S. N. Kapoor ( 1 ) A question : "whether for condonation of delay in filing an appeal, any application in writing accompanied by affidavit is essential?" is required to be answered in these five revision petitions relating to the abovesaid lame parties. ( 2 ) THESE five revisions arose out of a common judgment dated 4. 8. 84 dismissing five appeals on the ground that the appeals were barred by time in view of provisions of Order 41 Rule 3-A CPC. ( 3 ) FACTS : Five petitions u/ss. 14 and 17 Arbitration Act were instituted on 20. 11. 79. Objections were filed. After hearing the parties, objections filed by the petitioner were dismissed and awards were made rule of the court by five judgments dated 7. 1. 84. ( 4 ) THE appellant applied for certified copies of judgments in five cases on 13. 1. 84. The copies in appeal Nos. 25, 26 and 28 of 84 were delivered on 19. 3. 84, copy in appeal No 24/84 was delivered on 20. 3. 84 and in appeal No. 27, on 24. 3. 84. All the appeals were file in the court of Senior Sub-Judge on 3. 4. 84. d is apparent that appeal No. 25, 26 and 28 of 1984 were filed before SSJ within 21 days, appeal No. 24/84 within 20 days, and appeal No. 27/94 within 16 days. after excluding the time spent in obtaining certified copies. On 23. 4. 84 the appeals were returned under orders of Additional SSJ Shri R. C. Chopra, On the same date, all these five appeals were filed again in the court of District Judge. The limitation for filing the appeals in RCA 25, 26 and 28 of 1984 expired on 12. 4. 84 after excluding the period spent in obtaining the certified copy. In appeal RCA 24/84, the limitation expired on 13. 4. 1984 and in RCA 27/84, the limitation expired on 17. 4. 1984. So, when the appeals were filed before the learned District Judge, the appeals had already admittedly become time-barred as under item 116 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, the appeals under the CPC, 1908 were to be filed before the District Court within 30 days from the date of decree or order excluding, of course, the time spent in obtaining copy, 5. Grievance of the petitioner is that rigid rule of moving application for condonation of delay should not have been applied in view of the settled law that the technical rules are made to promote the cause of justice. Delay should have been condoned particularly in view of the observation in the impugned judgment that the objection u/s. 33 could not have been dismissed as time barred and the learned sub-judge was duty-bound to have decided these objections on merits. There was no need of written application and even oral prayer could be allowed. In view of Nirmala Chaudhary vs. Bisheshwar Lal AIR 1979 Delhi 26, it was not at all necessary to file an application for condonation of delay. It was not even necessarily implied in law that the powers of the court to condone the delay was circumscribed by an application being filed. The appellate court wrongly applied 0, 41 R. 3-A. Thus, everything revolves round the applicability of O. 41 R. 3-A of the Civil Procedure Code. ( 5 ) 0. 41 R. 3-A Civil Procedure Code reads as under : "3a. (1) When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that be bad sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. (2 ). . . " ( 6 ) IT is notable that seeing the language of the aforesaid provision, it is apparent that intention of the legislature in inserting R. 3-A 0. 41 Civil Procedure Code was to make it mandatory to move an application for condonation of delay by using the phrase "it shall be accompanied by affidavit". Sub-rule (1) of R. 3a, 0. 41 makes it a condition precedent to move such an application and the appeal even for grant of interim relief of stay of execution of decree could not be entertained and no such relief could be granted "so long as the Court does not, after hearing under-rule 11 "decides to hear the appeal". Sub-rule (1) of R. 3a, 0. 41 makes it a condition precedent to move such an application and the appeal even for grant of interim relief of stay of execution of decree could not be entertained and no such relief could be granted "so long as the Court does not, after hearing under-rule 11 "decides to hear the appeal". Consequently, an application for condonation of delay has to be moved along with appeal, otherwise the appeal must fail and insertion of Rule 3-A appears to have been made with a view to ensure that the question of limitation is not left open to be decided in future. In the absence of such an application for condonation of delay u/s. 5 or 14 or otherwise, the appeal itself docs not exist for all practical purposes. ( 7 ) I regret that I have not been able to pursuade myself to follow Nirmal Choudhary (Supra) relied upon by learned counsel for the revision petitioner, for the reason that newly inserted R. 3-A of 0. 41 Civil Procedure Code was neither argued before the court in that matter, nor considered by the court. Consequently, ratio laid down in Nirmal Choudhary s case is not applicable to the facts of this case and appeal cannot be entertained if it is beyond time and if it is not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, one of the contentions raised in the revision petition was that Order 41 Rule 3-A would not apply to the appeals relating to Arbitration Act. It may be mentioned that Section 41 (a) of the Arbitration Act provides that "subject to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code of 1908 shall apply to all proceedings before the court and to all appeals under this Act". In view of crystal clear provisions of Section 41 (a), it is not possible to accept that 0. 41 R. 3-A which has been inserted in 1976 shall not be applicable to the appeal relating to arbitration matters. As such, this contention raised in these revision petitions must also fail.