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1996 DIGILAW 524 (MP)

Harkunwar Bai (Mahila) v. State of M. P.

1996-06-24

FAKHRUDDIN, SHACHEENDRA DWIVEDI

body1996
JUDGMENT Dwivedi, J. -- 1. The appellants have challenged judgment of conviction passed against them under sections 302 and 201 of IPC and they have been sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and 4 years' R.I. respectively. 2. According to the prosecution version, deceased Geeta Bai, the wife of appellant No.3 Asharam and daughter-in-law of appellants 1 and 2, was living with the appellants, having been brought to the village about 8- 10 days earlier to the incident. The deceased died on 4.5.88 with burn injuries. 3. It was alleged that the accused-appellants, were harassing the deceased and were insisting upon her to bring Rs. 5,000/- of the dowry from her parents else she would be done to death. It was also alleged that the deceased was brought from her parental house on the assurance to the panchayat that the deceased . would not be harassed any further. The deceased had come to the house of the appellants only on such assurance. 4. A report of the incident was lodged by appellant Nirbhaysingh with Police Station Chanderi, on the date of incident itself, stating that at about 5.00 p.m., when the appellants were at the well, Balchand Lodhi of the village (DW 3), came to them from the village and asked them to proceed to the house as their daughter-in-law Geeta Bai had died due to the burn injuries. On such information, the appellants came to their house and found Geeta Bai dead. She had the burn injuries. The appellants had called the Sarpanch of the village and had narrated the incident to him. The maker of the FIR, appellant Nirbhaysingh further stated that how his daughter-in-law set herself to fire was not known. On the above information a marg was registered by the Police. 5. The body of the deceased was sent for postmortem. The two docotrs,namely, PW 7 Dr. H.S. Mudgal and PW 8 Dr. J.B. Singh conducted the post-mortem and were of the opinion that deceased Geeta Bai had died due to throttling and she was set to fire thereafter. On this view, the Police recorded the statement of the deceased's father Gajrajsingh (PW I) and of her mother Nainabai (PW 2). 6. H.S. Mudgal and PW 8 Dr. J.B. Singh conducted the post-mortem and were of the opinion that deceased Geeta Bai had died due to throttling and she was set to fire thereafter. On this view, the Police recorded the statement of the deceased's father Gajrajsingh (PW I) and of her mother Nainabai (PW 2). 6. Finding it acase of causing murder by the appellants on a demand of dowry and on the allegation of deceased being of bad character, the offence was registered under section 302/304-B read with section 201 of IPC. After the due investigation the challan was filed. The trial Court framed charges against the appellants under section 302 and in the alternative u/ss. 302/304-B and 201 of IPC. 7. The appellants abjured their guilt and pleaded their innocence with their ignorance about the incident. The defence of the appellants at the trial was that they were away at the well when the stated incident had occurred. They were informed by Balchand (who was examained by them as DW 3) and soon thereafter, appellant Nirbhaysingh had lodged the report of the incident with the police. The Sarpanch of De village was called and the incident was narrated to him before lodging the report with the police. On evidence the learned trial Court found the appellants to be guilty forthe offence punishable under section 302/20 I of IPC. 8. The case of the prosecution rests upon the circumstantial evidence as the eye-witness account of the incident is not available. The prosecution had examined the deceased's father Gajrajsingh and mother Nainabai as PW I and PW 2. They had stated that the accused-appellants were demanding dowry of Rs. 5,000/-, as this fact used to be stated by the deceased, whenever she had visited their house. It was also stated by them that the threat to their daughter was that if the amount was not brought by the deceas~d, she would be killed by them. 9. It was further stated by PW 2 that she was also told by the deceased that her father-in-law, i.e., appellant Nirbhay Singh used to take drinks and was keeping bad eye on her. Therefore, on one occasion, sht! had told to her father-in-law that she would pluck his moustaches, which had enraged her father-in-law. 9. It was further stated by PW 2 that she was also told by the deceased that her father-in-law, i.e., appellant Nirbhay Singh used to take drinks and was keeping bad eye on her. Therefore, on one occasion, sht! had told to her father-in-law that she would pluck his moustaches, which had enraged her father-in-law. It was further stated by them that they were informed by one Bhupat (not examined) at their village that their daughter had been killed by the accused-appellants and was also put to fire. As such, their version that the accused-appellants had killed the deceased and had later put her to fire, remained heresay due to the non-examination ofBhupaf. Deceased was stated to have come to appellants' house on assurance before Panchayat of proper treatment to her. 10. Witness Lal Chand (PW 3) hails from the parental village of the deceased, but he does not support the versi'on of PW I Gajraj Singh and PW 2 Rainabai on the point of holding of the Panchayat. The other witnesses PW 4 Rajaram, PW 5 Bhairon Lal and PW 6 Sarnam Singh are from appellants' village and no part of their statement goes to support the prosecution version. Witness Raja Ram (PW 4) though a neighbour of the appellants, has stated that he had gone to the appellants' house for the first time on the fateful day of the incident. He was examined by the prosecution in order to prove the spot map (Ex. P 2). It appears from his version that the appellants had left the village in the morning on the date of the incident, as on their field the well was being dug. The deceased was all alone in the house. It further appears from his version that she had chained the door from inside before the incident. There is no access to the room except the door. According to this witness, when he reached the spot, the deceased had asked for the water before her death. 11. PW S Bhairon Lal has proved the panchayatnama lash (Ex. P/4). PW 8 Sarnam Singh was examined by the prosecution as a witness of seizure of kerosene oil container and a petitioner under Ex. PIS. 12. The version of the two doctors PW 7 Dr.H.S. Mudgal and PW 8 Dr. 11. PW S Bhairon Lal has proved the panchayatnama lash (Ex. P/4). PW 8 Sarnam Singh was examined by the prosecution as a witness of seizure of kerosene oil container and a petitioner under Ex. PIS. 12. The version of the two doctors PW 7 Dr.H.S. Mudgal and PW 8 Dr. J.S. Singh go to describe the condition of the body of deceased and stated that they had found no external injuries on her body. The post-mortem report (Ex. P/8) had thus described the cause of death, "asphyxia since trachea and larynx were found highly congested and there was effusion of blood in surrounding tissue" and the doctors were of the opinion that the deceased was first throttled and then the body was burnt immediately after the death. 13. But the evidence led by the prosecution does not go to connect the accused-appellants with the offence. On the contrary, Raja Ram (PW 4) stated in the Court that when he reached the house of the appellants, the deceased had asked him for water, but soon thereafter she had died. The evidence goes to contradict the opinion of the two doctors. 14. The circumstances appearing against the appellants and relied upon by trial Court may be summarised as below :-i) That the accused/appellants were demanding the dowry amount of Rs.5,000/-. An allegation about the deceased being of the bad character was also levelled which provided motive for the alleged murder of the deceased. ii) That the deceased died in the house of the appellants within 4 years of marriage, hence, presumption u/s. l13B of Evidence Act. iii) That the doctors on post-mortem had found that the cause of death was throttling, and the body was burnt immediately, thereafter. 15. If we assume the above circumstances proved against the appellants, the question would still be whether conviction of the appellants can be based on those circumstances. 16. It is well settled that when the case rests upon the circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances ought to be complete, leading to the only hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The benefit of the missing links would go to the accused persons. The alleged circumstances go to raise the suspicion against the appellants of having committed the offence, but the suspicion howsoever strong cannot take place of the proof. The benefit of the missing links would go to the accused persons. The alleged circumstances go to raise the suspicion against the appellants of having committed the offence, but the suspicion howsoever strong cannot take place of the proof. In a case resting upon the circumstantial evidence, it is the bounden duty of the prosecution to prove the complete chain of circumstances. This has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of cases and in the recent past in Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC I 157): it was observed that- . - . "When a case rests upon the circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy three tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established, (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused, (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. The circumstantial evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence." 17. The view was reiterated in Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka ( AIR 1983 SC 446 ), holding that :- "5. In cases in which the evidence is purely of a circumstantial nature, the facts and circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is sought to be drawn must be fully established beyond any reasonable doubt and the facts and circumstances should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but they must be in their effect as to the entirely incompatible with the innocence of the accused and must exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence." 18. In the instant case, the prosecution also seeks the support of the legal presumption for offence under section 304-B, IPC but it stood rebutted from the evidence of PW 4 Rajaram and OW 3 Balchand. Rajaram had stated that when he reached at the spot, the deceased had asked him for water before her death. In the instant case, the prosecution also seeks the support of the legal presumption for offence under section 304-B, IPC but it stood rebutted from the evidence of PW 4 Rajaram and OW 3 Balchand. Rajaram had stated that when he reached at the spot, the deceased had asked him for water before her death. Such statement would go to indicate that when he alongwith one Kalyan had reached the appellants' house, the deceased was alive. Kalyan has not been examined by the prosecution. The statements of the examined prosecution witnesses run counter to the medical evidence. 19. Furthermore, the question remained unanswered by the prosecution as to who was the author of the crime, if the presumption be raised. Even the trial Court after posing the question to itself in para 29 of the impugned judgment, failed to answer the same. From the prosecution evidence itself, it is apparent that the appellants were away at their field as the well was being dug on that date and the deceased was all alone in the house. They were informed at the well by witness Balchand (OW 3), who was although cited as a witness by the prosecution, yet was not examined and the defence had produced the witness. The parents of the deceased were informed of the incident and had reached at the hospital. 20. The legal presumption available to prosecution under section 113-B of the Evidence Act stands rebutted from the version of PW 4 Rajaram and OW 3 Balchand. The learned trial Court ignoring the evidence-of PW 4 Rajaram and relying upon the medical opinion had found that witnesses Rajaram (PW 4) and Harnam Singh (PW 6) and Balchand (OW 3) were unreliable, as the doctors had stated that deceased's body was burnt after she was throttled to death. 21. The two doctors formed their opinion that the deceased was first throttled and her body was burnt later, on her tounge having been found protruded and bitten by teeth (although panchnama lash Ex. P-4 shows that her mouth was closed) and also as the blood was found in the tissues of surrounding trachea and larynx which were found to be congested, but the above circumstances do not conclusively lead to an inference nor an opinion could be formed only on the above condition of body that the death of the deceased was caused by throttling. The doctors did not state in post-mortem report (Ex. PIS) that the burn injuries were antemortem. After long lapse of time the doctors could have deposed only on the basis of their reports, and if the report did not contain the material fact, their statements on that fact would be unreliable being an improvement. 22. Mody in Book of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology has found the following symptoms for forming an opinion that the death might have resulted from throttling causing asphyxia:-"( 1) If the windpipe is compressed so suddenly as to occlude the passage of air altogether, the individual is rendered powerless to call for assistance, becomes insensible and may die instantly. If the windpipe is not completely closed, the face becomes cyanosed, bleeding occurs from the mouth, nostrils and ears, the hands are clenched and convulsions precede delayed death. As in hanging, insensibility is very rapid, and death is quite painless. In such cases, death is usually due to asphyxia (anoxic hypoxia). (2) When a person is throttled and when both hands are used to grasp and compress the throat, the thumb mark of one hand and the finger marks of the other hand are usually found on either side of the throat. Sometimes, both thumb marks are found on one side and several finger marks on the opposite side. If the throat is compressed between two hanus, one being applied to the front and the other to the back, bruises and abrasions may be found on the front of the neck, as well as on its back. Besides these marks, there may be abrasions and bruises on the mouth, nose, cheeks, forehead, lower jaw or any other part of the body, if there has been a struggle. Similarly, fractures of the ribs and injuries to the thoracic and abdominal organs may be present, if the assailant kneels on the chest or abdomen of his victim while pressing his throat. (3) In asphyxia the fact is puffy and cyanosed, and marked with petechiae. The eyes are prominent and open. In some cases they may be closed. The conjunctivae are congested, and the pupile are dilated. Patchiae are seen in the eyelids and the conjunctivae. The lips are blue. Bloody foam, escapes from the mouth and nostrils, and sometimes pure blood issues from the mouth, nose and ears, espacially if great violence has been used. The. In some cases they may be closed. The conjunctivae are congested, and the pupile are dilated. Patchiae are seen in the eyelids and the conjunctivae. The lips are blue. Bloody foam, escapes from the mouth and nostrils, and sometimes pure blood issues from the mouth, nose and ears, espacially if great violence has been used. The. tongue is often swollen, bruished, protruding and dark in colour, showing patches of extravasation and occasionally bitten by the teeth. There may be evidence of brusing at the back of the neck. The hands are usually clonched. The genital organs may be congested and there may be discharges of urine, faeces and seminal fluid." 23. The above described symptoms do not appear on the body of the deceased. The panchnama lash (Ex. P/4) shows that the mouth of the deceased was closed and the tongue was not seen protruded. But contrary to it, the post-mortem report (Ex. PIS) has shown the mouth to he open and the tongue protruded. The absence of the symptoms as described by Modi and the contradictions appearing in the two documents Ex. P/4 and Ex. PIS go to make the case of the prosecution a doubtful story. 24. The prosecution has failed to produce any evidence to suggest that the appellants or any of them was seen in the house or in its vicinity soon before the incident or at the time of the incident. The post-mortem report (Ex. P/8) does not lead to the conclusion that the bum injuries were anti-mortem. The doctors failed to find any other external injury on the body of the deceased. In almost similar circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mulak Raj and others v. State of Haryana [1996 CrLR (SC) 72] observed that :-"Merely because deceased Krishna Kumari who was staying with the accused had died a homicidal death in their household and her dead body was found in the kitchen with post mortem bums it cannot be said that the said circumstance by itself would connect all the accused or anyone of them with the crime." 25. In the above circumstances, where the medical opinion is in contradiction to the ocular evidence and the circumstances do not satisfy the test where the death by throttling could be inferred. 26. In the above circumstances, where the medical opinion is in contradiction to the ocular evidence and the circumstances do not satisfy the test where the death by throttling could be inferred. 26. The prosecution has, therefore, failed to prove the complete chain of circumstances in order to bring home the guilt to the accused-appellants and that too beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. Therefore, no conviction can be based on the circumstances, which have been brought out by the prosecution in the instant case in order to connect the accused-appellants with the offence. 27. The learned trial Court under the impugned judgment, proceeded to convict the accused-appellants on suspicion and surmises, rather than on the circumstantial evidence. 28. On the foregoing discussion, this appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. The appellants (except Mahila Harkunwar Bai) be set at liberty forthwith if they are not required in any other case. Mahila Harkunwar Bai, appellant No.1, is already on bail. Her bail bond shall stand discharged. Ordered accordingly.