The Management, Binny Limited, (Buckingham & Carnatic Mills), Madras. v. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeal), Madras-600 006, (Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972) and others
1996-06-12
S.M.ABDUL WAHAB
body1996
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment : These writ petitions are for a writ of certiorari, for quashing the common order dated 8. 1986, in P.G.Appeal Nos.28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35 of 1985 of the 1st respondent. .2. The Management Binny Limited (Buckingham & Carnatic Mills), Madras- 600012, is the petitioner in all the writ petitions. The 3rd respondents in the writ petitions are former employees of the mills and they were superannuated on the attaining of the age of superannuation on different dates. After the superannuation they were paid gratuity computed in accordance with the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. According to the petitioner, they were on daily rate wages but paid once a month. In January, 1980, the Madras Labour Union, on behalf of the members, including the 3rd respondents, demanded payment of gratuity at the rate of 15 days’ wages for a maximum period of 20 years, in short for 600 days. This was resisted by the petitioner by its letter dated 2. 1980 stating that the month has to be reckoned with 26 days and not 30 days, and therefore for 20 years, they would be entitled for 520 days’ wages and not 600 days’ wages. Even though the 3rd respondents accepted the payment in full and final settlement without reserving any right, But after, the judgment of the Supreme Court was rendered on 28. 1984 and reported in Jeevan Lal (1929) Ltd. etc., v. Appellate Authority Payment of Gratuity Act, (1984)2 L.LJ. 464 . Holding that an employee would be entitled to 600 days of wages and not 520 days’ wages, the 3rd respondents approached the controlling authority by filing applications claiming the difference between the amount paid and the amount due as per the decision of the Supreme Court. The petitioner contended that the applications were time-barred, and the belated claim need not be attended. Even though there was no explanation at all for the delay in the applications, the controlling authority by a common order dated 18. 1985 held that the 3rd respondents were entitled to 600 days of wages and therefore they were entitled to the difference as claimed by them. The controlling authority has also held that the applicants have reasonable grounds for submitting the applications belatedly, since they came to know of their right only after the decision of the Supreme Court. Against the common order dated 8.
The controlling authority has also held that the applicants have reasonable grounds for submitting the applications belatedly, since they came to know of their right only after the decision of the Supreme Court. Against the common order dated 8. 1986 the petitioners preferred 7 appeals as mentioned above and all the appeals were rejected by a common order dated 30.12.1986. Hence the petitioner has preferred these writ petitions. .3. The contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner is three-fold. (1) The third respondents in all these writ petitions accepted the gratuity paid to them without any dispute whatsoever; (2) The controlling authority as well as the appellate authority have erred in understanding the scope and effect of Form No. ‘N’ and Rules 7 and 10, and merely because the Act is welfare minded intended to confer benefits for the workmen, that does not mean that Rules under the Act need not be complied with and can be given a go-by. Hence they are estopped from reopening the settled matter. 4. As regards the first contention that the 3rd respondents in the writ petitions received the gratuity paid to them without any protest, and therefore they should not be allowed to reopen the same. The 3rd respondents in the writ petitions reached their superannuation in 1981. They accepted the gratuity for 520 days in 1981. Only in March, 1985 applications for gratuity have been made. Sl.No. Date of super animation No. of writ petition and the name of the the 3rd respondent. Date of Payment of Gratuity Date of application in Form No.‘N’ 1. 16. 1981 W.P.No.4130 of 1987 P.Ranganathan 18. 1981 20.3.1985 2. 16. 1981 W.P.No.4131 of 1987 T.Arumugam 28. 1981 22. 1985 3. 8. 1983 W.P.No.4132 of 1987 Veeraraghu 19. 1983 13. 1985 4. 16. 1981 W.P.No.4133 of 1987 Rajagopal 28. 1981 20.3.1985 5. 9. 1982 W.P.No.4134 of 1987 A.Manickam 212. 1982 20.3.1985 6. 211. 1980 W.P.No.4135 of 1987 Jagannathan 22. 1981 23. 1985 7. 16. 1981 W.P.No.4136 of 1987 K.Arumugam 9. 1981 20.3.1985 5. From the above facts, I find that almost all the 3rd respondents excepting one have received the gratuity in the year 1982 and before itself. There is also no protest when they received the amount.
1982 20.3.1985 6. 211. 1980 W.P.No.4135 of 1987 Jagannathan 22. 1981 23. 1985 7. 16. 1981 W.P.No.4136 of 1987 K.Arumugam 9. 1981 20.3.1985 5. From the above facts, I find that almost all the 3rd respondents excepting one have received the gratuity in the year 1982 and before itself. There is also no protest when they received the amount. One another fact that has to be noted in this case is that the Madras Labour Union addressed the letter in January, 1980 on behalf of the petitioners claiming gratuity for 600 days. The claim was rejected by the management in February, 1980. Only thereafter the gratuity has been received by the 3rd respondents. This additional fact also must be taken into account. 6. When a claim for payment is made and rejected and thereafter the person who made the claim accepts the amount without any protest, the presumption is that he accepted the amount knowing fully well that the person who paid the amount did not agree with his claim. If such a person later turns round and makes a claim for higher amount. Courts cannot rush to help him. A company or a management of an establishment has to adjust its income and expenditure, profit and loss every year. In making such adjustments it does show some amount of confidence and hopes that claims made by its employees and settled earlier will not be reopened. Only on this basis the management has to plan and take decisions for future course of action. The decision depends on the hope that there would be no reopening of the claims made by the employees. In such a circumstances, if the employees choose to make a claim after lapse of sometime it will definitely affect the decision taken by the management but also the economy of the establishment. In my view therefore, the employees who accept a payment without protest especially when the higher claim is rejected by the Management must be deemed to have waived the claim. Further, an amount of a detriment is also suffered by the management on account of the conduct of the employee. Therefore, the principle of estoppel will be applicable in such case when a settled claim is sought to be reopened. 7.
Further, an amount of a detriment is also suffered by the management on account of the conduct of the employee. Therefore, the principle of estoppel will be applicable in such case when a settled claim is sought to be reopened. 7. With reference to the second contention of delay I have taken the view in the earlier case, W.P. No. 1627 of 1987 that the claim for higher amount of gratuity after the lapse of a reasonable period, on account of a decision giving an interpretation favourably to the employees by the Apex Court is not governed by Rule 10 at all and the claim must be only as per Sec.7(4). Applying the principle in the said decision, the claims in these writ petitions have to be held to be unsustainable. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also has some weight. One fundamental principle we have to remember is that labour laws conferring benefits upon the employees and workers are not only for conferring benefits upon the employee and labourers but also to a very large extent deprive the rights of the managements and the employers. Therefore if a benefit which is not specifically granted under the Rules and the enactments is granted by courts, it indirectly adds to the curtailing of the rights of employers and the managements. It is not only the duty of the courts to protect the interest of the employees and the workers but also not to encroach upon the rights of the managements. The courts therefore should not lean upon this side or that side. The balance should be maintained. The industrial harmony must be maintained not at the cost of the managements but by maintaining a stand of neutrality. Therefore, in my view, if a liberal view is not possible in interpreting a Rule, the court need not rush to give such liberal meaning. 8. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the decisions, I am of the view that these writ petitions have to be dismissed. Accordingly, they are dismissed. But, however, there wil be no order as to costs.