JUDGMENT - MANOHARAN L., J.:---The petitioner was appointed as junior stenographer by Annexure-1 order dated 21-2-1975. From the grade of junior stenographer, the next place of promotion is P.A./ senior stenographer. For promotion to the said place of P.A./ senior stenographer, as per Annexure-3, cadre scheme of stenographic personnel, the candidate should satisfy proficiency in stenography with the speed not less than 100 w.p.m. and must have put in at least one year service as junior stenographer. Respondents 1 to 5 conducted a test for identifying candidates who are qualified to be promoted as P.A./ senior stenographer. The petitioner participated in the said test but failed. Therefore, he filed this writ petition. His grievance being, since he possessed certificate Annexure-II issued by the Director of Education, Pune, certifying that he has a speed of 100 w.p.m. in English shorthand, he was not required to appear for the test. In short, according to the petitioner, a person placed in his position who is possessed of a certificate as Annexure-II need not and should not have been required to sit for the test as mentioned in Annexure-III and it was not necessary for the petitioner to pass the said test for attaining promotion to P.A./ senior stenographer. 2. It was urged by the learned Counsel, Shri Dhabe, it is irrational to have such a requirement so far as the petitioner is concerned as he possesses the certificate Annexure-II. On the other hand, Shri Mehadia learned Counsel for respondents 1 to 5, would point out that the petitioner has forfeited the right, if any, to challenge the test by his participating in the test not only before the institution of the petition but also after the institution of the petition. It is pointed out that after the institution of the petition, the petitioner appeared for the test and was successful and then was promoted. He accepted the promotion also. He was promoted on 6-3-1986 on his passing the test. Now the grievance is that he ought to have been promoted on 1-3-1984 when others were promoted. As noticed, the very basis of the said claim is that a person like the petitioner need not appear for the test nor does he require to pass the test for promotion as he possesses the certificate Annexure-II. 3. Now the grievance is that he ought to have been promoted on 1-3-1984 when others were promoted. As noticed, the very basis of the said claim is that a person like the petitioner need not appear for the test nor does he require to pass the test for promotion as he possesses the certificate Annexure-II. 3. Shri Mehadia, learned Counsel for respondents 1 to 5, contended that inasmuch as the petitioner took chance by appearing in the test and got failed, now he cannot turn round and question the very test. This is more so, as even after the institution of the petition, he appeared for the test and was successful. Mr. Mehadia relied on the decision in the case of (Surinder Kaur and others v. State of Punjab and others)1, 1996 Lab.I.C. 1521. It concerned a case where those who had requisite experience as Anganwari Workers applied for the post of supervisors and appeared in the written test held on 16-1-1994. Interviews of 77 candidates were held in June, 1994. The petitioners were not successful. They contended that after the written test, the respondents had no authority to hold interview. In considering the aforesaid contention, at para 9 of the decision, the Division Bench held : “It is true that in the notice (Annexure P/1) inviting applications, no mention was made regarding the holding of interview for the purpose of making selection and the appointment to the posts of Supervisors. However, it is not disputed that the selection was to be made by the Departmental Selection Committee...... None of the candidates objected to the holding of the interview at any time. Rather the grievance of the petitioner was that they were wrongly not permitted to appear in the interview.” The Court expressed the view that since written test and interview were held and selection was made; on the basis of the said challenge the selection is not liable to be quashed. Shri Mehadia also relied on the decision in the case of (National High School, Madras v. Education Tribunal and another)2, 1992 (Supp. 3) S.C.C. 106. There, in a departmental enquiry the delinquent teacher wanted the Enquiry Committee must be other than the School Committee constituted for conducting enquiry. Accordingly an Enquiry Committee was appointed, he participated in the enquiry without raising any objection to the jurisdiction. 3) S.C.C. 106. There, in a departmental enquiry the delinquent teacher wanted the Enquiry Committee must be other than the School Committee constituted for conducting enquiry. Accordingly an Enquiry Committee was appointed, he participated in the enquiry without raising any objection to the jurisdiction. The authority accepted the report of the Enquiry Committee and ultimately the respondent before the Supreme Court was dismissed from the service. One of the points raised on behalf of the respondents was that the Committee had no jurisdiction to conduct an enquiry. Adverting to the same, in paragraph 4 of the decision, the Supreme Court observed : “It is not in dispute that the respondent himself demanded that the enquiry should be held by educationists other than the school committee. That request seems to have been necessitated since he has made accusations against the Headmaster of the school. Accordingly a committee of outsiders was appointed to hold the enquiry. The respondent participated in the enquiry and did not at any time raise objection as to the jurisdiction of the Committee. He was therefore, estopped from raising the objection as to the jurisdiction of the school committee.” It would appear that two factors weighed with the Court - one is that the Committee itself was constituted at the behest of the respondent, and the other he participated in the enquiry and at no point of time questioned the jurisdiction of the committee. What is important to be noticed is, the fact that the respondent participated in the enquiry also weighed with the Supreme Court in deciding the said point. Shri Mehadia relied on the decision in the case of (R. N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir)3, 1992(4) S.C.C. 683 . That matter arose in a petition for eviction under E. P. Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. There an eviction order was passed and time was granted by High Court for vacating the premises on filing an undertaking. Supreme Court held that after electing to avail protection from eviction for one month by filing an undertaking, tenant cannot be permitted to assail the eviction order by filing SLP before Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held so on the principle of Approbate and Reprobate. Here also the principle can apply because the petitioner had choice to elect to sit for the test or not to appear for the test. The Supreme Court held so on the principle of Approbate and Reprobate. Here also the principle can apply because the petitioner had choice to elect to sit for the test or not to appear for the test. He challenges the same now as he possesses Annexure-II certificate; but he took the chance of appearing for the test and got failed. Applying the principles of Approbate and Reprobate, the petitioner cannot be permitted to turn round and question the competency of the test after choosing to appear for the examination. This Court in the decision in the case of (G.V. Unkule v. High Court, Appellate Side, Bombay)4, 1997(1) Bom.C.R. 199 had occasion to consider the right of a party after having opted to participate in an interview to question the very constitution of interview committee. Adverting to the same, this Court held: “Even otherwise, it appears that the petitioner had himself accepted the constitution of the Selection Committee, as he chose to appear before the said Selection Committee. It is only after he realised that he had not been selected that he chose to challenge the constitution of the Selection Committee.” The principle applies to the facts and circumstances of this case also. 4. Against this, Shri Dhabe, learned Counsel for the petitioner, sought to rely on the decision in the case of (The State of Punjab v. Madan Singh)5, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1429. The same concerns the seniority and promotion to the post of Assistants. The Revenue Secretary to the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, issued office order No. 42 of 1950 prescribing a test for those who were working as senior clerks and those who officiated as Assistants in order to guide the promotions to the post of Assistants. The office order stated that the officials who refused to take the test or failed to qualify in it will not be deemed eligible for promotion. The challenge was against the said order of the Commissioner. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the executive instructions issued by the State Government are void as they amount to an alteration of the Rules prescribed under section 241 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which was then applicable. There is nothing in the said decision to show that the candidate appeared for the examination. Evidently on the facts of that case, the same cannot apply to the instant case. There is nothing in the said decision to show that the candidate appeared for the examination. Evidently on the facts of that case, the same cannot apply to the instant case. The next decision relied on by the learned Counsel 1992 Lab.I.C. 118 (M. M. Bhaskara Rao and others v. Union of India and others)6, was a case where the affected employees filed a writ petition questioning the promotion of Grade II Officers to Grade I alleging that the same was arbitrary. The High Court directed to consider the case of the petitioners after applying the uniform rule of appraisal of reports in regard to service as on the date their juniors were promoted, with a further direction that the bank has to give the petitioners an opportunity to explain adverse remarks, if any, against them before the appraisal of reports. Instead of applying the said direction by the Court, the bank adopted a technique of interview giving a complete go-by to the uniform rule of appraisal reports; and since the petitioners did not come up to the required standard in the interview the appraisal reports were not considered by the authorities. The High Court held that the process of filtering the petitioners through interview was invalid as the appraisal report was not considered for the purpose of promotion. The learned Counsel, Shri Dhabe contended that though the petitioners therein participated in the interview, the High Court did not approve the method adopted by the bank in promoting the candidates. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, applying the said principle in this case, simply because the petitioner appeared for the test, that cannot operate adversely to the interest of the petitioner. 5. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid submission of learned Counsel Shri Dhabe. The principle of approbate and reprobate is only a specie of estoppel; and estoppel cannot operate against law. When there was a direction by the High Court to promote candidates on the basis of appraisal reports the bank not only did not implement the direction but committed breach of the directions of the High Court and adopted a method of giving promotion by screening the candidates on the basis of interview. When there was a direction by the High Court to promote candidates on the basis of appraisal reports the bank not only did not implement the direction but committed breach of the directions of the High Court and adopted a method of giving promotion by screening the candidates on the basis of interview. A direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would function equally as a provision of law inasmuch as the party to whom the direction is issued has no option but to obey it. No estoppel can operate against the said direction. There can be no option for the party when the Court directs to do a particular thing in a particular way. His only duty is to obey it. No party can contend that the said direction is subject to estoppel. The said decision is clearly distinguishable and the same cannot have any application to the facts and circumstances of this case. 6. To conclude, as the petitioner has opted to appear for the test and took the chance, it is not open for the petitioner to turn round now and challenge the very validity of the test. In view of the same, we find nothing to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. Consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed, which, accordingly, is dismissed. Rule discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed. -----