D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is defendants second appeal, against the judgment and decree dated 10th October, 1980 of District Judge, saharanpur. The brief. facts are that on 5th june. 1973 the defendant-appellant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff-respondent for sale of his three plots No. 757, 787 and 759 for Rs. 7,000/ -. Thesale deed was to be executed within 5 years from the date of agreement. The plaintiff requested the defendant several times to execute the sale deed, but heavoided. Two notices were sent on 8th February, 1978 and 18th February, 1978. Through the second notice dated 18th february,. 1978, 3rd March,. 1978 was fixed as the date for execution of the sale deed, but the defendant did not respond. The plaintiff went to the office of Sub-Registrar, got his presence noted. Thereafter the suit was filed on 22nd March,. 1978 alleging that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of obligation under the contract and the defendant refused to execute the sale deed. ( 2 ) THE suit was contested on the ground that the plaintiff had no means to pay the sale consideration and was never ready and willing to perform his part of obligation under the contract. A notice was given by the defendant to the plaintiff on 15th March, 1978 in which 30th March, 1978 was fixed as the date for execution of the sale deed, but the plaintiff did not respond and did not appear with the money before the Sub-Registrar. ( 3 ) THE suit was dismissed by the trial court observing that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement because he had no means to arrange Rs. 7,000/ -. An appeal was filed, which was allowed, hence this second appeal. Only two substantial questions of law arose in this second appeal. The first is whether the suit was premature. Learned Counsel for the appellant on this point argued that since the agreement was executed on 5th June, 1973 and the period stipulated was 5 years, the suit could not be filed before 5th June, 1978. Reliance was placed upon the pronouncement in Harihar Singh v. Udaibir Singh, wherein it was laid down that the cause of action in such cases of specific performance of contract arises only after the time for performance of contract expires. Reliance was placed upon the pronouncement in Harihar Singh v. Udaibir Singh, wherein it was laid down that the cause of action in such cases of specific performance of contract arises only after the time for performance of contract expires. It was held that since the suit was filed before the expiry of the prescribed time, the suit was premature and was liable to be dismissed. The first Appellate Court has not answered this plea of the defendant-appellant and has observed that this may not be considered material since the time limit did expire after the suit had been brought and there can be no legitimate bar to the Court taking notice of this subsequent fact also. . Thus the first Appellate court did not answer this question. For answering this question, agreement has to be referred and it is to be seen whether cause of action, on the facts of the case, accrued after the expiry of the period mentioned in the agreement or upon the defendants refusal and avoidance to execute the sale deed. ( 4 ) EXT. 2 is the agreement. The relevant portion of the agreement is as follows:"condition No. 1-That within 5 years from today (namely the date of execution of agreement, 5. 6. 1973) the moment Jagmal Singh will pay Rs. 7,000/- at the time of registration, sadhu Ram will execute the sale deed and. will get it registered. " ( 5 ) IT is thus clear from this condition No. 1. of the agreement that the parties never intended that the sale deed could be executed only after the expiry of 5 years. On the other hand the intention of the parties was that within 5 years at any time "when Jagmal Singh paid Rs. 7,000/- before the Sub-Registrar, at the time of registration, the sale deed will be executed and registered. On such recital, it cannot be said that the cause of action accrued after expiry of 5 years. From this part of the agreement, it can be said that the cause of action accrued the moment Jagmal Singh paid or tried to pav or tender Rs. 7,000/-before the Sub-Registrar and execution and registration of the sale deed was refused, the suit could be filed. From this part of the agreement, it can be said that the cause of action accrued the moment Jagmal Singh paid or tried to pav or tender Rs. 7,000/-before the Sub-Registrar and execution and registration of the sale deed was refused, the suit could be filed. There is allegation in the plaint and also evidence to indicate that several times the defendant was requested to execute the sale deed, Two notices were sent, one on 8th February, 1978 and the other on 18th February, 1978. Inspite of these two notices the sale deed was not executed. The notice dated 8th February, 1978 (paper No. 15-A-I) was not-served on the defendant, rather it was returned to send or. Notice (paper No. 16-A) dated 18th February, 1978 was refused by the defendant, hence it was returned to send or. Notice was sent at the correct address, hence refusal will certify to draw presumption of sufficient service on the defendant. In this notice 3rd March, 1978 was fixed as the date for execution of the sale deed. Knowledge of this notice can be upheld from the reply notice (Ext. I) paper No. 14-A-i. If inspite of knowledge of this notice the defendant did not approach or appear before the office of the Sub-Registrar, it can be said that he was not willing to perform his part of the obligation. Under these circumstances, upon refusal of notice dated 18th February, 1978, the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff for filing suit and if the suit was filed, it cannot be said to be premature. The cause of action consists of bundle of facts. On the facts of the case, the cause of action did accrue, when the notice of the plaintiff dated 18th February, 1978 was refused by the defendant. The suit, as such, cannot be said to be premature. ( 6 ) ATTENTION was also drawn to the defendants notice Ext. I dated 15th March, 1978 in which the defendant intimated that the plaintiff should appear on 30th March, 1978 for getting the sale deed executed. The postal endorsement on this notice is "not met". Consequently it cannot be said that the plaintiff did not comply with this notice and intentionally absented on 30th March, 1978. I dated 15th March, 1978 in which the defendant intimated that the plaintiff should appear on 30th March, 1978 for getting the sale deed executed. The postal endorsement on this notice is "not met". Consequently it cannot be said that the plaintiff did not comply with this notice and intentionally absented on 30th March, 1978. Moreover when the suit was already filed on 22nd March, 1978, it was not obligatory for the plaintiff to appear before the Sub-Registrar on 30th March, 1978. The plaintiff had cause of action for filing suit on defendants refusal to accept the notice dated. 18th February, 1978. Further this notice Ext. 1 from the defendant fixing 30th March, 1978, a date within 5 years of the agreement, also indicates that the parties never intended that the sale deed could be executed only after the expiry of 5 years from the date of the agreement. It seems that because 5 years period was going to complete within 3 to 4 months that the plaintiff proposed to serve notice upon the defendant. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons given above, the suit cannot be said to be premature and it could not be dismissed on this ground. The second point for consideration is whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation under the agreement. The effect of non-compliance of Section 16-C of the. Specific Relief Act was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant. The finding of the lower Appellate Court, reversing the finding of the trial Court on readiness and willingness on. the part of the plaintiff, is finding of fact, which hardly constitutes substantial question of law. The requirement of law under Section 16-C of the Specific Relief Act is that the plaintiff must aver in the plaint and must prove that right from the date of agreement upto the date of the decree or the date of hearing of the suit, he was continuously ready and willing to perform his part oj the obligation under the contract. That requirement has been met by incorporating paragraph 6-A in the plaint wherein it is specifically averred that the plaintiff had always ready money and registration expenses for the sale deed and was also ever ready and willing to get the sale deed executed. This is the compliance of Section 16-c of the Specific Relief Act. That requirement has been met by incorporating paragraph 6-A in the plaint wherein it is specifically averred that the plaintiff had always ready money and registration expenses for the sale deed and was also ever ready and willing to get the sale deed executed. This is the compliance of Section 16-c of the Specific Relief Act. Complete compliance of Section 16-C of the Act is said to have been made when evidence has been adduced on this point by P. W. 1 Jagmal Singh and his statement on readiness and willingness could not be shaken during cross-examination. P. W. 2 Radhey Lal, another witness of the plaintiff stated that in his presence jagmal Singh asked Sadhu Ram to execute the sale deed and at that time he had cash amounting to Rs. 11,000/- and he was offering the same. The first Appellate Court for cogent reasons has observed that the plaintiff had financial status to raise Rs. 7,000/- and this inference was drawn from the material evidence on record. If the finding of the trial court on this point was reversed by the lower appellate Court by giving cogent reasons, it cannbt constitute substantial question of law calling for any interference in this second appeal. After the disposal of the first appeal, the plaintiff deposited Rs. 7. 000/- within a period of one month, that is, on 3rd november, 1980. The judgment of the lower appellate Court was delivered on 10th October, 1980. The plaintiffs statement coupled with his subsequent conduct clearly indicates that he had always means to pay Rs. 7,000/ -. It was not. necessary for him to show on each and every date that he had ready money, namely, Rs. 7,000/- with him. In my opinion the findings of. the lower Appellatecourt regarding plaintiffs readiness and willingness to get the sale deed executed and perform his part of the obligation under the contract does not suffer from any legal error. The appeal in these circumstances is devoid of merit and is bound to fail. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. .