JUDGMENT - S.S. NIJJAR, J. :---This judgment will dispose of two writ petitions viz. Civil Writ Petition Nos. 249 and 250 of 1989 as both of them involve decision on related questions of facts as well as law. The controversy giving rise to the filing of the present writ petitions under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India may be noticed. 2.In Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989, the petitioner claims to have been appointed as Lecturer in Chemistry in M.S.G. Arts, Science and Commerce College. The said college is stated to be run by the society styled as Mahatma Gandhi Vidya Mandir. The petitioner claims that he was fully eligible to be appointed on the post of Lecturer. He came to be appointed as Lecturer on 16th September 1995. He claims to have been appointed by a duly constituted Selection Committee. The translation of this order of appointment may be reproduced here as it would be useful for the decision of the controversy involved. "MANAGING COUNCIL OF COLLEGE EDUCATION MALEGAON CAMP (DIST. NASIK) Office. M.S.G. College, Malegaon (Camp) Ref. : MG/85-86/73Date : 16-9-85. To Shri B.K. Deore, At Post Malegaon Camp, Malegaon (Nasik) Sir, With reference to your application and your interview on 2-9-85 you have already been selected by the Selection Committee as Lecturer in Chemistry. The Institution has decided to give you appointment at " M.S.G. College, Malegaon Camp". Due to internal Court affairs of the Office bearers we are not able to give you immediately appointment without permission of the Court. It will take sometime to issue said appointment order with the permission of the Court till then you are requested that to avoid any loss to the students and taking into consideration the interest of the students and for smooth functioning of the College you may go to M.S.G. College and start your work. We will issue appropriate appointment order to you with a permission of the Court and will also pay you necessary salary for the work done by you with the permission of the Court. You may, therefore immediately resume your duties. Copy for information : Principal M.S.G. College, Malegaon Camp, Malegaon. Chairman, Managing Council of College Education, Malegaon Camp, Malegaon (Dist Nasik)" The pleaded case of the petitioner may be noticed from the judgment given by the College tribunal as these facts have been reiterated in the writ petition. You may, therefore immediately resume your duties. Copy for information : Principal M.S.G. College, Malegaon Camp, Malegaon. Chairman, Managing Council of College Education, Malegaon Camp, Malegaon (Dist Nasik)" The pleaded case of the petitioner may be noticed from the judgment given by the College tribunal as these facts have been reiterated in the writ petition. 3.The petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989 had been discontinued from service by an oral order dated 20th June, 1987. The appeal was preferred on 19th October, 1987. The petitioner has pleaded that he was selected after a regular interview as Lecturer in Chemistry in September, 1985. Regular orders of appointment could not be issued due to the litigation pending in the High Court between two rival groups who were trying to secure the management of the society. Writ Petition No. 2805 of 1984 was pending in the High Court. As permission of the High Court was necessary for appointing the petitioner, a formal appointment letter was not given to the petitioner. However, letter dated 16th September, 1985 was issued as reproduced above. On the basis of the contents of this letter it is further stated that the institution had decided to give the appointment to the petitioner. Due to pendency of Court cases of the office-bearers he was not given the appointment immediately as it could not be done without permission of the Court. Thus the letter states that it will take sometime to issue the said appointment with the permission of the Court. The petitioner was requested to work in the College to avoid hardship to the students. It was further stated in the letter that appointment letters with the permission of the Court will b e issued and the payment of the necessary salary for the work done by the petitioner would be made, with the permission of the Court. Relying on these representation, the petitioner continued to work. It is stated that he worked without salary until 14th January, 1986. Not only this it is further stated that he was not permitted to sign the muster roll of the College. Writ Petition bearing No. 2805 of 1984 was at that time pending in the High Court. The appeal of the petitioner was resisted by the management. According to the management, the appointment was purely temporary. It was made in a leave vacancy of one Ms. M.C. Jadhav. Writ Petition bearing No. 2805 of 1984 was at that time pending in the High Court. The appeal of the petitioner was resisted by the management. According to the management, the appointment was purely temporary. It was made in a leave vacancy of one Ms. M.C. Jadhav. The said Ms. Jadhav joined her duties in September 1986 and, therefore, the appointment of the petitioner came to an end automatically. It was further pleaded that the petitioner could not be posted on probation for two years because of the specific orders passed by the High Court from time to time in Writ Petition No. 2805 of 1984. It is pleaded that Civil Application No. 4283 of 1985 was filed in the said writ petition in which various orders came to be passed. The High Court had put some restrictions on the then Management for making any appointments without the sanction of the High Court. Thus the order of appointment of the petitioner on probation for a period of two years was invalid and inoperative. In accordance with the permission granted by the High Court, the petitioners at the most has been appointed for the academic year 1985-86. The respondents had also urged that the appeal filed by the petitioner should be dismissed as barred by limitation. After noticing the pleadings of the petitioner, the tribunal framed certain issues. The first point was whether or not the appeal of the petitioner was to be dismissed on account of delay and laches. It was held that the delay is condoned and, therefore, the appeal was entertained. The second question posed was whether the order of appointment dated 17th December, 1985 (wrongly typed for 27th December, 1985) appointing the petitioner on probation was a valid order in view of the various directions of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2805 of 1984 and C.A. No. 4282 of 1985. This question was answered against the petitioner and it was held that the then Principal or Chairman had issued the orders in violation of the direction of the High Court. The tribunal then framed a point as to whether the appointment of the petitioner was against leave vacancy or in a permanent vacancy. The Tribunal held that the appointment of the petitioner was in leave vacancy. 4.In the writ petition, a few further facts have been narrated which may be noticed. The tribunal then framed a point as to whether the appointment of the petitioner was against leave vacancy or in a permanent vacancy. The Tribunal held that the appointment of the petitioner was in leave vacancy. 4.In the writ petition, a few further facts have been narrated which may be noticed. It is stated that the appointment of the petitioner was approved by the University on the basis of a request made by the Institution. This approval is stated to have been given in view of the fact that the orders have been issued which were not temporary in nature. The said approval is said to have been given on 25th February 1986. In Writ Petition No. 250 of 1989 the petitioner has made similar averments with a few variations, which may be capitulated. The petitioner states that he was appointed on 6th September, 1985 (But no order of appointment has been placed on the record). He also continued working without salary till 14-1-86. On this date an order of appointment is said to be issued, which is attached as Exhibit-I to the petition. This appointment is on probation for two years. However, the petitioner was still not paid the salary regularly. In May, 1987 some posts were again advertised. Petitioner was asked to submit a fresh application to continue in service, having been appointed on probation. The College reopened on 20-6-87 for one academic session 1987-1988. Although, no order of termination of his services had been passed, yet the petitioner was not allowed to join. Thus the petitioner preferred Appeal No. 42 of 1987 before the Presiding Officer, College Tribunal. 4A.The orders of the Tribunal had been attacked on various grounds by both the petitioners which are identical in nature. It has been stated that the entire approach of the Presiding Officer was erroneous. The Tribunal was in error by entering into discussion about the validity of the appointment order dated 25th December 1985 and 14th January, 1986 respectively. The Presiding Officer has misinterpreted the various orders of the High Court. The petitioners further submit that 14 persons who had been similarly placed as the petitioners had been continued in service, thus the college authorities had acted in violation of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. On the other hand it has been submitted by Mr. The Presiding Officer has misinterpreted the various orders of the High Court. The petitioners further submit that 14 persons who had been similarly placed as the petitioners had been continued in service, thus the college authorities had acted in violation of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. On the other hand it has been submitted by Mr. Ketkar that all the facts pleaded by the petitioners before the College Tribunal had been controverted by the respondents therein. It had categorically denied that the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989 had been appointed on probation. In the written statement filed before the College Tribunal it had also been stated that the petitioner was in fact appointed w.e.f. 16th September, 1985. It was further controverted that he was ever appointed against a clear and permanent vacancy. In the case of petitioner in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1989 it was stated that as per the orders of the High Court dated 29-9-84 and 30-7-85, no appointment could be made without the permission of the High Court. Thus Dr. Baliram Hiray had no power to issue any appointment order to the petitioner. It was denied that the petitioner was appointed on probation. The appointment on probation cannot be limited to two years. The appointment order had been issued with mala fide intention. Before the College Tribunal it was also pleaded that there was a dispute between the management of the society which was pending decision in Writ Petition No. 2805 of 1984. During the pendency of the said writ petition on 29-9-84 certain directions were given by the High Court to the effect that no appointment, no transfer, no termination or no suspension or no major decision shall be carried out by the management in the College Section. The management was also directed to prepare a scheme through the Charity Commissioner, Maharashtra for better management and administration of the said society. In obedience to the directions of the High Court the scheme was prepared by the society on 31st December, 1986. The first Board of Trustees were appointed by the learned Charity Commissioner. Subsequently the first Board of Trustees have selected the office bearers for the Institution. Mr. Baliram Waman Hiray was not the office bearer of the society w.e.f. 31-12-1986. Earlier also he had no authority whatsoever to issue any appointment orders to the petitioners. The first Board of Trustees were appointed by the learned Charity Commissioner. Subsequently the first Board of Trustees have selected the office bearers for the Institution. Mr. Baliram Waman Hiray was not the office bearer of the society w.e.f. 31-12-1986. Earlier also he had no authority whatsoever to issue any appointment orders to the petitioners. It was further pleaded before the tribunal that a Civil Application No. 4283 of 1985 in Writ Petition No. 2805 of 1984 was moved before the High Court for permission that the society may be permitted to make appointment of staff. The said application was heard by a Division Bench and ultimately an order was passed on 19th December, 1985 directing the Collegiate Committee that the appointment can be made subject to the approval of the Executive Committee of the society. Thus it was pleaded before the College Tribunal that any appointment which were made by the Committee was null and void as it was contrary to the directions issued by the High Court. It was pleaded that the direction of the High Court was deliberately ignored by Dr. Hiray and in fact he had acted in contempt of Court. It was denied that the petitioners were in service till 14-1-1986. It was also denied that they were in service thereafter. It was pleaded that the petitioners be directed to produce the evidence that they had worked in the College as alleged. It was further pleaded that the petitioners be asked to give an explanation why they kept quite for non-payment of the salary from 19th September 1985 till 14-1-1986. It was denied that the petitioners were ever given any legal appointment w.e.f. 15-1-86. Time and again it has been denied that the petitioners were not appointed on probation. 5.On the basis of these controverted facts, Mr. Ketkar submits that the tribunal has examined the factual matter in detail and has given certain findings of fact. It is the submission of Mr. Ketkar that the tribunal has appreciated all the rival contentions and has taken into consideration all the necessary evidence. The tribunal has given findings of fact to the effect that in view of the orders of the High Court, the initial appointment of the petitioners were illegal. The tribunal on internal page 5 of the judgment (in Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989) has observed. The tribunal has given findings of fact to the effect that in view of the orders of the High Court, the initial appointment of the petitioners were illegal. The tribunal on internal page 5 of the judgment (in Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989) has observed. "In order to solve the main controversy in this appeal i.e. whether the order of appointment, appointing the appellant on probation, was valid or not, it would be necessary to refer to various orders passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2805 of 84 and C.A. No. 4283 of 85. C.A. No. 4283 of 85 is an off-shoot of W.P. No. 2805 of 84." Similar observation is made in the judgement challenged in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1989. Thereafter, it is submitted by Mr. Ketkar that, the Tribunal has taken into consideration all the facts pleaded by both the sides in both the appeals. The Tribunal has observed that there were two rival groups trying to gain control over the management. The Charity Commissioner was directed to frame a scheme by the High Court. The Charity Commissioner framed a scheme in view of the orders of the High Court. Writ Petition No. 2805 of 1984 was disposed of on 17th September 1987. Writ Petition was preferred by the group which is now in power after the scheme has been implemented. In order sic other words, Dr. Baliram Hiray who is alleged to have given all the disputed appointments was belonging to the other group and that they were respondents in Writ Petition No. 2805 of 1984. There are number of disputed orders passed in between 1984 to 17th September, 1987, the date when the rule was discharged by the High Court. Thereafter the tribunal notices the various orders passed by the High Court On 29th September, 1984 the High Court was pleased to pass the following order. "There would be no further appointments, promotions, termination or transfers of teachers at any of the College or Schools till further orders. In case of emergency, liberty to apply to Court." This was followed by an order dated 28th November, 1984 wherein sanction was granted for creating temporary appointments upto the end of April, 1985. Thereafter the tribunal notices that C.A. No. 4283 of 1985 seeking permission to appoint lecturers and other staff as a matter of urgency was filed. In case of emergency, liberty to apply to Court." This was followed by an order dated 28th November, 1984 wherein sanction was granted for creating temporary appointments upto the end of April, 1985. Thereafter the tribunal notices that C.A. No. 4283 of 1985 seeking permission to appoint lecturers and other staff as a matter of urgency was filed. However, the High Court found that no details had been furnished and thus proceeded to pass the order on 30th July, 1985. "Unless the whole matter is placed before this Court including the advertisements, applications received, constitution and the personnel of the Selection Committee and its recommendation, such a blanket permission cannot be asked for nor can be granted." After the order dated 30th July, 1985 was passed, the management headed by Dr. Baliram Hiray filed another statement in C.A. No. 4283 of 1985 for necessary orders. On 19th December, 1985 an order was passed by the High Court wherein the society was allowed to make appointments. Permission had however been granted on 28th November, 1984 to make temporary appointments upto April, 1985. Therefore, it is the submission of Mr. Ketkar that since both the petitioners claim to have been appointed in September, 1985 the same are null and void and non-est in the eye of law. The said appointments, he submits, could not have been made without the permission of the High Court. He further supports his contention by drawing our attention to the order dated 16th September, 1985 which has been placed on the record by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989. A perusal of this order (the translation of which has been reproduced above) would reveal that even that order was issued subject to the permission being granted by the Court. Time and again it is mentioned that appointment order cannot be issued without the permission of the Court. It is further mentioned that the salary also cannot be paid without the permission of the Court. That being so, it is the submission of Mr. Ketkar that even if the petitioners claim to have been appointed on a probationary basis, the same would be totally contrary to the orders of the High Court and would amount to Dr. Hiray committing Contempt of the Court. Relying on these documents, the tribunal has given a finding of fact that the appointment of the petitioners were not legal. Ketkar that even if the petitioners claim to have been appointed on a probationary basis, the same would be totally contrary to the orders of the High Court and would amount to Dr. Hiray committing Contempt of the Court. Relying on these documents, the tribunal has given a finding of fact that the appointment of the petitioners were not legal. They could not have been appointed at all, let alone being appointed on probation. 6.At the time of the hearing of the petition Mr. Langote drew our attention to the order of appointment purportedly issued in favour of the petitioner. We have perused the order dated 27th December, 1985 in Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989. A perusal thereof shows that although it is mentioned that the appointment is for a period of 2 years yet none of the clauses had been scored out in the remaining part of the order. Thus the appointment order reads in columns 1 to 8 as he/ she, his/her. One of the clauses is that his/her appointment is on probation for a period of 2 years subject to the approval of the Pune University. The very next clause says his/her appointment is purely temporary in leave vacancy of Shri--------upto----------. In writ petition No. 250 of 1989 the order of appointment of the petitioner is dated 14-1-86. This order states that he is appointed on probation for a period of two years. It does not state that he is appointed on a regular basis, and that he will be on probation for a period of two years. The appointment is not a tenure appointment. This being the position we are unable to agree with the submissions of Mr. Langote to the effect that the petitioners had in fact been appointed on probation. Mr. Langote has further submitted that the appointment of the petitioners having been approved by the University, it is deemed to have been issued on a permanent basis. In our opinion even if the appointment has been approved it cannot lead to the conclusion that they have been appointed on a permanent or regular basis. This matter has also been considered by the tribunal in detail. In our opinion even if the appointment has been approved it cannot lead to the conclusion that they have been appointed on a permanent or regular basis. This matter has also been considered by the tribunal in detail. In para 9 of Appeal No. 39 of 1987 ( Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989 ) the tribunal has observed that on the basis of the documents produced by the respondents it could not be held that the appellant was ever appointed in a clear vacancy. He further discusses that as per the appointment order he joined duty on 15-1-1986. However, from the documents it is evident that the petitioner was shown as full time Lecturer in the leave vacancy of Ms. Jadhav. Thereafter the tribunal refers to various other documents and correspondence of the College with the University Grants Commission. In two of the statements sent to the University Grants Commission it was pointed out that the petitioner was a full time lecturer, in leave vacancy of Ms. Jadhav. Therefore, the tribunal came to the conclusion that the appointment of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989 was of a casual and temporary nature and made in a leave vacancy. Furthermore, the said appointment having been made without the permission of the High Court was wholly illegal and, therefore, unsustainable. We find no fault with the reasons adopted by the tribunal. In Appeal No. 42 of 1987 ( Writ Petition No. 250 of 1989 ) the Tribunal has held that Dr. Baliram Hiray had no power to issue the order of appointment on a regular basis. This finding is arrived at by analysing the various orders of the High Court. The Tribunal has given very elaborate reasons in paras 6, 7 and 8. In paragraph 9 of it is also noticed that the petitioner had accepted a contractual appointment on 1-11-86, for the session 1986-87. This finding is also based on appreciation of evidence. 7.We have considered the rival contentions of Mr. Langote and Mr. Ketkar. We are inclined to agree with Mr. Ketkar for more than one reason. Firstly in exercise of the powers under Article 226/277 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as Court of Appeal over the finding of fact recorded by the tribunal. Under Article 226 the High Court does not generally enter into disputed questions of fact. Ketkar. We are inclined to agree with Mr. Ketkar for more than one reason. Firstly in exercise of the powers under Article 226/277 of the Constitution, the High Court does not sit as Court of Appeal over the finding of fact recorded by the tribunal. Under Article 226 the High Court does not generally enter into disputed questions of fact. These have to be decided by the fact finding authority. In our view, the tribunal has given cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion on various controversies raised in this case. In this view of the matter we are unable to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the tribunal. Even otherwise we have with the help of the Counsel gone through the various pleadings as also the material placed on the record. We find that the orders of appointment if issued to the petitioners were in utter disregard of the directions given by the High Court. In normal circumstances we would be minded to take proceedings for Contempt of Court against Dr. Baliram Hiray. We refrain from going into this question as Dr. Hiray is not a party before us. Mr. Langote has further submitted that 14 persons similarly appointed on probation by Dr. Baliram Hiray are continuing in service. On the other hand the services of the petitioners have been arbitrarily terminated. Thus the action of the respondents is violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. No details have been furnished by the petitioner to prove that they are similarly situated as the 14 persons who have been permitted to continue. Thus it would not be possible for us to hold that the petitioners have been subjected to hostile discrimination. Even otherwise, both the petitioners claim to have been appointed on 16th September, 1985 ( in Writ Petition No. 249 of 1989 ) and 6th September, 1985 (in Writ Petition No. 250 of 1989). This selection and purported appointment was in clear contempt of the orders of the High Court dated 29th September, 1984 by which it was directed that : "There would be no further appointment, promotions, termination or transfer...........till further orders." This illegality is sought to be turned into a legality by saying that the petitioners have been appointed on 27-12-1985 and 14-1-86 in pursuance of the order of the High Court in C.A. No. 4283 of 1985 on 19/12/85. Relevant part of the order states that :- "As regards 38 selections already made, we permit the Collegiate Council to issue immediate appointment letters to those who have worked as lecturers in the College, -about 14 persons......" We are of the opinion that the above order was correctly interpreted by the tribunal. Persons illegally appointed, whose appointments are non est in the eye of law, could not be appointed by virtue of this order. This order applied to the 14 persons who had been legally appointed and had been legally working in the College. Thus the case of the petitioners is clearly distinguishable from the 14 persons permitted to be continued. On principle as also on precedent our view is fortified by the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd.)1. A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2005. In paras 17 to 20 the Supreme Court has observed thus : "17. The contemner should not be allowed to enjoy or retain the fruits of his contempt": The principle that a contemnor ought not to be permitted to enjoy and/or keep the fruits of his contempt is well-settled. In (Mohd. Idris v. R.J. Babuji)2, 1985 1 S.C.R. 598 this Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment for contempt does not mean that the Court is not entitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and rectifying the things done in violation of its orders. The petitioners therein had given an undertaking to the Bombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A learned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and imposed a sentence of one month's imprisonment. In addition thereto, the learned Single Judge made appropriate directions to remedy the breach of undertaking. It was contended before this Court that the learned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of Court. The argument was rejected holding that "the Single Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach (of undertaking)". 18.The above principle has been applied even in the case of violation of orders of injunction issued by Civil Courts. In Clarke v. Chaoburn (1985) 1 All ER 211, Sr Robert Megarry V-C observed : "I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of high importance that orders of the Court should be obeyed. 18.The above principle has been applied even in the case of violation of orders of injunction issued by Civil Courts. In Clarke v. Chaoburn (1985) 1 All ER 211, Sr Robert Megarry V-C observed : "I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of high importance that orders of the Court should be obeyed. Wilful disobedience to an order of the Court is punishable as a contempt of Court and I feel no doubt that such disobedience may properly be described as being illegal. If by such disobedience the persons enjoined claim that they have validly effected some charge in the rights and liabilities of others, I cannot see why it should be said that although they are liable to penalties for contempt of Court for doing what they did, nevertheless those acts were validly done. Of course, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by pointing out that it was done in breach in law. If a meeting is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be said that the meeting has not been held. But the legal consequence of what has been done in breach of the law may plainly be very much affected by the illegality. It seems to be on principle that those who defy a prohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits of their defiance are good and not tainted by the illegality that produced them." 19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in (Century Flour Mills Limited v. S. Suppiah)3, A.I.R. 1975 Madras 270 (F.B.) and (Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun)4, A.I.R. 1986 Calcutta 220. In Century Flour Mills Limited, it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the Court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing. The inherent power of the Court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The inherent power of the Court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to be exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order. 20. In Sujit Pal, A.I.R. 1986 Cal. 220 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and took possession of the property. The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the Court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law." The principles enunciated above apply with full force to the facts and circumstances of the present case. We have, however, in the interest of justice not proceeded against Dr. Hiray for contempt of Court. But this does not mean that the Court will legalise the orders issued in contempt of the orders of the Court. 8.In view of what has been stated above, we find that there is no substance in both the writ petitions which are hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed. *****