A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE applicant-State has moved this application for condonation of delay of three days in preferring Criminal Appeal No. 422 of 1996 against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class) at Nadiad on 28th February 1996 in Criminal Case No. 5943 of 1990. Thereby the learned trial Magistrate acquitted the opponents herein of the offences punishable under Secs. 422 and 448 read with S. 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. ( 2 ) OPPONENT No. 1 was present. Opponent No. 2 is his wife. He prayed for assistance from an Advocate to be appointed by this Court. I tried to ascertain from learned Advocate Shri C. H. Vora present in the Court room whether or not it would be possible for him to assist this Court on behalf of the opponents in this case. On his showing willingness, learned Advocate Shri Vora has been appointed to assist this Court in this case for the opponents. ( 3 ) ). The delay in preferring the appeal in question is only of three days. Learned advocate Shri Vora for the opponents has submitted that the delay in this case has occurred on account of lethargy shown by the Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State Government in the trial Court, and as such the delay need not be condoned as it would amount to putting premium on such lethargy. As against this, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri Mehta has submitted that no litigant should be let down on account of default, inaction or omission on the part of his Lawyer and the State Government as a litigant need not be let down by its Lawyer in the form of the concerned Public Prosecutor. ( 4 ) ). It appears that the judgment and order of acquittal was pronounced on 28th february 1996 and its certified copy was applied for on 21st March 1996. It would have been better if the concerned Public Prosecutor had applied for its certified copy soon after pronouncement of the judgment and order of acquittal and ought not to have waited for three weeks. It appears that its certified copy was ready for delivery on 27th March 1996 but its delivery was taken nearly 12 days thereafter on 8th April 1996. It appears that its certified copy was ready for delivery on 27th March 1996 but its delivery was taken nearly 12 days thereafter on 8th April 1996. Again, the concerned Public Prosecutor does not appear to have been vigilant in that regard. It appears that the proposal to the Legal Department for carrying the matter in appeal was forwarded on 27th May 1996, that is, nearly one month and twenty days after obtaining the delivery of the certified copy of the judgment in question. It would have been better if the concerned Public prosecutor remained vigilant and sent his proposal quite early. It thus appears that eight precious days were thus lost on account of inaction on the part of the concerned public Prosecutor in the trial Court. If he had remained vigilant, perhaps the delay in preferring the appeal in question beyond the period of limitation would not have occasioned. ( 5 ) ). It is a settled principle of law that no litigant should be let down on account of default, inaction or omission on the part of his Advocate in view of the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq v. Munshilal, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 . What applies to a private litigant will apply with equal, if not more, force to the State Government as a litigant. Its right of appeal need not be denied simply because its Public Prosecutor in the trial Court remained somewhat inactive or lethargic or even negligent. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that a sufficient cause is made out for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal in question by the State Government. ( 6 ) ). In the result, this application is accepted. The delay of three days in preferring the appeal in question is condoned. Rule issued on this application is accordinglymade absolute. .