Honble PRASAD, J. – By this appeal accused/appellant Sunil Kumar has challenged his conviction under Section 304 (B) IPC and under Section 498 (A) IPC passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Sri Ganganagar Camp Sri Karanpur. (2). Briefly stated facts of the prosecution are, Sh. Mani Ram PW-2 lodged a written report on 20th March, 1992 at Police Station, Ghamurwali. On the basis of this report a formal F.I.R. Ex. P-2 was registered. In this F.I.R. it was stated by PW-2 Mani Ram that his daughter Maya aged about 26 years was given in marriage to the son of Shri Ram Chandra Chipa. They got married on 11.06.1985. The in-laws of the Maya started ill beating her soonafter the marriage, specifically Balvir Singh, elder brother of Sunil and Smt. Sajana Devi, mother of Sunil used to create problems. Whenever Sunil used to visit his in-laws place, he used to indulge in quarrel and demand of dowry. Because of this, the family of the complainent was very disturbed. The grand father of the girl Maya, Shri Lekh Raj visited the house of the accused alongwith former Sarpanch of Ghamurwali but , the accused did not meand their ways. (3). The accused persistently made a demand for a Motor-Cycle. The complainant was forced to purchase a Bajaj scooter for the accused. On 11-12th March accused had come to attend a marriage in the family of his in-laws and at that time he specifically demanded the sum of Rs. 30,000/- and threatened that in case the money is not paid, he will kill Smt. Maya. This was stated in the First Information Report that on 19th March, 1992 Smt. Maya killed herself by throwing into the water diggi. After usual investigation police submitted challan against accused Sunil Kumar only. Against accused Balveer Singh and Sajana Devi cognizance were taken by the Court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Padampur. Who then committed the case to Additional District and Session Judge No. 1 Sri Ganganagar Camp Sri Karanpur. (4). The Trial Court framed the charge against all the three accused persons under Section 304 (B) IPC & 498 (A) IPC. After trial accused Smt. Sajana Devi and Shri Balveer Singh were acquitted and the accused/appellant Sunil Kumar was convicted under Section 304 (B) IPC and sentence of seven years RI and fine of Rs. 500/-. (4). The Trial Court framed the charge against all the three accused persons under Section 304 (B) IPC & 498 (A) IPC. After trial accused Smt. Sajana Devi and Shri Balveer Singh were acquitted and the accused/appellant Sunil Kumar was convicted under Section 304 (B) IPC and sentence of seven years RI and fine of Rs. 500/-. He was also convicted under Section 498 for one year RI and a fine of Rs. 500/-. (5). Shri M.K. Garg counsel for the appellant/accused has urged that the Trial Court has erred in convicting the accused/appellant under Section 304 (B) IPC. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the marriage was not solemnised within seven years of the incident and therefore, the application of Section 304 (B) IPC is ruled out. It has further been contended by the counsel for the appellant that the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused had subjected deceased to such cruelty or harassment which was inconnection with any demand for dowry. In absence of any proof of such cruelty being done with the deceased soon before her death the offence under Section 304 (B) cannot be held to be proved. (6). That the father of the deceased Maya PW-2 Mani Ram has given the date of marriage of the deceased and Sunil Kumar as 11.6.1985, and the date of incident has been given as 19th March 1992. Apart from this witness PW-5 Anant Ram states the the marriage of Maya and Sunil Kumar was performed 6-7 years before, PW-6 states that the marriage was solemnised about 8-9 years before, this witness was examined in August, 1993. From the testimony of these witnesses it cannot be definitely said that the marriage has been solemnised beyond seven years of the incident and therefore, this argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. (7). The prosecution case has to be judged in the light of the another argument of the Counsel for the appellant that the death cannot be termed as to be dowry death, in terms of Section 304 (B) IPC as asoon before the incident she was not subjected to any cruelty. There is no evidence regarding that on record. (8). The statement of the PW-2 Mani Ram speaks of the threat given by accu- sed on March 12, 1992 that if he is not given the sum of Rs. There is no evidence regarding that on record. (8). The statement of the PW-2 Mani Ram speaks of the threat given by accu- sed on March 12, 1992 that if he is not given the sum of Rs. 30,000/- he will kill his daughter. This threat may be anything but not the subjection of cruelty by the accused to the deceased. The statement of the other witnesses who are the close relatives of the deceased are to the same effect. Therefore, the only evidence produced by the prosecution to support the allegations under Section 304 is to the fact that the demand for Rs. 30,000/- was made on March, 12, 1992. Can this demand itself constitute cruelty under Section 304 (B) IPC is the most important question. (9). This court and the case reported in Gurditta Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan (1), have considered this question and have held that the words `it is shown occurring in Section 304 (B) are of significance for the reason that the initial burden of proving that circumstances envisaged by Section 304 (B) IPC did exist is on the prosecution. This being shown or established, the question of presumption under Section 113-B of the ion under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act would arise. In otherwords to draw a presumption under Sec. 113(B) of the Evidence Act, the necessary ingredient that it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment, in connection with the demand of dowry has to be proved. Only when the facts are proved then by virtue of the deeming provision of Section 304-B the Court shall presume that the husband or any relative of the husband had caused dowry death. Whenever it is directed by the Evidence Act that the Court shall presume a fact, that fact shall be taken as proved unless and until it is disproved. Meaning thereby that the presumption is a rebuttable presumption. In this view of the matter, the prosecution has to prove the main factor of cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry. I am fully agree with this view. (10). The demand of dowry on 12th March may be anything but cannot be considered to be cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry because further only evidence of the demand of dowry is not cruelty. I am fully agree with this view. (10). The demand of dowry on 12th March may be anything but cannot be considered to be cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry because further only evidence of the demand of dowry is not cruelty. A demand on March 12, 1992, which too, is not, soon before her death and therefore, there is merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no evi- dence that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death, in relation to demand for dowry. (11). Not only on this interpretation of section 304 (B) but also if the evidence produced by the prosecution is taken into consideration then too the case of the prosecution is not proved. PW-1 Chatter Singh who is the person who has taken out the deceased from the Diggi states that soon after the deceased fell into the Diggi, he was informed of the same by Raju. Raju informed him that the Guddi has fallen into the Diggi therefore, the first version available to the person who arrived on the seen to rescue the deceased is of an accident. The prosecution has not directed any re-examination of this witness and thus the testimony of this witness PW-1 Chatter Singh comes to show that the incident was mere a accident and there was no culpability of any kind attached to the death of Smt. Maya alias Guddi. (12). The cause of death is, according to the Doctor who had conducted postmortem, Asphysia resulted from drowning. This also supports the version of PW-1 that accidentally Maya had fallen into the Diggi and died. In the aforesaid cir- cumstances it cannot be a case of dowry death as defined under Section 304 (B) IPC. The offence under Section 304 is not made out. (13). As regards the offence under Section 498 (A) it can be stated that the evidence of demand of dowry and harassment of the deceased prior to her death has been spoken by the witnesses and therefore it cannot be said that offence un- der Section 498 (A) is not made out and therefore, the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant under Section 498 (A) is sustained. (14). In the result the appeal is partly allowed. (14). In the result the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction and sentence is passed under Section 304 (B) is set aside and that under section 498 (A) is maintained.