DATTU, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER who was working as Senior Administrative Officer in the first respondent Institute, is before this Court inter alia questioning the correctness or otherwise of the action of the institute in discharging the petitioner from service with effect from 17. 10. 1991 (afternoon) in accordance with letter No. 02 (1758)/91 dated 17. 10. 1991 of the Director, Central Machine Tool institute, Bangalore. ( 2 ) FACTS in nutshell are : Petitioner was selected for appointment as 'senior Administrative officer' in the 1st respondent - Institute, on certain terms and conditions. Selection for appointment was communicated to the petitioner by the respondent-Institute by its letter dated 18th September, 1989. Salient features of this appointment were, that duration of appointment was temporary, but likely to be continued and the period of probation would be for a period of two years initially which may be extended or curtailed at the discretion of the Institute and it was also made known in clear terms that the appointed candidate will continue on probation until such time he is absorbed in writing in the said post. In so far as termination of service, the letter of appointment also indicated that during the probation period, petitioner's services could be terminated without giving any notice and after absorption in service by giving three month's notice in writing or in lieu of it three months salary. This apart there were other usual conditions. The entire case of the petitioner revolves round this letter of appointment. The relevant portion of the letter dated 18th September, 1989 is extracted and it reads as follows : "sub : Recruitment to the post of 'senior Administrative Officer'. With reference to the interview held on 25. 8. 1989 I am to inform you that you have been, selected for appointment as 'senior Administrative Officer' in this Institute on the following terms and conditions: xxx XXX XXX probation : You will be on probation for a period of two years which may be extended or curtailed at the discretion of the Institute. You will continue to be on probation until such time you are absorbed (in writing) in the post. Notice : i) During the probation period, your services are liable to termination without giving any notice. You will continue to be on probation until such time you are absorbed (in writing) in the post. Notice : i) During the probation period, your services are liable to termination without giving any notice. ii) After absorption your service can be terminated at any time by giving three month's notice in writing or salary in lieu thereof on either side. Service You will have to furnish an under taking that you agreement: will not apply for any post outside the Institute for a period of three years from the date of joining this post. xxx xxx xxx general: i) During your service in this Institute, you will be governed by the Rules and Regulations of the institute in force from time to time. " ( 3 ) PETITIONER by his letter dated 25. 9. 1989 accepted the offer of appointment with a request to modify certain terms and conditions in the letter offering appointment. Specific requests were for starting pay with five increments. e. Rs. 3500/- per month, in relaxing the probationary period of two years and lastly to continue to stay in the family accommodation available at Bangalore. Respondent-Institute by their letter dated 27. 9. 1989 informed the petitioner that it is not possible to accept certain requests made by the petitioner in his letter dated 25. 9. 1989. However, it transpires that the respondent - Institute did not specifically either agree or reject the request in so far as relaxation of probationary period was concerned. After all the initial hurdles and correspondence between the parties to the lis, respondent-Institute by its establishment order dated 22. 2. 1990 appointed petitioner in its Institute with effect from forenoon of 18th October, 1989 in the Grade of Rs. 3000-100-3500-125-4500, subject to the terms and conditions specified in their letter No. 03 (03)/89-ADM dated 18th September, 1989. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner joined the services of the institute. The establishment order dated 22. 2. 1990 reads as under: "ref. No. 03 (03)/90-ADM date: 1990-02-22 establishment ORDER shri P. S. Ramchander is appointed as Senior Administrative Officer in this Institute with effect from the forenoon of 18th October, 1989 in the grade of Rs. 3000-100-3500-125-4500, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated in the offer of appointment letter No. 03 (3)/89-ADM dated 18th Sep. 1989. 1990 reads as under: "ref. No. 03 (03)/90-ADM date: 1990-02-22 establishment ORDER shri P. S. Ramchander is appointed as Senior Administrative Officer in this Institute with effect from the forenoon of 18th October, 1989 in the grade of Rs. 3000-100-3500-125-4500, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated in the offer of appointment letter No. 03 (3)/89-ADM dated 18th Sep. 1989. " ( 4 ) RESPONDENTS in their pleadings have stated, that the petitioner's performance as Senior administrative Officer was reviewed by the Committee and after reviewing the performance, the committee decided not to confirm the services of the petitioner. Accordingly, an order came to be issued by the Director of respondent-Institute to the effect that the petitioner's appointment ceases with effect from 17. 10. 1991 (afternoon) in terms of Clause (1) under head 'notice' of offer of appointment dated 18. 10. 1989 and petitioner was relieved on the same day. Aggrieved by this letter of discharge before completion and confirmation as a probationer dated 17. 10. 1991, petitioner has presented this Petition seeking several reliefs. ( 5 ) SRI Rao, learned Counsel for petitioner would submit that the petitioner's specific request for relaxation of probationary period of two years had not been rejected by respondent-Institute in its reply to petitioner's letter dated 25. 9. 1989, thereby implying that Institute had agreed to relax the specific request of the petitioner so far as probationary period was concerned. He would submit that nothing prevented the Institute to reject the specific request of the petitioner which they have done in so far as other request of the petitioner, According to him, this action of the institute would clearly indicate that offer for appointment by the Institute was without stipulation of probationary period, which the petitioner accepted when he joined the services of the Institute on the forenoon of 18. 10. 1989. Continuing his imaginative and realistic picturisation of the case, he would submit that the respondent - Institute could not have passed order of discharge simpliciter against the petitioner after completion of two years probationary period assuming that the respondent-Institute had not waived this specific request of the petitioner. According to him, they should have held a detailed enquiry as required under Regulation before issuing order of termination dated 17. 10. 1991. According to him, they should have held a detailed enquiry as required under Regulation before issuing order of termination dated 17. 10. 1991. ( 6 ) SRI Gururajan, learned Counsel for respondent would submit that the letter offering appointment clearly stipulated that the appointment is subject to completion of two years probationary period and further there is nothing like automatic confirmation of the post. After probationary period, the same has to be done by- the management in writing. He would further say that at no point of time respondent-Institute waived this condition. This he would demonstrate by referring to the letter of appointment dated 22. 2. 1990 by specifically referring to condition that the appointment as a Senior Administrative Officer "subject to terms and conditions in the offer of appointment letter dated 18. 9. 1983. " He would also refer to pleadings to indicate that even petitioner understood the Establishment Order dated 22. 2. 1990 has an inbuilt probationary period in it. Apart from citing Case Laws, he would say petitioner is not entitled to relief sought for in the Petition. ( 7 ) HAVING regard to the respective contentions, the first issue that requires to be considered is whether the Establishment Order dated 22. 2. 1990, was hedged with any condition in so far as probationary period that the petitioner will have to complete, before he would be confirmed in the post. The Establishment Order is sequel to the offer of appointment letter dated 18th september, 1989. In my view, the Establishment Order is in clear terms and there is no ambiguity in the language employed therein. The Establishment Order clearly indicates that petitioner was appointed as Senior Administrative Officer in the respondent-Institute with effect from 18. 10. 89, subject to terms and conditions enumerated in the offer of appointment letter no. 03 (3)/89-ADM dated 18. 9. 1989, which would only mean all the conditions specified and stipulated in the letter dated 18th September, 1989 are bodily lifted and engrafted in the establishment Order dated 22. 2. 1990. If that is the only possible meaning that could be ascribed to the letter dated 22. 2. 03 (3)/89-ADM dated 18. 9. 1989, which would only mean all the conditions specified and stipulated in the letter dated 18th September, 1989 are bodily lifted and engrafted in the establishment Order dated 22. 2. 1990. If that is the only possible meaning that could be ascribed to the letter dated 22. 2. 1990, then what follows is that all the conditions including condition with regard to probationary period was inbuilt in the appointment order, which only means appointment of the petitioner as Senior Administrative Officer in the respondent-Institute was with a condition that the petitioner would be on probation for a period of two years, which may be extended or curtailed at the discretion of the respondent-Institute and the period of probation would continue until such time. Petitioner was absorbed in the post in writing. In view of the later developments the earlier correspondence between the parties would get effaced in the teeth of the Establishment Order of the Institute dated 22. 2. 1990. On the plain construction of the establishment Order, it could be safely presumed that the appointment order was hedged with a condition and that condition was period of probation for two years with an option to the Institute either to curtail or extend the period and what follows is that the management had reserved their right to discharge the petitioner during the period of probation. It so transpires in this case, that the Institute after reviewing the performance of the petitioner, during the period of probation and being unsatisfied with the performance of the services of the petitioner had to take extreme step of discharging petitioner during the period of probation by its letter dated 17. 10. 1991. ( 8 ) THE next issue that falls for consideration is whether the order of the Institute dated 17. 10. 1991 is merely an order of discharge simpliciiter or is in the nature of termination of probationer without enquiry. The relevant portion of the order dated 17. 10. 1991 by which petitioner was discharged would read as under; "after review of your performance during your probation period, it is decided not to confirm your service. 10. 1991 is merely an order of discharge simpliciiter or is in the nature of termination of probationer without enquiry. The relevant portion of the order dated 17. 10. 1991 by which petitioner was discharged would read as under; "after review of your performance during your probation period, it is decided not to confirm your service. " ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for petitioner relying on the letter dated 6th September, 1991 of the director-in-Charge of the Institute addressed to the petitioner would submit that there is direct nexus between the allegation made and the action taken by the Institute to terminate his services even if it is assumed that the petitioner was still under probation and the Institute had not confirmed the services of the petitioner and the impugned order of termination of service of the petitioner was penal in nature having civil consequences and therefore so called order of termination simpliciter amounts to dismissal without enquiry. ( 10 ) IN BABULAL vs. STATE OF HARYANA, AIR1991 SC 1310 , [1991 (62 )FLR505 ], JT1991 (1 )SC 211 , 1991 Lablc1201 , (1991 )II LLJ327 SC , 1991 (1 )SCALE39 , (1991 ) 2 SCC335 , [1991 ]1 SCR73 , 1991 (1 )UJ528 (SC ), the Supreme Court held that though the order was innocuous on the face of it, still then the Court if necessary, for the ends of fair play and Justice can lift the veil and find out the real nature of the order even though it was couched with the order of termination in accordance with the terms and conditions of the order of appointment. ( 11 ) DEALING with more or less similar situation, Apex Court in the case of GOVERNING council OF KIDWAI MEMORIAL INSTITUTE OF ONCOLOGY, BANGALORE vs. Dr. ( 11 ) DEALING with more or less similar situation, Apex Court in the case of GOVERNING council OF KIDWAI MEMORIAL INSTITUTE OF ONCOLOGY, BANGALORE vs. Dr. PANDURANG GODWALKAR, AIR1993 SC 392 , 1992 Lablc2439 , (1993 )I LLJ308 SC , 1992 (2 )SCALE861 , (1992 )4 SCC719 , [1992 ]supp2 SCR250 , 1993 (2 )SLJ174 (SC ) was pleased to explain the principle of tearing of veil for finding out the real nature of the order by stating that: "---If an employee who was on probation or holding an appointment on temporary basis was removed from the service with stigma because of some specific charge, then a plea cannot be taken that as his service was temporary or his appointment was on probation, there was no requirement of holding any enquiry, affording such an employee an opportunity to show that the charge levelled against him was either not true or it was without any basis. But whenever the service of an employee was terminated during the period of probation or while his appointment was on temporary basis, by an order of termination simpliciter after some preliminary enquiry, it cannot be held that as some enquiry had been made against him before the issuance of an order of termination, it really amounted to his removal from service on a charge as such penal in nature, when an appointment is made on probation, it presupposes that the conduct, performance ability and the capacity of the employer concerned have to be watched and examined during the period of probation. He is to be confirmed after the expiry of probation only when his service during the period of probation is found to bo satisfactory and he is considered suitable for the post against which he has been appointed. The principle of tearing of the veil for finding out the real nature of the order shall be applicable only in a case, where the Court is satisfied that there is direct nexus between the charge so levelled and the action taken. If the decision is taken, to terminate the service of an employee during the period of probation, after taking into consideration the overall performance and some action or inaction on the part of such employee then it cannot be said that it amounts to his removal from service as punishment. If the decision is taken, to terminate the service of an employee during the period of probation, after taking into consideration the overall performance and some action or inaction on the part of such employee then it cannot be said that it amounts to his removal from service as punishment. It need not be said that the appointing authority at the stage of confirmation or while examining the question as to whether the service of such employee be terminated during the continuance of the period of probation, is entitled to look into any complaint made in respect of such employee while discharging his duties for purpose of making assessment of performance of such employee. Even if such employee while questioning the validity of an order of termination simpiiciter brings on record that some preliminary enquiry or examination of some allegations had been made, that will not vitiate the order of termination. " ( 12 ) IN OM PRAKASH GOEL vs. HIMACHAL PRADESH TOURISM DEVELOPMENT corporation LTD. SIMLA, AIR1991 SC 1490 , [1991 (63 )FLR245 ], JT1991 (3 )SC 6 , 1991 Lablc1414 , 1991 (1 )SCALE892 , (1991 )3 SCC291 , [1991 ]2 SCR701a , 1991 (2 ) UJ176 (SC ), (1991 )2 UPLBEC967 , the Apex Court held that it was well settled that in a case of an order of termination even that of temporary employee, the Court has to see whether the order was made on the ground of misconduct. , If such a complaint was made and in that process, the Court would examine the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order complained of and if the Court was satisfied that the termination of services was not so innocuous as claimed to be and if the circumstances further disclose that it was only a camouflage with a view to avoid an enquiry as warranted by Article 311 (2) of the constitution, then such a termination was liable to be quashed. ( 13 ) KEEPING in view, the principles enunciated by Apex Court, a cursory look at the letter of director-in-Charge of the Institute to the petitioner dated 6th September, 1991 and the so called admissions made by respondent in its objections (para-8) does not suggest that the impugned order made would cast a stigma on the petitioner, which would entitle him an enquiry before passing an order of termination simpliciter. Prior to the issuance of impugned order, there was correspondence between the Director-in-Charge and the petitioner suggesting that the petitioner was not coming up to the expectations of the Institute in the performance of his duties. It is to be borne in mind that the petitioner was entrusted with the onerous responsibility as Senior administrative Officer in the Institute. The Administration Department is the nerve centre of the institute and any lapse, omission or commission on the part of the Head of the Department would have its telling effect on the entire working of the Institute. Therefore, the Institute was forced to issue the letter dated 6th September, 1991 bringing to his notice the various omissions and commissions on his part while working as probationer. It was then expected of the petitioner to be more vigilant in the performance of his duties. On this basis, his performance was reviewed by the appointing authority and after reviewing the performance the Institute came to the conclusion the petitioner's performance as Senior Administrative Officer was wholly unsatisfactory during the period of probation which necessitated the Institute not to confirm petitioner's services, but to dispense with his services. Petitioner being a probationary employee/officer had no right to hold the post and the appointing authority has terminated his services by innocuous order of termination without casting any stigma on him. The termination order did not indict the respondent for any misconduct. In my view, the order of termination is in accordance with the contract of service. Certain statements made by respondent/institute in the counter by way of defence also do not change the nature and character of the order of termination. Service of probationer has been terminated after making/reviewing the overall performance during the period of probation. In my view no exception can be taken to such an order of termination simpliciter. It does not cast a stigma on the probationer employee/officer and this does not amount to dismissal without enquiry. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner's Counsel that the termination order should have been preceded by an enquiry. ( 14 ) THE next question is whether the respondent-Institute passed the impugned order after the completion of two years probationary period and if so, whether enquiry as contemplated under article 311 (2) of the Constitution should have been instituted to terminate the services of the petitioner. ( 14 ) THE next question is whether the respondent-Institute passed the impugned order after the completion of two years probationary period and if so, whether enquiry as contemplated under article 311 (2) of the Constitution should have been instituted to terminate the services of the petitioner. This question need not detain me for long. Facts would clearly indicate that the petitioner was appointed as Senior Administrative Officer under Establishment Order dated 22. 2. 1990 with effect from 18th October, 1989 and the petitioner was terminated from services of the Institute by an order dated 17. 10. 1991 with effect from 17. 10. 1991 (afternoon ). That is before completion of two years probation period. Even otherwise, in the offer of appointment letter dated 18. 9. 1989 against column 'probation', it had been clearly stated that: "you will be on probation for a period of two years which may be extended or curtailed at the discretion of the institute you will continue to be on probation until such time you are absorbed (in writing) in the post," In MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, RAIPUR vs. ASHOK KUMAR MISHRA, AIR1991 SC 1402 , JT1991 (2 )SC 599 , (1991 )II LLJ343 SC , (1991 )3 SCC325 , [1991 ]2 SCR320 , 1991 (2 )UJ170 (SC ), the Supreme Court held that mere expiry of initial period of probation does not automatically have the effect of deemed confirmation and the status of a deemed confirmation of probation - an express order in that regard only confers the status of an approved probationer. In the present case, the respondent - Institute has positively acted in terminating the services of a probationer, without confirming the appointment. In my view, when the impugned order came to be passed, petitioner was still on probation and the order of termination simpliciter without holding any enquiry by the respondent -Institute is not vitiated in any manner whatsoever. ( 15 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, this Petition is liable to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.