JUDGMENT P. A. Mohammed, J. 1. The second defendant in O.S.No. 51 of 1980 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Kozhikode, is the appellant. The suit was one for partition. The Trial Court passed a preliminary decree for partition. As against the said decree, appellant filed an appeal A.S.No. 193 of 1987, before the District Court, Kozhikode. As there was delay in filing the said appeal, an application for condonation of delay, I.A.No. 1562/87, was also filed. The said application was dismissed by the court below as per order dated 9-12-1988. Consequently the appeal was also dismissed on the same day. It is against the said judgment and decree this Second Appeal has been filed. 2. The appellant claimed one - third share in the plaint schedule properties available for partition. However, by the preliminary decree plaint A schedule properties were directed to be divided into two equal shares and one such share be allotted to the plaintiff and the other share to the first defendant. The appellant did not get any share in the suit property. It was found that she was only entitled to get maintenance for her life out of income from the plaint schedule properties. The counsel therefore submits that the appellant is very much aggrieved by the preliminary decree inasmuch as no share has been allotted to her. However, the merits or otherwise of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant does not call any consideration at this stage. In this appeal what is required to be decided is only the question relating to the dismissal of the application for condonation of delay. 3. An exparte decree in O.S.No. 51/80 was passed by the Trial Court on 19-11-1982. an application, I.A.No. 6221 of 1982, for setting aside the exparte decree was filed on 18-12-1982. The said application was dismissed on 24-02-1983. As against the said order, appellant filed C.M.A.No. 147 of 1983 before this court on 28-06-1983. Ultimately, after the hearing, the C. M. A. was dismissed on 16-03-1987. It appears, the appellant thereafter filed an application for certified copy of the judgment and decree in O.S.No. 51/80 for the purpose of filing the appeal. After obtaining the certified copy, appeal was filed on 07-08-1987. Since it was filed out of time, I.A.No. 1562 of 1987 was filed under S.5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. After obtaining the certified copy, appeal was filed on 07-08-1987. Since it was filed out of time, I.A.No. 1562 of 1987 was filed under S.5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The lower appellate court observed that the period during which the appellant had been prosecuting the proceeding for setting aside the exparte decree could be excluded as it would constitute 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of S.5 of the Limitation Act. However, the court further observed that the appellant is bound to explain the delay in filing the appeal after the final disposal of the said proceeding. The lower appellate court finally dismissed the petition on the ground that the delay after the final disposal of the C.M. Appeal has not been properly explained. 4. The question that has been mainly urged by the counsel is whether the court below is justified in law in holding that the facts and circumstances of this case could not constitute 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of S.5 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand the counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant having adopted the course of filing petition to set aside the exparte decree under O.9 R.13 of the Code of Civil Procedure he cannot adopt the course of filing the regular appeal against the same decree. The counsel further adds that when the appellant has adopted the said course the delay in filing the appeal would not constitute 'sufficient cause'. 5. What is 'sufficient cause' and how it has to be gauged? These are the issues which the courts frequently face in deciding the disputes between the parties. S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that any appeal or any application other than an application under any of the provisions of O.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. The power conferred under this provision is no doubt a discretionary power, the exercise of which is dependent on the satisfaction of the court. This discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common sense and sound judgment. In other words, the discretion is to know through law what is just and reasonable. The power conferred under this provision is no doubt a discretionary power, the exercise of which is dependent on the satisfaction of the court. This discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common sense and sound judgment. In other words, the discretion is to know through law what is just and reasonable. While interpreting S.5 of the Limitation Act, the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan (1890) ILR 13 Madras 269) observed: "We think that S.5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words "sufficient cause" receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant." This decision was approved by the Supreme Court Dinabandhu Sabu v. Jabumoni Mangaraj and others ( AIR 1954 SC 411 ) and in Ramlal and others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. ( AIR 1962 SC 361 ). In The State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others ( AIR 1972 SC 749 ) the Supreme Court held that the words 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. It further held in Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag v. Mst Katiji and other ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) thus: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S.5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. It is common knowledge that this court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy." Therefore the apex court has laid down therein six principles for the guidance of the courts in adopting "a justice oriented approach" while dealing with an application for condonation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act. 6. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles governing the exercise of discretionary power, this court must examine the background of the present case. In Shyamal Kanti Danda v. Chunilal Choudhary ( AIR 1984 SC 1732 ) the Supreme Court in a similar set of circumstances allowed the application for condonation on certain conditions. The background of the said case can well be understood from the following tactual situation stated by the Supreme Court, which more or less resembles the facts of the present case. "After an unsuccessful appeal, the petitioner filed an appeal against what was styled as exparte decree in the Court of the District Judge, Alipore. He filed an application praying for condonation of delay of 386 days in preferring the appeal on the ground that he was prosecuting under legal advice a remedy in another civil court, to be precise for selling aside the exparte decree under O.9 R.13 C. P. C., but as that court was unable to grant relief, the time spent bona fide in prosecuting this remedy must be excluded in computing the period of limitation." In a similar situation a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jokam Reddy and others v. Gokar Mallaiah ( AIR 1977 A.P. 367 ) observed: "Reading S.14 and 5 of the Limitation Act, the best that can be spelled out of the two provisions is that when S.14 does not, in terms apply to any particular proceeding, the fact that the aggrieved party bona fide prosecuted that proceeding may be considered in the circumstances of each case as a sufficient cause for the delay. Each case will have to be decided on its facts. Each case will have to be decided on its facts. The utmost that can be said is that the delay from 1-3-1972, the date on which O.9 R.13 petition was presented to 7-8-1975, on which C. M. A. 199/74 was dismissed, is satisfactorily explained." In M. T. Cherian v. Pankal Vittal Naik & Co.(P) Ltd. ( 1972 KLT 227 ) this court said: "........ what is material is not whether there were reasonable grounds to take the earlier proceeding which ultimately did not succeed, but whether the party acted bona fide in taking the said proceeding, and acted diligently in prosecuting the same and in filing the appeal after the termination of the proceeding. If he did so, it would be sufficient ground for not filing the appeal in time; and the delay would be excused." 7. Once the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Shyamal Kan Danda's case ( AIR 1984 SC 1732 ) and Jokam Reddy's case ( AIR 1977 A.P. 367 ) supra are applied to the facts of the present case, then it is crystalline that the delay from the date on which O.9 R.13 petition is presented till the passing of the order in the appeal has been caused by 'sufficient cause'. Then what remains is the alleged delay after the date of judgment in the appeal. The judgment dismissing C. M. A.No. 147/1983 was pronounced on 16-3-1987. It appears the appellant after obtaining legal advice to file the appeal against the exparte decree in O.S. No 51/80 filed the application for printed copy on 31-3-1987. Though the printing charge was called for on 8-4-1987 it was remitted on 23-5-1987. The certified copy was ready on 1-7-1987 but it was taken delivery only on 3-7-1987. The appeal was filed on 7-8-1987. The delay noticed above cannot be said to be inordinate or unexplainable. This is not a case where there is no explanation at all. The appellant was examined as P.W. 1 and she testified her case. Her case is that she being illiterate does not know the steps in relation to the obtaining of the printed copy of the judgment. Her further case is that she could not meet the advocate in time since he has changed her residence. She is an illiterate lady aged more than 78 years. Her case is that she being illiterate does not know the steps in relation to the obtaining of the printed copy of the judgment. Her further case is that she could not meet the advocate in time since he has changed her residence. She is an illiterate lady aged more than 78 years. I do not see any reason to disbelieve her statement in so far as the reasons for the delay in filing the appeal against the exparte decree in O.S.No. 51/80. That being so, I am persuaded to hold that 'sufficient cause' has been made out for condoning the delay after the judgment in C.M.A.No. 147 of 1983. However, in view of the unnecessary hardship caused to the first respondent in conducting the case the application am be allowed only on terms. Accordingly, I fix a sum of Rs. 750/- as costs to be paid by the appellant to the first respondent plaintiff. 8. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree in A.S.No. 193/ 87 and the order in I.A.No. 1562/87 in A.S.No. 193/87 of the court below are set aside on condition that the appellant pays the aforesaid cost of Rs. 750/- to the counsel appearing for the second respondent in this appeal, within a period of two months from today. In the default of the above payment within the time stipulated above, this appeal will stand dismissed. I further direct the court below to dispose of the appeal, A.S. No 193/87, on merits and in accordance with law, in the event of allowing the appeal on compliance of the condition stipulated above. The appeal is disposed of as above.