JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition contains two effective prayers; one is to quash Ext. P5 and the other is to direct the respondents 1 and 2 to consider the petitioner as having joined for training as Village Extension Officer Gr. II on 15th September 1988 and give him all,benefits including seniority, arrears of pay, etc. Ext. P5 is the order passed by the Government on 30th June 1995 pursuant to the judgment of this court in Writ Appeal No. 286/92. 2. Ext. P1 is the copy of the judgment of the Division Bench in the above writ appeal. The said writ appeal was filed by the present writ petitioner against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in O.P. No. 2396/89. In Ext. P1 judgment it is observed as below: "When Ext. P5 was issued by the Government, the position was that there were 10 vacancies to be arisen in future and one non joining duty vacancy. Thus in fact, the Public Service Commission was bound to advise 11 candidates. If 11 candidates are advised, certainly the appellant also has to be advised. As regards this aspect of the matter, there is no serious controversy. In fact counsel appearing for the Public Service Commission submitted that if this court holds that the Public Service Commission was bound to advise 11 candidates taking into account Ext. P5 and also the fact that one candidate did not join duty, the appellant is entitled to be advised for appointment." The Division Bench ordered in Para.6 thus: "We hold that the Public Service Commission ought to have taken into account when they received Ext. P5 Government Order that the Public Service Commission was bound to advise for 11 vacancies. If the Public Service Commission would have done so, certainly the appellant would have been advised by the Public Service Commission. Since we are holding so, we have to give a direction to the Public Service Commission to advise the Government to appoint the appellant also. We make it clear that the turn of the appellant came on account of the fact that an Ezhava candidate, K.P. Vijayan who had a higher rank, relinquished his right." In view of the above observation of the Division Bench, the petitioner ought to have been advised by the Public Service Commission on 7th May 1988. We make it clear that the turn of the appellant came on account of the fact that an Ezhava candidate, K.P. Vijayan who had a higher rank, relinquished his right." In view of the above observation of the Division Bench, the petitioner ought to have been advised by the Public Service Commission on 7th May 1988. In other words, the Public Service Commission has committed an error in not advising the petitioner' along with other ten candidates. 3. Pursuant to the above judgment, the petitioner was actually advised on 25th May 1994 and he joined for training on 26th June 1994. Ext. P5 is the order passed by the Government on the representation made by the petitioner that his seniority in service will be determined with effect from the date of advise by the Public Service Commission, that is to say, with effect from 25th May 1994. By the said order the Government have rejected the request for fixation of the seniority, back arrears etc. as claimed by the petitioner. 4. Mr. O.V. Radhakrishnan, Standing Counsel for the Public Service Commission has opposed the prayer for a direction to the third respondent at this stage to advise the petitioner for appointment with effect from 7th May 1988. But the fact remains that the Public Service Commission apparently committed a mistake in not advising the petitioner for appointment on 7th May 1988. In this background the question to be considered is as to how the claims of the petitioner would be moulded. The direction to Public Service Commission to make a fresh advise with effect from 7th May 1988 may appear to be redundant and result in unsettling the whole appointments. What is sought for is only a consequential benefit arising out of Ext. P1 judgment and the same can be dealt with by affording the relief individually provided the claim is bona fide and legally justified. 5. What is guaranteed under Art.16 (1) of the Constitution is not only the right in matters relating to the employment but also the appointment. The appointment to an office implies the conception of tenure, duration, emoluments, duties and obligations. When the right to an appointment is recognized all the consequential benefits must enure. The said right cannot be defeated directly or indirectly. The petitioner need not suffer for the errors committed by others. The appointment to an office implies the conception of tenure, duration, emoluments, duties and obligations. When the right to an appointment is recognized all the consequential benefits must enure. The said right cannot be defeated directly or indirectly. The petitioner need not suffer for the errors committed by others. That means the petitioner is justified in channelizing his claim but it must be just and reasonable. 6. The counsel for the petitioner lias brought to my notice the decision of this court in Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala 1978 KLT 29 . In that case a question arose whether, a Government servant would forfeit his claim for arrears of salary when he did not get his due promotion by a mistake of the Government. In that contest, the learned judge said: "..... .I would like to observe that no one can be penalised for no fault of his. Suppose a Government servant was reverted illegally or his services wrongly terminated and such reversion or termination is subsequently held to be wrong by a court of law and he is directed to be promoted or reinstated, could it be contended that such Government servant is not entitled to the remuneration for the period during which he was under illegal reversion or illegal termination. The Government cannot take advantage of a mistake committed by them or an order passed by them in illegal exercise of their power. If this principle is kept in mind I feel no hesitation to hold that the submissions made by the petitioner's counsel in support of his claim are entitled to weight and acceptance." This decision was approved by the Division Bench of this Court in Rajappan Nair v. State of Kerala 1984 KLT 141 . The Division Bench observed: " It quite often happens that a Government servant does not get his due promotion on the date he ought to have got it, but later it is given to him with retrospective effect from an earlier date. If for no fault of his, promotion to a Government servant is delayed and it is given to him later with retrospective effect from the date on which it was due, the Government servant is naturally entitled to restoration of the benefits which he has lost not on account of his conduct or laches. If for no fault of his, promotion to a Government servant is delayed and it is given to him later with retrospective effect from the date on which it was due, the Government servant is naturally entitled to restoration of the benefits which he has lost not on account of his conduct or laches. It is only proper that the Government should restore to him all that is lost by way of salary or other emoluments." The above case envisages a situation of claiming service benefits after the Government servant enters into service. In the present case, the claim is with regard to the period prior to the joining service. When the protection under Art.16 (1) is available for all matters relating to the appointment, no distinction can be drawn between claims for the period prior to the joining of service and the period subsequent to it. Once the entitlement to the appointment is established, the benefits accruing therefrom cannot be obliterated by the wrong committed by others. Though the factual situation is little different, I am of the view that the principle laid down in the aforesaid case can very well be adopted here too. 7. What is claimed by the petitioner is service benefits including seniority, arrears of pay etc. treating him as having joined for training as Village Extension Officer Grade II on 15th September 1988. In this context it is necessary to examine the case of the first respondent as contained in the counter affidavit. It is stated therein that the petitioner was working as Agricultural Demonstrator from 24th April 1979 till 1990 and this fact is not disputed by the petitioner. The Government Pleader has specifically maintained that the petitioner is not entitled to restore the seniority from 24th April 1979 to 16th April 1990 if at all any service benefit to be given to him. In this context what is required to be examined is whether the claim for service benefits advanced by the petitioner is just and reasonable. The fact remains that the petitioner has joined for training as Village Extension Officer Grade II only on 26th June 1994. That would mean, he is not entitled to claim arrears of salary for the period during which he has not actually worked. The salary is always a recompense made to a person for his pains of industry or work. The fact remains that the petitioner has joined for training as Village Extension Officer Grade II only on 26th June 1994. That would mean, he is not entitled to claim arrears of salary for the period during which he has not actually worked. The salary is always a recompense made to a person for his pains of industry or work. Therefore the claim for arrears of salary cannot be acceded to. Likewise the claim for counting the period from 24th April 1979 to 16th April 1990 for the purpose of seniority cannot be considered favourably. During the said period the petitioner was admittedly working as Agricultural Demonstrator. It may be a provisional service but he cannot claim that period also for purpose of counting seniority. It is the discretion of the court after evaluating the circumstances of the case. 8. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that Ext. P5 order is infirm and hence it is set aside. Consequently the petitioner is entitled to all service benefits with effect from 17th April 1990 except arrears of salary as aforesaid. The writ petition is all owed as above. No order as to costs.