TIRATH S. THAKUR, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition calls in question an order dated 3-10-1988 issued by the Charity Commissioner, Belgaum reducing the seva fees prescribed for performances of sevas in the Sri Saunsthan mahabaleshwar Dev, Temple at Gokarn. ( 2 ) SRI Saunsthan Mahabaleshwar Dev Temple is a venerated and popular place of pilgrimage in this country. The temple is a public Trust governed by the Bombay Public Trust Act which continues to remain in force in the Bombay-Karnataka areas of the present State of Karnataka. The affairs of the Trust are managed by a committee of trustees appointed for the purpose. ( 3 ) SEVAS (Prayers and Services) are performed in the temple by devotees on payment of certain fees prescribed by the Charity commissioner. Pursuant to a proposal sent by the Managing trustee of the Trust, the Charity Commissioner by his order dated 29-5-1988 enhanced the rates for different sevas performed in the temple from those that were prevalent since the year 1979. Representations and protests followed the hike in the seva rates prescribed by the said order. So much so by an order dated 29-08-1988 the Government had to intervene and ask the Charity Commissioner to revise the seva rates considering the widespread objection to the same from different quarters. Upon consideration of all these representations, protests and letters received by the Charity Commissioner and also the recommendations made by the Minister for endowments and member of the Parliament from the area concerned, the Charity Commissioner passed an order dated 3-10-1988 modifying seva rates in respect of 20 out of a total 34 items. Aggrieved by, the petitioner-Trust has come up with the present writ petition seeking a certiorari quashing the said order and for a declaration to the effect that the charity Commissioner has no jurisdiction in the matter of fixing seva fees which power according to the petitioner vests exclusively in the trustees of the temple. ( 4 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner made a two fold submission in support of the petition. Firstly he argued that the charity Commissioner had no authority under the provisions of bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, to prescribe the seva fees applicable to the sevas being performed in the holy temple. He urged that the order being without jurisdiction was liable to be quashed. Firstly he argued that the charity Commissioner had no authority under the provisions of bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, to prescribe the seva fees applicable to the sevas being performed in the holy temple. He urged that the order being without jurisdiction was liable to be quashed. Alternatively he submitted that even if the Charity commissioner had any power to do so yet the modification made by him in his earlier order could be justified only if a specific finding was recorded by him that the rates earlier prescribed were excessive. It was contended that no such finding had been returned by the Charity Commissioner nor was there any material before him to suggest that the rates earlier prescribed were in any way exorbitant so as to warrant any reduction. ( 5 ) MR. Ramesh, Government Advocate on the other hand supported the order made by the Charity Commissioner and urged that the power vested in him was wide enough to include the power to prescribe the rates for the performance of the sevas. He contended that the petitioner having accepted the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner for the past nearly 20 years and having subjected itself to the same could not at this belated stage turn around to question his authority. The Charity commissioner it was submitted had sufficient material before him to show that the rates earlier prescribed by him were excessive and therefore required to be suitably reduced, if not all at least in respect of some of the sevas. ( 6 ) THE Bombay Trust Act, was enacted to make better provisions for administration of Public Religious and Charitable trusts. The Act is in recognition of the principle that the government is 'parens Patriae' of its wards and the protector of charities in general. It constitutes an appropriate authority called the Charity Commissioner for the due discharge of the functions that would otherwise vest in the Government. Section 3 of the Act enables the Charity Commissioner to superintendent the administration and carry out the provisions of the Act. Section 37 gives general powers to the Charity commissioner and others mentioned therein to enter upon and inspect any property belonging to a public Trust, to call for or inspect any extract from any proceedings of such Trust as well as the books of accounts in the possession of the trustees. Section 37 gives general powers to the Charity commissioner and others mentioned therein to enter upon and inspect any property belonging to a public Trust, to call for or inspect any extract from any proceedings of such Trust as well as the books of accounts in the possession of the trustees. It obliges the trustees to afford all convenience and facilities for such examination. Section 38 of the Act, empowers the Charity commissioner to refer the matter to an auditor to look into the management of the Trust and to call upon any defaulting trustee to give an explanation. Section 40 empowers him to determine the loss if any caused to the Trust. Whereas Section 41 envisages imposition of surcharge upon the defaulting trustees. From a reading of the provisions of the Act, particularly those relating to the powers of the Charity Commissioner, it is apparent that he does not function merely as a Tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial authority, for determining questions which are brought before him but is vested with inquestoreal powers as well. The expression "superintend the Administration" appearing in Section 3 of the Act, has not been defined but is in the light of the other provisions and the object underlaying the act, of the widest amplitude. The term 'superintend' has been defined by Black in his Law Dictionary thus:"to have charge and direction of; to direct the course and oversee the details; to regulate with authority; to manage to oversee with the power of direction; to take care of with authority. "the term 'administration' similarly has been described thus:"management or conduct of an office or employment; the performance of the executive, duties of an institution, business, or the like. In public law,the administration of government means, the practical management and direction of the executive department, or of the public machinery or functions, or of the operations of the various organs or agencies. Direction or oversight of any office, service, or employment. "it is thus obvious that the power to superintend the 'administration' is wide enough to include within it the power to decide whether or not there should be a fee for the performance of sevas in a temple and if so, what should be the fee structure. Direction or oversight of any office, service, or employment. "it is thus obvious that the power to superintend the 'administration' is wide enough to include within it the power to decide whether or not there should be a fee for the performance of sevas in a temple and if so, what should be the fee structure. The argument that the power to fix the fee for sevas vests only in the trustees and that the Charity Commissioner does not enjoy any superintendence or supervision over the exercise of any such power, does not get support from any provision of the Act nor is the same compatible with the scheme, underlying the same. Fixation of the fees for sevas to be performed in the temple does not interfere with the performance of the sevas as such. All that it implies is that the Charity Commissioner, has by reference to the nature of the sevas to be performed, the expenses involved in the performance thereof the prices of the articles utilised for performance of such sevas, the paying capacity of devotees who get the sevas performed and such other relevant factors would determine the fee structure for such sevas. Any such determination cannot be said to be an interference with the performance of any religious ceremony or ritual connected with the temple, so as to give rise to any legitimate objection. Any other interpretation upon the powers of the Charity commissioner would lead to anomalous results. If the trustees be deemed to be the ultimate authority to determine the fees chargeable for the sevas performed it may seriously hamper the administration of the Trusts besides defeating the very purpose for which the law aimed at streamlining the affairs of the Trusts was enacted. Suffice it to say that the Charity Commissioner while discharging his duties and functions under the Act, is entitled to maintain a vigil over the activities of the trustees and take remedial steps wherever the same are found necessary. In as much as the Charity Commissioner, in the instant case modified his earlier order prescribing the seva rates on account of the widespread protest against the hike in the same, he cannot be said to have transgressed the limits of his jurisdiction so as to warrant interference from this Court. In as much as the Charity Commissioner, in the instant case modified his earlier order prescribing the seva rates on account of the widespread protest against the hike in the same, he cannot be said to have transgressed the limits of his jurisdiction so as to warrant interference from this Court. ( 7 ) THERE is considerable merit even in the alternative submission that was made on behalf of the respondents. The charity Commissioner has been prescribing the rates for the performance of sevas in the temple for the past many decades. The last of such orders Was passed on 29th May, 1988, reliance whereupon has been placed by the petitioner. This order even though issued on receipt of a proposal from the trustees nevertheless was an order passed by the Charity Commissioners in exercise of his power of superintendence enjoyed under the act. The petitioner never questioned the said order nor even any earlier order passed in that regard. A modification made in any such order issued by the Commissioner himself cannot therefore be assailed, not only because the authority issuing an order is competent to modify or rescind the same, but also because having conceded the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner and invited an order, the petitioner cannot turn round and contend that he did not have any such jurisdiction. It is true that consent does not confer jurisdiction where it does not otherwise inhere in the authority concerned, but interference with an order passed by any such authority can be declined by this Court at the instance of a party who has invoked the said jurisdiction taken a chance for a favourable decision and when disappointed turned round to question its competence to do so. ( 8 ) THAT brings me to the only other ground urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. He contended that the impugned order modifying the rates prescribed earlier is not a speaking order, in the sense that the same does not record any reasons in support. A reading of the impugned order however itself shows the fallacy of the submission. From the order it is apparent that not only were representations received from various quarters against the increase in the rates for the performance of sevas, but even the Government had asked the charity Commissioner to look into the question of reducing the same. A reading of the impugned order however itself shows the fallacy of the submission. From the order it is apparent that not only were representations received from various quarters against the increase in the rates for the performance of sevas, but even the Government had asked the charity Commissioner to look into the question of reducing the same. The very basis for the issue of the impugned order thus was a general complaint against the new rates prescribed. It is therefore, apparent that the reduction was induced by no consideration except that the rates prescribed were excessive. If that be so, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that Charity commissioner ought to have gone a step further and specifically recorded that the earlier rates were excessive. The reduction in the old rates is by itself sufficient to show that the order was necessitated on account of the earlier rates being higher than what was reasonable. In the circumstances, therefore, I see no reason to interfere. This writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .