M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision petition has given rise to an interesting controversy with regard to the aspect of jurisdiction in relation to legal action a trustee is empowered to initiate within the framework of the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The facts to the extent necessary for purposes of deciding the issue are only being recounted by me. The petitioner is a trustee who is the original plaintiff before the lower Court and it is his case that the respondents are alleged to have committed certain encroachments on trust property and he has, therefore, instituted the suit for purposes of obtaining appropriate reliefs in respect thereof. The litigation has had a long history in so far as it commenced in the year 1962 and the respondent before me deserves to be complimented for having kept his litigation going for 34 years without the suit having commenced. The petitioners have virtually been bouncing from Court to Court and the question of whether the Court of the learned Munsiff before whom the proceeding is at present, has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, has still not been finally concluded. As of now, the respondents, relying on the provisions of Section 50 of the bombay Public Trusts Act, contended that having regard to the law as enunciated by the Full Bench of this Court in the decision in Ganapathi Ram Naik and Another v Kumta Shri venkatraman Dev, as also the decision of the Supreme Court in shree Gollaleshwar Dev and Others v Gangawwa Kom shantayya Math and Others , that the proceeding can only be instituted before the District Court and that the learned Munsiff has no right to entertain and try the suit. After hearing the parties, the learned Munsiff upheld this contention and so did the Appeal Court. The present civil revision petition is directed against that order. ( 2 ) THE petitioners' learned Advocate sought to place relianceon the fact that when the suit was originally filed, the question of jurisdiction was raised and that the present petitioner was directed to represent the plaint before the appropriate Court and according to him, this controversy was finally resolved in the year 1972 when it was held that the Munsiff s Court does have jurisdiction. His submission is that this issue was concluded in the same proceeding between the same parties, that the respondent did not challenge that decision and that therefore, according to him, there is a bar of estoppel in the way of the respondents once again re-agitating the same point. The respondents' learned Advocate sought to place reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi v maman Chand Ratilal Agarwal and Others, in support of his plea, that the principles analogous to res judicata which are sought to be enforced against his client, would not apply because, there has been considerable amount of legal thought bestowed on the interpretation of Section 50 of the Act and that it has been the subject-matter of the aforesaid two subsequent decisions both of which are binding on the Trial Court and the parties and he therefore, submits that if having regard to the change of law, as laid down by the Supreme Court, there is alteration of the situation that it is certainly open to a litigant to point that out to the Court and insist on the changed position being given effect to. I do concede that this is the correct position in law and that the respondents' learned Advocate is justified in this submission in so far as law is an ever growing process and if there are changes or modifications in the state of the law, no bar can be pleaded on the basis of the old situation. ( 3 ) THE petitioners' learned Advocate submitted that a trustee of a public trust is performing the role of a manager or an administrator, that he has to deal with property, assets and various other situations and that in the event of disputes arising or in the event of the need arising for the safeguarding of the interests of the trust or for that matter, even as far as recovery proceedings are concerned, that trustees would from time to time be required to have recourse to the law Courts. The learned advocate submitted that there is absolutely nothing in the bombay Public Trusts Act which prohibits a trustee from approaching any Court for obtaining such a remedy and that even though this is a special statute, there is no provision contained therein which requires that a trustee will be precluded from approaching a Court of law. The learned advocate submitted that there is absolutely nothing in the bombay Public Trusts Act which prohibits a trustee from approaching any Court for obtaining such a remedy and that even though this is a special statute, there is no provision contained therein which requires that a trustee will be precluded from approaching a Court of law. His submission is that this is an inherent right of a trustee and that the provisions of Section 50 of the Act will not have any application because, according to him, that provision relates only to action instituted either by the charity Commissioner or by persons interested in the trust other than trustees who have to institute such action after obtaining sanction. He therefore, submits that the aforesaid decisions, even though they have interpreted Section 50, would not in any way come to the assistance of the respondents and that both the lower Courts have erred in relying on these decisions. ( 4 ) AS against this position, the respondents' learned Advocat evehemently submitted that Section 50 of the Act must be read in conjunction with Section 52. He draws my attention to Section 52 of the Act which specifically excludes the operation of sections 92 and 93 of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned advocate submits that this very clearly indicates that the bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is a self-contained code and that it is a special enactment and that therefore, the procedure in relation to institution of proceedings is circumscribed by the provisions contained therein. The learned advocate submits that this very clearly indicates that the bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is a self-contained code and that it is a special enactment and that therefore, the procedure in relation to institution of proceedings is circumscribed by the provisions contained therein. He relies on Section 50 which deals with suits by or against or relating to public trusts or trustees or others and in particular, the earlier part of Section 50 which reads as follows: ( 5 ) IN any case, (i) where it is alleged that there is a breach of a public trust, negligence, misapplication or misconduct on the part of a trustee or trustees; (ii) where a direction or decree is required to recover the possession of or to follow a property belonging or alleged to be belonging to a public trust or the proceeds thereof or for an account of such property or proceeds from a trustee, ex-trustee, alienee, trespasser or any other person including a person holding adversely to the public trust but not a tenant or licensee; (iii) where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any public trust; or (iv) for any declaration or injunction in favour of of against a public trust or trustee or beneficiary thereof, the Charity Commissioner after making such enquiry as he thinks necessary, or two or more persons having an interest in case the suit is under sub-clauses (i) to (iii), or one or more such persons in case the suit is under sub-clause (iv) having obtained the consent in writing of the Charity Commissioner as provided in Section 51 may institute a suit whether contentious or not in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or part of the subject- matter of the trust is situate, to obtain a decree for any of the following reliefs: (a) an order for the recovery of the possession of such property or proceeds thereof; xx XX XX XX'. 5. The learned Advocate has relied on the wording of sub-clause (a) which specifically deals with an order for the recovery of the possession of the property or proceeds thereof and he submits that this is precisely the relief that is being sought in the present proceeding. 5. The learned Advocate has relied on the wording of sub-clause (a) which specifically deals with an order for the recovery of the possession of the property or proceeds thereof and he submits that this is precisely the relief that is being sought in the present proceeding. He has further drawn my attention to the state of the law as it now stands after the decision of the Full bench of this Court and the Supreme Court and he submits that it has been clarified that a legal action instituted by a trustee under Section 50 of the Act is synonymous or on par with legal action that is instituted by the Charity Commissioner or third parties or other persons who are interested in the trust, who have obtained the leave or sanction of the Charity commissioner. His argument proceeds on the footing that section 50 sets out various situations in which legal action may be necessary and that the section also very clearly indicates, as is the scheme of the Act, that these proceedings can be instituted only in the District Court. In doing so, the learned Advocate relies on the definition Section 2 (4) of the Act which defines the term "court". The respondents' learned Advocate has relied on two decisions wherein Section 9, Civil Procedure Code has been interpreted and the Courts have examined the law in some depth. The first of them is the decision in Firm Seth Radha kishan (deceased) represented by Hari Kishan and Others v administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, in and the second one is a Full Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in magulu Jal and Others v Bhagaban Rai and Others. In both these cases, the Court has done an incisive examination of the law relating to Section 9, Civil Procedure Code. The Court has pointed out very clearly that where special provisions exist, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is expressly or impliedly barred. In both these cases, the Court has done an incisive examination of the law relating to Section 9, Civil Procedure Code. The Court has pointed out very clearly that where special provisions exist, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is expressly or impliedly barred. On an analogy, the learned Advocate submits that the same principle would apply while deciding between the two Courts because, the proceeding is now before the Court of the learned munsiff and he submits that since this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit, that any order passed by that court would be an order without jurisdiction and that therefore, the lower Courts was right in directing the plaintiff to go back to the District Court. With regard to the length of the litigation and the fact that the plaintiff has virtually been shuttling between the two Courts over the years, the learned Advocate submits that the law has now been settled after these two decisions and that therefore, regardless of the fact that it is rather late in the day, the proceeding must be sent to the proper Court as it would be a waste of judicial time if a Court which lacks jurisdiction, were to go on with the matter. It is in this background that he has submitted that the orders passed do not require any interference with. ( 6 ) A subsidiary argument raised by the respondents' learned Advocate in reply to what had been submitted by the petitioners' learned Advocate proceeds on the footing that if one were to examine the scheme of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, where section 50 which deals with litigation of this type, prescribes that if the litigation were to be instituted by the Charily commissioner or persons interested in the trust other than trustees, has to go to the District Court alone, that it would be incongruous to permit the same or identical litigation instituted by the trustees to go to some other Court and the learned advocate submitted that the rule of consistency would require that the Court must uphold his contention that the provisions of section 50 would apply to all such litigation irrespective of who institutes it. ( 7 ) THE controversy that has been raised proceeds on the assumpoion that after the aforesaid decisions, that there is a parity between proceedings instituted by trustees and proceedings, instituted by the Charity Commissioner or persons interested in the trust, i. e. , those other than trustees. A correct reading of the judgments in question will indicate that this is not the position. There are two distinct categories of litigation which could arise in relation to public trusts. The first of them constitutes cases of the present type where the trustees are required to institute legal action. The second category is in relation to cases that have been referred to in Section 92, Civil procedure Code whereby the Charity Commissioner or persons interested in the trust who have obtained sanction from him, may institute proceedings against the trust or the trustees or for that matter, against third parties for purposes of safeguarding the interests of the trust. In the controversy that was before the supreme Court, the difficulty that arose was with regard to a situation where the trustees themselves followed the procedure prescribed in Section 50 and the question arose as to whether they could be treated on par with non-trustees, and the Supreme court answered the question in the affirmative. The controversy before this Court is entirely different in so far as in the first instance, it is the operation of Section 9, Civil Procedure Code that has been pressed into service whereby a trustee who has not followed the procedure prescribed under Section 50 is being forced to follow that procedure. In other words, since the supreme Court, in the special circumstances of that case, equated the action of the trustee with that of non-trustees, the respondent has concended that this should be the position in all cases and that therefore, the suit must go to the District Court. This is precisely where the error has arisen because, there is no parity between the proceedings instituted by a trustee and those instituted by non-trustees. A special provision has been provid for situations where non-trustees institute litigation and for good reason. This is precisely where the error has arisen because, there is no parity between the proceedings instituted by a trustee and those instituted by non-trustees. A special provision has been provid for situations where non-trustees institute litigation and for good reason. The petitioners' learned Advocate demonstrated to me that sanction is condition precedent for non-trustees if they were to institute such proceedings and that this would be an unreasonable hurdle and an impracticable situation because it would fetter the enforcement of normal legal action of the trustees if in the every legal proceedings they are required to obtain prior sanction from the Charity Commissioner. There is considerable substance in this argument in so far as Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with exclusion of jurisdiction and the case law referred to by me very clearly postulates that if jurisdiction is to be excluded, there must be specific provisions to that effect. 4s far as the rights of the trustees to institute legal proceedings in any Court of competent jurisdiction is concerned, the Bombay Public Trusts Act does not place any restrictions, fetters or exclusions on them. The petitioners' learned Advocate is therefore, right when he points out that the trustees are entitled to exercise their normal rights under the law without any such restriction because, those restrictions have been put down only in relation to proceedings instituted by non-trustees. The law is very clear with regard to situations in which Section 9, Civil Procedure Code applies in so far as it requires that before the jurisdiction of a particular Civil Court is taken away, that it must be demonstrated that there is an exclusion clause. It is true that the Courts have interpreted Section 9 to mean that such a bar can be either direct or implied. As far as the Bombay public Trusts Act is concerned, I find no such bar either direct or implied. It is true that as a result, if suits are to be instituted by a trustee, that he could go to whichever Court has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, but if a non-trustee is to institute a suit or a Charity Commissioner is to institute a suit, that it would have to go to the District Court. It is true that as a result, if suits are to be instituted by a trustee, that he could go to whichever Court has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, but if a non-trustee is to institute a suit or a Charity Commissioner is to institute a suit, that it would have to go to the District Court. This is a special provision and if a special procedure is prescribed in relation to such situations, to my mind, it would not lead to any serious anamolies or conflicts because, the two categories of suits are very dissimilar in so far as they are instituted by persons of different status. ( 8 ) HAVING regard to the position in law that emerges, the Trial Court as also the Appeal Court which confirmed the order of the Trial Court were in error in having held that the petitioner's suit cannot be entertained by the Trial Court. The order of the Trial Court which has been confirmed by the Appeal court being erroneous in law is required to be set aside. ( 9 ) THE civil revision petition accordingly succeeds. Having regard to the age of the litigation, the parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 1-10-1996 for further orders. The interim stay granted by this Court to stand vacated. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. ( 10 ) THE Trial Court shall endeavour to ensure that this whole litigation is disposed of as expeditiously as possible. --- *** --- .