Judgment D.P.Wadhwa and S.J.Mukhopadhaya JJ. 1. The appellant, reserve Bank of India has challenged the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 14th of February, 1995 in C.W.J.C No. 12456 of 1993. By the impugned judgment the learned Single Judge allowed the petition filed by the respondent, Rana Ramdeo Singh (hereinafter referred to as the writ petitioner) and set aside the order dated 31st of January, 1992, by which it was ordered to recover a sum of Rs. 5,000.00 from the post-retirement benefits of the writ petitioner, as well as the appellate order dated 31st of July, 1993. 2. The writ petitioner was in the services of the Reserve Bank of India. He superannuated form the services of appellant-Bank on 19th of May, 1985. It was after his superannuation, a some sort of proceeding was initiated any by letter dated 11th of June, 1985 followed by letter dated 24th of January, 1987 the writ petitioner was asked to show cause with respect to certain incident said to have taken place in the year 1984. The writ petitioner filed show cause reply, wherein after the impugned order dated 31st of January, 1992 was passed by the Bank. It was ordered to recover a sum of Rs. 5,000.00 from the post-retirement benefits of the writ petitioner, being 50 percent of purported loss of Rs. 10,000.00 . On appeal the appellate authority also rejected the appeal petition of the writ petitioner by order 31st of July, 1993. 3. The aforesaid order dated 31st of January, 1992 and appellate order were challenged by writ petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 12456 of 1993, which was allowed by the impugned judgment. The learned Single Judge held that there was no provision to proceed in a departmental proceeding and to punish after retirement, that too with respect stale allegation of the year 1984. 4. Mr. T.K. Jha, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-Bank mainly stressed one point. According to him, the writ petitioner having taken part in the proceeding, after issuance of an order, after such proceeding, it was not open to the writ petitioner to challenge the jurisdiction of the enquiry officer and/or the punishing authority. He relied on different decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court in the case of Sohan Singh and Ors. V/s. The General Manager, Ordinance Factory, Khamaria, Jabalpur and Ors. reported in -- ; Hindustan Construction Co. He relied on different decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court in the case of Sohan Singh and Ors. V/s. The General Manager, Ordinance Factory, Khamaria, Jabalpur and Ors. reported in -- ; Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. V/s. Governor of Orissa and Ors. reported in -- and in the case of Arun Kumar Jain v. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1995 (1) B.L.J page 419. 5. It will be evident from the pleading made by the parties that the appellant-Bank never raised the question aforesaid before the learned Single Judge. The writ petitioner was barred from raising the question of jurisdiction on the principle of acquiescence was not pleaded or raised by the appellant before the learned Single Judge will be evident from the impugned judgment, as well as the pleading made by the parties before the learned Single Judge. So, according to this Court, the appellant cannot raise such plea before the appellate court. Apart from the same, it will be evident from the show cause reply of the writ petitioner dated 10th of March, 1987 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) that he raised the jurisdiction of disciplinary authority while submitting show cause reply. Paragraph 5 of the said show cause reply reads as follows: ...5. Though generally, departmental action is independent of court case, its purview is limited to the existence of employer-employee relationship and not beyond. In the instant case this relationship had ceased to exist with effect from the 19th May, 1986 on my final retirement from the Banks services. As such, not only a departmental action, if any, will be ultra vires but even my treatment by the Bank as an employee in matters such as issuing of show cause notice, calling for explanation and fixing of time limit for giving replies, it misconstrued.... 6. From the aforesaid fact it is also evident that the writ-petitioner raised the objection relating to initiation of proceeding at the first instance. We find no merit in this appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.