Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. One Ayyavoo Iyer had two wives. By the first wife he had three daughters, Peria Kuppammal, Chinna Kuppammal and Negalammal. By the second wife he had one daughter Pankajavalliammal. He had no male issue though he was very much aspiring for it. At the age of 55 he thought it better to make an arrangement with regard to his properties and executed a Will on 11-11-1926, which is marked as Ex. A-2 in the present proceedings. By that Will, he appointed an executor for administering the estate after his death. He had referred to his intention to adopt a son during his life time, if possible and made a provision in the event of such adoption. He had also provided in the Will by Clause (9), which is relevant for our purpose, that for his daughters who were existing at that time and daughters who may be born thereafter an immovable property shall be purchased at the rate of Rs. 3,000/- per head from out of the family funds. He provided that the said purchase shall be made for the daughters through the first wife within two years after his death and for the daughter through his second wife four years after her marriage. A similar provision was made with regard to the daughters who may be born thereafter. 2. On the 29th of November, 1926 he executed another document called additional Will in which he referred to the fact that he had adopted a boy by name Meenakshi Iyer. That document is marked as Ex. A-3. By the said document he had only confirmed the provisions contained in Ex. A-2 and appointed the natural father of the adopted son as another executor to function jointly with the executor already appointed under the earlier Will. He died on 3-12-1926. The two executors did not carry out the direction given by the testator to purchase properties for Rs. 3,000/- to each of the three daughters through the first wife within a period of two years. However, on 29-6-1936 they executed a settlement deed, marked as Ex. A-1 in favour of Peria Kuppammal, the first daughter through the first wife of the testator, settling certain properties in her favour. 3,000/- to each of the three daughters through the first wife within a period of two years. However, on 29-6-1936 they executed a settlement deed, marked as Ex. A-1 in favour of Peria Kuppammal, the first daughter through the first wife of the testator, settling certain properties in her favour. As per the recitals in the said document, the property was being settled pursuant to the direction contained in the Will executed by Ayyavoo Iyer and the property was given to the settlee who shall enjoy the same by paying all taxes and charges. It was however added that as she had so no santhathi by them, she shall enjoy the same during her life time and if she got any male or female heirs by the grace of God they shall take the house property after her life time from generation to generation. It was also stated that if she had no santhathi during her life time she had only a right to enjoy the property but no right to encumber or alienate the same in any manner. 3. Soon after the settlement Peria Kuppammal issued a notice under Ex. B-1 dated 14-9-1936 to the executors that the clause restricting her estate to be a life estate was not valid and that she was entitled to enjoy the property absolutely as it was given to her by her father Ayyavoo Iyer. She had stated that thereafter she was in enjoyment only as an absolute owner and not as life estate holder. But she did not take any proceedings during her life time for declaring her absolute right to the property. 4. In May, 1937 Peria Kuppammals husband adopted a boy who is the 1st defendant in the present suit. Peria Kuppammal died in 1970. In 1971 i.e. on 22-10-1971 the suit out of which these proceedings arise was filed by Meenakshi Iyer, the adopted son of Ayyavoo Iyer. He prayed for a declaration that the suit property belonged to him absolutely after the death of Peria Kuppammal on 30-1-1970 and for recovery of possession from the defendants. Several contentions were raised by the defendants. The plaintiff had also challenged the validity of the adoption of the 1st defendant. Equally, the defendants had challenged the adoption of the plaintiff by Ayyavoo Iyer. But those issues were not pressed at the time of trial. Several contentions were raised by the defendants. The plaintiff had also challenged the validity of the adoption of the 1st defendant. Equally, the defendants had challenged the adoption of the plaintiff by Ayyavoo Iyer. But those issues were not pressed at the time of trial. Ultimately, the trial court found that the plaintiff was entitled to get the property after the death of Peria Kuppammal as she was entitled only to life estate. Consequently, the suit was decreed. 5. On appeal by the first defendant, a Judge of this Court held that under S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act the estate given to Peria Kuppammal under Ex. A-1 became absolute and the claim of the plaintiff was not sustainable. The appeal was thus allowed and this suit was dismissed. A further appeal was filed under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent by the plaintiff. A Division Bench of this Court held that the issue raised under the S. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act had been expressly given up by the defendants in the trial court and it could not be resurrected in the appeal. The Division Bench set aside the judgment of the single judge and sent back the appeal to be disposed of with regard to the other issues. The matter came before the same judge again and on a construction of Ex. A-1 the learned judge held that under the said document the adopted son of Peria Kuppammal was entitled to claim the property after the death of Peria Kuppammal and therefore, the plaintiffs claim was not sustainable. The learned judge construed the expression ‘santhathi’ as including an adopted son. It is the said judgment which is challenged in this appeal. 6. The plaintiff died during the pendency of this appeal and his legal representatives have come on record. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that the learned judge is in error in omitting to take into consideration certain crucial expressions found in Ex. A-1. According to learned counsel the words: Tamil “have been ignored by the learned judge. It is contended that what is contemplated in the document is only birth of children naturally by the Grace of God and an adoption was totally excluded from consideration in view of the aforesaid expression. A-1. According to learned counsel the words: Tamil “have been ignored by the learned judge. It is contended that what is contemplated in the document is only birth of children naturally by the Grace of God and an adoption was totally excluded from consideration in view of the aforesaid expression. It is also argued by learned counsel that when a document of 1936 is being construed the court should put itself in the arm-chair of the executant and decide the question with regard to the circumstances and the law prevailing at that time. It is contended that in 1936 there was no question of a female child being adopted and when the document refers to both male and female in the expression (Tamil) it could only refer to heirs by natural birth and not by adoption. It is therefore argued that under Ex. A-1 what was given to Peria Kuppammal was only a life estate and the 1st defendant being only an adopted son had no right whatever to claim as her successor. It is further contended that all the clauses in Ex. A-1 should be taken together for the purpose of construction of the document and if that is done there cannot be any possibility of any other construction being adopted. Learned counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Divisions Bench of this Court in K.M.S.L. Sundaramier v. K.N. Sarojini (97 L.W. 169) in which it has been held that “when a person governed by Hindu Mitakshara law spoke of ‘varish’ and ‘santhathi’ one can naturally infer that he would have had in his mind only such person who would be entitled in law to succeed to his property and who would be in a position to transmit the interest in the property to his heirs”. Consequently the Bench held that (Tamil) in the relevant document could only indicate the male heir and would not refer to female heir. 7. Per contra learned counsel for the respondents contends that by the earlier clause in Ex. A-1 the settlee i.e. Peria Kuppammal was given absolute right in the property conveyed to her and the subsequent clause restricting her right is repugnant and wholly invalid. He places reliance on the judgment of a single judge of this Court in Subbayan Chettiar v. Rajaram and another (1958 I MLJ 335 = 71 L.W. 129). A-1 the settlee i.e. Peria Kuppammal was given absolute right in the property conveyed to her and the subsequent clause restricting her right is repugnant and wholly invalid. He places reliance on the judgment of a single judge of this Court in Subbayan Chettiar v. Rajaram and another (1958 I MLJ 335 = 71 L.W. 129). He has also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in N. Krishnammal v. R. Ekambaram ( AIR 1979 SC 1298 ). It is also contended by him that when the testator has directed the executor to give a property to his daughters without any restriction it is not open to the executor to impose a restriction or a condition that they shall enjoy only for their life time. Alternatively, it is argued that the expression ‘santhathi’ used in the document would include adopted son and it is not confineed to a natural born son. 8. In our opinion the matter has to be approached from a different angle. We have already referred to the provisions in Ex. A-2, the terms of which are very clear. Under Cl. (9) of Ex. A-2 Ayyavoo Iyer who is referred to as the testator has expressly provided that his daughters through his first wife shall be given property worth Rs. 3,000/- each from out of the family funds. The relevant clause roads thus,- Tamil There is no doubt whatever that the said clause is a bequest in favour of each of his daughters. It has also specified the time within which the purchase has to be made. The testator instead of giving property worth a sum of Rs. 3,000/- to each of the daughters has directed the executors to purchase some immovable property for a sum of Rs. 3,000/- and given to the daughters. Thus the clause is a bequest in favour of the daughters with reference to a property and the bequest has to be carried out in a particular manner by the executors as directed by the testator in the clause. 9. That clause will fall certainly within S. 138 of the Indian Succession Act. 3,000/- and given to the daughters. Thus the clause is a bequest in favour of the daughters with reference to a property and the bequest has to be carried out in a particular manner by the executors as directed by the testator in the clause. 9. That clause will fall certainly within S. 138 of the Indian Succession Act. The Section reads thus: “Direction that fund be employed in particular manner following absolute bequest of same to or for benefit of any person.-Where a fund is bequeathed absolutely to or for the benefit of any person, but the Will contains a direction that it shall be applied or enjoyed in a particular manner, the legatee shall be entitled to receive the fund as if the Will had contained no such direction”. 10. Though the Section provides that the legatee shall be entitled to receive the fund as if the Will contained no such direction and entitle Peria Kuppammal to insist upon the payment of Rs. 3,000/-immediately after the death of the testator or insist upon the purchase of a property for Rs. 3,000/-within the time limit prescribed by the testator, the fact that Peria Kuppammal did not exercise her right to do so did not deprive her of the said-right. As and when the executors thought of purchasing a property for a sum of Rs. 3,000/- and handing over it to Peria Kuppammal, they were doing so only in accordance with the specific direction contained in Ex. A-2. Hence the executors had no power whatever to add any condition so as to restrict the scope of the estate which is to be given to Peria Kuppammal. When the testator had intended to give heer an absolute estate in the property for Rs. 3,000/- the executors cannot go one step ahead and impose a condition which will reduce her estate to a life estate. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 307 of the Indian Succession Act can be looked into at this stage. Under that sub-section, to the extent to which it is relevant, if the deceased was a Hindu the general power conferred by Sub-sec.(1) i.e. the power conferred on the executor shall be subject to the restrictions and conditions. Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 307 of the Indian Succession Act can be looked into at this stage. Under that sub-section, to the extent to which it is relevant, if the deceased was a Hindu the general power conferred by Sub-sec.(1) i.e. the power conferred on the executor shall be subject to the restrictions and conditions. One such condition and restriction is that the power of the executor to dispose of the immovable property so vested in him under Cl.(1) is subject to any restriction which may be imposed in this behalf by the Will appointing him. Thus when in the Will which appointed the executor an absolute estate is given to the daughters of the testator, it is not open to the executor to reduce it to a life estate. 11. Consequently the clause restricting the estate of the settlee Peria Kuppammal in Ex. A-1 is absolutely invalid as it is beyond the power of the executors. The executors had no right whatever to introduce such a clause in Ex. A-1. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether the earlier clause gave an absolute estate and the subsequent clauses is repugnant and therefore invalid. However we are in agreement with the contention urged by learned counsel for the respondent that the first clause in Ex. A-1 gave the estate absolutely to the settlee Peria Kuppammal as per the direction contained in Ex. A-2, the Will of the testator. The said clauses reads as follows: Tamil 11. The above clause clearly shows that what was given to the settle Peria Kuppammal was nothing less than an absolute estate. No doubt the clause continues to add that she had no issue till then she could enjoy the property only for her life time. The said clause is repugnant to the earlier clause and therefore, invalid, even assuming that the executors had the power to restrict the estate given under the document to Peria Kuppammal. 12. We do not think it necessary to consider the contention that the expression ‘santhathi’ would include adopted son and therefore, on a construction of Ex. A-1, the 1st defendant is entitled to succeed to the estate of Peria Kuppammal as, if such a construction, is necessary, the court is bound to take into account the words (Tamil) as pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants. A-1, the 1st defendant is entitled to succeed to the estate of Peria Kuppammal as, if such a construction, is necessary, the court is bound to take into account the words (Tamil) as pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants. In the view we have expressed above we are not dealing with that contention of the respondents counsel. 14. It follows from the above discussion that the plaintiff has no right whatever to the suit property and his claim for declaration of title has to fail. The judgment and decree passed by this Court in A.S. No. 704 of 1975, reversing that of the Subordinate Judge of Madurai in O.S. No. 487 of 1971 are hereby confirmed. The Letters Patent Appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.