JUDGMENT : M.L. Dudhat, J. 1. This first appeal is preferred against the judgment and award dated 10.1.1989, passed by the Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pune, in Application No. 159 of 1982. By the said award, the trial court has directed respondent No. 3, original respondent No. 3, jointly and severally with opponent Nos. 1 and 2 to pay an amount of Rs. 1,44,750 with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of application till actual realisation along with proportionate costs. Being dissatisfied by the award granted by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pune, the present appellants-original claimants have preferred this first appeal for enhancement of the compensation by an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-. Few facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are as under: Appellant No. 1 is the wife of the deceased Balasaheb Ganpat Jadhav and appellant No. 2 is the minor son of the said deceased. The deceased succumbed to injuries in a motor accident at Kastur Chowk, Pune at 2.30 p.m. on 31.1.1982. It is the case of the appellant-claimant that the deceased Balasaheb Ganpat Jadhav was working as Sub-Inspector of Police, in Samart Police Station on the date of the accident. On the said date, deceased was returning from his duty towards his house at Swargate Police Quarters. Along with him, there was a police constable Salunk-he, who was pillion rider. The motor cycle on which both the deceased and said Salunkhe were travelling was motor cycle No. MZB 3701, which was proceeding from Ratnapratap Road towards Mitha Ganj Chowki and when they were crossing through Kastur Chowk at the junction of Ratnapratap Road and Mahatma Phule Road, the motor truck No. APQ 8249 belonging to opponent No. 2, and driven by opponent No. 1, dashed against the deceased Balasaheb Jadhav due to rash and negligent driving by opponent No. 1. As a result of this collision, the motor cycle went ahead and fell on the ground in front of Pawar Welding Shop. The deceased Balasaheb was thrown out and fell in front of the motor lorry while the constable Salunkhe, pillion rider, fell to the right side of the motor lorry. As a result of this collision, the motor cycle went ahead and fell on the ground in front of Pawar Welding Shop. The deceased Balasaheb was thrown out and fell in front of the motor lorry while the constable Salunkhe, pillion rider, fell to the right side of the motor lorry. After the accident, the truck driver, opponent No. 1, made futile attempt to escape due to which entangled truck moved further and right hand side wheel of the lorry passed over the right hand of Balasaheb Jadhav and he got entangled with the truck and dragged on the ground for some distance and thereafter the deceased Balasaheb was thrown out. Due to aforesaid accident, the deceased sustained multiple injuries and was admitted to Sasoon Hospital. In the meantime, some persons chased the truck driver, opponent No. 1 and produced him at Subhansha Police Station. It is the case of the appellant that at the time of accident, deceased was driving the motor cycle with moderate speed and/or on proper side of the road and the said accident took place because of the rash and negligent driving by opponent No. 1. At the relevant time, speed of the truck was highly excessive due to which opponent No. 1 lost control over the vehicle and tried to run away by getting out of the truck which further caused serious injuries to the deceased. 2. In the same application filed by the appellants, the appellants claimed compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- as the deceased was earning Rs. 811.50 per month at the time of accident and for deprivation of consortium. The trial court after hearing arguments of all the parties awarded compensation of Rs. 1,44,750/- with interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the application till actual realisation. It is this judgment and decree which is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal. 3. Mr. Vaze, learned Counsel appealing for the appellants assailed the judgment mainly on two grounds. Firstly, according to him, the trial court ought to have granted interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum instead of 9 per cent per annum. Secondly, he contended that the trial court has awarded compensation taking into consideration the pay of Rs. 800/- which the deceased was earning at the time of his death and after taking into consideration dependency of Rs. Secondly, he contended that the trial court has awarded compensation taking into consideration the pay of Rs. 800/- which the deceased was earning at the time of his death and after taking into consideration dependency of Rs. 700/-, applied multiplier of 20 and arrived at the figure of Rs. 1,68,000/-. The trial court further reduced 25 per cent of the said figure arrived, on the ground that the claimants were receiving the said amount in lump sum. However, according to Mr. Vaze, while calculating the aforesaid amount, the trial court has not taken into consideration the future promotions which the deceased could have got and also has not taken into consideration the fact that after applying multiplier, there was no necessity of deduction of 25 per cent of the amount on the ground that the appellants are receiving the said amount in lump sum. On the other hand, Mr. Chaphekar, learned Counsel appearing for the insurance company, respondent No. 3, contended that the trial court ought not to have granted interest on the amount of compensation from the date of application, but ought to have granted interest from the date of the award. He further contended that the trial court has arrived at the figure of Rs. 1,44,750/- after adjusting equities and, therefore, there is no need to disturb the finding of the trial court. 4. As regards interest, according to our opinion, the trial court ought to have granted interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the compensation amount instead of 9 per cent. On this point, there is no dispute between both the sides before us. The main dispute is as to whether the trial court was right in awarding interest from the date of application instead of from the date of the award. Mr. Chaphekar on behalf of respondent No. 3, insurance company, contended that in view of the provisions of Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which was applicable at that time and further in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the trial court ought to have granted interest from the date of award and not from the date of application. On the other hand, Mr. On the other hand, Mr. Vaze for the appellant-claimants, contended that in view of Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and in view of the decisions of this Court as well as decisions of the Supreme Court, the trial court was right in awarding interest from the date of the application. 5. Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is analogous to Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The said section is as under: Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf. On bare reading of the aforesaid section, the intention of the legislature appears to be that at the time of awarding interest, it is the discretion of the court to grant interest from a particular date. However, while granting such interest from that particular date, interest cannot be granted to the claimant earlier than the date on which the claim is made under the Act. Therefore, in case of an accident, discretion is left under the aforesaid provision to the Tribunal to award interest from a particular date, but not earlier to the date of making claim. In the present case, the trial court has awarded interest from the date of the application and, therefore, according to our opinion, the trial court has used its discretion within the ambit of Section 110-CC or Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 6. However, the learned Counsel Mr. Chaphekar strenuously contended that in view of the judgments of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court the court has to award interest on the loss of earning and future earning from the date of the award and not from the date of the application. To support this contention, Mr. Chaphekar relied upon ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Gaurish Transport and Another Vs. To support this contention, Mr. Chaphekar relied upon ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Gaurish Transport and Another Vs. Pedro Salvador and Others, wherein the Division Bench of this Court in para 9 held: It is undoubtedly true that in respect of the first two items, viz., the expenses and the damages for pain and suffering, interest could be awarded from the date of the application, but logically in respect of the loss of earnings and loss of future earnings calculated on the date of the award, it would be difficult to sustain awarding of interest from the date of the application. and, therefore, the Division Bench of this Court in the said case awarded interest from the date of the award. 7. Mr. Chaphekar, appearing for the insurance company, has also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in R.D. Hattangadi Vs. M/s. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others. In para 18 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court held as under: So far as the direction of the High Court regarding payment of interest at the rate of 6 per cent over the total amount held to be payable to the appellant is concerned, it has to be modified. The High Court should have clarified that the interest shall not be payable over the amount directed to be paid to the appellant in respect of future expenditures under different heads. It need not be pointed out that interest is to be paid over the amount which has become payable on the date of award and not which is to be paid for expenditures to be incurred in future. As such we direct that appellant shall not be entitled to interest over such amount. According to our opinion, the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court will not be applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court has observed that in respect of future expenses, the High Court ought not to have granted interest from the date of the application, but ought to have granted from the date of the award. In the present case, appellants-claimants have not mentioned any item in their claim filed before the Tribunal towards 'future expenses'. In view of this, the aforesaid observations are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 8. Mr. In the present case, appellants-claimants have not mentioned any item in their claim filed before the Tribunal towards 'future expenses'. In view of this, the aforesaid observations are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 8. Mr. Chaphekar also relied upon the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in R.D. Hattangadi Vs. M/s. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others. In the said case, the Supreme Court has awarded interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the award. According to our opinion, there is no fixed rule for awarding interest under the Motor Vehicles Act, only after the award. In various cases, the Supreme Court has also awarded interest from the date of application and for that Mr. Vaze has relied upon various decisions of the Supreme Court, one of which is Smt. Chameli Wati and Another Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others, wherein the Supreme Court has specifically interpreted Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 and held that the learned Judges of the Division Bench in that case should have awarded interest on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date of the application. In the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and made the above mentioned observations. Since in the aforesaid judgment, the Supreme Court has decided the issue of date from which interest on the claim should be granted by interpreting Section 110-CC. According to our opinion, the trial court has not committed any error by granting interest from the date of the application instead from the date of the award. Apart from that, we may further point out that against the judgment and finding given by the Tribunal, the respondent No. 3, insurance company has not preferred any appeal. Further, as per interpretation of Section 110-CC, since we have already come to the conclusion that while awarding interest discretion is left to the court as to from what point of time, interest on compensation is to be granted and since the trial Judge has exercised the discretion within the purview of Section 110-CC, there is no need to disturb the said finding. 9. The next argument advanced by the learned Counsel Mr. 9. The next argument advanced by the learned Counsel Mr. Vaze for the appellants is that while arriving at the figure of compensation, the trial court has not taken into consideration the promotions which the deceased could have got and for which the appellants have led the evidence. In the evidence, the appellants have examined P.G. Niphadkar, witness No. 2, wherein he has stated that the deceased could have received Rs. 2,750/- as salary in the post of Police Inspector. The aforesaid statement made by Niphadkar, who is serving in the Police Department is not challenged in the cross-examination. Admittedly, in this case, deceased was Sub-Inspector of 31 1/2 years of age as on the date of the accident. The age of retirement in his case would be 58 years. He belonged to Banjara community and in the normal course he would have got the promotion as Inspector of Police as stated by the aforesaid witness. In the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Lachhman Singh and Others Vs. Gurmit Kaur and Others, it was observed: From a close scrutiny of the various judgments of the Supreme Court, as referred to above, it can be safely held to have been settled that in order to determine the quantum of damages in cases of fatal accidents, a basic figure indicative of the annual loss to the dependants from the premature death has to be arrived at. This amount is to be worked out not only on the basis of the salary or earning of the deceased at the time of the accident but also by taking into consideration the entire relevant data regarding future prospects of increase in the course of employment or business, as the case may be. This basic figure has then to be converted into a lump sum by applying a suitable multiplier. In order to arrive at the correct multiplier, a number of factors which have been indicated in various judgments, as discussed above, have to be borne in mind. Whereas the courts in England have so far gone to the extent of multiplying the basic figure of annual dependency by 16 year purchase, the Supreme Court approved in one case 20 times as the suitable multiplier. Whereas the courts in England have so far gone to the extent of multiplying the basic figure of annual dependency by 16 year purchase, the Supreme Court approved in one case 20 times as the suitable multiplier. After taking into consideration the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, while arriving at the figure of compensation in respect of accidental death of the deceased, the same to be worked out not only on the basis of salary or earning of the deceased at the time of accident, but also by taking into consideration the entire relevant data, regarding the future prospects of increase in the course of employment or business. In view of this, according to our opinion, the dial court ought to have taken into consideration the promotional chances in the normal course of employment, while arriving at the final figure of compensation. 10. Mr. Vaze also relied upon ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Smt. Manjushri Raha and Others Vs. B.L. Gupta and Others. In the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court has observed that the lower courts ought to have taken into consideration the salary which he could have earned while reaching the maximum before his retirement. 11. We have gone through the aforesaid authorities and according to our opinion, the trial court ought to have taken into consideration the promotional chances and increments in the normal course of the deceased in his service. Mr. Chaphekar for the insurance company contended that in view of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum Vs. Mrs. Susamma Thomas and others, in which the Supreme Court observed relying upon the Halsbury's Laws of England, that multiplier in accidents claims should not be more than 16. According to our opinion, observations of the Supreme Court in the said case definitely point out the principle as to how the multiplier is to be applied. In the present case, in our opinion, the trial court ought to have applied multiplier of 16 years instead of 20 years. The trial court has granted compensation of Rs. 15,000/- to the wife towards loss of consortium and Rs. 10,000/- for the loss of love and affection. Thus, on this ground, the trial court has granted Rs. 25,000/- against which there is no appeal filed and we are confirming the same. 12. The trial court has granted compensation of Rs. 15,000/- to the wife towards loss of consortium and Rs. 10,000/- for the loss of love and affection. Thus, on this ground, the trial court has granted Rs. 25,000/- against which there is no appeal filed and we are confirming the same. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the figure of compensation should be determined after taking into consideration the promotions and increments factors. As discussed above, according to our opinion, for the first 10 years of the multiplier, the appellants will be entitled to Rs. 84,000/-calculating the dependency at Rs. 700/-p.m. Taking into consideration the promotional aspect of the deceased as stated by the witness from the Police Department, according to our opinion, the appellants will be entitled to get Rs. 1,400/- p.m. for a period of 6 years, i.e., Rs. 16,800 x 6 = Rs. 1,00,800/- + they are also entitled to get Rs. 25,000/- for loss of consortium and love and affection, which comes to Rs. 2,09,800/- (Two lakh nine thousand eight hundred). On the aforesaid amount of Rs. 2,09,800/-, they are also entitled to get interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the application, i.e., 21.7.1982, till actual realisation of the amount. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and award dated 10.1.1989 passed by the trial court in M.A.C. Petition No. 159 of 1982 is set aside and opponent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are jointly and severally directed to pay an amount of Rs. 2,09,800 (Two lakh nine thousand eight hundred) to the appellants along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of the application till the date of actual realisation. Whatever amount paid by the respondents is to be given credit and thereafter, the trial court to work out interest as awarded above, on the amount of compensation. The trial court is further directed to invest the said amount in any nationalised bank in fixed deposit for a period of three years, which should be renewed from time to time till appellant No. 2 attains the age of 21 years. The trial court is further directed to invest the said amount in any nationalised bank in fixed deposit for a period of three years, which should be renewed from time to time till appellant No. 2 attains the age of 21 years. In the event, appellant No. 1 and/or appellant No. 2 require some money to meet some exigencies, they should make an application to the trial court and obtain appropriate orders regarding payment out of the said amount of compensation as awarded by the court, to meet such exigencies. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with costs.