JUDGMENT S.B. Sakrikar, J. 1. This letters patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order and judgment dated 30.10.1990 rendered by the learned single Judge of this Court in Misc. Appeal No. 163 of 1988, thereby awarding the compensation in favour of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4, claimants, of Rs. 36,500/- along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till realisation of the amount. Learned single Judge held the appellant insurance company jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation along with the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, owner and driver of the vehicle. 2. The facts in brief are that on 7.1.1986 at about 12.15 p.m. Abhaykumar, aged 10 years, was going with his class mates from his school at the playground for attending some function. At the relevant time, a bus bearing registration No. MPF 7789, owned by the respondent No. 1, being driven by the respondent No. 2, rashly and negligently, hit the said Abhay kumar, resulting in his death. The claim petition was filed by respondent Nos. 2 and 3, parents of the deceased, before the Tribunal. The claim petition was dismissed on the ground that it was not proved that the vehicle was driven by respondent No. 2 at the relevant time. Aggrieved by the award of the Tribunal, respondent Nos. 3 and 4 preferred the appeal before this Court. The learned single Judge awarded the compensation in favour of the respondents as stated above. Aggrieved by the order of the learned single Judge, the insurance company has filed this letters patent appeal. 3. We have heard Mr. Dandwate, the learned Counsel for the appellant. None appeared for the respondents. 4. The only contention urged by the learned Counsel appearing for appellant is that the insurance policy of the offending vehicle was transferred in the name of respondent No. 1, Nasir Hussain, at about 3.00 p.m. on 7.1.1986, after the alleged accident. Therefore, the insurance company cannot be held liable to indemnify respondent No. 1, the owner of the vehicle, as the alleged accident occurred at Evidence Act, 1872, Section 58-Evidence-Appreciation of-Whether letters admitted are required to be proved-Held: no. (Para 7) about 12.15 p.m. on 7.1.1986. It was also contended before us that as the appellant was informed by letters, Exhs. Therefore, the insurance company cannot be held liable to indemnify respondent No. 1, the owner of the vehicle, as the alleged accident occurred at Evidence Act, 1872, Section 58-Evidence-Appreciation of-Whether letters admitted are required to be proved-Held: no. (Para 7) about 12.15 p.m. on 7.1.1986. It was also contended before us that as the appellant was informed by letters, Exhs. D/6-C and D/7-C, that for all the acts done before 3.00 p.m., the responsibility shall be of the owner of the vehicle. In letter dated 30.7.1986 it was stated that the responsibility of an accident has been taken by the owner of the vehicle, on this count also, the appellant insurance company cannot be held liable to pay the compensation to the respondents-claimants. Learned counsel referred to Section 64VB of the Insurance Act, 1938 and relied on Division Bench decision of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ratansingh 1993 ACJ 1219 (MP). 5. Considering the contentions urged by the counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record it is not disputed that bus bearing registration No. MPF 7789 was formerly owned by one Hastimal Kothari and it was insured in his name. The insurance policy was valid for the period of one year till 29.1.1986. It was also not in dispute that during continuance of this policy Hastimal transferred the vehicle to respondent No. 1 and in the noon at about 3.00 p.m. on 7.1.1986, the respondent No. 1 applied to the insurance company for the transfer of the insurance policy in his name. The policy was then transferred in the name of respondent No. 1 at 3.00 p.m. on 7.1.1986. Section 64VB of the Insurance Act clearly states that no insurer shall assume any risk with regard to a vehicle unless the premium is received in advance. 6. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ratansingh 1993 ACJ 1219 (MP), the Division Bench of this Court has also held as under: A bare reading of Section 64VB of the Insurance Act shows that the object of the section is to secure advance payment of the premium by the insurance company before the assumption of risk. It is clear that in terms of the mandate of Section 64VB the liability is assumed only after the premium is received in advance. It is clear that in terms of the mandate of Section 64VB the liability is assumed only after the premium is received in advance. In the present case, it is not disputed that the respondent No. 1 applied for transfer of the policy on 7.1.1986 at about 3.00 p.m., i.e., after the alleged accident and in the application for transfer of the policy, Exh. D/5-C and also in the letters, Exhs. D/6-C and D/7-C, it is clearly mentioned that for the acts done before 3.00 p.m. the responsibility shall be of the owner of the vehicle. 7. The learned single Judge while considering the aforesaid application and the letters, stated in its order that the application for transfer, Exh. D/5-C, does not speak about the time as to when this application was made. There was no endorsement from the insurance company about the time when it was received but at the same time, learned single Judge has mentioned in its order that letter, Exh. D/6-C, shows that at 3.00 p.m. this was issued on the letter-head of the respondent No. 1 specifying that for the acts done before 3.00 p.m. the responsibility shall be of the owner of the vehicle. In our opinion, from the aforesaid facts it emerges that the application for transfer of the policy, Exh. D/5-C, was also filed at about 3.00 p.m. on 7.1.1986, i.e., after the alleged accident. The letter, Exh. D/6-C and another letter dated 30.7.1986, Exh. D/7-C, clearly show that the owner respondent No. 1 has taken the responsibility of the acts done before 3.00 p.m. There is no evidence in rebuttal on record suggesting that the application Exh. D/5-C and letters Exhs. D/6-C and D/7-C were not sent by the respondent No. 1 to the appellant. This clearly goes to show that the policy of the insurance transferred in the name of respondent No. 1 is effective from 7.1.1986 but only after 3.00 p.m. as disclosed in the unrebutted letters of the owner. In our view, the decision of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Ram Dayal 1990 ACJ 545 (SC), is not applicable in the instant case because of the letters granting immunity to the insurance company till 3.00 p.m. It is not correct to say that these letters are not proved. What is admitted is not required to be proved as is clear from Section 58 of the Evidence Act. Ltd. v. Ram Dayal 1990 ACJ 545 (SC), is not applicable in the instant case because of the letters granting immunity to the insurance company till 3.00 p.m. It is not correct to say that these letters are not proved. What is admitted is not required to be proved as is clear from Section 58 of the Evidence Act. Risk in the instant case was not assumed before 3.00 p.m. and the accident indisputably occurred at about 12.15 p.m. 8. Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act provides as under: When one person has by his declaration act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing. Here the letters Exh. D/6-C and D/7-C contained declaration that the appellant shall not be liable for any risk before 3.00 p.m. and induced the appellant to 'act upon such belief. The owner is thus estopped from denying the 'truth of that thing' and from passing on the liability to the appellant. At 12.15 p.m., no premium was paid and no transfer was in existence. The appellant exercised due care and caution and obtained the undertaking in writing. If it were not so, then owner would have been saved by the principle of law laid down in Ram Dayal's case 1990 ACJ 545 (SC). The owner is, thus, confronted by doctrine of estoppel. Gulam Abbas v. Hazi Kayyam Ali AIR 1973 SC 554 , is pertinent. The policy has to be read and construed along with these letters as part of the same transaction. 9. In view of these facts and this legal position, we conclude that the Tribunal and single Bench have erred in belittling the impact and importance of the intentional declaration contained in these letters and in foisting the liability on the appellant contrary to undertaking and Section 64VB of the Insurance Act. Consequently, we vacate the finding recorded against the appellant; hold that appellant is not liable jointly and severally with respondent Nos. 1 and 2, i.e., owner and driver; order that only respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are liable to pay the awarded amount and allow this appeal accordingly but with no order as to costs. 10. Consequently, we vacate the finding recorded against the appellant; hold that appellant is not liable jointly and severally with respondent Nos. 1 and 2, i.e., owner and driver; order that only respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are liable to pay the awarded amount and allow this appeal accordingly but with no order as to costs. 10. The counsel submitted that the awarded amount has been paid by the appellant. If that is so, the appellant may proceed against the respondent No. 1 (owner of the vehicle) in conformity with law for recovery of the amount as may be due by this time. None appeared for the respondent No. 1 to oppose the appeal and direction. 11. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 500/-, if certified.