M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) CERTAIN complicated legal issues which would have far-reaching repercussions both as far as litigations of the present type are concerned as also to execution proceedings generally have come up for determination in these two civil revision petitions. The controversy hinges essentially around the question as to whether a decree that has become final and that has come up for execution can be varied by the executing Court or whether the executing Court is bound to mechanically implement the terms of that decree irrespective of the nature of objections or rather legal impediments that may be pointed out. Essentially, there exists a well-settled principle that the rule of finality is sacrosanct and that an executing Court is therefore precluded from reopening any issues concerning a decree or, as has often been repeated by the Courts, that there is a bar to going behind a decree. There is good reason for enforcing this view particularly in situations where the Courts have to take judicial notice of the fact that all sorts of frivolous pleas are canvassed at the execution stage with the sole object of praying for time defeating the terms of the decree and in general making a mockery of the rule of law. The inflexibility of this principle is really the main issue that is in debate in these proceedings because the respondents' learned Advocates have advanced the proposition that there may be isolated situations in which an exception will have to be carved out to the application of this rule and they specifically illustrate a situation whereby through an Act of the Legislature, where there is a drastic alteration of the law, that an executing Court would in those circumstances be obliged to act in consonance with the law in its altered form as it would be improper to proceed on the footing that an executing Court must shut its eyes to subsequent changes or amendments of the law. It is necessary to briefly recount the facts that have given rise to the dispute. The petitioner before me in Civil Revision Petition No. 4867 of 1992 is the judgment- debtor, hereinafter referred to as the owner. The petitioner in the second Civil Revision Petition No. 1913 of 1992 is the syndicate Bank, hereinafter referred to as the Bank. It is necessary to briefly recount the facts that have given rise to the dispute. The petitioner before me in Civil Revision Petition No. 4867 of 1992 is the judgment- debtor, hereinafter referred to as the owner. The petitioner in the second Civil Revision Petition No. 1913 of 1992 is the syndicate Bank, hereinafter referred to as the Bank. The admitted position is that the Bank had made available certain financial assistance to the owners of certain vehicles which had been purchased by them for being run as contract carriages. The state Government took a decision to nationalise all these routes and promulgated Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) act, 1976. By virtue of the provisions of this Act, the government virtually took over all the vehicles and we are not concerned with the remaining provisions as regards the staff etc. These vehicles were hypothecated to the Bank as collateral security for the repayment of the loans. The age of the vehicles differs from case to case and consequently, the intrinsic value of the vehicles is different. Also, the position is that the different agreements entered into at various points of time reflect outstanding which are different from case to case depending on the age of the loan, repayments etc. The main difficulty that arose was that the owners had originally expected to run these vehicles, earned certain amounts of money out of them and make the repayments to the Bank. By virtue of the abrupt take-over, this arrangement got frustrated. The Bank which is a financial institution was entitled to insist on the repayment of the amounts due to it in so far as the vehicles were only a collateral security and it is the owners who were personally liable for the repayments by virtue of the documents executed by them. The question of repaying the amounts therefore created certain difficulties principally because under the provisions of the Act, though the State was liable to pay compensation on the take-over of the vehicles, the actual payment was deferred and it also depended on several factors such as the valuation of the vehicles, the number of vehicles etc. The question of repaying the amounts therefore created certain difficulties principally because under the provisions of the Act, though the State was liable to pay compensation on the take-over of the vehicles, the actual payment was deferred and it also depended on several factors such as the valuation of the vehicles, the number of vehicles etc. As far as the present two proceedings are concerned, the Bank filed suits against the owners for recovery of the amounts due to them and in both the cases the owners who desired not to dispute their liability entered into consent decrees agreeing to pay up the prescribed amount with interest computed at the rate of 17 %. The Bank was entitled to charge the interest that had been agreed to in the documents that had been executed and under these circumstances, the consent decrees in question came to be passed. ( 2 ) THE Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, thereafter went through two amendments in the years 1980 and 1981. We are only concerned in this proceeding with the amendment that was being carried out to Section 11 of the principal Act whereby the interest that was prescribed at the rate of 6% P. A. has been altered to 12%. The amending Act 1990 states that this amendment "shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted". As a result of this provision, when the Bank took out execution proceedings in the year 1988, a plea was raised on behalf of the owners that irrespective of what the terms of the consent decree may have provided for, that the Bank was precluded from charging interest at the rate of 17% and that this would have to be limited to the statutorily prescribed rate of 12%. Reliance was sought to be placed on the amendment of 1990 which prescribe that "the secured creditor shall have no right to claim from the contract carriage operator any more amount by way of interest on such amount". In sum and substance therefore, the contention raised was that it is not open to the executing Court to give effect to the terms of the consent decree by virtue of the subsequent change in the law and that the Court would have to limit the operation of the decree to be in consonance with the existing provisions. In sum and substance therefore, the contention raised was that it is not open to the executing Court to give effect to the terms of the consent decree by virtue of the subsequent change in the law and that the Court would have to limit the operation of the decree to be in consonance with the existing provisions. The Bank seriously contested this position on a variety of grounds the principal one being that the decree in question had become final, that it was a decree passed long before the changes had taken place and that therefore, the amendments to the law cannot in any way alter the complexion of such a decree. The alternate submission was that irrespective of the objections pleaded that an executing Court is required to merely translate the decree into action and cannot permit any reopening of the questions involved in that decision as they have been finally concluded. The executing Court upheld the owner's objection in the first civil revision petition against which the Bank has filed the present civil revision petition and the executing Court rejected the objection in the second proceeding and it is against that order of rejection, that the owner has filed the second civil revision petition. The issues involved in both the proceedings begin common, the learned Counsel have advanced their submissions in respect of the areas of controversy and the two civil revision petitions are being disposed of by the Court through a common order. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel who represents the Bank submitted that the challenge to the execution of the decree is totally devoid of merit in so far as according to him, the executing Court has completely overlooked the importance of the time factor. His contention is that once a Court of competent jurisdiction has passed a decree, and that decree has assumed a garb of finality that any subsequent changes either of the facts or for that matter circumstances or even the law cannot affect the complexion of that decree. The learned Advocate submitted that there may be one solitary exception to this rule and that would be in case of a situation where a subsequent amendment of the law includes a non-obstante clause which specifically provides for the abrogation of the effects of the decree. The learned Advocate submitted that there may be one solitary exception to this rule and that would be in case of a situation where a subsequent amendment of the law includes a non-obstante clause which specifically provides for the abrogation of the effects of the decree. He points out that none of the amendments to the present statue contained such a provision and that in the absence thereof, there can be no question of seeking any alteration or variation of the decree. ( 4 ) AS regards the basic proposition that an executing Court cannot go behind a decree nor can it be modified, the learned counsel drew my attention to a decision in the case of Bhima rama Jadhav v Abdul Rashid alias Yaktyar Saheb , wherein this Court held that "where a compromise decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction contains a term which is opposed to law or public policy and that decree has not been set aside in proper proceedings, that decree can be pleaded as constituting estoppel by resjudicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties". The Division Bench of this Court on that occasion referred to several of the earlier decisions of various Court including the Supreme Court and emphasised the rule of finality which embodied the principal that a compromise decree will have to be treated as such once it assumes finality and that it was not open to any form of reconsideration. In holding that such a decree could be cited in situations where the doctrine of resjudicata is pleaded, the Court reiterated the position that the decree is beyond question. I need to record here that the learned counsel laid particular emphasis on the fact that in both these proceedings, we are concerned with compromise decrees and he contended that it is an accepted legal convention that compromise decrees have an even greater binding force on the parties because of the aspect of voluntariness on both sides and that therefore, such a decree is totally immune from attack on the basis of any principles, legal or circumstantial. Learned counsel drew my attention to the observations of the Supreme court in the decision in the case of Shankar Sitaram Sontakke and Another v Balkrishna Sitaram Sontakke and Others, wherein the Court held that consent decree is binding upon the parties thereto as the decree was passed "by invitum" and that it had the binding force of res judicata and the plaintiff was barred from re-agitating any question relating thereto in fresh or further proceedings. Reference was also invited to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Byram Pestonji gariwala v Union Bank of India and Others, wherein the same view has been reiterated. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel also drew my attention to a few selected passages from the leading authors on the subject relating to interpretation of statutes. He referred to a passage from Maxwell, 12th Edition, pages 215 and 216 with regard to the principle of retrospective operation of statutes. The direct reference was that retrospective operation should not impair existing rights. The contention raised was that under the decree in question, the Bank was entitled to recover the interest in terms of the decree and that even assuming an attempt had been made by amending the Act to provide certain restrictions or limitations, that these could not be made operative in a case of pre-existing rights namely a situation where a decree had been passed earlier. A reference was also made to Craies on Statute law, 7th Edition, page 387, with regard to the question of virtually back dating the legislation and the guiding principle set out is that a Court will have to go by the language of the statute for purposes of determining whether it has a retrospective operation or not. Learned Advocate also relied on a passage from Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 4th Edition by G. P. Singh, page 271, wherein the learned author has reiterated the principle that an amending statute cannot affect existing rights. In this context, the learned Advocate has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhrigunandan prasad and Others v Appellate Officer and Others , whereby the custodian of a evacuee property had sought to reopen the question of interest on the ground that the amount paid in excess of 5% was refundable by virtue of the change of law. That was a case in which Section 9 (1) started with the clause: "notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or contract or any decree or order of a Civil Court or other authority. . . . " the court still upheld the position that the pre-existing situation between the parties cannot be altered to the prejudice of one of them by virtue of a subsequent amendment and therefore, refused to permit any recovery of the excess interest. Learned counsel has relied on this for a second reason in so far as he contends that having regard to the principles of interpretation referred to by him, that the respondents will first have to specifically demonstrate that the Legislature while amending the Act was conscious of decrees that have already been passed and specifically provide for a situation whereby those decrees would have to be disregarded. He contended that unless there is such a specific provision, that the principles are very clear in so far as the changes would leave such a decree unaffected. In sum and substance, the learned Counsel submitted that irrespective of whether this Court upheld the position that the amendment was retrospective or not, that on the special facts of the present case the decree remain unaffected and he therefore contended that the executing Court was obliged to give effect to those decrees as they existed. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the owners, the two learned Counsel who represent them, advanced a basic submission that this Court will have to take in to account the reason why the amendments became necessary. According to them, the stock-in-trade of the owners namely the vehicles have been virtually taken away from them, they were left with no source of finance whereby they could meet their liabilities. This was an action initiated by the state on its own account and over which the owners had no control. They were virtually left high and dry in so far as their only source of repayment was taken-over by the State whereas their personal liability to the Banks subsisted. The State itself was taking its own time in settling the compensation payments and it was therefore manifestly unjust to the owners that they should have to bear the consequences of the State action by paying heavy interest at Bank rate during the intervening period. The State itself was taking its own time in settling the compensation payments and it was therefore manifestly unjust to the owners that they should have to bear the consequences of the State action by paying heavy interest at Bank rate during the intervening period. Learned Counsel therefore submitted that the obvious method of redressing this injustice was to amend the law and to peg the rate of interest and at the same time to put in a positive provision that no secured creditor could claim or demand any interest in excess of the prescribed rate. It was also necessary to make this provision date back to the point of acquisition which was why the amendment was incorporated and an otherwise unusual provision to the effect that the amendment incorporated would be taken as having always been part of the parent statute. Learned Counsel submitted that this is a case of retro-activity or in other words, where the law had itself undergone a sweeping change and would therefore be slightly distinguishable from a mere situation of retrospective operation. Their submission was that in these circumstances, the inclusion of a non-obstante clause which provides for a various situations including decrees was totally redundant. The learned Counsel therefore contended that by a deeming fiction, the very structure of the law has been altered and in these circumstances, there is no question of acting by the point of time when the amendments have come into being because they have essentially altered the statutory provision from the very inception. There is a deeper significance in this argument because the implication of this plea canvassed on behalf of the owners is that strictly speaking even on the date of the passing of the decrees since the law prohibited the claiming of interest over and above 12%, that no valid decree could have been passed by the Court providing for interest at any higher rate. ( 7 ) THE owners' learned Counsel referred to an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Ramachandra Laxman Doddamani v syndicate Bank, wherein a Division Bench of this Court while construing the provisions of this very Act applied the amended provisions with retrospective effect when it came to the question of claiming of interest. I need however to clarify that the order in question came to be passed after the amendments had taken effect. I need however to clarify that the order in question came to be passed after the amendments had taken effect. The Supreme Court in the decision in the case of State of karnataka and Another v Ranganatha Reddy and Another, where again the Court was concerned with the present Act read down the sections for purposes of upholding its validity but virtually directed that the payment was to be made in a lumpsum. More importantly, the learned Counsel have placed heavy reliance on the decision in the case of East End Dwellings company Limited v Finsbury Borough Council, wherein the house of Lords while construing the legal effect of retrospective operation of a statute recorded a finding that it will have to be "all pervading". Considerable emphasis was also laid on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sunder Dass v Ram parkash. This was a very unusual case under the Delhi Rent control Act wherein the Court held that full effect must be given to the deemed situation in the case of retrospective operation of statutes. While construing Section 47 of the Act, the Court held that the proviso to Section 3 which was added retrospectively could nullify a decree even at the stage of execution if the Court passing it thereafter, thereby lacks the jurisdiction. On this basis, the Supreme Court held that an executing Court can go behind the decree if it is pleaded that the decree was a nullity by reason of the Court passing it lacking inherent jurisdiction to pass it. I need to mention here that the learned Counsel also drew my attention to three more decisions, Punjab Co-operative bank Ltd. , Head Office, Amritsar v Amrik Singh and Others, m/s. Ghaki Mal Hukam Chand and Others v Punjab National bank Ltd. and Smt. Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan kalliani Amma and Others v K. Devi and Others, wherein the court once again emphasised the position that through a process of legal fiction, a Court must give effect to the changed law. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel further drew the Court's attention to Section 5 of the General Clauses Act whereby sub-clause (3) specifically provides that unless the contrary is expressed, a regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately. . . . . ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel further drew the Court's attention to Section 5 of the General Clauses Act whereby sub-clause (3) specifically provides that unless the contrary is expressed, a regulation shall be construed as coming into operation immediately. . . . . and they also drew my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhavan Vaja and Others v solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang and Another, wherein the apex Court laid down that an executing Court is required to apply its mind to the decree at the stage of execution. Similarly, in the decision in the case of Chandrika Misir and Another v bhaiyalal5. The Court upheld the position that a plea with regard to jurisdiction may be raised at any stage even in the execution proceedings. Reliance was also placed on a Division bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of presidency Talkies Limited, represented by the Managing director V. L. Narasu Narasunagar, Guindy, Madras v First additional Income Tax Officer, City Circle II, Madras, wherein the Court was dealing with the situation wherein the executing court was required to relieve the parties of certain penal clauses in a compromise decree and the Court held that it was within the jurisdiction of the executing Court to do so. Lastly, the learned Counsel drew the Court's attention to a decision in the case of Gurupadappa Shivlingappa v Akbar Sayad Budan kadri, wherein the Court while construing the provisions of order 23, Rule 3 and Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code held that an executing Court is not bound to execute that part of the decree which was contrary to the terms of statute. In sum and substance therefore, what was basically contended on behalf of the owners was that the legal effect of the amendments would be that the decrees which were passed against them may not be rendered invalid in their totality but that they would stand altered or modified to be in consonance with the amended provisions of law. They therefore submitted that the executing court is required as on necessity to take cognisance of this situation and to construe the decree accordingly. They therefore submitted that the executing court is required as on necessity to take cognisance of this situation and to construe the decree accordingly. It is their case that this is a situation in which the owners would be fully justified in law in going by the amended provisions and that therefore, the claim of the Bank to a rate of interest higher than which is provided for in the amended provisions could not be given effect to. ( 9 ) I have summarised the principles relating to interpretation of statutes as also the manner in which the Courts have construed the law in such situations and it is on this basis that this Court will have to finally adjudicate in the special facts and circumstances of this case. What needs to be taken special note of is that for no fault of the owners, their property was taken-over by the State and this is a fact which no Court, not even the executing Court can lose sight of. This happened not because of any default on the part of the owners but by operation of law. It is true that they had submitted to a decree and that consent decrees were passed but the all important fact was that the decrees in question had not been executed. I have already referred to various decisions and in particular, to the cases wherein the Courts were construing the effect of an amendment or a change in the law at a subsequent point of time which was given retrospective effect. It is true that in the present instance the amendments do not include a non- obstante clause neither do they refer to the effect of the amendment on a decree which may have been passed by a Court. That to my mind was totally unnecessary since the Legislature has in this instance taken the unusual step of changing the statutory provisions from their very inception. This would really mean that the pre-existing law becomes non-existent and is totally and completely replaced by the provisions of the amendment. The effect of this would be that as on the date when the decree came to be passed, by a deemed provision the amended law will have to be deemed to have been in force and not the Act in its original form. The effect of this would be that as on the date when the decree came to be passed, by a deemed provision the amended law will have to be deemed to have been in force and not the Act in its original form. This would therefore mean that the two provisions contained therein namely the limit of 12% interest and the prohibition of claiming interest at a higher rate will be deemed to have been in force even on the date when the decree was passed. The only logical conclusion that emerges from the state of affairs is that the Trial Court even while passing a consent decree did not possess the jurisdiction to pass a decree that was in breach of those provisions. It is a well-settled principle of law that if a breach is curable that the law will take that factor into account and consequently, what in fact happens in the present case is that the decree will not be rendered either illegal or invalid but would necessarily have to stand amended to be in consonance with the provisions of law that were in existence at that point of time. ( 10 ) THEORETICALLY, if this is the position the question arises as to whether the executing Court is invested with the power to translate such a situation into action. It is implicit that if a decree is in breach of express statutory provisions that a executing Court must refuse execution. That principle would necessarily require, as has been pointed out by the Courts in the decisions cited by me that an executing Court must apply its mind to this limited aspect of the matter. This is a post-decretal prospective exercise and would not constitute going behind the decree as the law postulates a reopening of the dispute or a re-examination of the matters. It is totally a different concept in law. A Court of law cannot act in breach of the statutory provisions at any stage either when passing a decree or for that matter when executing it and it is for this reason that the supreme Court emphasised this fact in the Delhi Rent Control act case, supra. It is totally a different concept in law. A Court of law cannot act in breach of the statutory provisions at any stage either when passing a decree or for that matter when executing it and it is for this reason that the supreme Court emphasised this fact in the Delhi Rent Control act case, supra. It is the validity of the decree that is being examined and not a re-examination of the case on merits or in other words, the question as to whether having regard to the state of the law, the Court would be justified in ordering execution of that decree. That virtually brings us to the crux of the present dispute namely the question as to whether the amendments carried out in this case could affect a decree that has become final prior to the date on which the amendments have taken place. The answer to that question will have to be in two parts namely that had the decree been executed, the law is to the effect that the question could not thereafter have been reopened. But on the other hand, if the decree had not been executed it still requires the operation of the judicial machinery for purposes of directing execution. If there has been a sweeping change of the law which places on the statute book a specific prohibition to the doing of something that has been provided for in the decree then, the executing Court is duty bound in law to take note of that provision and to either ignore it or to give effect to it in such a manner that it is in consonance with the amended law. The validity of the amendments has not been questioned and they will therefore have to be presumed to be intra vires and therefore, the Trial Court in the first of the two cases was right when it held that the decree in question would stand amended and could be enforced to be in consonance with the amended law. It is true that in the second case, the objection was dismissed on the ground that the Court took the view that it was not of any consequence but in view of the fact that the challenge is on a pure point of law, that decree would also have to stand amended in keeping with the change in the legal position. ( 11 ) I need to sound a note of caution here in so far as the Bank's learned Counsel is right when he points out that the principles in relation to finality of decrees are well-crystallised and that normally they preclude an executing Court from commencing any re-examination. The present situation is virtually one of the rarest of the rare cases or in other words, a very unusual exception where an amendment of the type that is normally not found on the statute books has been promulgated and which was so sweeping in effect that it has virtually replaced the entire statute from its very inception. The Bank cannot be faulted for not having executed the decrees but having regard to the various developments in the Courts and the change of the law, the Bank which had a necessity to enforce its rights as a financial institution unfortunately found itself faced with a situation whereby the Legislature had carried out a sweeping amendment that in effect left the decree in a altered form. Under normal circumstances, the executing Court would have been precluded from entertaining any challenge to that decree but as pointed out by me, this is an exceptional situation which would not hold good in the majority of circumstances that come up before the executing Court. While it is the duty of the executing Court to put down challenges that are frivolous or challenges that are pleaded before the Court seeking to plead for time, the law envisages a duty on the part of the executing Court to take note of and give effect to a challenge on a point of law such as the present one which is substantial and well-founded and which is so fundamental that it affects the very complexion of the decree that is being executed. ( 12 ) IN the exceptional facts and circumstances of this case therefore, the order passed by the executing Court in Civil revision Petition No. 1913 of 1992 is confirmed whereas the order passed in Civil Revision Petition No. 4867 of 1992 is set aside. The executing Court shall take note of the decision of this court as is indicated in this judgment and shall give effect to it in both these cases. The executing Court shall take note of the decision of this court as is indicated in this judgment and shall give effect to it in both these cases. ( 13 ) BEFORE parting with this judgment, I would like to place on record the appreciation of this Court as far as the degree of research, meticulousness and competence with which the three learned Counsel who represented the parties have presented their respective cases and have assisted the Court admirably. ( 14 ) CIVIL Revision Petition No. 4867 of 1992 and Civil Revision Petition No. 1913 of 1992 both stand disposed of in terms of the aforesaid order. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .