ORDER A. R. TIWARI, J. - At the instance of the assessee-applicant, the Tribunal (Board of Revenue) has stated the case and referred the undernoted question of law, arising out of the order dated July 8, 1987 passed by the Tribunal in Second Appeal No. 248-III/86 on application under section 44 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (for short "the Act") for our opinion : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the penalty of Rs. 8,537 imposed on the assessee under section 17(3)(c)(ii) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 was proper and legal ?" 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the assessee deals in sales of vehicles and their parts and implements. For the period from July 1, 1982 to June 30, 1983, his books of accounts were found defective and best judgment assessment was made by the assessing officer. This process resulted in determination of the turnover at a figure higher than shown in the books of accounts. The deduction claim of tax-paid goods was no allowed to the extent of Rs. 60,272. The appellant submitted the third quarterly return late by eight days and the fourth quarterly return late by 27 days. Monthly tax was also not paid in time. On these lapses, penalty of Rs. 8,537 was imposed (annexure B). The first appeal was rejected on July 1, 1986 by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (annexure C). The Second Appeal No. 248-III/86 was rejected on all grounds on July 8, 1987 by the Tribunal (annexure D). Aggrieved, the department filed the application under section 44 of the Act proposing three questions as contained in the statement of case dated October 10, 1991. However, it was conceded by the department that questions Nos. 1 and 2 did not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. The only question, as referred, was pressed. The Tribunal, thus, stated the case and referred the aforesaid question. 3. We have heard Shri J. W. Mahajan, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri Surjeet Singh, learned counsel for the non-applicant. 4. 1 and 2 did not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. The only question, as referred, was pressed. The Tribunal, thus, stated the case and referred the aforesaid question. 3. We have heard Shri J. W. Mahajan, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri Surjeet Singh, learned counsel for the non-applicant. 4. Right at the threshold the counsel for the parties submitted that an inadvertent error has crept in the aforesaid question and as such, the question be corrected as containing section 17(3)(b) of the Act instead of section 17(3)(c)(ii) of the Act. 5. Section 17(3)(b) of the Act substituted with effect from September 1, 1976 vide Act No. 48 of 1976 provides as under : "(b) a registered dealer fails without sufficient cause to pay the amount of tax in the manner prescribed under sub-section (2) of section 22 or to furnish his return under sub-section (1) or revised return under sub-section (2) for any period in the manner and by the date prescribed thereunder or while furnishing the return fails to furnish along with the return, the proof of payment as required by sub-section (1-A)....." 6. The counsel for the applicant submitted that after deciding the aforesaid case, the Full Bench of the Tribunal has taken the view in case of Himmat Steel Foundry Limited Kumhari v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (1991) 7 TLD 75 that penalty under section 17(3)(b) of the Act cannot be imposed for non-payment or late payment of monthly tax as provided under rule 27(2) of the Rules and has set aside the penalty imposed by the lower authority. 7. We find that the Full Bench took the view as under : "It is an accepted principle of interpretation as propounded by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Automobile Industries [1961] 12 STC 122 and the Assessing Authority-cum-Excise and Taxation Officer, Gurgaon v. East India Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1981] 48 STC 239; (1983) 16 VKN 69 that statute must be construed according to its plain language nothing is to be added and nothing is to be subtracted from the words of the statute and, in case of any doubt or ambiguity, the benefit should go to the tax-payer. Co. Ltd. [1981] 48 STC 239; (1983) 16 VKN 69 that statute must be construed according to its plain language nothing is to be added and nothing is to be subtracted from the words of the statute and, in case of any doubt or ambiguity, the benefit should go to the tax-payer. We have already seen that according to the plain language of section 17(3)(b) read with section 22(2) read with section 17(1) read with rules 15, 16, 18, 19, 22 and 28 of the Rules, it is clear that payment of tax is to be made into Government treasury before furnishing of the returns. We also found that the charging section i.e., section 17(3) of the Act does not incorporate non-payment of monthly tax or late payment of monthly tax as offence punishable under section 17(3)(b). As we have stated, non-payment of monthly tax or late payment of monthly tax, even in terms of rule 27(2), is not an offence by itself as the deficiency is permitted by that rule, to be made good before filing the return. When the rule itself permits to make good such deficiency, the non-payment or late payment of monthly tax is not an offence under the substantive Act. If deficiency is not made good then only is an offence committed under section 17(3)(b) of the Act. We do not find any real conflict between section 22(1) and (2) of the Act, and rule 27(2). These provisions stand on different footing. The rule prescribing for monthly payment of tax can still operate without destroying the provisions of section 22(1) and (2) of the Act. Since rule 27(2) is not a part of section 22(1) and (2) of the Act, the breach of rule 27(2) is punishable only under rule 69(a) being a violative or rule and not of the law." 8. It appears from the statement of case, that the penalty was imposed for non-payment of monthly tax in time. The late submission of the return seemed to be an incidental question. 9. Nothing is urged before us to show that the view taken by the Full Bench of the Tribunal is erroneous in law. The factual position is not shown to be different. 10. In view of the foregoing position, we are satisfied that the Tribunal was not right in law in imposing the penalty as it did. 11. 9. Nothing is urged before us to show that the view taken by the Full Bench of the Tribunal is erroneous in law. The factual position is not shown to be different. 10. In view of the foregoing position, we are satisfied that the Tribunal was not right in law in imposing the penalty as it did. 11. In the result, we answer the question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department, as regards section 17(3)(b) of the Act. 12. Our answer is with reference to section 17(3)(b) of the Act, as submitted by both the sides, on modification of the question in that regard. Precisely for this deviation and departure, we deem it proper to reserve liberty to the Tribunal to restate the case and re-refer the question on the linchpin of section 17(3)(c)(ii) of the Act, once it is understood by it that the answer is sought and required to be given on that basis only or to resort to some other appropriate proceedings for this purpose. The counsel for both the sides indicated no objection to such a liberty and course. The Tribunal shall have four months' time from the receipt of the copy of this order to act in this manner. 13. This Misc. Civil Case stands disposed of with no orders as to costs. 14. A copy of this order shall be transmitted to the Tribunal in accordance with law. Ordered accordingly.