A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE applicant-State has moved this application for condonation of delay in preferring Criminal Appeal No. 737 of 1995 against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Ahmedabad on 21st march 1995 in Criminal Case No. 2780 of 1988. The opponent-accused has filed his reply-affidavit and resisted this application on various grounds. ( 2 ) THE delay is only of 32 days. It is explained in this way. The CBI Anti Corruption department at Bombay received the certified copy of the judgment and order on 6th April 1995 and they thereafter applied to the Chief Official Translator on 21st April 1995 at the high Court of Bombay. Since the High Court was to have vacation, the Department again sent its reminder on 17th May 1995. The translation became necessary because the judgment and order of acquittal in question was in Gujarati and it was required to be translated into English for the purpose of deciding whether or not an appeal should be preferred. It is stated in this application that officers of the Department are unable to understand the Gujarati language. It is further stated in this application that the translated copy was received by the Department on 3rd July 1995 and it was immediately forwarded on the very next day to its Head Office at Delhi with necessary details. It passed through various tables according to procedure and the decision to draft the appeal was taken on 17th July 1995. It is further stated in this application that the entire bunch along with the forwarding letter was forwarded to the Ministry of Department of Personnel and Training in the Central Government. Approval from the Central Government was communicated to the State of Gujarat by its letter on 20th July 1995. The State Government thereafter directed the Government Pleaders office in the High Court of Gujarat to prefer appeal and thereafter this appeal was filed on 28th July 1995. ( 3 ) LEARNED Additional Public Prosecutor Shri Mehta for the applicant-State has submitted that the delay in preferring the appeal in question has properly been explained. As against this, learned Advocate Shri Tirmizi for the opponent-accused has submitted that the delay could not be said to have been properly explained. According to him, the law requires explanation of each days delay and it has not been explained. As against this, learned Advocate Shri Tirmizi for the opponent-accused has submitted that the delay could not be said to have been properly explained. According to him, the law requires explanation of each days delay and it has not been explained. It has further been urged on behalf of the opponent-accused that even the prayer clause is silent about the number of days by which the appeal has been delayed. Learned Advocate Shri Tirmizi for the opponent- accused has further submitted that the decision of the learned trial magistrate is quite correct both in law and on facts and it will not be interfered in appeal and it is therefore necessary not to allow the matter to remain unnecessarily pending in this court. He has therefore submitted that the delay in preferring the appeal in question need not be condoned. ( 4 ) IT cannot be gainsaid that the court is seized of the matter regarding condonation of delay in preferring the appeal in question. What the court has to see at this stage is whether or not a sufficient cause is made out for its condonation. The court is not seized of the merits of the case at this stage. It would not therefore be desirable to dwell upon the merits of the appeal at the time of consideration of the application for condonation of delay. This court will consider the merits of the appeal at the time of its preliminary hearing if delay in preferring it is condoned. That stage will reach only after the delay is condoned and not before it. This court need not be persuaded in vain to cross the bridge before it is reached. I am therefore of the opinion that the merits of the appeal cannot and need not be considered at the stage of consideration of the application for condonation of delay. ( 5 ) SO far as explanation for each days delay is concerned, I think it has been explained. It transpires from the certified copy of the judgment and order of acquittal that an application for it was made on 21st March 1995, the delay on which the judgment and order of acquittal was pronounced. It was ready for delivery on 27th march 1995 and its delivery was taken on 6th April 1995. It transpires from the certified copy of the judgment and order of acquittal that an application for it was made on 21st March 1995, the delay on which the judgment and order of acquittal was pronounced. It was ready for delivery on 27th march 1995 and its delivery was taken on 6th April 1995. The CBI Department would not be responsible for obtaining its delivery as it was the function of its representative at the trial, namely, the concerned, Assistant Public Prosecutor. It is a settled principle of law that no litigant should be let down on account of default, inaction, omission or even negligence on the part of his advocate in view of the binding ruling of the Supreme court in the case of Rafiq vs. Munshilal, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 . What applies to a private litigant would be applicable with all the greater force to the State Government as a litigant when it has to work through human agency and at times human agency is responsible for lethargic approach and attitude to a legal problem. ( 6 ) SO far as non-mentioning of the number of days by which the appeal is delayed in the prayer clause is concerned, it is not always necessary to mention it in the prayer clause. No one can be said to be well-versed in computation of the exact days of delay. The Registry would examine the matter on institution of an appeal and would find out whether it is filed beyond the period of limitation and, if so, by what exact period. It appears that this application for condonation of delay has been filed on the day on which the appeal has been instituted. If the delay condonation application was made at a later stage, the represenative acting on behalf of the applicant-state drafting this application would have taken into consideration the exact period of delay to be condoned. It must be said to the credit of the office of the Public Prosecutor that it has preserved the delay condonation application simultaneously with institution of the memo of appeal. It must be said to the credit of the office of the Public Prosecutor that it has preserved the delay condonation application simultaneously with institution of the memo of appeal. ( 7 ) IT is difficult to countenance the submission urged before me by learned advocate Shri Tirmizi for the opponent-accused that the delay during the period from 6th April 1995 when the certified copy of the judgment and order of acquittal was received and 21st April 1995 when it was sent to the Official Translator for translating into English is not explained. It is too much to expect from human agency working in the Government department to act with quite promptitude in all matters. There might be thousands of reasons in not attending to a matter in a Government office by human agency minding its affairs. It is only a procedural delay. It is hardly of 15 days. This court need not and should not highlight this procedural delay of only 15 days in sending the judgment and order of acquittal to the Official Translator for translating it from Gujarati into English. ( 8 ) IN this connection, a reference deserves to be made to the recent binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani, reported in judgment Today 1996 (3) Supreme Court at page 371. It has been held therein that procedural delay on the part of the Government or its agency in instituting proceeding deserves to be condoned. Sitting as a single Judge, the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme court is binding to me. ( 9 ) A reference also deserves to be made to the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Katiji [mst. ], reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court at page 1353. In that case, the Supreme Court has directed courts to adopt liberal approach in matters of condonation of delay under Sec. 5 of the limitation Act, 1963. It is not necessary to burden this judgment by elaborately reproducing the reasons for liberal approach inimitably stated in paragraph 3 therein. The aforesaid dictum of law pronounced by the Supreme Court is binding to this court. It is on all fours applicable in the present case. It is not necessary to burden this judgment by elaborately reproducing the reasons for liberal approach inimitably stated in paragraph 3 therein. The aforesaid dictum of law pronounced by the Supreme Court is binding to this court. It is on all fours applicable in the present case. In that view of the matter, there is no escape from the conclusion that a sufficient cause for condonation of delay has been made out in this case. ( 10 ) IN the result, this application is accepted. The delay of 32 days in preferring criminal Appeal No. 737 of 1995 is condoned. Rule issued on this application is accordingly made absolute. .