brother Maniyan were standing on the road near the residence, appellant - Seethamaniyam came from the southern side and on seeing him deceased Raveendran asked why he had beaten the wife of PW-2. PW-2 also asked him as to why he acted in that manner as if he had no mother or sister. According to the prosecution, appellant Seethamaniyan took out a knife and stabbed Raveendran on his chest. Raveendran fell on the ground with face downwards and the appellant then stabbed PW-2 and ran away from the place. PW-2 on sustaining injury ran to his house and fell in front of his wife and PW-3, who were standing near his residence. PW-2 was immediately taken to Medical College Hospital. 2. PW-1 - Gopakumar is an IPS Officer residing in that locality. Appellant - Seethamaniyan went to the house of PW-1 and cried out for the help. PW-1 came out of the house and saw the appellant with blood stains on his face and shirt worn by him. PW-1 asked him what had happened. Then appellant told that one Ravi and Maniyan had beaten him and he in turn stabbed and that Ravi was lying there and Maniyam had run away. Thus saying, the appellant took out a folding knife and unfolded the same and gave it to PW-1. PW-1 asked the appellant to place it on the floor. The knife was fully stained with blood. PW-1 kept the knife in polythene cover and then telephoned to the control room. One Kochumanian came there and told PW-1 that Ravi was lying injured at the scene of occurrence and people are afraid and nobody was willing to take him to the hospital. PW-1 summoned one of his neighbours and asked him to be on guard of the appellant and proceeded to the place of occurrence and when he reached the public road he saw a mobile jeep. PW-1 summoned one of his neighbours and asked him to be on guard of the appellant and proceeded to the place of occurrence and when he reached the public road he saw a mobile jeep. He boarded the same and reached the place of occurrence. When he reached there, there was another mobile jeep and Raveendran was taken to Medical College Hospital Thrissur. 3. On the same day, PW-8 - The SI of Police, recorded Ext. P1 F.I. statement of PW-1 and PW-1 handed over the knife to PW-8 and he seized the same under Ext. P2 mahazar. A case was registered against the appellant. PW-9 held inquest over the dead body of deceased Raveendran and he prepared a scene mahazar. PW-10 laid the final charge sheet. 4. PWs-1 to 3 are the main witness examined on the side of prosecution. On the basis of prosecution evidence, the appellant was found guilty of offence punishable under section 302 and 324 IPC. The conviction and sentence are challenged in this appeal. 5. As regards the cause of death of deceased Raveendran, there is no dispute. Ext. P-4 is the post mortem certificate. The first injury noted in Ext. P-4 is an incise penetrating would of 5.5 x 2.5 cms. vertically placed on the left side of chest. This wound entered the left chest cavity by cutting the cartilage of 3rd rib and penetrated to the adjoining intercostal spaces. The wound had a minimum depth of 7.7 cms. The pericardial cavity contained 100 ml. of blood. PW-5 expressed his opinion that the cause of death was the penetrating injury sustained on the left side of the chest. 6. The counsel for the appellant contended that PWs-2 and 3 should not have been relied upon. It was also contended that the alleged extra judicial confession made by the appellant to PW-1 is not admissible in law, in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. As regards the evidence of PWs-2 and 3, the counsel for the appellant raised several objections. PW-2 is the person who sustained injury in the incident. Therefore, his presence at the scene of occurrence cannot be suspected. The appellant's contention is that incident did not happen as alleged by the prosecution. As regards the evidence of PWs-2 and 3, the counsel for the appellant raised several objections. PW-2 is the person who sustained injury in the incident. Therefore, his presence at the scene of occurrence cannot be suspected. The appellant's contention is that incident did not happen as alleged by the prosecution. The plea of the appellant as evident from Section 313 statement is that when the appellant reached the place of occurrence he was attacked by deceased and PW-2 and there ensued a scuffle and in that melee PW-2 aimed a stab at the appellant and the appellant tried to wriggle out and the stab must have fell on the chest of deceased Raveendran. The appellant further submitted that even if the previous day's incident was correct, it was not the appellant but the deceased and PW-2, who would have been in a violent mood to settle score with the appellant. It is to be noted that appellant has no case that he sustained any injury in the incident. There is also no evidence to show that the deceased Raveendran and PW-2 were armed with any weapons. There is no evidence to show that the case put forward by the appellant is probable. PW-2 desposed that when he was walking with his brother Raveendran, the appellant came there and the incident happened all of a sudden. The nature of the injuries sustained by the two persons is also fully consistent with this case. 7. The evidence of PW-3 Sarala is also in corroboration with the evidence of PW-2. PW-3 is a person residing in the same locality. According to her, herself and wife of PW-2 were standing on the road and talking. Then she saw PW-2 going northwards towards the pan shop and returning to the place of occurrence. Then she heard PW-2 asking the appellant as to why he had beaten his wife, when he was not present. Then she saw the appellant taking a kife from the waist and stabbing the deceased Raveendran and thereafter PW-2. She deposed that PW-2 fell in front of her and he was taken to hospital. According to appellant's counsel. PW-3 could not have been present on the road at that time as it was already 9.30 p.m. The scene mahazar prepared in this case shows that the houses of PW-2 and deceased are by the side of a road. She deposed that PW-2 fell in front of her and he was taken to hospital. According to appellant's counsel. PW-3 could not have been present on the road at that time as it was already 9.30 p.m. The scene mahazar prepared in this case shows that the houses of PW-2 and deceased are by the side of a road. PW-3 also is a person residing in the locality. We do not think that it is quite unusual for the ordinary people to stand by the side of the road and exchange pleasantries even at that time. Deceased Raveendran, PW-2 and some others were also present on the road. For that reason, we are not inclined to disbelieve the evidence of PWs-2 and 3. 8. The next item of evidence is the testimony of PW-1. He deposed that the appellant came to his house immediately after the incident with a blood stained knife and confessed that he had stabbed deceased Raveendran and PW-2. During the relevant time, PW-1 was working as an Assistant Inspector General in the Public Grievances Cell attached to Police Head Quarters at Trivandrum. The counsel for the appellant contended that during the relevant time. PW-1, - an IPS Officer, was working as a police officer and hence the confession alleged to have been made by the appellant to him is not admissible in evidence as it is expressly prohibited under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Let us at once set out that Section emphasising for convenience those parts with which the challenge is most directly concerned with : "Sec. 25 : No confession made to a Police Officer shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence." The term 'police officer' occurring in Section 25 of Evidence Act has been vexing problem of interpretation and this question arose for consideration in different forms in various decisions. One of the earliest decisions is State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram (AIR 1962 SC 276 : 1962(1) Cri LJ 217. In that case the Court was called upon to consider whether Customs Officers to whom confessional statements were made could be said to be police officers within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act. One of the earliest decisions is State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram (AIR 1962 SC 276 : 1962(1) Cri LJ 217. In that case the Court was called upon to consider whether Customs Officers to whom confessional statements were made could be said to be police officers within the meaning of Section 25, Evidence Act. After referring to various statutes including Section 5(2) of the old Code, the Supreme Court held that : "The foregoing consideration of the case law and the statutory provisions yields the following results. The term 'police officer' is not defined in the Evidence Act, or, as a matter of fact, in any other contemporaneous or subsequent enactment. The question, therefore, falls to be decided on a fair construction of the provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, having regard to the history of the legislation and the meaning attributed to that term in and about the time when Section 25 of the Evidence Act came to be inserted therein." and after discussing various provisions it was held that : "A police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act may be defined thus. An officer, by whatever designation he is called, on whom a statute substantially confers the powers and impulse the duties of the police is a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act." The Court finally held that, the duties of the Customs Officers were substantially different from those of the police and merely because they possessed certain powers having similarity with those of police officers, cannot make them police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 9. In another decision reported in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 828 : 1964 (1) Cri LJ 705), the Supreme Court took a slightly different view and held that Excise Inspector who recorded the confession statement was held to be a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The Court was of the view that the test would be whether the powers are such as would tend to facilitate the obtaining by him of a confession from a suspect or a delinquent. If they do, then it is unnecessary to consider the dominant purpose for which he is appointed or the question as to what other powers he enjoys. 10. If they do, then it is unnecessary to consider the dominant purpose for which he is appointed or the question as to what other powers he enjoys. 10. Possibly due to these divergent opinions the matter came before the Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in a case reported in Badku Joti Savant v. State of Mysore (AIR 1966 SC 1746) : 1966 Cri LJ 1353, and in that case it was held that Central Excise Officer was not a police officer under section 25 of the Evidence Act. The nub of the decision is expressed in the following words : "..... if an officer is invested under any special law with powers analogous to those exercised by a police officer in charge of a police station investigating a cognizable offence, he does not thereby become a police officer under section 25 of Evidence Act, unless he has the power to lodge a report under section 173 of the Code." 11. In Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India (1990 SCC Crl 330), a question arose whether the Officers of the Department of Revenue Intelligence who have been invested with the powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station under section 53 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 could be said to be police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of Evidence Act. The Supreme Court held that : "Even if an officer is invested under any special law with powers analogous to those exercised by a police officer-in-charge of a police station investigating a cognizable offence, he does not thereby become a police officer under section 25, Evidence Act, unless he has the power to lodge a report under section 173 of the Code. Any person on whom power to investigate under Chapter XII is conferred can be said to be a 'police officer', no matter by what name he is called. The nomenclature is not important, the content of the power he exercises is the determinative factor. The important attribute of police power is not only the power to investigate into the commission of cognizable offence but also the power to prosecute the offender by filing a report or a charge-sheet under section 173 of the Code. The nomenclature is not important, the content of the power he exercises is the determinative factor. The important attribute of police power is not only the power to investigate into the commission of cognizable offence but also the power to prosecute the offender by filing a report or a charge-sheet under section 173 of the Code. There is nothing in the provisions of the Act to show that the legislature desired to vest in the officers appointed under section 53 of the Act, all the powers of Chapter XII, including the power to submit a report under Section 173 of the Code." 12. The counsel for the appellant contended that PW-1 being an IPS Officer, he is a police officer as per the provisions contained in Kerala Police Act and he has got all the powers under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was submitted that, even though he is working as an Assistant Inspector General in the Police Headquarters, he is invested with the power of investigation and that is expressly conferred on him under section 30 to 38 of the Kerala Police Act. We are unable to accept this contention. During the relevant time, PW-1 was working in an administrative post. He was not specially authorised to conduct investigation in any case and we do not think that he had the power of investigation under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. and even if an information as to the commission of a cognizable offence was furnished to him, he was not conferred with any power to register a case and conduct an investigation and file a final report under section 173 of the Code. Such powers could only be conferred on a police officer by special orders, as it is evident from the working of the police department of the State. From the various Supreme Court decisions cited above, it is clear that the term 'police officer' occurring in Section 25 of the Evidence Act means only such officers who are invested with powers of investigation into the commission of offences and also that he should have the power to prosecute the offender by filing a report or a charge sheet under section 173 of Code of Criminal Procedure. As PW-1 was evidently not invested with such powers during the relevant time, he cannot be said to be a police officer for the purpose of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. 13. The appellant made a confessional statement to PW-1 that he has stabbed deceased Raveendran and PW-2. The appellant has also added that he was beaten by those persons, but that is not proved by other evidence. It is also pertinent to note that the appellant surrendered his blood stained knife to PW-1. The confession made by the appellant before PW-1 is clearly admissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act. The conduct of the appellant, of handing over the blood stained knife immediately after the incident is also admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. We do not find any reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW-1. The knife was also found to be blood stained on chemical examination. 14. There is ample evidence against the appellant and it is proved that the appellant had caused the death of deceased Raveendran and caused injury to PW-2 and he has rightly been convicted under sections 302 and 324 IPC. We confirm the conviction and sentence. We find no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.