Judgment :- 1. Plaintiff in O.S. No. 141 of 1977 on the file of District Munsif, Thiruchirapalli, is the appellant in the above Second Appeal. The plaintiff is a temple which filed the said suit for possession of the suit property from the defendant and for the recovery of Rs. 720/- being the past damages and future damages. 2. The case of the plaintiff is as follows:— First defendants husband Mani Pillai became a tenant of the plaint schedule property on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/-. Each months rent is payable on or before the 5th of every succeeding English calender month. The tenancy is oral. Mani Pillai is no more. Rent from 1958 onwards has not been paid. After the death of Mani Pillai first defendant continued to be in possession of the property. She is liable to pay damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 20 /- per month. The plaintiff is claiming damages only for 3 years prior to the suit. Notice has been given to the defendants. In the place of Krishnaveni Arnmal, the third defendant, namely, Swarnambal has occupied in the first week of September, 1980. She is also bound to surrender possession. Hence the present suit. 3. After filing written statement, the first defendant remained absent and she was set ex parte . The 2nd defendant already remained absent and set ex parte. 4. The third defendant alone filed a written statement in the following manner:— The allegation that the father of this defendant Mani Pillai became the tenant in respect of the suit property on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/- is incorrect The ground site alone belongs to the plaintiff. This defendants father took on lease the ground site alone and he built the superstructure over the same. The property was taken on lease long before, viz. , prior to 1995 and therefore the deceased tenant Mani Pillai and now this defendant are entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1955 as amended. The allegation that this defendant is a sub-tenant under the 1st defendant is false. The third defendant is the legal representative of the deceased Mani Pillai. Since the deceased Mani Pillai and now this defendant are entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, the present suit for recovery of possession will not lie. The allegation that this defendant is a sub-tenant under the 1st defendant is false. The third defendant is the legal representative of the deceased Mani Pillai. Since the deceased Mani Pillai and now this defendant are entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, the present suit for recovery of possession will not lie. A separate application is filed claiming relief under the said Act No notice is given to this defendant. The tenancy has not been properly terminated. On this ground alone the suit is liable to be dismissed. Notice under Section 11 of the said Act must be given. With these averments, the third defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 5. In support of the plaintiffs case, one Dharamalingam was examined as P.W. 1 and Exs. A-1 to A- 24 were marked. On the other hand, the third defendant who is the only contesting defendant has been examined as D.W. 1. Exs. B-1 to B-22 were marked in support of the third defendants defence. 6. After framing necessary issues, the learned District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli came to the conslusion that the defendants are not entitled to claim the benefits of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, consequently, decreed the suit with costs as prayed for. 7. Aggrieved by the judgement and decree of the trial court, the unsuccessful third defendant filed appeal in A.S. No. 56 of 82 before the Sub Court, Tiruchirapalli. After determining the necessary points for consideration, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that the third defendant is entitled to claim benefits under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, consequently allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit filed by the temple. 8. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the temple filed the present appeal before this court. 9. Mr. M.N. Padmanabhan, learned senior counsel for the appellant, without going into the merits of the case, initally relying upon Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1996 (Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1994), contended that the entire proceedings in respect of the relief claimed by the tenant under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act is abated and prayed for setting aside the judgement and decree of the lower appellate court granting relief in favour of the tenant. Alternatively he also contended that in as much as the respondent/tenant has denied the title of the landlord-plaintiff, she is not entitled to claim the benifits under the said Act. On the other hand, Mrs. Chitra Sampath, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that as per Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1996, certain proceedings shall not be abated and the respondent/tenant is entitled to compensation in repect of the superstructure as per Section 3 of the Principal Act. 10. I have carefully considered the rival submissions. Since the learned senior counsel for the appellant straight way brought to my notice the amendment brought in Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921, I shall consider the first point raised by him. For clear understanding, it is useful to mention the entire amendment Act, which is reproduced hereunder:— “ACT No. 2 of 1996. An act further to amend the Madras City Tenantss Protection Act, 1921. BE it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the State of Tamil Nadu in the Forty-fifth Year of the Republic of India as follows:— 1. (1) This Act may be called the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1994. (2) It shall come into force at once. 2. Tamil Nadu Act III of 1992. In section 1 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), in sub-section (3), in the first provison, after clause (e), the following clause shall be added, namely:— “(f) by any religion institution or religious charity belonging to Hindu, Muslim, Christian, or other religion. Explanation:— For the purpose of this clause:— (A) “religious institution” means any:— (i) temple; (ii) math; (iii) mosque; (iv) church; or (v) other place by whatever name known, which is dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by, any community or section thereof as a place of public religious worship; (B) “religious charity” means a public charity associated with a religious festival or observance of religious character (including a walk associated with a religious festival or observance of religious character), whether it be connected with any religious institution or not. 3. 3. Certain pending proceedings to abate:— Every proceeding instituted by a tenant in respect of any land owned by any religious institution or religious charity belonging to Hindu, Muslim, Christian or other religion and pending before any court or other authority or officer on the date of the publication of this Act in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, shall, in so far as the proceeding relates to any matter falling within the scope of the principal Act as amended by this Act, in respect of such land, abate, and all rights and privileges which may have accrued to that tenant in respect of any such land and subsisting immediately before the said date shall in so far as such rights and privileges relate to any matter falling within the scope of the principle Act, as amended by this Act, cease and determine and shall not be enforceable: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any suit or proceeding in which a decree or order passed has been executed or satisfied in full before the said date. (By Order of the Governor).” Section 1 sub-clause (3) proviso exempts the entire provisions of this Act (Principal Act Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1922) to tenancies of land owned by (f) any religions institution or religious charity belonging to Hindu, Muslim, Christian or other religion. In other words, the above said clause (f) has been now added in the exemption clause in Section 1(3). 11. Section 3 of the Act 2 of 1996 makes it very clear that every preceding initiated by a tenant in respect of any land owned by any religious institution pending before any Court on the date of the publication of this Act (Act 2 of 1996) is abated The proceeding relating to any matter falling within the scope of the principal Act in respect of such land abates and the said Section also makes it clear that all rights and privileges which may have accrued to that tenant in respect of any such land and subsisting immediately before the said date shall in so far as such rights and privileges relating to any matter falling within the scope of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, cease and determine and shall not be enforceable. The only exemption is, if any decree or order obtained by the tenant has been executed or satisfied in full before the date of the Act , the above mentioned Section 3 will not operate. In as much as the proceeding relating to the relief under the principal Act is pending on the date of the publication of the Act 2 of 1996, there is no dispute with regard to the applicability of the amended Act to the present case. Absolutely there is no doubt about the applicability of the amended Act to the present case and, if we apply the same, as rightly contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, the entire proceedings shall stand abated, consequently the judgement and decree of the lower appellate court granting relief in favour of the tenant has to be set aside. 12. Mrs. Chitra Sampath, learned counsel for the respondents, as contended earlier after reading section 3 of the principal Act and in the light of the “head note” for section 3 namely, “certain pending proceedings to abate” , contended that in view of the above referred “head note” , not all the proceedings shall abate and according to her with the aid of section 3, the respondent/tenant is entitled to compensation for value of the super-structure. Since the learned counsel very much emphasised the marginal note and head-notes in section 3, it is but appropriate to refer various decisions of the Supreme Court with regard to “marginal note” and “head-note” of a particular section”. 13. In The Income Tax Commissioner v. Ahmed Bhai Umarbhai and Company (AIR (37) 1950 SC (134) the Apex Court has held that “Marginal notes in an Indian statute, as in an Act of Parliament, cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute. Nor can the title of a chapter be legitimately used to restrict the plain terms of an enactment.” 14. In Bhinka v. Charan Singh ( AIR 1959 S.C. 960 ) the Apex Court while interpreting the statutes has explained the role of headings prefixed to section and marginal note. According to the Supreme Court, the headings prefixed to section or sets of sections in some modern statutes ate regarded as preambles to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute, but they may explain ambigious words. According to the Supreme Court, the headings prefixed to section or sets of sections in some modern statutes ate regarded as preambles to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute, but they may explain ambigious words. If there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words in the section, the heading certainly helps the court to resolve that doubt. The Supreme Court further observed in the following manner:— “Section 180 provides for the eviction of a person who but for the eviction would become a hereditary tenant by efflux of the prescribed time. It there is any ambiguity — we find none — it is dispelled by the heading given to the section and also the description of the nature of the suit given in the Schedule. The heading reads thus: “Ejectment of person occupying land without Title.” “Maxwell On Interpretation of Statutes”, 10th Edn., gives, the scope of the user of such a heading in the interpretation of a section thus, at p. 50: “The headings prefixed to sections or sets of sections in some modern statutes are regarded as preambles to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of the statute but they explain ambigous words”. If there is any doubt in the interpretion of the words in the section, the heading certainly helps us to resolve that doubt. Unless the person sought to be evicted has title or right to possession, it cannot be said that his possession is in accordance with the provisions of law for the time being in force.” 15. In Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani ( AIR 1978 S.C. 1025 ) the Apex Court has explained the Rule of construction with regard to the marginal note in the following manner:— “The expression” “any person” in S. 161, Cr.P.C. would include persons then or ultimately accused. Any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case, includes an accused person who fills that role because the police suppose him to have committed the crime and must, therefore, be familiar with the facts. The supposition may later prove a fiction but that does not repel the section. Nor does the marginal note ‘examination of witnessess by police’ clinch the matter. A marginal note clears ambiguity but does not control meaning.” (emphasis supplied). 16. The supposition may later prove a fiction but that does not repel the section. Nor does the marginal note ‘examination of witnessess by police’ clinch the matter. A marginal note clears ambiguity but does not control meaning.” (emphasis supplied). 16. In Muslim Wakhfs Board, Rajasthan v. Radha Kishan (( AIR 1979 S.C. 289 ) the Supreme Court has held that marginal note appended to section cannot be used for construing the section. The relevant passage of the Supreme Court is extracted hereunder:— “24. In dealing with the scope of enquiry by the Commissioner of Wakfs under sub-section (3) of Section 4, the High Court adverts to the heading of Chap. II and the marginal note of sub-section (1) of Section 4. It observes: “The heading of Section 4 with which this Chapter started was ‘Preliminary Survey of Wakfs’. The use of the word ‘Preliminary’ in the heading is one of significance.” The weight of authority is in favour of the view that the marginal note appended to a section cannot be used for construing the section. Lord Macnaghten in Balraj Kunwar v. Jagatpal Singh (1904) ILR 26 A11 393: (1 A11 LJ 384) (PC) considered it well settled that marginal notes cannot be referred to for the purpose of construction. This Court after referring to the above case with approval, said in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co., 1950 SCR 335 : ( AIR 1950 SC 134 ): “Marginal notes in an Indian Statute, as in an Act of Parliament, cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute.” As explained by Lord Macnaghten in the Privy Council, marginal notes are not part of an Act of Parliament.” 17. In Frick India Ltd., v. Union of India ( AIR 1990 S.C. 689 ) with regard to heading prefixed to sections or entries, the Apex Court has held in the following manner:— “It is well settled that the heading prefixed to sections or entries cannot control the plain words of the provision, they cannot also be referred to for the purpose of construing the provision when the word used in the provision are clear and unambigous; nor can they be used for cutting down the plain meaning of the words in the provision. Only in the case of ambiguity or doubt, the heading or sub-heading may be referred to as an aid in construing the provision but even in such a case it could not be used for cutting down the wide application of the clear words used in the provision. Sub-item (3), so construed is wide in its application, and all parts of refrigerating and air-conditioning appliances and machines whether they are covered or not covered under sub-items (1) and (2) would be clearly covered under the sub-item. Therefore, whether the manufacturer supplies the refrigerating or airconditioning appliances as a complete unit or not is not relevant for the levy of duty on the parts specified in sub-item (3) of Item 29A.” 18. In view of the series of decisions referred above, starting from 1950 ending with 1990 by the Apex Court, I am unable to accept the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent that in view of the marginal note in respect of the amended Act 2 of 1996, Section 3 of the principal Act is applicable to the respondent/tenant. As a matter of fact, in the light of the above mentioned catena of decisions Section 3 of Act 2 of 1996 is very clear and after the notification of the amended Act 2 of 96 any proceedings initiated by the tenant in respect of any land owned by any religious institution, pending before any court on the date of the publication of Act 2 of 1996 in the Tamil Nadu Gazette to any matter falling within the scope of principal Act as amended by the present Act shall abate. The said Section 3 further speaks that all rights and privileges which may have accrued to that tenant in respect of any such land and subsisting immediately before the said date shall in so far as such rights and privileges relate to any matter falling within the scope of the principal Act as amended by this Act, cease and determine and shall not be enforceable. In view of the specific and clear words used in Section 3 the marginal note appended to Section 3 cannot have any role. As already pointed out by the Apex Court, if words are in ambiguity in the section, certainly the marginal note and heading annexed to the Section may be used or construed. In view of the specific and clear words used in Section 3 the marginal note appended to Section 3 cannot have any role. As already pointed out by the Apex Court, if words are in ambiguity in the section, certainly the marginal note and heading annexed to the Section may be used or construed. However, as pointed out by me above, in as much as there is no doubt or ambiguity in Section 3, there is no need to go near the marginal note. In view of the above reasons, the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent in this regard cannot be contenanced. 19. In view of my conclusion on the first point, the second contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant cannot arise for consideration. However in view, of his contentions, I am referring to the second point also. According to him, in as much as the respondent/tenant has disputed the title of the landlord/temple, she is not entitled to claim the benefits under the provisions of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. The written statement filed by the first defendat in para 4 reads as follows:— “4. The husband of this defendant never became tenant under the plaintiff. The plaintiff has no right, interest or title, either over the suit property or over the temple, Sri Vada Badirakaliamman temple, Tiruchirappalli-2.”. 6. After the death of Kandasamy Pillai, there was none to receive rent Thereafter, this defendants husband began to enjoy the suit property, in his own right and adversely, claiming title in himself and denying the title of one and all. Thus, the defendants husband and thereafter this defendant, has prescribed title to the suit property.” In the written statement filed by the third defendant in para 4 it is mentioned as: “4. The further allegation in para 3 of the plaint that this defendant is a sub-tenant under the first defendant is false. This defendant is admittedly the legal representative of the deceased tenant Mani Pillai. In view of the fact that the deceased Mani Pillai and now this defendant are entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act the suit for recovery of possession, as it is, will not lie. 6. The allegation in para 3 of the plaint, that this defendant occupied the property, in the first week of September, 1980 is denied. 6. The allegation in para 3 of the plaint, that this defendant occupied the property, in the first week of September, 1980 is denied. This defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the property even during the lifetime of her father and after his death, she is in possession and enjoyment, as his legal representative and heir-at-law. Hence, this defendant also is entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. A separate application is also filed claiming relief, under the Act.” 20. In the light of the above mentioned pleadings of the defendants, learned senior counsel relied on three decisions of this Court, namely, (1) Subbarayan and another v. Devadas Nadar (1991-2-L.W.-355); (2) Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam v. Chakravarthi (1992-1-L.W.-254) and (3) Raju v. Angammal (1995-1-L.W.-620). In all the three referred cases, Justice M. Srinivasan, after referring to various decisions has categorically held that: “in case of denial of landlordss title by tenant, the latter is not entitled to claim the benefits of the Act.” In view of the legal position enunciated in the above mentioned 3 cases and of the fact that the defendants have denied the title of the landlord/plaintiff as borne out by the averments in their written statements, the respondent/tenant cannot claim any of the benefits provided in the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921. 21. In as much as the appellant/plaintiff has to succeed in view of the Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1996, there is no need to discuss further on other aspects. 22. Under these circumstances, and in view of the legal position, as pointed out above, the Second Appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court are restored. There will be no order as to costs.