JUDGMENT S.K. Kulshrestha, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated May 3, 1988 in Misc. Appeal No. 89 of 1988 under the provisions of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, by which the learned Single Judge has dismissed the appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 on the ground that the appeal filed against the Award of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner did not raise any substantial question of law. Similar appeals have been filed, in some cases against common award of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, against the decision of learned Single Judge declining to entertain appeal against the award on the ground that the appellant did not raise any substantial question of law as required by the proviso to Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). These appeals are : (1) LPA No. 22/88-WCL Barkui v. Fandi and Ors. (2) LPA No. 23/88-WCL Chandametta v. Sheikh Asgar (3) LPA No. 24/88-WCL Barkui v. Bhagirathi (4) LPA No. 25/88-WCL Chandametta v. Jamal (5) LPA No. 26/88-WCL Chandametta v. Kishanlal (6) LPA No. 27/88-EDC Colliery v. Saligram (7) LPA No. 28/88-Barkui Colliery v. Sittee (8) LPA No. 29/88-Barkui Colliery v. Kohloo (9) LPA No. 30/88-Bhamori Colliery v. Chhotelal (10) LPA No. 31/88-Bhamori Colliery v. Bharat (11) LPA No. 31/88-Bhamori Colliery v. Abdul Rehman (12) LPA No. 33/88-Eklehra Colliery v. Jamuna (13) LPA No. 34/88-Chandametta v. Sumran (14) LPA No. 35/88-EDC Colliery v. Rammanorath (15) LPA No. 36/88-Barkui Colliery v. Chapla (16) LPA No. 37/88-Chandametta v. Ajjan (17) LPA No. 38/88-Chandametta v. Badgoo (18) LPA No. 39/88-Chandametta Colliery v. Babulal (19) LPA No. 41/88-Chandametta Colliery v. Nankoo (20) LPA No. 42/88-Chandametta Colliery v. Gama (21) LPA No. 43/88-Chandametta Colliery v. Matroo (22) LPA No. 47/88-Shivpuri UG Mine v. SK Hussain (23) LPA No. 48/88-Barkui Colliery v. B. Sharma (24) LPA No. 49/88-Shivpuri UG Mine v. Ramkishan (25) LPA No. 50/88-GM Kannan v. Bhagwandin Since all these appeals raise common questions for determination, this Judgment shall also decide the above mentioned appeals. 2. Western Coalfields Limited, the appellant in these appeals, is a company incorporated under the Companies Act having various collieries in the State of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The respondents in each of the above appeals were employed in one or the other of such collieries by the said company. 2. Western Coalfields Limited, the appellant in these appeals, is a company incorporated under the Companies Act having various collieries in the State of Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The respondents in each of the above appeals were employed in one or the other of such collieries by the said company. Except in the case of LPA No. 23/88 (WCL Chandametta v. Sheikh Asgar) pertaining to WC Case No. 2/85 against the respondent - Sheikh Asgar, in all cases, it is admitted by the appellant that on the basis of the certification of disablement by the Medical Board as required under the M.P. Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Disease) Rules, 1963, the respondent - workman was declared unfit for the work he was doing and no alternative work or employment was offered to him. It is admitted that these workmen had filed claims before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation who treating the disablement of each respondent as 100%, directed the appellant to deposit the amount in his Court after deducting the compensation already paid by the appellant and pay costs to each of them in the sum of Rs. 100. 3. The case of the appellant is that even though the certificates of disablement ranged from 20% to 80%, the WC Commissioner treated each individual alike in the assessment of disablement and awarded the amount as applicable in the case of total disablement on the basis of loss of 100% of earning capacity merely on account of the fact that on the basis of the certificate issued by the Medical Board, the concerned employee was stated to be unfit for continuance of the under ground work in his colliery. The appellant has further contended that even where the occupational disease was much less than 80%, ranging from 20% to 50% only, with a view to give benefit of the National Coal Wage Agreement (II), the individual employee at his own behest was certified to be unfit for the work so that under the said bipartite agreement, his ward could be given employment in his stead. According to the appellant, such a benefit was given in all these cases except in the case relating to LPA No. 23/ 88 of respondent Sheikh Asgar as in the case of Asgar, there was no disease nor he was declared ; unfit. According to the appellant, such a benefit was given in all these cases except in the case relating to LPA No. 23/ 88 of respondent Sheikh Asgar as in the case of Asgar, there was no disease nor he was declared ; unfit. It was also contended that since each of the respondents was in receipt of wages exceeding Rs. 1000 and was not a workman as defined in Section 2(n) of the Act at the relevant time, no claim was maintainable under the provisions of the Act. It is contended that all these questions were substantial questions of law within the meaning of the proviso to Section 30(1) and the learned Single Judge, therefore, erred in dismissing the appeals on the ground that the appellant did not raise any substantial question of law. 4. The question regarding the receipt of wages by the individual workman has duly been considered by the WC Commissioner in his award and he has found after appreciating the tactual data placed before him that on the date in question, the actual wages earned by these workmen were not in excess of the sum of Rs. 1000 and therefore the claim was maintainable before him. This finding has been arrived at by the WC Commissioner purely on the basis of the appreciation of facts as placed on record and cannot be said to give rise to any question much less a substantial question of law. Under these circumstances, in appeal under Section 30 of the Act, this ground cannot be raised. 5. Coming to the next question about the extent of affliction with the occupational disease as mentioned in the list of Schedule III Part C, viz 'Pneumoconiosis', the stand of the appellant is that the respondent-husband of Dularibai was affected to the extent of 40%, respondent Mazeed Khan 50%, respondent Fandi 50%, respondent Sittee 30%, Kohloo, Chhotelal, Bharat and Abul Rehman 50%, Jamuna 80%, Sumran 40%, Ram Menorath 50%, Chapla 60%, Ajjan 80%, Badgoo 60%, Babulal 50%. Nandkoo 50%, Gama 80%, Matroo 50%, S.K. Hussain 50% and Bhagwandin 20%. In case of Sheikh Asgar, no disease was found nor he had been declared unfit for work. In case of Bhagirath, Jamal, Kishanlal and Saligram, the benefit of partial permanent disablement of 50% had been granted, while in the case of B. Sharma, the disablement was for reasons other than 'Pneumoconiosis'. In case of Sheikh Asgar, no disease was found nor he had been declared unfit for work. In case of Bhagirath, Jamal, Kishanlal and Saligram, the benefit of partial permanent disablement of 50% had been granted, while in the case of B. Sharma, the disablement was for reasons other than 'Pneumoconiosis'. The learned counsel contends that the certificate of disablement to the effect that these employees had become unfit for the work they were doing was given only to give them advantage of the National Coal Wage Agreement (II) providing for employment to the ward of such persons even though a large number of them was fit to be continued. In fact, almost in all cases, the benefit of the said agreement was extended after payment of compensation to these employees to the extent of disablement. The learned counsel has also submitted that agreement had been duly filed indicating settlement of compensation before the WC Commissioner but he neither registered the Agreement nor passed any order in his behalf refusing to register the same. 6. The M.P. Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Disease) Rules, 1963, in Rule 4 provides for the constitution of 'Pneumoconiosis' Medical Board for conduct of medical examinations, submission of medical reports and grant of medical certificates in pursuance of the said Rules. Proviso to Rule 4 permits recognition of the Medical Board with respect to the workmen employed in the mines. Rule 6 makes the evaluation of disablement, whether temporary or permanent, and the percentage loss functions as it pertains to loss of working capacity, quite sacrosanct on which alone the claim is founded. It is, thus, manifest that the medical board constituted under the rules performs a pious function which it is expected to discharge with utmost care, honesty and sincerity. It is greatly distressing to note from the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant before the WC Commissioner and before us, in patent sacrilege of this confidence reposed, the Medical Board had proceeded to certify such of the respondents employees also unfit for the work they were doing, who were not actually unfit and it also ill-beseems the responsible officers of a public undertaking to conspire and join in this deception to the serious detriment of the interest of the company and to cause it financial loss. It is clear from the argument itself that all concerned in granting unfair advantage, and any undeserved benefit, are guilty of dereliction of duty and have rendered themselves liable at least to disciplinary action. Be that as it may, so far as the merit of the argument is concerned, it is fallacious in the light of the fact that once the company has itself chosen to terminate the employee on the ground of the disablement assessed, it would be deemed to be a loss of 100% earning capacity under Rule 6 of the said M.P. Rules and the workmen would be entitled to claim compensation on that basis. The total disablement is defined in Section 2 of the Act to mean such disablement whether of temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement. Section 3 of the Act by fiction deems contracting of an occupational disease specified in Pt.C of Schedule III to be an injury by accident for the purpose of liability for payment of the compensation. 7. In the present case, it has not been disputed that the services of the workmen had been terminated on the ground that he had been incapacitated to perform the work nor is there any suggestion that any alternative work was offered to him or that, in fact, the workman was engaged in some other work after the termination of his employment on the ground of said disablement. The learned WC Commissioner, therefore, did not commit any error in holding that it was a case of total disablement. In this behalf, the observation of this Court in United India Insurance v. Bamat Singh and Anr. (1996-II-LLJ-525) relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pratap Narayan Singh v. Shrinivas Sabata (1976-I-LLJ-235) in para 8 and 10 of the judgment are pertinent which read as under : "8. In case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata (supra), the injured was a carpenter by profession whose left hand above elbow was amputated. Therefore, he was evidently rendered unfit for work of carpenter, as the work of carpenter cannot be done by one hand. In case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata (supra), the injured was a carpenter by profession whose left hand above elbow was amputated. Therefore, he was evidently rendered unfit for work of carpenter, as the work of carpenter cannot be done by one hand. That injury was of such a nature as to cause permanent disablement to the workman which incapacitated the workmen for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident. Therefore, the Supreme Court observed that there is no justification for the argument which has been advanced with reference to item 3 of Part II of Schedule I of the Act and affirmed the finding recorded by the Commissioner, who examined the question and recorded his finding accordingly, holding that the workman by loss of the left hand above the elbow was rendered unfit for the work of carpenter as the work of carpentry cannot be done by one hand only. 10. In the case in hand it is not disputed that because of the amputation the respondent workman has been incapacitated to perform the duties of Cleaner/Conductor in the truck and has suffered total disablement, in the absence of the evidence that the employer of the respondent has given any alternative employment of the respondent is doing some other job, the finding recorded by the Commissioner that after the accident the injured workman has become permanently disabled, it being as case of total disablement, in the opinion of this Court, workman is not debarred from claiming compensation more than that specified in the Schedule for the loss of earning capacity, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and Anr. (Supra). The same is the view of Karnataka High Court in National Insurance Company v. R. Vishnu and Anr. (supra) with which we are in respectful agreement." It is clear that in view of clear stand of the appellant that the termination was passed on the ground that there was total disablement of the workman for the work he was doing and further that no other work was offered to the workman concerned, it is not permissible to the appellant now to wriggle out of the position to which appellants stand committed and to question the validity of the Award. We therefore, find that except in the case of the workman Sheikh Asgar, in LPA No. 23/1988, pertaining to the WC Case No. 2/1985, the Award passed by the learned: WC Commissioner does not call for any interference. Even the question of having extended benefit of National Coal Wage Agreement (II) to the wards or the dependants of these workmen under the separate agreement, would be quite extraneous to the proceedings under the Act relating to the rights of the workmen and thus, irrelevant. 8. Now coming to the case of Sheikh Asgar, in LPA No. 23/1988, relating to WC Case No. 2/ 1985, we find that despite a clear pleading on behalf of the appellant herein that the said employee was not afflicted with any disease nor declared unfit for Work, his case has not been discussed by the learned WC Commissioner nor any finding on this point has been recorded. It appears that in deciding all cases by clubbing them, this important aspect has been overlooked. It would, therefore, be proper to remand the case of Sheikh Asgar to the WC Commissioner for compensation in the light of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence adduced in this behalf. 9. In the result, this appeal and all the connected appeals except LPA No. 23/1988 are dismissed. In LPA No. 23/1988 pertaining to WC case No. 2/1985, the case is remanded to WC Commissioner after setting aside the Award in the said case for adjudication in the light of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record and the said appeal is, thus, allowed to the extent indicated above. 10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their respective costs of these appeals.