Judgment P. K. Deb, J. 1. Order the defendants in Title suit No.208 of 1995 have filed this appeal against the order dated 21.12.1995 passed by Shri K. N. Ambastha, Subordinate Judgei, Ranchi, by which the interim order dated 16.11.1995 was made absolute restraining the defendants-appellants by issuing temporary injunction from implementing the termination of contract of distributorship granted in favour of the plaintiff-respondent no.1 and also restraining the defendents-appellants from preventing defendant no.4-respondent no.2 (Central Coalfields limited, Ranchi) from purchasing the Stores supplied by the appellant-defendant no.1 to the plaintiff till the disposal of the suit. 2. The admitted position remains that the plaintiff-respondent no.1 had entered into an agreement to the effect that the manufacturing products of defendant no.1, namely, Down the Hole Drilling Machines, button Bits, Accessories and Spare Parts for drillings etc. , would be sold to the plaintiff who shall render required services to its customers, namely, all Mines of Central coalfields Limited in the State of Bihar and orissa and Bhavnathpur Limestone Mines of Bokaro Steel Limited in the State of bihar. According to the terms of the agreement, price of materials supplied by defendant no.1 was to be paid to it by the plaintiff within a period of 30 days and in case of delay in payment, the plaintiff was to pay interest for period of delay over the amount remaining due. The plaintiff was also entitled to sell materials/articles to the central Coalfields Limited on the selling price fixed by Defendant no.1 for each item. It is the contention of the plaintiff that he was practically a distributor and his appointment of distributorship was governed by the initial agreement dated" 27.2.1987 and the same was renewed from time to time and the last agreement was signed at ranchi on 2nd January, 1995. According to the plaintiff, while he was having all stock of materials worth of about Rs.1,77,00,000/-supplied by defendant no.1 against payment, he was suddently served with a notice dated 14.8.1995 which was received by the plaintiff on 28.8.1995 terminating the agreement with the plaintiff with effect from 15.10.1995 but actually the termination was made to take immediate effect from 15.8.1995 itself. The plaintiff made representation before defendant no.1 but the same was not paid heed too and, hence, the present suit was filed. 3. The plaintiff made representation before defendant no.1 but the same was not paid heed too and, hence, the present suit was filed. 3. The following reliefs were claimed in the suit :- (A) It may be declared that the purported termination of the agreement is arbitrary, illegal and ineffectual in law and the same has not in any way effected the plaintiffs right under the agreement dated 2.1.1995 as contained in Annexure 1 to the plaint. (B) Perpetual injunction may be granted against defendants no.1,2 and 3 restraining them from implementing or in any way giving effect to the impugned letters as contained in Annexures IV and v of the plaint. (C) Any other relief or reliefs for which the plaintiff is found entitled to, be awarded. Thus, in this case, the plaintiff has challenged the termination of the agreement on the ground of its arbitrariness. On the other hand the defence plea is that the agreement between the parties is individualistic in nature and the termination is according to the terms and conditions as contained in the agreement itself and that the plaintiff became in arrear of huge sum of amount regarding the price of materials purchased by the plaintiff from defendant no.1 and, hence as per the terms of default, the termination was served on the plaintiff. 4. At the time of filing of the suit, a petition was filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the plaintiff for granting temporary injunction till the pendency of the suit. Ex-pane ad-interim order of injunction was passed and after filing objection from the side of the defendant, it was heard and then by the impugned order, the interim injunction passed earlier was made absolute. 5. Admittedly the suit is based on the agreement arrived at between the parties on 2.1.1995 and the suit is governed by the indian Contract Act and the specific performance of the same is to be effected under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (the Act ). It is the established principles of law, both in england and India under individual contract that interlocutory injunction will not be granted where damages will provide adequate remedy if the claim ultimately succeeds. Under section 41 of the Act, specific cases are mentioned where injunction should not be granted. It is the established principles of law, both in england and India under individual contract that interlocutory injunction will not be granted where damages will provide adequate remedy if the claim ultimately succeeds. Under section 41 of the Act, specific cases are mentioned where injunction should not be granted. According to the defendants-appellants, the present case is governed under section 41 (e) of the Act which runs as follow : -"to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. " 6. It is also the case of the defendants-appellants that the case of the plaintiff is not maintainable under section 14 of the Act when the contract is non-enforceable. Sec.14 (a) provides : "a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in mony is an adequate relief" on the other hand, the plaintiff-respondents case is that the present suit falls within the provision of Sec.10 of the Act as specifically provided under section 10 (ii) (a) which runs as follows : - "10 (ii) : that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property can be so relieved except in the following cases: - (a) where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce, or is of special value or interest to the plaintiff, or consists of goods which are not easily obtainable in the market. " 7. According to the plaintiff, the subject matter of contract between the parties in the present, case is not ordinary articles of commerce but specialised machines which are only applicable for drilling purposes in mines and lime stones, collieries and as such the articles which remained in stock of the plaintiff cannot be easily marketable unless the agreement is made in vogue at least during the pendency of the suit when the termination letter has been challenged being arbitrary. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. M. Y. Eqbal, appearing for and on behalf of the defendants-appellants has submitted that there is no scope of holding the materials to be non-marketable as according to the terms of the agreement itself, the plaintiff is entitled to sell the articles besides the central Coalfields Limited and other organisations specifically mentioned in the agreement and even if such articles are not marketable then also the plaintiff has got liberty to send back the unsold articles to the defendant no.1, who shall repurchase the same, as per its valuation at the time of re-sale/re-purchase. His main contention is that when the agreement between the parties are in the nature of buyer and seller, there is no scope for enforcement of the agreement under the Act and only damages can be claimed even if termination is said to be illegal and arbitrary on the face of it. 9. Mr. N. K. Prasad, appearing for and on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent has strenuously argued that normally although individualistic contract is not enforceable by the process of the court when money value is the adequate relief towards damages but, in the present cas;e, the parties do not stand in the status of buyer and seller rather on admissions being made from the side of the defendants in the agreement and also in the subsequent letters to the effect that the plaintiffs stand as distributor/ stockists of the defendants no.1 and as such the parties to the contract are in the form of principal and agent and not buyer and seller and hence section 14 of the Act would not be applicable in the present case rather section 10 of the Act would be applicable when the articles in question in the agreement are not ordinarily marketable articles of commerce. 10. For the purpose of injunction, three ingredients are required to be decided, namely, (i) Prima facie case (ii) Balance of convenience and (iii) Irreparable injury. It appears that by the impugned order, the learned court below has held all the ingredients in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. To decide the matter in issue as regards ingredient no. (i) Prima-Facie Case, it is. necessary for going into the terms of the agreement especially the termination within the agreement. 11. It appears that by the impugned order, the learned court below has held all the ingredients in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. To decide the matter in issue as regards ingredient no. (i) Prima-Facie Case, it is. necessary for going into the terms of the agreement especially the termination within the agreement. 11. On going through the agreement dated 2.1.1995 it appears that the status of the plaintiff was mentioned somewhere as purchaser and somewhere as distributor and in some clauses as an agent. In subsequent letter, the status of the plaintiff was designated as stockist by defendant no.1 but whatever may be the designations quoted within the agreement or in the subsequent letters, it is necessary to see the nature of transaction between the parties. Under Clause 7 of the agreement dated 2.1.1995, it has been specifically mentioned in the following manner: -"the relationship between the distributor and Ingersoll-Rand under this agreement is intended to be that of buyer and seller. " 12. Thus the whole intention of the agreement is that of buyer and seller between the plaintiff and defendant no.1. The nature of transaction is also in the form of buyer and seller. The plaintiff is to purchase the machineries from the manufacture of defendant through invoice and the payment of the same is to be made within 30 days of the receipt of the materials by the plaintiff and then for and on behalf of the defendant, the plaintiff is to market the same to defendant no.4 and others as the price being dictated from the side of the defendants but the plaintiff has also been given liberty to sell outside the quoted persons also. Thus the relationship at the very inception remains as buyer and seller even if the plaintiff is construed to be a distributor or an agent or a stockist. The recent decision of the Apex Court in Vijay Traders vs. Bajaj Auto Limited [ (1995) 6 Supreme court Cases 566] is regarding distributors of Vespa Scooters and Vespa Autorickshaws wherein it has been held that the relationship is that of the vendor and purchaser and not to principal and agent. The facts and circumstances of that case totally fit in with the present case. Mr. The facts and circumstances of that case totally fit in with the present case. Mr. N. K. Prasad feebly submitted that the said judgment was passed on the basis of full trial of the case and the present suit is yet to go on trial and as such, any decision of relationship of vendor and purchaser between the plaintiff and the defendant would be pre-judging of the matter in issue. It is true that for decision of prime facie case for the purpose of injunction, decision regarding the status should not be made rather it should be seen whether the plaintiff has got a prima facie case to go in for trial or not. As per the agreement and the nature of transaction between the parties would go to establish prima facie that they are all related to each other as buyer and seller and not the principal or agent. Whatever name the plaintiff be given regardings its status as Agents or stockists or distributorship, the nature of transaction between the parties governed by the agreement is that of vendor and purchaser. Apparently, in view of such matter, it being individualistic contract between a buyer and seller, there is no scope of any injunction when there can be relief through damages by money value. 13. Balance of convenience also in that sense remains in favour of the defendants. Admitedly the plaintiff was in arrear in payment of value/price of the machineries already received by the plaintiff and as such, if the contract/agreement is allowed to continue between the parties through the process of the court, then the principal vendor would be in most inconvenient position. Advantages cannot be taken by the plaintiff of his own default. 14. Regarding third ingredient "irreparable Injury": it goes without saying in the facts and circumstances of the case that there is no irreparable loss or injury to the plaintiff when he can get adequate relief by way of damages by money value. It is argued by Mr. N. K. Prasad that when there is huge stock of about two crores lying with the plaintiff and when it cannot be marketed ordinarily then the irreparable loss is in the side of the plaintiff and not on the defendants. Mr. It is argued by Mr. N. K. Prasad that when there is huge stock of about two crores lying with the plaintiff and when it cannot be marketed ordinarily then the irreparable loss is in the side of the plaintiff and not on the defendants. Mr. Eqbal has rightly answered that point by quoting the clause of the agreement that those articles may be resold to the manufacturer and if the plaintiff feels that his loss would not be evaluated properly through re-sale, he can claim damages, but in no case, the plaintiff can be made entitled to get injunction when the suit itself does not permit so under the Act. It appears that the learned court below did not approach the case in its proper perspective. He has lost sight of the fact that individual contractual matters can never be a subject matter of irreparable injury when damages are the adequate relief. The impugned order is contrary to well settled and well established principle that where damages or loss can be assessed/evaluated by money value, injunction cannot come into play to debar either of the parties for continuing the contract/agreement. 15. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 21.12.1995 is hereby set aside holding that the injunction order is bad in the eye of law. In the nature and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.