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1996 DIGILAW 571 (PAT)

Amiya Kumar Jha v. State Of Bihar

1996-09-04

P.K.SARIN

body1996
Judgment P. K. Sarin, J. 1. By this application under Sec.482 of the Code of criminal Procedure, the petitioner seeks quashing of an order dated 16-1-1996 passed by the Additional Chief judicial Magistrate, Patna, in Gardanibagh P. S. Case No.194/95 whereby the application of the petitioner under section 317 of the Code of Criminal procedure was rejected and the application for extension of provisional bail granted to the petitioner was rejected and bail bonds were cancelled and non-vailable warrant have been ordered to be issued against the petitioner. The petitioner has further prayed for a direction to the Trial Court to grant regular bail to the petitioner in terms of the order of the Supreme Court passed in s. L. P. (Cr.) No.3065/95 and further direction to the Court below for compounding the offences punishable under sections 420 and 120-B of the Indian penal Code in view of the joint compromise petition filed on behalf of the rival parties. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner not pressed the application regarding compounding of offences on the basis of compromise petition. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Counsel for the opposite party as well as the learned counsel for the informant have been heard. 3. It appears that the petitioner is an accused in Gardanibagh P. S. Case no.194/95. It further appears that the supreme Court passed order in criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.4903/95 on 13-11-95 wherein it has been observed that as the petitioner has been granted interim bail no further order need be passed and the petitioner will be entitled to ask for regular bail from the Trial Court. It was further directed that the interim order will be confined up to a period of two months from that date (13-11-95 ). With the above direction the special Leave Petition was disposed of. It further appears that the petitioner applied for regular bail on 23-12-95. However, the learned magistrate instead of disposing of the said bail application deferred hearing on the same to 14-1-96 after making observation that as the Hon ble Supreme court has ordered for interim bail to the petitioner till 13-11-95, the said order of interim bail will remain in force till that date. A copy of the order passed by the learned Magistrate on 23-12-95 is at annexure 5. A copy of the order passed by the learned Magistrate on 23-12-95 is at annexure 5. It further appears that the case could not be taken up on 14-1-96 and 15-1-96 and it was taken up on 16-1-96. On that date the petitioner filed an application for representation through Counsel under Sec.317 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Magistrate rejected the said representation on the ground that period of interim bail had expired on 13-1-96. The learned Magistrate also refused to allow the prayer of the accused/petitioner for extension of the period of provisional bail which had earlier been granted up to 10-1-96 by order dated 18-12-95 (copy at annexure 4 ). The learned Magistrate did not consider the regular bail application of the petitioner and did not even refer in the order dated 16-1-96. The learned magistrate cancelled the bail bonds of the petitioner and ordered for issuance of non-bailable warrant against the petitioner and show-cause notices against the sureties. Feeling aggrieved by this order the petitioner has moved this application. 4. It has been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the learned Magistrate ought to have granted regular bail to the petitioner when he had already filed an application for the same on 23-12-95 before the expiry of the period of interim bail and the action of the learned Magistrate in not granting regular bail and without disposal of the same passing any order on the bail application cancelling the bail bonds is abuse of the process of court and is liable to be quashed. It has also been contended that the learned magistrate was duty bound to grant bail in view of the order of the Supreme court. It has also been submitted that this court at the time of granting of stay order on 13-1-96 has observed that petitioner was entitled for regularisa-tion of his interim bail. 5. The leaned Counsel for the State has submitted that as the petitioner was not present on 16-1-96 the court has rightly cancelled his bail bonds and issued non-bailable warrant. 6. As regards the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this Court has observed in the order dated 13-1-96 that the petitioner was entitled to the regularisation of the interim bail, I do not find any merit in the said contention. 6. As regards the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that this Court has observed in the order dated 13-1-96 that the petitioner was entitled to the regularisation of the interim bail, I do not find any merit in the said contention. This court had only observed that he has not only refused to regularise etc. interim bail granted by the trial court but also issued non-bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner. It is obvious that there was no laches on the part of the petitioner, therefore, I am satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to the protection. This does not appear to be an expression of any opinion on the grant of regular bail to the petitioner. The Court has only referred to the order of the trial Court and the action taken by the learned Magistrate by not disposing of the regular bail petition and the postponing hearing to 14-1-96. 7. As regards the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the learned Magistrate could not have cancelled the bail bonds when the bail application was pending which was filed before the expiry of the period of interim bail order, the same appears to be without force. The period of interim bail remained in operative for the months in view of the order of the supreme Court. The petitioner had filed the application for grant of regular bail before the expiry of the period. The learned Magistrate ought to have disposed of that bail application in the light of the order passed by the Supreme court. He instead of passing any order on the bail application, postponed the hearing on 14-1-19%, i. e. next day after expiry of the interim bail. On 14-1-96 and 15-1-96 the case could not be taken up on account of being holidays and when the case was taken up on 16-1-96 even on that date the learned magistrate did not pass any order on the regular bail application and keeping the regular bail application pending, he passed the order cancelling the bail bonds and issuance of warrant against the petitioner. It is, in my opinion, was not justified and the learned Magistrate ought to have passed proper orders in the light of the order of the Supreme court before expiry of the period of interim bail as that period was granted only in order to enable the petitioner to apply for regular bail before the learned magistrate. In this view, the order of the learned Magistrate regarding cancellation of the bail bonds and issuance of non-bailable warrant cannot be sustained. Issuance of warrant and cancellation of bail bonds without passing any order on the regular bail petition of the petitioner is liable to be quashed. 8. In these circumstances, the impugned order dated 16-1-96 by which the bail bonds of the petitioner have been cancelled and warrant of arrest have been issued is quashed hereby. The learned Magistrate is directed to pass appropriate orders on the bail petition filed by the petitioner in the light of the order of the Supreme Court passed in cr. Miscellaneous Petition No.4903/95 which has been referred to in the order dated 7-12-95 (copy at annexure 3 ). This application is disposed of accordingly. The Trial Court shall not take the petitioner into custody until the disposal of the bail petition. The petitioner is directed to appear before the trial court on 18-9-96. It is also made clear that no adverse inference shall be drawn by the learned Magistrate on the ground that this Court has not issued any other direction. Order Accordingly,