N.G.Das, J.- This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 30th of November, 1995 passed in Civil Rule No.41 of 1987. 2. We have heard Mr. S. Deb, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. B. Das, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. 3. The facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that the respondent who was recruited to the post of Technician Grade IV (Cementing) redesignated as Helper Grade II (Cementing) joined the post on 27.1.1977 hi the office of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission (abbreviated hereinafter a Commission) and thereafter he was prompted to the post of Assistant Technician (Mechanical) with effect from 1.1.1984. While serving as Assistant Technician (Mechanical) the petitioner i.e. respondent herein fell sick on account of mental derangement and hence he could not attend office, The In-charge Officer, Cementing therefore, by his Memorandum No.AGT/CEM/47/PF/83-84/3459 dated 7th July, 1984 contained in Annexure A asked the respondent to join in his duty without further delay. Thereafter Deputy Director (P & A) of the Commission issued another Memorandum bearing No. AGT/2G/989/77-Estt/2c5 7 dated 16th of November, 1984»on behalf of the General Manager of the Commission asking the respondent to join immediately and also informed him that in case he was sick he should submit medical certificate within seven days (Annexure B). This memorandum was followed by another Memorandum bearing No.AGT/20/989/77-Estt/3538 dated 19th/20th of December, 1984 contained in Annexure C whereby the respondent was informed to show cause as to why the provision of Regulations 14 (5) of ONGC Leave Regulations, 1968 should not be invoked. 4. In response to this the respondent submitted a representation dated 19.1.1985 but that being hot satisfactory the General Manager of the Commission by his Memorandum No.AGT/20/989/77-Estt/3960 dated 16th of January, 1985 contained in Annexure D intimated the respondent that he was absconding from his duties with effect from 17th September, 1984 (AN) after committing a grave criminal offence. The respondent then submitted another representation dated 22.1.1985 requesting the General Manager to allow him 15 days time to submit reply in details. By this representation he also informed the General Manager of the Commission that he was attending office regularly with effect from 9.1.1985 but neither his attendance was recorded nor he was allowed to discharge any duty (Annexure E). 5. By this representation he also informed the General Manager of the Commission that he was attending office regularly with effect from 9.1.1985 but neither his attendance was recorded nor he was allowed to discharge any duty (Annexure E). 5. Thereafter the General Manager of the Commission drew up a formal disciplinary proceeding vide Memorandum No.AGT/27/379/V&D/84 dated 24th/30th January, 1985 on the allegation that he caused serious injuries on the head and belly of one Shri KP Chakraborty, Assistant Driller (Cementing) and that he was absenting from duties with effect from 17.9.1984. He was, therefore, asked to submit his reply within 15 days from 22,1.1985. But it was alleged that the contention of the respondent that he was regularly attending the office with effect from 9.1.1985 was not refuted. However, the respondent asked the Commission to furnish copies of the statement of the witnesses and also to allow him to inspect the statement of the witnesses mentioned in the memo whereby the proceedings were drawn up. Since the copies of the documents were not furnished to the respondent, the latter again requested the General Manager to supply those copies. The respondent was, however, intimated that he could take assistance of another employee of ONGC for inspection of the documents. Thereafter by Memorandum bearing No.AGT/20/989/77-Estt dated 25th April, 1985 the respondent was again informed that he did not inform the authorities that he was arrested by police in connection with some case. The Commission, however, allowed the respondent some more time to submit his statement. 6. The respondent by his written statement dated 15.6.1985 denied the charges but despite that suddenly the Project Manager of the Commission by his Memorandum dated 19th/24th January, 1987 contained in Annexure S informed the respondent that he was granted 8 days' earned leave with effect from 17.9.1984 to 24.9.1984 and that he was also allowed extra-ordinary leave for 90 days with effect from 25.9.1984 to 23.12.1984 and that finally he was informed that he was deemed to have resigned his appointment with effect from 23.12.1984 and he was no longer an employee of the Commission with effect from that date. The respondent, therefore, challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid memorandum dated 19th/24th January, 1987 contained in Annexure S. 7. The respondent, therefore, challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid memorandum dated 19th/24th January, 1987 contained in Annexure S. 7. The appellants herein resisted the writ petition by filing an affidavit-in-opposition wherein it was contended, inter alia, that the respondent was repeatedly asked to join his duties and submit medical certificate in support of his illness but in spite of that he neither attended the office nor submitted any medical certificate. It was contended that instead of doing that the respondent absconded from his duties with effect from 17.9.1984 and that although he committed some criminal offence, he did not bring the matter to the notice of authorities. Therefore, a departmental proceeding vide No.AGT/27/379/V & D/84 dated 24th/30th January, 1985 was drawn up and the respondent was asked to submit his reply within 15 days. He was also informed that he might also take the assistance of a defence assistant who may be an employee of the Commission. But in spite of all these opportunities the respondent neither reported for duties nor reported to the Medical Superintendent of the Commission for his treatment. However, the order contained in Annexure S was not passed in pursuance of the departmental proceeding that was drawn up against him. It was contended that the aforesaid order was passed under Regulation 14 (5) of the ONGC Leave Regulations, 1968 and that the order having been passed in exercise of the powers conferred under the Regulations the respondent was not entitled to get any relief as sought for in the writ petition. 8. The learned Single Judge by his aforesaid judgment held that the order contained in Annexure S was an order of removal and hence such an order is not sustainable as the Commission did not follow the procedures prescribed in its own Regulations. Hence this appeal. 9. In the background of the facts stated above the first question which calls for consideration is whether the impugned office order dated 19/24.1.1987 contained in Annexure S can be treated as an order of removal. For better appreciation the impugned order may be quoted as under: xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 10. It would be apparent from the aforesaid office order that the name of the respondent was struck off from the rolls of the Commission and he was stated to be no longer an employee of the Commission with effect from 23.12.84 (AN). Mr. For better appreciation the impugned order may be quoted as under: xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 10. It would be apparent from the aforesaid office order that the name of the respondent was struck off from the rolls of the Commission and he was stated to be no longer an employee of the Commission with effect from 23.12.84 (AN). Mr. S. Deb, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants contended that the aforesaid order is an innocuous order striking off the name of the respondent from the rolls of the Commission and since this order does not contain any stigma, such an order cannot be treated to be an order of removal from the service. But Mr. B. Das, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Jai Shankar vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1966 SC 492 that such an order is nothing short of an order of removal from service and since the respondent was not afforded any opportunity of showing cause the impugned order is absolutely illegal and not tenable in law. It may, therefore, be advantageous at this stage to look into the Leave Regulations 14 (5) which runs as under : "Where an employee fails to resume duty on the expiry of the period of extraordinary leave if the leave granted to him is the maximum that can be granted under this regulation where an employee who is granted a lesser amount of extraordinary leave than the maximum admissible under this regulation, remains absent from duty for any period which, together with extraordinary leave so granted exceeds the limit upto which he could have been granted leave under this regulation, he shall be deemed to have resigned his appointment and shall accordingly cease to be in the employment of the Commission, unless the Commission may determine otherwise, in view of the exceptional circumstances of the case." 11. In this context decision of the Supreme Court in the Jai Shankar's case (supra) where Regulation 13 was required to be interpreted by the Supreme Court may be reproduced as under : "13. In this context decision of the Supreme Court in the Jai Shankar's case (supra) where Regulation 13 was required to be interpreted by the Supreme Court may be reproduced as under : "13. An individual who absent himself without permission or who remains absent without permission for one month or longer after the end of his leave should be considered to have sacrificed his appointment and may only be reinstated with the sanction of the competent authority. Note : The submission of an application for extension of leave already granted does nut entitle an individual to absent himself without permission." 12. We have quoted this Regulation 13 as the same would appear to be almost identical in nature and effect with Regulation 14 (5) of the ONGC Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Commission Act). In Jai Shankar's case after referring to the Regulation 13 as quoted above it was argued before the Supreme Court that the order passed under Regulation 13 does not amount to an order of removal. But repelling this contention the Supreme Court held : "We do not think that the constitutional protection can be taken away in this manner by a side wind. While, on the one hand, there is no compulsion on the part of the Government to retain a person in service if he is unfit and deserves dismissal or removal, on the other a person is entitled to continue in service if he wants until his service is terminated in accordance with law. One circumstance deserving removal may be over-staying one's leave. This is a fault which may entitle Government in a suitable case to consider a man as unfit to continue in service. But even if a regulation is made, it is necessary that Government should give the person an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be removed." 13. The same question posed for consideration in the case of Sukhen Haider vs. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Tel Bhaban, Dehra Dun & another, in Civil Rule No.28 of 1976 of this Court where learned Single Judge, Hon'ble Mr. The same question posed for consideration in the case of Sukhen Haider vs. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Tel Bhaban, Dehra Dun & another, in Civil Rule No.28 of 1976 of this Court where learned Single Judge, Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. L. Hansaria as then he was referring the decision of Jai Shankar's case (supra) and the decision rendered in the case of Sukhdev Singh vs. Bhagatram reported in AIR 1975 SC 1331 observed : "It has been clearly pointed out by the Supreme Court in this case that bodies like the Commission are bound to comply with the terms and conditions of service as laid down in the regulations. Any breach of such compliance was regarded as a breach of the regulations which were described to have the force of law." 14. In the instant case it is an admitted fact that a departmental proceeding under No.AGT/27/379/V&D/84 dated 24th/30th January, 198S was drawn up against the respondent. It is also an admitted fact that the respondent on receipt of the notice in respect of this departmental proceeding prayed for supplying him copies of some documents but those copies were not supplied. There is nothing in the record to show that this proceeding was dropped. Regulation 34 of the Commission Act shows that removal from service is a major penalty. Mr. Deb Das, however, argued that the impugned order is not an order of removal. According to him over-staying is not misconduct and it is also not a punishment. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 Mr. Deb has drawn our attention to para 63 of the judgment and submitted that the impugned order does not contain a stigma and hence the impugned order cannot be treated to be an order of termination. Mr. Deb is, therefore, of opinion that in view of the successive notices issued to the respondent no fresh notice/opportunity was required to be given to the respondent before passing the impugned order. Mr. Deb is, therefore, of opinion that in view of the successive notices issued to the respondent no fresh notice/opportunity was required to be given to the respondent before passing the impugned order. Paragraph 63 of the aforesaid judgment may be quoted as under : "No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminated without saying anything more in the order of termination than that the services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 (2) of the constitution." 15. It would appear from the above quoted passage that reasonable opportunity has to be given before passing any order of discharge. Mr. Das has, therefore, argued that where it is an admitted fact that a departmental proceeding was drawn up against the respondent and the same having been not dropped, the impugned order in the circumstances must be treated to be an order of removal. Mr. Das has quite fervently argued that the Commission has its own Regulations where it has been specifically laid down how to conduct a disciplinary proceeding and how a major penalty like removal from service can be imposed on an employee. We find considerable force in the submission of Mr. Das as where a disciplinary proceeding was drawn up against the respondent asking him to reply and where he also wanted copies of the documents such an abrupt order in the terms of impugned order contained in Annexure S must be treated to be an order of removal and since the respondent was not afforded any reasonable opportunity of showing cause against this order of removal, this order is nothing short of an order of removal from service. Mr. Deb has, however, contended that a perusal of the records will show that not only one notice but successive notices were issued to the respondent for showing cause in respect of his absence and he was also asked to join and submit the medical report and all these notices, if taken together, would amount to reasonable opportunity to the respondent. Deb has, however, contended that a perusal of the records will show that not only one notice but successive notices were issued to the respondent for showing cause in respect of his absence and he was also asked to join and submit the medical report and all these notices, if taken together, would amount to reasonable opportunity to the respondent. 16. Mr. Das has, however, placed reliance upon a decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Town Area Committee, Jalalabad vs. Jagdish Prashad & others reported in (1979) 1 SCC 60 , and submitted that reasonable opportunity does not mean a notice to show cause 'in respect of opportunity or to join with medical certificate. What is reasonable opportunity was discussed by their Lordships in the aforesaid judgment under paragraph 1 of the judgment. It was held: "A reasonable opportunity is a term of well known legal significance and includes an opportunity given to the employee to cross examine the witnesses examined against him and to lead defence in support of his version." 17. In the instant case as already stated that even though the respondent wanted copies of some documents, he was not afforded any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. More so, there is nothing on the record to show that this proceeding was dropped. 18. The last contention of Mr. Deb is that vires of the regulations having been not challenged the respondent is not entitled to raise the question of legality and validity of the Regulation 14 (5) of the Commission Act. We have, however, not been able to persuade ourselves to take the view that in absence of any specific provision for hearing before passing the order of termination/removal, the respondent is not entitled to be heard. It must be remembered that the parties have a right to insist upon having all the advantages to a hearing of his case. Mr. Das has submitted that even though the vires of the Regulation 14 (S) of the Commission Act have not been challenged the respondent was very much entitled to a personal hearing before the impugned order was passed. In support of his contention Mr. Mr. Das has submitted that even though the vires of the Regulation 14 (S) of the Commission Act have not been challenged the respondent was very much entitled to a personal hearing before the impugned order was passed. In support of his contention Mr. Das has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Sirai Municipality vs. Ceclia Kom Francis Tellis reported in 1973 (1) SLR 655 where their Lordships under para 42 of the judgment observed : "Even where there was no specific rule on the subject like Rule 143 in the case before us, this Court has held that violation of implied rules of natural justice, in exercise of a quasi-judicial statutory power, results in a legally void decision. It was so held because the obligation to observe rules of natural justice was imperative in such a situation. In State of Orissa vs. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi this Court held : "The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would, therefore, arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed; it need not be shown to be super added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person. Duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case." This principle would be equally applicable to local Government bodies which fall within the definition of "State as given in Article 12 of the Constitution". Byles. J., in Cooper vs. The Baord of Works for Wandsmurthy District, said long ago about the primordial character of the opportunity to the heard before punishment: "The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. Byles. J., in Cooper vs. The Baord of Works for Wandsmurthy District, said long ago about the primordial character of the opportunity to the heard before punishment: "The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man, upon such occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence. 'Adam' (says God) where art thou? Next thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded the that thou should not eat" ? Such a principle has been described as a principle of' Universal Jurisprudence' by Mohomood, J., in Queen Empress vs. Sohni." 19. Hence taking all the facts into consideration and the principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court we have come to the conclusion that the impugned order contained in Annexure S is an order of removal from service and the respondent having not been afforded any opportunity of showing cause before passing the impugned order contained in Annexure S, this order is not maintainable and the learned Single Judge rightly quashed the order. 20. For the reasons, therefore, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs.