Judgment Dharmpal Sinha, J. 1. In this petition filed under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for brevity the Code) the petitioner (The State of bihar through the Secretary-cum-Commissioner, Department of Water resources, Government of Bihar, patna) has questioned the legality of the order dated 24.11.1995 passed by the learned Sabordinate Judge VII, Patna, in Money Suit No.77 of 1993, whereby he has stayed, on a petition filed by opposite party No.1 (defendant No.2 in the money suit) under Sec.151 of the Code, the further proceeding of the suit against opposite party No.1 till the disposal of a criminal case bearing special case No.60 of 1994, which is pending before the Special Judge, Vigilance, south Bihar, Patna, awaiting submission of final form. 2. The back ground facts leading to the passing of the impugned order may briefly be stated as follows: Opposite party No.1, Ram Lakhan Singh, an officer of the Bihar Administrative service, was posted on deputation as deputy Collector, Revenue Administration, Patna Division of the Water resources Department from April, 1984 to October, 1983 and Opposite party no.2, Rama Shankar Prasad Sinha was then posted as the Cashier. On 5/10/1989 a first information report (Ext. E to the counter-affidavit) bearing kadam Kuan Police Station Case No.761 of 1989 was lodged for the offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 409, 1208 and 420 of the Indian Penal code on a report submitted by another deputy Collector, who was posted there later. The substance of the allegation was that the money collected by different Tahshildars in that Division on account of revenue dues used to be received from them, but the amounts were not properly accounted for. Broadly three devices were allegedly adopted by the two opposite parties in conspiracy to keep substantial part of the collected revenue with themselves: first, in the money receipt book maintained in triplicate different entries were made and while the Tahshildars, who made payment, were given receipt containing the amount received from them but in other part of the money receipt book lower amount was mentioned, and lower amount was actually deposited in the Treasury to the credit of the Government. Secondly, some forged money receipt book had been prepared and receipts were granted to the Tahshildars from the receipt book, which were not genuine and money received were not accounted for, and deposited in the Treasury. Secondly, some forged money receipt book had been prepared and receipts were granted to the Tahshildars from the receipt book, which were not genuine and money received were not accounted for, and deposited in the Treasury. Thirdly, in some cases no receipt at all was actually given about the amount received, nor was the amount deposited or in any way accounted for in the counterfoil of the receipt book or any other relevant documents, which were required to be maintained. After the institution of the case, the police took up investigation and submitted final form on 8/2/1992, whereby only the Cashier was chargesheeted and not the opposite party no.1, who, on the basis of the final form, was discharged by an order dated 20.2.1992 passed by the Chief Judicial magistrate, Patna, who took cognizance of some offences only against the cashier (opposite party No.2 ). 3. Later after acceptance of final form a departmental proceeding was initiated on 22/4/1992 against opposite party No.1, and the Personnel Department also sent on 23/10/1992 a Proposal to the Home (Police) Department for taking up re-investigation of that criminal case. Further on 3/4/1993 the money Suit was filed against both the opposite parties for recovery of the amount allegedly misappropriated and embezzled by them with interest. After the institution of the suit the Cabinet vigilance Department, which had taken up re-investigation, filed on 13/4/1994 a note on investigation before the Chief judicial Magistrate stating that some materials had appeared against opposite party No.1 indicating commission of offence punishable under different Sections of the Indian Penal Code as also some offences under the Prevention of corruption Act and making a prayer to transfer the case to the Court of Special judge. The learned Chief Judicial magistrate, accordingly, passed an order on 21.4.1994 for addition of some Sections of the Prevention of Corruption act in the first information report and transferred the case to the Special Judge and the case was registered as Special case No.60 of 1994, in which final form is still awaited. 4. The learned Chief Judicial magistrate, accordingly, passed an order on 21.4.1994 for addition of some Sections of the Prevention of Corruption act in the first information report and transferred the case to the Special Judge and the case was registered as Special case No.60 of 1994, in which final form is still awaited. 4. In the Money Suit opposite party No.1 appeared and after some adjournments had been allowed to opposite party No.1 for filing written statement, he filed, on 13/9/1995, a petition (a copy of which is Annexure 2 to this revision-petition) under Section 151 of the Code for staying further proceeding of the Money Suit till the disposal of the aforesaid Special Case no.60 of 1994. The impugned order was passed on that petition. A perusal of the impugned order shows that after the petition dated 13/9/1995 was filed some adjournments had been sought by the plaintiff for filing rejoinder; but eventually the impugned order was passed without hearing the learned counsel for the plaintiff, as he did not appear when the matter was taken up. The order staying further proceeding of the Money Suit till the disposal of the criminal Special Case No.60/94 purports to have been passed on consideration of the decision of the Hon ble supreme Court reported in A. I. R.1954 (Vol.41) S. C.397 (M. S. Sheriff and another V/s. State of Madras and others)and the decision reported in A. I. R.1979 goa, Daman and Diu 37 (Assumpcao rebiro and others V/s. Elaviano Boaventura Salvador Silveira and others), which had been relied upon by the opposite party No.1. It appears from the impugned order that the stand taken by the opposite party before the learned subordinate Judge was that if he would be required to file written statement in the Money Suit, his entire defence will be disclosed, and that may cause serious prejudice to him in the criminal case. Learned Court below has accepted the stand and taken a view that it will be proper to stay the money suit; otherwise prejudice would be caused to opposite party No.1 in the criminal proceeding. 5. Learned Court below has accepted the stand and taken a view that it will be proper to stay the money suit; otherwise prejudice would be caused to opposite party No.1 in the criminal proceeding. 5. It may be noticed here that in the departmental proceeding, which had also been started against him, opposite party No.1 had filed a Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.3457 of 1995, which was disposed of by an order dated 25/7/1995 (a copy of which is Annexure 4 to this revision-petition) and a direction had been given to stay some of the charges of the departmental proceeding and some other observations made with regard to other charges. Since it appears that against the order passed in the civil writ jurisdiction case L. P. A. has been filed, in which notice has been issued, nothing need be said here about that, particularly when the fact of stay of departmental proceeding has little relevance for the matter under consideration in this case. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order by raising the following contentions: His first contention is that the criminal case, in which the final form is still awaited, cannot be said to be pending for eventually final report and no charge-sheet may be submitted, and in such a situation, there could be no justification of the stay of the further proceeding of the money suit. According to his further submission in this regard the plaintiff-petitioner may be deprived of realising any amount, if decree in money suit is delayed and opposite party No.1 thereby gets opportunity to remove all his assets. His second contention is that opposite party no.1 had appeared in the suit some times in April, 1994 and for several dates he did not file written statements and only belatedly on 13/9/1995 in order to only delay the progress in the suit, he filed a petition for stay and in such a situation no stay should have been allowed by the learned Court below. His further contention is that although in order to prevent embarrassment stay of civil suit is permissible in the interest of justice as had been held in the decision of the Hon ble Supreme Court reported in A. I. R.1954 S. C.397 (Vol.41), but in this case there is no question of embarrassment, because there is no criminal case at all pending for he has not been chargesheeted ir the special case, in which sanction, so far the offences punishable under the Prevention of corruption Act is concerned, has not yet been obtained. According to him stay that has been allowed by the impugned order amounts to stay of the suit for indefinite and uncertain period. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also advanced a general argument that recently there is tendency on the part of the various public functionary to misappropriate public money and when the State by instituting a Money suit has tried to recover the money, there should be no hurdle in the progress of the suit and that will not serve the ends of justice, which also can justify invoking the jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code. According to his submission, the impugned order goes against the interest of justice, and so the learned Court below must be held to have committed material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction while passing the impugned order. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite party No.1 has contended that the criminal case against the opposite party No.1 must be deemed to be pending when re-investigation has been started and the vigilance Department has already intimated to the learned Chief Judicial magistrate that some materials have been collected during investigation and offences punishable under some sections of the Prevention of Corruption act are also made out, and on that basis the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had transferred the case to the Special judge. He has controverted the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that only after submission of the charge-sheet, a criminal case can be said to have been pending. A further contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite party is that if opposite party No.1 is required to file written statement in the money suit, the rules of pleading as contained in Order VII of the Code requires that he would have to give specific denial and not evasive. A further contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite party is that if opposite party No.1 is required to file written statement in the money suit, the rules of pleading as contained in Order VII of the Code requires that he would have to give specific denial and not evasive. If the denial is not specific regarding any fact alleged in the plaint, that fact under the law of pleading will be deemed to be admitted. According to his submission opposite party No.1 will have to give details of his pleas in the written statement, if further proceeding of the money Suit is not stayed, as has been done by the impugned order, and the opposite party No.1 will be prejudiced in his defence. He has also contended in this regard that requiring opposite party no.1 to give his written statement will be violative of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India, which mandatorily lays down that no person, who is an accused in an offence, can be compelled to be a witness. A further contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite party No.1 is that a Revisional Court should not interfere with an order passed by the Court below while exercising inherent power under Sec.151 of the Code, and in this case the learned court below has passed the impugned order in the interest of justice in order to prevent the petitioner from embarrassment, which he may have indefending himself in the criminal proceeding. According to him even the Supreme court had stayed a civil case as is indicated from the decision reported in a. I. R.1954 S. C.379 (Vol.4 ). According to him that decision also indicates that as between civil case and criminal case, trial of criminal case should be given precedence. The decision reported in a. I. R.1979 Goa 37, according to the learned Counsel for the opposite party, also indicates the same thing and the learned Court below was right in placing reliance on those decisions in the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. The decision reported in a. I. R.1979 Goa 37, according to the learned Counsel for the opposite party, also indicates the same thing and the learned Court below was right in placing reliance on those decisions in the facts and circumstances of the case. 9. In reply the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the argument based on the provision of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India is completely misconceived and the decision reported in A. I. R.1979 Goa 37 only indicates that since the criminal case was fixed for trial on day-to-day basis and was likely to be concluded within a month, stay of the civil suit in that case was allowed; but in this case there is no such circumstance and the stay granted by the impugned order is not only for a month or two as was as was in that case but for uncertain and indefinite period, and interest of justice will suffer, rather than be served by the stay. 10. The point that arises for decision in this revision petition is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case it can be held that the learned Sub-ordinate Judge has committed any illegality or material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction in passing the impugned order of stay? 11. It may be mentioned at the very outset that although the claim made in the money suit (as it appears from the copy of the plaint, Annexure-1) does not appear to be limited to what was alleged in the first information report (Annexure-E), namely, the short deposits or non-deposits of the money received on account of revenue and the claim includes some other advances taken on account of travelling allowances or on other accounts received from the cashier, which amounts were not adjusted and some diverted amount from one head to other, a major amount of the claim made in the plaint relates to short deposit or non-deposit and interest which alone amounts to over rs.33.21 lakhs so, it can be said that the substantial amount of the claim made in the money suit relates to the amount (and interest thereon) which according to the first information report, are said to have been defalcated or embezzled by opposite parties No.1 and 2 in conspiracy with each other. 12. 12. It, however, appears to be admitted fact that the police after investigation of the case instituted on the first information report (Annexure-E)had not submitted charge-sheet against opposite party No.1 but only against opposite party No.2. opposite party No.1 after receipt of the final form was discharged in that case by an order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 20.2.1992, and that criminal case only proceeded against co-accused, opposite party no.2. also seems to be un-disputed that later the Cabinet Vigilance Department has taken up the case and has been re-investigating it and that agency has already indicated by letter dated 13.4.1994 to the Chief Judicial magistrate (Annexure- 5) that some prima facie evidence had been collected during investigation and after receipt of the note the learned Chief Judicial magistrate transferred the case to special Judge and certain offence punishable under the provisions of the prevention and Corruption Act had been added in the first information report. What eventually will come into the shape of the final form that is yet to be submitted by the Cabinet Vigilance department after re-investigation is still indefinite and uncertain, although the first information report seems to have been lodged as early as in October, 1989. About what charges opposite party No.1 will have to face or even whether he will have to face any charges at all is still not clear; nor is it definite as to when final form will be submitted. According to the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner (not controverted by the other side) even sanction, which is needed for prosecution of the opposite party No.1 for prosecuting him of the offences punishable under the provision of Prevention of Corruption Act, which had been added to the first information report on the request of the Cabinet Vigilance, is yet to be obtained. 13. The crucial question, therefore, is whether in such a situation the impugned order which had the effect of postponing the further proceeding of the Money Suit indefinitely and to an uncertain period can be said to be in the interest of justice and in order to prevent opposite party No.1 from embarrassment or protecting him from prejudice, which he may eventually have in defending himself in the criminal case. I think that in the fact and circumstances of the case the answer to the aforesaid question will be negative. I think that in the fact and circumstances of the case the answer to the aforesaid question will be negative. Of course, there cannot be any dispute, and it may be deemed to be rather settled by the decision reported in A. I. R.1954 S. C.397 that in appropriate case even civil suits can be stayed still disposal of the criminal proceeding. The principle in this regard has been enunciated in the aforesaid decision in paragraphs 14 to 16 of the judgment, which read as follows: " (14) We were informed at the hearing that two further sets of proceedings arising out of the same facts a now pending against the appellants. One is two civil suits for damages for wrongful confinement. The other is two criminal prosecutions under Sec.344, i. RC. for wrongful confinement, one against each sub-Inspector. It was said that the simultaneous prosecution of these matters will embarrass the accused. But after the hearing of the appeal we received information that the two criminal prosecutions have been closed with liberty to file fresh complaints when the papers are ready, as the High Court record were not available on the application of the accused. As these prosecutions are not pending at the moment the objection regarding them does not arise but we can see that the simultaneous prosecution of the present criminal proceedings out of which this appeal arises and the civil suits will embarrass the accused. We have therefore to determine which should be stayed. (15) As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of india on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when It expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as, sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the. likelihood of embarrassment. (16) Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The only relevant consideration here is the. likelihood of embarrassment. (16) Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and Impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust. This, however, is not a hard and fast rule, special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to say it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under S.476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished. " It appears from the above quoted observation that there cannot be straight-jacket formula and even though it would appear that criminal proceeding should be given precedence, in this case there is hardly any scope for considering the aspect of precedence for when the criminal case instituted in the year 1989 had once terminated against opposite party No.1 when after the investigation by the police, which is the usually normal agency of investigation, the final form had been submitted, but has again been revived and is now in the re-investigation stage, and final form is being awaited. The result of reinvestigation is not yet final and it is not possible to anticipate in this case as to whether or not charge-sheet will be submitted against opposite party No.1 and if submitted, what will be nature and shape of the criminal charge that may be levelled against him. Even sanction needed for prosecuting him of the offence punishable under the provision of prevention of Corruption Act is yet to be given by the competent authority, which may grant or refuse it. Even sanction needed for prosecuting him of the offence punishable under the provision of prevention of Corruption Act is yet to be given by the competent authority, which may grant or refuse it. In such a situation to think of prejudice or embarrassment that is likely to be caused to opposite party No.1, if he filed his written statement in the money suit, in my opinion, seems to be premature and is indicating of showing undue concern to an imaginary possibility of prejudice or embarrassment 14. I may notice here that there can be hardly any scope for attracting the provision of Article 20 (3) of the constitution of India, although the learned Counsel for the opposite party made some elaborate argument in this aspect and submitted that the protection of that article, if available , it can extend not only to giving oral statement but also written statement and also production of document as has been held in the decision reported in A. I. R.1961 S. C.1808 (State of Bombay V/s. Kathi Kalu Oghad ). But when a civil suit has been filed against any person, he cannot be said to be an accused. Nor is there any element of compulsion in the civil suit that he must file a written statement. It is his liberty to defend the suit by filing written statement, if so advised or to allow it to go ex pane. In my opinion, the protection under the provision of Article 20 (3) cannot be sought or given in a civil proceeding going on against him. This protection, of course, would be available to him in case he will have to face trial of a criminal charge. I think the argument of the learned Counsel for the opposite party No.1 based only on the provision of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of india is misconceived. 15. The real question is the question of embarrassment, which alone can be considered to be relevant for the purpose of considering whether a civil suit should or should not be stayed till the disposal of a criminal case. The word embarrassment, according to the dictionary meaning given in the Concise oxford Dictionary may mean encumber, impede, complicate or perplex. The learned Counsel for the opposite party has also submitted that it means to "to hinder through perplexity" or "to render intricate". The word embarrassment, according to the dictionary meaning given in the Concise oxford Dictionary may mean encumber, impede, complicate or perplex. The learned Counsel for the opposite party has also submitted that it means to "to hinder through perplexity" or "to render intricate". A person may also be embarrassed in the sense that if he has to defend simultaneously, he may have difficulty to give proper attention to two simultaneous proceedings and this may be perplexing. In the facts and circumstances of this case, however, it appears that the criminal case is yet to take any particular shape and for the present at least he has not been asked to meet any specific charge, so far the criminal case is concerned, in which earlier final report had been submitted but re-investigation is going on. So, I do not think that in this case Opposite party No.1 can have embarrassment because of the continuance of the money suit as also the criminal case. 16. It may be noticed here that in the decision reported in A. I. R. .1979 goa 37 the stay of civil suit had been granted for a different reason when the criminal case was likely to be concluded within a month. After referring to the decision of the Apex Court reported in a. I. R.1954 SC 397, the following observation had been made in the case: " 2. . . . . the only relevant consideration while disposing of the prayer for staying a civil suit pending disposal of a criminal case started on the same facts is likelihood of embarrassment, as has been held in the judgment of the Supreme court. In the present case the embarrassment likely to be caused is that the petitioners if required to file the written statement will have to disclose their case. This will prejudice them in effectively contesting the criminal case. I find that this submission has some force. The learned civil Judge has failed to take note of this fact. Further I am told that the criminal case is fixed to be taken from day to day with effect from 11th December. It is expected that the criminal trial will soon come to a close, say within a month or so. The learned civil Judge has failed to take note of this fact. Further I am told that the criminal case is fixed to be taken from day to day with effect from 11th December. It is expected that the criminal trial will soon come to a close, say within a month or so. Civil cases often drag on for years and therefore nothing serious will turn out if the present civil suit is stayed for a period of one or two months more until disposal of the criminal case. " It may be seen that the reason for stay of the civil proceeding in that case was that within about a month or two the criminal case was likely to be disposed of and the stay of the civil suit in that case was, therefore, to last for only one month or two. In the instant case, however, the picture regarding criminal case, as already noticed above, is still indefinite and uncertain and it cannot be anticipated what picture will eventually emerge out of the materials finally collected during re-investigation. I do not think that the opposite party no.1 in the facts and circumstances of this case can legitimately take shelter of being under embarrassment if further proceeding of the suit is not stayed. There cannot be also question of prejudice in taking up defence in the criminal case when it cannot be anticipated what will be the exact result of the re-investigation and what he would be asked to defend. In my opinion, staying of money suit till the disposal of special Case No.60 of 1994 in the facts and circumstances of the case must be taken to be stay for indefinite and uncertain period and on a unpredicable contingency and will go against the interest of justice, rather serve the interest of justice by staying a matter, in which claim has been made by the petitioner against the Opposite party (No.1) on assertion of specific facts. 17 I may also notice in this connection that a close perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. I. R.1954 SC 397 would show that the Hon ble Supreme Court had stayed only one out of the two criminal proceedings and there was no stay of one criminal proceeding which had been closed for the time being but for which liberty had been given to file fresh complaints when the papers would be ready, So despite the fact of another criminal prosecution was about to be started on a fresh complaint when no stay was granted in that regard as is clear from second part of paragraph 14 of the Judgment as already quoted above. That observation may be somewhat relevant for the purpose of appreciating the contentions, which have been raised on the point as to whether the criminal proceedings in this case can be said to be pending against opposite party (No.1 ). The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that there is no criminal case pending because no charge-sheet has been filed or cognizance has been taken; but the learned Counsel for the opposite party (No.1) has submitted that right from the date of lodging of the first information report the case must be deemed to be instituted as has been held in A. I. R 1951 SC 1808. In this connection I consider it sufficient to notice that when question for consideration of protection given in Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India is concerned, the case may be deemed to be pending as soon as the first information report is lodged or complaint is filed; but when the question is whether any prejudice or embarrassment would be caused to an accused in defending the case, it has to be held that only when charge-sheet has been submitted the question whether prejudice or embarrassment might occur to him during the course of defence can be considered. A fresh complaint that was intended to be filed after some papers would become available was not considered by the Apex Court in the case reported in A. I. R.1954 S. C.397 to be such a criminal case, pendency of which would justify stay of civil suit till the disposal of the case, in which fresh complaint was to be filed. throgh based on the same (acts. throgh based on the same (acts. I do not think that in the facts and circumstances of the stage of the special case, when the criminal case is being re-investigated, proceeding of money suit can be stayed in the interest of justice. 18. As regards likelihood of prejudice that may be caused to opposite party No.1, accused in criminal case, this idea seems to emanate from the principle that the accused has got the right to keep silent in the matter of his defence when he his being prosecuted in a criminal case till the prosecution produces all its evidence. From the submissions made it seems that filing of the written statement in the money suit instituted against opposite party (No.1) is sought to be with-held mainly on two grounds : first that to ask him to file written statement will be violative of the provision of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India; and secondly he may not be compelled to disclose his defence which he may take in the criminal case as he has right to keep his defence secret till the prosecution has adduced all its evidence in support of its case before the trial court. About the first aspect, I have already made comments holding that the argument based on Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India is misconceived. About the second aspect I have already indicated that it is still uncertain as to what would be outcome of the re- investigation and what shape the prosecution case will take against opposite party (No.1), and so there is no question at present of thinking of prejudice for which there is no ground or basis. This theory of secrecy or right to keep defence reserved till the end itself, in my opinion, does not seem to have any rational foundation. It is now a general demand and there is also a general trend that there should be transparency every where in the matter of public dealing. In this case whatever is said to have been done opposite parties Nos.1 and 2, had allegedly been done when they were acting in their official capacity and the foundation of the claim made in the money suit is what the opposite party no.1 had done when he was acting as deputy Collector, Revenue Administration of Patna Division. In this case whatever is said to have been done opposite parties Nos.1 and 2, had allegedly been done when they were acting in their official capacity and the foundation of the claim made in the money suit is what the opposite party no.1 had done when he was acting as deputy Collector, Revenue Administration of Patna Division. There seems to be no good reason why opposite party no.1 can be allowed to keep silent about alleged transactions, which form the basis of the claim of money made against him and opposite party No.2 by the State of Bihar in the money suit. Perhaps, the right of the accused to keep silent till the end had been recognized previously for the reason that was based on a fear that the Machinery of administration of criminal justice might be highly discredited, if any innocent person is convicted. But the old theory, that was anxious to prevent conviction of even a single innocent person, even though by adoption of that theory numerous really guilty could be acquitted, has now undergone change. Our Apex Court has now emphasised that it is the duty of the Court not only to ensure that the innocents are not punished; but it is equally the duty of the Court to ensure that really guilty persons do not escape. Moreover this right to keep silent about defence that is available to the accused is not absolute; for the Court has been empowered by section 313 of the Code of Criminal procedure to examine him at any stage to enable him to explain circumstance appearing in evidence against him; and section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act also empowers this Court to put any question from him. So, there does not seem to be any good reason for maintaining this principle, that an accused may keep silent and keep secret his defence till the entire evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge levelled against him is brought before the Court of course he is protected against self-incrimination in a criminal case, and cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself in view of the provision of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution of India. But this protection cannot be extended to a civil suit for the hearing of which elaborate provisions have been made in the Code of Civil procedure and the opposite party No.1 cannot be allowed to say that if he would file written statement in the money suit, he will have to disclose some facts, which may cause prejudice to him in defending him in the criminal case, in which he is entitled to keep his defence secret till the prosecution would addu#e all its evidence. In any case, it is obvious that any postponement of the civil proceeding for indefinite or uncertain period and on an uncertain contingency cannot be said to be in the interest of justice. 19. Even when the apprehension expressed by the learned Counsel of the opposite party No.1 about likelihood of prejudice that may be caused to the opposite party in my opinion is at present, only anticipatory in view of the fact that the criminal proceeding against him is in inchoate condition, I think only one observation by way of abundant caution will be sufficient to protect the interest of the opposite party No.1 from any possible prejudice; and it is that any thing stated in the written statement, which the opposite party may file in the money Suit, or any evidence given by the opposite party in support of the stand taken by him in the written statement will not be used by the prosecution in the special case for any purpose, and the opposite party-defendant would be at liberty to take whatever defence he would like in the special case, if occasion for the same would arise and that defence may be inconsistent with the stand he will take in his pleading and the evidence in the civil proceeding. This observation will not also be inconsistent with any settled principles, such as, that finding in any proceeding is to be given on the basis of the case made out by the parties and evidence given in support thereof in the particular proceeding; and materials brought on the record in one proceeding cannot be made the basis of any finding in any other proceeding. Moreover, the purpose of civil proceeding is different and nature or standard of evidence required to prove a fact in the different proceedings are different. Moreover, the purpose of civil proceeding is different and nature or standard of evidence required to prove a fact in the different proceedings are different. It is also settled that in certain matters alternative and even inconsistent stand may be taken by a person in civil suit as well as in criminal proceeding. Finding in civil proceeding will also have no bearing on the finding in a criminal proceeding, for neither the principle of res judicata (which is only applicable when two civil proceedings centre round the same issues are involved) nor principle of issue estoppel (which applies when two criminal proceedings on same facts are involved)can apply; and possibility of conflicting decision is also not relevant, as is obvious from the last part of paragraph 15 of the decision reported in AIR 1954 s. C.397. 20. In view of what I have stated above I set aside the impugned order and direct that further proceeding of the money Suit (No.77 of 1993) shall proceed; but any statement made by the opposite party No.1 either in the pleading or in his evidence in the money suit shall not be used by the prosecution to his prejudice and he will be at liberty to take any stand, which may even be inconsistent with what is said by him in his pleading and evidence in the money suit, if occasion would arise to face a specific charge in connection with Special Case No.60 of 1994. This revision-petition is, accordingly, disposed of. Order Accordingly.