JUDGMENT Banerjee, J 1. This appeal is against an order dated 1st February, 1995, passed by the learned trial Judge in Civil Order No. 15034 (W) of 1991 dismissing the writ application and discharging the Rule, if any issued in this behalf. The writ application was dismissed solely on the ground of delay applying the principle of acquiescence holding inter alia that "Although I am minded to hold in favour of the writ petitioner on all other points, in my opinion the writ petitioner must fail on the ground of delay and on the ground of delay alone. He made representations to the Corporation no doubt, but when he found those representations to be not productive of any fruit at all, he should have approached the writ Court with expedition if he wanted relief from a Court of Justice rather than from his employer, or from the State Government. He did not approach the Court for seven years. He drew pay at the lower scale on every month during the said seven years. He waited for so long that another implementation of pay rules came into being. Long before that time the Corporation had made it plain, if not by words, by their action, that they were not going to give effect to their resolution of November 1981 and that they would continue to pay their employees at the lower scale. Not moving the Court in spite thereof was an act of acquiescence on the part of the writ petitioner notwithstanding the representation made by him from time to time. I am deeply dissatisfied with the conduct of the Corporation which ill befits an Article 12 authority. It is well known that public service in India is both a matter of contract and of status. Such status can be altered unilaterally by the employer. Increase of pay is one instance of such alteration; if a public body adopts a resolution altering the service status and then does not give effect to it, it appears to impartial third parties like Courts of law that they are acting with great irresponsibility in the matter which is not at all the yardstick of a model employer which they are supposed to do. This observation, however, gets the writ petitioner nowhere. I can only wish that he had approached the Court earlier. There will be no order on this writ application. This observation, however, gets the writ petitioner nowhere. I can only wish that he had approached the Court earlier. There will be no order on this writ application. Rule, if any issued will stand discharged. Interim order passed, if any, will stand vacated". 2. The fact which requires consideration in this appeal is whether the appellant would be entitled to the pay scale of Rs. 380/- - 910/- in the tune of G.O. No. 7530-F dated 4.7.84 or not and it is stated that the right to claim such pay scale on the basis of the resolution adopted by the respondent West Bengal State Minor Irrigation Corporation Limited in its meeting held on 3.11.81. The said resolution reads as follows:- "Resolved that undernoted clause may be incorporated in the Service Rules of the Company adopted by the Board of Directors at the meeting held on 21.7.1981. The scale of pay admissible from time to time to the State Government Employees shall also be applicable to the employee of this Corporation so far as analogous posts are concerned". The appellant claims the pay scale on the basis of the revision of pay scales under the ROPA Rule which was adopted by the Corporation. It is evident that the writ petitioner went on making representation after representation for getting such pay scale. The resolution was adopted after the said resolution by which the pay scale admissible by the employees of the State Government could also be applicable to the employees of the Corporation. The revision of pay scale was made in respect of the employees of the State Government by the Memo No. 4784 and thereafter the writ petitioner made representations to the authorities concerned and the said representations were forwarded by the Divisional Engineer, Burdwan by his letter dated 20th September, 1984 to the Managing Director of the said Corporation. Further representation was also forwarded by the said authority to the Managing Director of the Corporation on 9.12.85. The writ petitioner himself made a representation again on 25.8.86 before the Managing Director of the Corporation for granting such relief but the same was not granted and the ground that was disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition was that permission of the State Government was necessary before any relief could be granted in this behalf. 3. The writ petitioner himself made a representation again on 25.8.86 before the Managing Director of the Corporation for granting such relief but the same was not granted and the ground that was disclosed in the affidavit-in-opposition was that permission of the State Government was necessary before any relief could be granted in this behalf. 3. The learned trial Judge held that the Minor Irrigation r Corporation is not subservient to the State of West Bengal although in its articles it has declared itself to be bound by the declaration of broad policies of the State Government yet there is nothing in the Memorandum or the Articles which curtails the absolute authority of the Corporation in such a manner that it has to knock at the door of the State Government every time its Board of Directors adopts a resolution of any importance or consequence. Instead of granting the pay scale in terms of such resolution the writ petitioner was paid at the old pay scale which was lower than the pay scale which was taken to be a part of the conditions of service of the employees of the Corporation in its resolution dated 3.11.81. Even though the learned trial Judge held on merits against the respondent Corporation and in favour of the appellant-writ petitioner no cross-appeal or cross-objection has been preferred by the Corporation against the finding of the learned trial Judge. 4. Mr. S.C. Bose, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the learned trial Judge was wrong in dismissing the writ application on the ground of delay and acquiescence. It is submitted by Mr. Bose that the respondents have not preferred any appeal against that part of the finding of the learned trial Judge which was held in favour of the appellant. The appeal was only confined to the refusal by the learned trial Judge to grant relief on the ground of delay and acquiescence. Affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the Corporation and in that affidavit the only stand that was taken was that until and unless the Corporation obtains any permission and sanction from the State Government the Corporation was not in a position to grant any relief to the appellant-writ petitioner. In the said affidavit-in-opposition questions of delay and acquiescence have not been pleaded. Affidavit-in-opposition was filed by the Corporation and in that affidavit the only stand that was taken was that until and unless the Corporation obtains any permission and sanction from the State Government the Corporation was not in a position to grant any relief to the appellant-writ petitioner. In the said affidavit-in-opposition questions of delay and acquiescence have not been pleaded. So in the absence of any cross-objection the scope of the appeal is very limited and that this Court is only concerned whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting the writ application on the ground of delay and acquiescence. In this connection Mr. Bose has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Smt. Navabai Laxman Jadhav v. Namdeo Jlzaba Gaikwad reported in 1987 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 57 wherein the Supreme Court has held that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground of laches. It was also held that there was no inordinate or unexplained delay on the part of the appellants in filing the writ petition. The delay, if any, was on the part of the State Government in disposing of the application for review and therefore, could not be a reason for dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. Reliance was also placed on another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) Smt. Bhuri Bai (Dead) by L.R.S. v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1987 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 690 wherein the Supreme Court has held that in the absence of a plea of bar of limitation, Court is not justified in taking up the question of limitation suo motu and dismiss the matter. Reference was also made to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (3) Haryana State Electricity Board v. The State of Punjab & Haryana reported in AIR 1974 SC 1806 wherein a writ petition was filed by a Government Servant in connection with fixation of the seniority. In that case the Government servant shown to have made representations and moved the appropriate authorities at all stages. Under such circumstances the Supreme Court held that it was not a case where relief could be declined on the ground of laches or delay. 5. In that case the Government servant shown to have made representations and moved the appropriate authorities at all stages. Under such circumstances the Supreme Court held that it was not a case where relief could be declined on the ground of laches or delay. 5. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that the Corporation had adopted a resolution but did not give effect to the same and that the resolution that was passed was not revoked or rescinded by the Corporation and according to the Corporation the same could not be given effect for want of permission of the Government but the learned trial Judge has held on this point against the respondents, accordingly, on this point we cannot make any adjudication as the issue is not before us in this appeal in the absence of any cross-objection or cross appeal. On the question of delay the most important factor is that if by virtue of delay if any third party's interest is accrued in that event the delay would be very fatal. In case of termination of a service if there was inordinate delay in filing the writ application in that event equitable remedy could not be granted for in case of reinstatement the public exchequer will have to be paid twice. But this is not such a case where equitable remedy is to be refused. Further the most important factor in this particular case is that all the three representations that were made by the appellant-writ petitioner were forwarded with recommendations by the authority concerned. In other words, the management had taken up the case of the appellant until October 1991, when the Government formally turned down such permission. So it cannot be said that there was any delay or laches on the part of the appellant-writ petitioner to move the writ application because as soon as the appellant had come to know that permission was turned down by the Government he moved the writ application. Permission was turned down in October 1991 and the writ petition was moved in December 1991. Permission was turned down in October 1991 and the writ petition was moved in December 1991. So on facts we are of the view that there was no delay on the part of the appellant-writ petitioner to move the writ application and accordingly the question of delay will not arise and the principle of acquiescence, in the facts and circumstances of the case, could not be invoked for the purpose of denying the relief claimed by the writ petitioner. The terms and conditions of service was changed by a resolution which was not given effect to or rescinded and accordingly we are of the view that the principle of acquiescence is wholly inapplicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Further there was no pleading on the question of acquiescence or delay on the part of the writ petitioner. The principle of fairness is also a factor which is to be taken into consideration in respect of the conduct of the Corporation which is a public authority and the learned trial Judge in the penaltimate paragraph of the judgment has clearly stated that the learned Judge was deeply dissatisfied with the conduct of the Corporation but was unable to grant relief on the question of delay and acquiescence. 6. Accordingly that portion of the order of the learned trial Judge in which the learned trial Judge has held that the writ petition was barred by the principle of delay and laches is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The writ petition succeeds. Let a writ in the nature of Mandamus be issued commanding the respondents to revise the pay scale of the appellant-writ petitioner allowing him the scale of pay of Rs. 380-910/- in accordance with the resolution dated 3.11 81 read with the provisions of the West Bengal (Revision of pay and Allowances) Rules, 1984. There will be no order as to costs. Dutta, J.: I agree.