H. N. TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) BY this writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of india, the petitioner has sought for issuance of a writ of certiorari or writ order or direction in the nature of writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 18-10-1995 passed by the first respondent and as affirmed by the appellate authority in Annexure-H. He has also prayed for quashing the order dated 12-12-1995 passed in miscellaneous appeal No. 49 of 1995 by the principal district judge, dharwar in Annexure-K. The petitioner has further prayed for an order or direction in the nature of writ of mandamus directing the respondents 1 and 2 to consider the application of the petitioner for allotment on lease-cum-sale basis or outright sale basis in respect of an area of 15' x 40' in the market yard of agricultural produce market committee, dharwar which is in the possession of the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE petitioner's case in nut-shell is that the petitioner is a physically handicapped person belonging to backward community and does not own any land has earning by self employment. The petitioner has stated that he is now running a petty business shop of cool drinks in an area of 15' x 40' in the market yard of respondent-1 in a corner abutting the boundary wall. The petitioner's case is that the vacant land was leased to the petitioner on 30-11-1992 on a monthly rent of Rs. 350/- by the respondents in pursuance of the order dated 18-11-1992. The petitioner has annexed the copy of the order of the director as well as the copy of the order of respondent-1 as annexures-a and b respectively. To provide the required facilities to the visitors of the market yard who are the customers of the petitioner, the petitioner invested about Rs. 2 lakhs to establish the cool drink shed, and the details of which he has given as per paragraph-2 of the writ petition. The petitioner's case is that he has deposited six months advance rent and thereafter continued to pay the rent regularly and the rent was paid till the order impugned was made in october, 1994 and the deposits were continuously made with respondent-1. The petitioner's case is that he has deposited six months advance rent and thereafter continued to pay the rent regularly and the rent was paid till the order impugned was made in october, 1994 and the deposits were continuously made with respondent-1. According to the petitioner on account of personal animosity for reasons extraneous to allotment the then secretary of respondent-1, issued a show-cause notice dated 1-8-1993 to the petitioner to quit and deliver the possession of the premises and thereafter the petitioner filed writ petition No. 8403 of 1993 which writ petition according to the petitioner was withdrawn as he was assured that his representation would be considered. Copy of the order has been produced as Annexure-C. According to the petitioner, the petitioner met the director and the Hon'ble minister and repeated his request and he has filed the copies of the representations as annexures-d and d-l in the writ petition. According to the petitioner when the writ petition had been withdrawn by the petitioner on 10-3-1995, respondent-1 on 28-9-1995 issued another show-cause notice under Section 4 (1) of the Karnataka public premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act' copy of which the petitioner has annexed as Annexure-E to the writ petition according to the petitioner the only ground mentioned in the show-cause notice was that the petitioner's writ petition was disposed off. The petitioner's further case is that he was given less than 10 days time that is less than the time prescribed under the law. The petitioner's case is that he has filed his reply to that notice and the case was fixed for hearing on 12-10-1995 though notice was served on the petitioner on 11-10-1995. Petitioner's case is that he has given written submissions on 14-10-1995. Copies of the written submissions are annexed as annexures-g and g-l and on 18-10-1995, respondent-1 passed an order directing the petitioner to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the premises within 45 days. Against the order of respondent-1, the petitioner preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 49 of 1995 under Section 10 of the act before the principal judge at dharwad and the learned principal judge, dharwad by the order dated 12-12-1995 has dismissed the appeal granting two months time to vacate. Against the order of respondent-1, the petitioner preferred miscellaneous appeal No. 49 of 1995 under Section 10 of the act before the principal judge at dharwad and the learned principal judge, dharwad by the order dated 12-12-1995 has dismissed the appeal granting two months time to vacate. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 18-10-1995, Annexure-H and the order of the principal district judge dated 12-12-1995, the petitioner has come up before this court under article 226 of the constitution. In this petition it has also been stated that representations were made by the petitioner to respondents 1 and 2 to grant the land on lease-cum-sale basis but the said representations have not been decided so far and the same were pending consideration. The petitioner has further alleged that the petitioner has not constructed any wall to make permanent construction. The petitioner has only fixed sheets to cover the premises on sides using the existing boundary wall and has put temporary roof of tiles and eucalyptus poles. Notice of this petition was issued to the respondents. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the first respondent statement of objection ssupported by affidavit has been filed. No counterer has been filed on behalf of the state government. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated very clearly that no lease was granted in favour of the petitioner in respect of the land. Though respondent-1 had given a licence to the petitioner with respect to that site for supply of cool drinks, there was a clear condition that petitioner shall not put up any permanent structure and that period of licence was only for 11 months. The copies of the documents have been filed as annexures-a and b. The respondents denied the allegation of the petitioner that he has invested a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs but stated that all that he has invested is Rs. 20,000/ -. The first respondent has further stated that the petitioner has been informed that the land was granted not on lease but on licence basis and that too for a period of 11 months for supply of cool drinks. In the counter-affidavit allegations of personal animosity, allegation of non-issuance of show-cause notice have been denied. 20,000/ -. The first respondent has further stated that the petitioner has been informed that the land was granted not on lease but on licence basis and that too for a period of 11 months for supply of cool drinks. In the counter-affidavit allegations of personal animosity, allegation of non-issuance of show-cause notice have been denied. It has been stated that the petitioner intended to put up the permanent structure on the land or the site which was given on licence basis to him so the secretary issued a notice and thereupon the petitioner filed the writ petition No. 8403 of 1993, but realising that the petitioner's writ petition has no substance, the petitioner withdrew that writ petition. The respondent has asserted that he has no knowledge whether the petitioner had met the director or the Hon'ble minister as stated in paragraph-3. In paragraph-4 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that allegations to the effect that the petitioner made representation to the minister and it was forwarded to the joint director etc. , was not admitted. The case of the respondent is that sufficient time was given to the petitioner to file objections and after giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner and after consideration of his submissions, order dated 18-10-1995 was passed and petitioner was granted 45 days time to hand over the vacant possession. The opposite party denied the petitioner's case that no reasonable opportunity was given. It has further been stated in the counter affidavit that the learned district judge, dharwar after hearing the parties dismissed the appeal as there was no substance in it. The opposite party has denied that the petitioner has not put up any permanent structure. The respondents have further taken the plea that by putting permanent structure the. Petitioner deliberately flouted the terms of lease or licence and as such is not entitled to the equitable relief. The respondent asserted that the premises in dispute is a public premises and the proceedings is not maintainable in view of the amendment to Section 2 of the act by insertion of including the premises belonging to the market committee. It has been further asserted that the period of licence namely period of 11 months has already expired long before and there was no justification for the petitioner not to have vacated the premises and the order of the district judge is just and proper. It has been further asserted that the period of licence namely period of 11 months has already expired long before and there was no justification for the petitioner not to have vacated the premises and the order of the district judge is just and proper. It has further been asserted that the impugned order do not suffer from any error of law or of jurisdiction and the petition is not maintainable. It is further stated that there is no equity in favour of the petitioner as such and there is no justification for the petitioner to continue in the premises. It is further stated that 2 months time was granted by the district judge over and above the 45 days time granted by the respondent. Opposite parties case is that there is no substance in the petitioner's case and the petition deserves to be dismissed. As there is no equity in favour of the petitioner. ( 4 ) I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the notice issued to the petitioner under Section 4 (1) of the act is invalid and is not in compliance with the requirements of Section 4 of the act. The learned counsel elaborating his contentions contended that it is the mandatory requirement of Section 4 (1) of the act that notice is to be issued only when the competent authority opines that a person is in unauthorised occupation of a public premises and the notice must satisfy the ground on which the order of eviction is supposed to be made. The learned counsel submitted that the grounds are to be based on material facts indicating the cause of action and form an opinion. So a notice must contain the statement of facts and then must indicate that the notice is based on those facts. The learned counsel submitted that here in this case the notice lacks the necessary particulars. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the date fixed in the notice was earlier than 10 days from the date of issue of the notice. The learned counsel submitted that here in this case the notice lacks the necessary particulars. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the date fixed in the notice was earlier than 10 days from the date of issue of the notice. The learned counsel submitted that the period of 10 days was required to take place in between the two days, that is date of issuance of notice and the date on or before which the person concerned is to show-cause and in this case the notice has been only of seven or eight days not of 10 days and therefore the notice is invalid and the entire proceedings taken there under were illegal and are void and deserve to be quashed. The learned counsel further contended that the notice was based on the ground as it purports to be that some condition under the licence and agreement has been violated and therefore action was taken to evict the petitioner. It is no where been stated that the breach of what condition was committed by the petitioner. It is further been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice did not appear to be based on the ground that the period of licence or lease has expired and therefore the opposite parties were altogether under the impression that the petitioner was in authorised occupation and so the proceedings were wrongly initiated. The learned counsel contended that it is nowhere stated that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation or that the period of lease has expired and no fresh lease has been granted or that there is no renewal of the lease and therefore he is in unauthorised occupation and so the notice is vague. The learned counsel further submitted that for proceeding under Section 4, notice should be very particular, clear and specific of the ground on the basis of which the action is being taken under sections 4 and 5 of the act. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that even the representation that has been made by the petitioner to the authorities has not been decided and is pending for consideration on matter of extension of period of lease and without disposing that off keeping the petitioner in hopes and illusion, opposite parties have issued the notice under Section 4 of the act. Respondent 1 has only proceeded to examine whether the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation and it proceeded on the ground as if notice was issued on the basis of expiry of the licence. But the authorities did not consider the question of petitioner's representation to the government or the director or the authorities or its fate. The learned counsel further submitted that the district judge has taken the view that if the notice was less than 10 days it did not affect the legality of the proceedings. He further submitted that in view of the breach of the Provisions of the laws that the impugned order as well as the order of district judge deserve to be quashed. ( 5 ) THE petition has been opposed on behalf of the respondents by Sri rudragouda for respondent 1 as well as Sri r. k. hatti learned government pleader. The learned government pleader submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed as the petitioner has neither impleaded the director or the joint director of agricultural produce marketing committee with respect to whom allegations have been made that the representation of the petitioner has been forwarded by the minister to them and they did not consider it and kept it pending. He further submitted that once the appellate order had been passed, the order of the original authority merged into the order of the appellate authority, but the district judge has not been impleaded in this case whose order has been challenged in this petition as well. The learned government pleader on this basis submitted that the writ petition should be dismissed. The learned counsel for respondent-1 submitted that it is a finding of fact that the petitioner is in unauthorised occupation and particularly in view of the fact that the licence has been granted in favour of the petitioner for a period of 11 months only and that the period of 11 months expired long back on 31-10-1993. Sri rudragouda further submitted that the period of licence having expired on 30-11-1993, the petitioner either should have applied for extension or applied for fresh lease or licence. The petitioner has not annexed any of the copy of the application for extension of licence or renewal of licence. He further submitted that the petitioner had been granted sufficient opportunity to show-cause but he failed to prove that his occupation was not unauthorised. The petitioner has not annexed any of the copy of the application for extension of licence or renewal of licence. He further submitted that the petitioner had been granted sufficient opportunity to show-cause but he failed to prove that his occupation was not unauthorised. He further urged that as per the licence condition the petitioner could not put any permanent structure. But he committed the breach of that condition. He submitted that any way the petitioner's possession was illegal and the minister had no authority to direct the director to enhance the period of licence. The direction of the minister cannot be taken to be within the 4 corners of the Provisions of Section 4 (l) (c) of the act. To a question put by the court as to why the director did not pass an order rejecting the representation of the petitioner that had been forwarded and endorsed by the minister for consideration and for passing the orders, taking the view that minister has no business to interfere and the petitioner was not entitled to any renewal or extension of period of licence who should at least have passed that Order, the learned counsel failed to give any specific reply. Lastly the learned counsel for the respondent contended that as alleged by the petitioner that the petitioner is a handicapped person, the only sympathy that can be shown by the court is that he may be given some time to vacate and hand over the vacant possession, otherwise equity is not in favour of the petitioner as the petition deserves to be dismissed. ( 6 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions made by the learned counsel for the parties. It is well-settled principal of law that when a special power is given to do a thing and the law prescribes a special mode for doing those things, the power has to be exercised in that manner alone and in accordance with the requirements of that law and it means that power cannot be exercised otherwise than in the manner prescribed. Section 4 of the act provides that if a competent authority is of the opinion that any person or persons are in unauthorised occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, then the competent authority shall issue the notice in the manner prescribed in the act and a notice in writing calling upon such persons to show-cause why the order of eviction should not be made. The language indicates that procedure or the manner in which notice should be issued including the contents of notice, the time prescribed in the notice, in all these matters what has been prescribed in the act has to be followed by the authority issuing the notice. In the notice under Section 4 of the act it is necessary to indicate that tentative or prima facie opinion have been formed by the competent authority that the person to whom notice is being issued in its opinion is in unauthorised occupation of a public premises. The notice should specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made. The notices required to call upon all persons concerned, that is all persons who are, or may be, in occupation of or claim interest in the public premises to show-cause, if any, against the proposed Order, on or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not earlier than 10 days from the date of issue thereof. After having examined the present case, I am compelled to observe that notice in the present case does not comply with the requirements of law. No doubt in the notice it has been stated that the licence was granted or the premises was granted on lease/licence basis for a period of 11 months from 1-12-1992 and that the writ petition filed by the petitioner had been dismissed or decided on 10-3-1995, but notice is not on the basis that the licence has expired and the petitioner has become unauthorised occupant and so why he should not be evicted. It is stated as if the petitioner had flouted certain conditions of agreement or of the licence so he was treated to have become unauthorised occupant when the licence was alive and has not come to an end. The petitioner states that he has not put any permanent construction. It is stated as if the petitioner had flouted certain conditions of agreement or of the licence so he was treated to have become unauthorised occupant when the licence was alive and has not come to an end. The petitioner states that he has not put any permanent construction. The petitioner also states that he has made representations to the minister and the minister endorses the same to the director. So the petitioner took it that until the disposal of that representation his possession was not unauthorised possession. The competent authority who passed the order says that period of licence had expired on 31-10-1993 and thereafter the petitioner was in occupation without licence and took the view that no document or documentary evidence was produced to show that the time or period was extended. As regards the appellate authority, the appellate authority has observed that it is true that the show-cause notice issued, specifies less than ten days for calling for explanation to the show-cause notice issued under Section 4 (1) of Karnataka public premises (eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1974. . . . . . . Merely because the period given for submitting explanation is less than ten days, from the material on record it disclosed that no denial of opportunity has occurred to the disadvantage of the appellant as such since the appellant has submitted explanation and participated in enquiry, there was no prejudice and it cannot be said that the appellant was denied opportunity to represent his case effectively and on that ground rejected the contention of the counsel for the appellant about the deficiency. In my opinion the notice firstly lacks in material statement of case. It is not in accordance with Section 4 of the act. Apart from that, the conduct of the authorities in not disposing of that representation of the petitioner which was forwarded by the minister with his recommendations as observed by the district judge as well, and district judge has not been considered the effect of non-disposal of petitioner's representation by the authorities and that of their act of keeping the petitioner in disguise. Of course the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation. But the question is can the state take the benefit of its own in. Action when its duty was or the duty of its officer that is the director was to. Of course the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation. But the question is can the state take the benefit of its own in. Action when its duty was or the duty of its officer that is the director was to. Dispose of the application either allowing it or rejecting it if he thought that the minister had no business to make recommendation. If the authorities would have rejected the application, the petitioner definitely should have or ought to have handed over the possession of the premises. So in this case it cannot be said that equity does not lie in favour of the petitioner. In the circumstances it appears just and proper for me to allow the writ petition and to quash the orders impugned in the interest of Justice ignoring the technical pleas of impleading of the director or the district judge as parties. As regards the representation of the petitioner which is with the officers of the government, the district judge has observed in para 18 of his order that since it is only a direction to the joint director of marketing that resolution may be passed and case may be put up for further consideration. So I direct the opposite parties to consider that representation if it is available on the records of the joint director of the concerned department. If the same is not available petitioner may be required to supply a copy of that order within a period of 2 weeks from the date of receipt of intimation. At this stage the learned counsel suggested that let the petitioner produce the representation because it may not be available with the opposite parties and the competent authority may consider that representation for extension or renewal of the licence to use and pass appropriate orders in that context. If within 2 weeks the petitioner does not receive any intimation from the respondents that representation has not been traced, then on expiry of two weeks from today the petitioner will file a fresh representation with the director/joint director concerned in writing and it is open to them to consider that representation keeping in view the interest and the welfare of the state and the disabled persons as well. The authorities concerned after consideration of the representation is expected to inform the petitioner of their decision thereof as well as to the marketing committee concerned at the earliest, may be within a period of nine months from today or six months from the date of receipt of fresh representation from the petitioner, whichever is the earliest. If the orders are passed in favour of the petitioner by the director/joint director in the matter of allotment of the vacant site under their policy, then no proceedings may be taken against the petitioner during that period. If orders are passed against the petitioner rejecting his representation, then it is open to the opposite parties to take action in accordance with law. ( 7 ) IN the result the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders that is Annexure-H dated 18-10-1995 and Annexure-K dated 12-12-1995 are quashed. ( 8 ) THE opposite party that is the state through its director of agricultural produce market committee is directed to find out the representation of the petitioner and to consider the same. If the copy of the representation is not available on their record, they may intimate the petitioner on the petitioner's address within 2 weeks from today. If in case the petitioner does not receive any intimation of representation of being traced out or not and two weeks time expires, the petitioner is permitted to file a fresh representation for consideration of his request for extension or renewal of licence for the site in question. This application may be made within a period of one week from the date of expiry of the period granted to the state for tracing out the representation. The time of six months that has been granted to the state is to commence from the date of filing of the representation by the petitioner or from the date of it being traced whichever is earlier. Till the disposal of the petitioner's representation no action shall be taken to evict the petitioner. --- *** --- .