Umed Singh v. State of Rajasthan — 1996 DIGILAW 531 (RAJ)

Honble DALELA, J. – This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nagaur, whereby the accused-appellant has been convicted for the offence under Sec. 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100/-. (2). We have heard the arguments of both the sides. (3). The prosecution case in brief is that on 29.9.87, the mother and the sister of the appellant went inside the field of the deceased enroute to their house. The latter objected to their entry into the field. On this a quarrel took place between them. However, the ladies went to their house and the deceased to the village. In the village the deceased went to the residence of Bhanwar Singh to pay his condo- lence on the said demise of Gopal Singh, father of Bhanwar Singh. At the Chabutra of Bhanwar Singhs residence the accused appellant came there with Kassi in his hand and assaulted the deceased with the Kassi as a result of which the deceased sustained injuries and died on the spot. Sumer Singh brought the dead body to the house of the deceased and in the evening the FIR was lodged. The appellant was charged by the trial court for committing the murder of the deceased punishable under Sec. 302 IPC. He pleaded not guilty and in the trial the prosecution examined 13 witnesses. (4). The accused-appellant in his statement under Sec. 313 Cr.P.C. stated that there was permanent way, that passed through the field of the deceased, who tried to close it. When the mother and sister of the accused removed the obstruction put on the way the deceased assaulted the ladies, who in defence inflicted the injuries to the deceased, who died consequently. Five witnesses have been examined in defence. (5). After considering the evidence of both the sides and hearing the argume- nts advanced by both the sides the learned trial court has convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant as indicated above. (6). That learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the prosecution has tried to produce P.W.3 Narain Singh and P.W. 1 Sumer Singh as eye-witnesses, whereas they were not so. According to the learned counsel for the appellant this creates doubt in the prosecution case as the prosecution has tried to create false witnesses. But the contention of the learned counsel does not seem to be correct. According to the learned counsel for the appellant this creates doubt in the prosecution case as the prosecution has tried to create false witnesses. But the contention of the learned counsel does not seem to be correct. The trial court has held that P.W. 3 and P.W. 1 were not the eye witnesses though they claimed to be so. The prosecution case can not be thrown away merely because these two witnesses unsuccessfully claimed to be the eye- witnesses. The- re are other eye-witnesses of the alleged incident. (7). P.W. 8 Bhanwar Singh is the son of Gopal Singh, who had expired and the deceased went to his residence to pay his condolence. The presence of P.W. 8 Bhanwar Singh on the site of occurrence is thus quite natural and can not be doubted. He has deposed that the accused-appellant assaulted the deceased at the Chabutra of his house with Kassi as a result of which the deceased sustained injuries and died consequently. Moti Singh (P.W.7) is also the relative of Gopal Singh, who had expired and as such his (P.W.7) presence at the site of occurrence is quite natural and can not be doubted. He has corroborated the testimony of P.W. 8 Bhanwar Singh. A perusal of the testimony of P.W. 7 and P.W. 8 would show that they are natural witnesses and their evidence is reliable and trust-worthy. The learned trial court has rightly believed the evidence of P.W. 7 and P.W. 8 for coming to the conclusion that the accused-appellant assaulted the deceased with Kassi as a result of which the deceased sustained injuries and died consequently. (8). Over importance can not be given to the minor discrepancies in the evidence here and there. Unless the discrepancy goes to the root of the matter the benefit of the minor discrepancy here and there is not available to the accused-ap- pellant. (9). We broadly agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court on the basis of these witnesses and also approve the reasonings given by the learned trial court in the support of its conclusion. (10). The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution has deliberately changed the site of occurrence to show that the incident had taken place at the house of the deceased. But we do not think that it is so. (10). The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the prosecution has deliberately changed the site of occurrence to show that the incident had taken place at the house of the deceased. But we do not think that it is so. The charge which was read over and explained to the accused-appellant is that the accused has assaulted and killed the deceased near the house of Bhanwar Singh at about 3 p.m. The evidence of eye- witnesses P.W.7 and P.W. 8 also goes to show that at the Chabutri of the house of Bhanwar Singh the deceased was assaulted by the accused-appellant and the deceased died on the spot. Thus, there is no attempt on the part of the prosecution to change the site of occurrence and the contention of the learned counsel does not appear to have any force. (11). The learned counsels next argument is that there has been delay in filing the FIR and as such the FIR is fabricated one and, therefore, the entire prosecution case collapses. But we do not agree with this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant because the incident took place at about 3 p.m. and the FIR was lodged in the same evening at 5.45 p.m. We, therefore, do not consider that the FIR was brought into existence long after the occurrence. The FIR, therefore, can not be said to be a delayed FIR. (12). The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in defence is that the FIR reached the concerned Magistrate on 30.9.87 and as such there has been delay in despatching the F.I.R. to the Magistrate and this throws a serious doubt on the prosecution case. We, however, do not agree with this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant.The FIR was lodged in the evening of 29.9.87 and it reached the Magistrate on 30.9.87. It appears that on 30.9.87 there was a holiday or Sunday. Therefore, the FIR reached the concerning Magistrate at 2 p.m. at his residence. Therefore, we find ourselves unable to agree with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that there has been a delay in despatch of the FIR to the Magistrate. Therefore, merely on this count the prosecution case can not be thrown away as doubtful. (13). The learned counsel for the appellant has next argued that Mst. Therefore, we find ourselves unable to agree with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that there has been a delay in despatch of the FIR to the Magistrate. Therefore, merely on this count the prosecution case can not be thrown away as doubtful. (13). The learned counsel for the appellant has next argued that Mst. Sada Kanwar the mother of the accused-appellant passed through the field of the deceased and when the latter objected to passing of the ladies through his field and assaulted them, Sada Kanwar (P.W.9) had sustained injuries. According to the learned counsel the fact that Sada Kanwar received injuries goes to indicate that the incident had taken place in the field of the deceased on a quarrel between Mst. Sada Kanwar and the deceased. The learned counsel has further argued that the witnesses have proved that the quarrel took place between the deceased and Sada Kanwar and her daughter in the field of the deceased, and that deceased assaulted them and in retaliation the ladies inflicted injuries on the deceased as a result of which he died. Upon the consideration of the entire evidence produced by both the sides and to the oral arguments advanced by both the sides before us we find ourselves broadly in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial court that the defence story is not reliable and seems to be not true. We also approve the reasonings given by the learned trial court in arriving at this conclusion. (14). We need not enter into a detail re-appraisal of evidence and reiterate the reasonings given by the learned trial Court. We are broadly in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial court upon the consideration evidence of both the sides and we also approve the reason given by the learned trial court for arriving at the conclusions at which it had arrived. In the case Girijanandini Devi & Ors. We are broadly in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial court upon the consideration evidence of both the sides and we also approve the reason given by the learned trial court for arriving at the conclusions at which it had arrived. In the case Girijanandini Devi & Ors. vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary (1), it has been held by the Supreme Court that where the appellate court generally agree with the conclusions and the reasonings of the learned trial court the former need not enter upon the re-appraisal of the evidence and reiterate the reasons given by the trial court in support of the conclusions and the expression of general agreement of the appellate court with the conclusions and reasonings of the trial court would suffice. As stated above, we are broadly in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the learned trial court in holding the accused appellant guilty for committing murder of the deceased-the offence punishable under Sec. 302 IPC. We also approve the reasons given by the learned trial court for coming to the said conclusions. (15). The punishment awarded by the learned trial court seems to be adequate and would meet the ends of justice in the matter. (16). No other point has been argued and pressed before us. (17). The net result of the above entire discussion is that the appeal fails and is dismissed hereby.