Judgment R.M.Prasad, J. 1. In this writ application the petitioners are State Bank of India and its officers on the management side, who have assailed the validity of the order dated December 21, 1982 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Patna-cum-Authority under the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act (hereinafter referred to as the Shops Act) (respondent No. 2) under Sec. 28(1) of the Shops Act, contained in Annexure-1, whereby and whereunder he has held the claim of respondent No. 3 to be legally justified for payment of wages for the period July 1, to July 31, 1980, August 1, to August 6, 1980, August 16, 1980 to August 31, 1980 and September 1, 1980 to September 30, 1980 together with compensation to the tune of two times of the directed amount, as also the judgment and order dated December 27, 1983 passed by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal and appellate authority under Sec. 28 (7) of the Shops Act in B.S.F. Appeal No. 1 of 1983 contained in annexue-2 modifying the order contained in annexure-1 to the extent that respondent No. 3 has been held to be entitled to receive his wages as claimed by him for the period July 1, 1980 to July 6, 1980 and from August 16, 1980 to September 30, 1980 subject to deduction of Rs. 50.00 per month as flood relief loan and contributory Provident Fund besides, the compensation to the extent of two times of the amount of wages, which he has been held to be entitled in the judgment under appeal. 2. In short, the relevant facts giving rise to this writ application are that respondent No. 3 was working as clerk at the material time in the State Bank of India, Exhibition Road, Patna. During the period July 1, 1980 to September 30, 1980 he on different days either absented himself for the whole day or left the bank just after signing registers. Therefore, he was not paid his wages for such absence from duty. Respondent No. 3 challenged the said action of the Bank in a proceeding under Sec. 28 (1) of the Shops Act, which was allowed on contest by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Patna-cum-Authority. under the Act (respondent No. 2) and the petitioner bank by impugned order (annexure-I) was directed to pay the claim amount with compensation as stated above. Respondent No. 3 challenged the said action of the Bank in a proceeding under Sec. 28 (1) of the Shops Act, which was allowed on contest by the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Patna-cum-Authority. under the Act (respondent No. 2) and the petitioner bank by impugned order (annexure-I) was directed to pay the claim amount with compensation as stated above. The management of the Bank filed the aforementioned B.S.H. Appeal No. 1 of 1983 against the judgment of respondent No. 2 before the Industrial Tribunal. The said appeal was finally heard by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna and Appellate Authority under Sec. 28 (7) of the Shops Act, who disposed it of by judgment and order contained in Annexure-2, as stated above. The petitioners being aggrieved by the said two orders, has filed the present writ petition for their quashing. 3. This writ application was admitted for hearing on April 23, 1984 and in the meantime, the operation of part of the impugned order, as contained in Annexure-2 was stayed. 4. Mr. Shailesh Kumar Sinha, learned Sr. Counsel, appearing for the Bank has submitted that the impugned orders are wholly without jurisdiction as the provisions of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act are not applicable in respect of workmen employees of the Bank in face of the detailed and elaborate procedure, provided in Sastri Award/Settlement in respect of all the matters concerning the terms and conditions of the service of such employees of the Bank. It was contended by him that the Award will control the field and bind both the parties under Sec. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act. According to him an agreement in the form of Award will prevail over the general law even assuming that the provisions of the Shops Act, are applicable to the employees of the Bank as well. He also ventured to submit that under Sec. 4 (2)of the Shops Act the provisions of the Act specified in the third column of the Schedule I shall not apply to the establishment employees and other persons referred to in the corresponding entry in the second column of the said schedule. According to him, the State Bank of India being an office under the Central Government is exempted from applicability of the provisions of the Shops Act as per item No. 3 of Schedule 1, which was incorporated by S.C. 12 dated January 14, 1980. According to him, the State Bank of India being an office under the Central Government is exempted from applicability of the provisions of the Shops Act as per item No. 3 of Schedule 1, which was incorporated by S.C. 12 dated January 14, 1980. On merit it was contended by Mr. Sinha that the aforementioned action of the Bank against the petitioners was not by way of punishment. According to him, by the order impugned in the proceeding the salary/ wages of the petitioners for the period when he remained absent from duty or marked the attendance and left the office immediately as is evident from the attendance Register have been deducted. This aspect has not been considered by either of the authorities namely, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and the impugned orders suffer from non-application of mind and/or non-consideration of valid pieces of relevant evidence namely, Attendance Register (Ext. A). 5. On the other hand, Mr. Gupta, learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 submitted that there is no substance in either of the aforementioned submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. He submitted that the point of jurisdiction was never raised and as such, he cannot raise it for the first time in this writ application. 6. As regards the binding effect of the Sastri Award it was contended by him that there is nothing in the Sastri Award to preclude the remedy available under the Shops Act nor any remedy is specifically provided in the Sastri Award. However, according to him, the Sastri Award is not a statute whereas the Shops Act is a statute, which will prevail over any Award or agreement. It was also contended by him that in view of the matter the question will be of election of remedy by the suiter and the petitioner, who elected remedy under the Shops Act cannot be denied the benefit of the judgment or order passed under the said Act merely because he also had remedy under the Award. 7. On merit the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 submitted that the Tribunal has considered all the evidence including the attendance register. In this regard he referred to para 8 of the judgment at page 19. Mr. 7. On merit the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 submitted that the Tribunal has considered all the evidence including the attendance register. In this regard he referred to para 8 of the judgment at page 19. Mr. Gupta thus, submitted that in view of the concurrent finding of the two authorities below, this Court in its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India should not go into it and reappraise the evidence about which the two authorities below have recorded their findings. 8. I do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Sinha on the question that in the case of the State Bank of India the applicability of the provision of the Shops Act has been excluded by Schedule under Sec. 4 (2) of the Shops Act. Firstly, it is difficult to accept the, submission of Mr. Sinha that the State Bank of India can be held to be an office under the Central Government which has been excluded under item 3 of Schedule I firm application of the provisions of the Shops Act. The State Bank of India is a, creature of an Act known as State Bank of India Act and thus, it is an autonomous body and cannot be said to be an office under the Central Government. This is also evident from items 14, 25, 26, 33 of the said Schedule I which deal with the different banks including public sector banks and regional and rural banks situated in the State of Bihar. Under item 14 banks transacting Government business are exempted from application of Sec. 7 of the Shops Act, which is in regard to opening and closing hours of establishment. Item 24 exempts the applicability of Secs. 33 (1) and 12-A of the Shops Act to the banks situated in the State of Bihar. Sec. 12-A of the Shops Act deals with other holidays and Sec. 33 (1) deals with maintenance of registers and records and display of notice. Under item 26 the applicability of all provisions of the Shops Act are exempted in the case of Reserve Bank of India. 9. Thus, from the above, it cannot be disputed that the Legislature has put banks in category different from the office under the Central Government in item No. 3. Under item 26 the applicability of all provisions of the Shops Act are exempted in the case of Reserve Bank of India. 9. Thus, from the above, it cannot be disputed that the Legislature has put banks in category different from the office under the Central Government in item No. 3. It is true that under item 33 all branches of scheduled commercial banks including the public sector banks and regional rural banks situated in the State of Bihar are exempted from the application of provisions of Shops Act but item 33 was incorporated in the aforesaid form by S.O. 499 dated March 25, 1986, i.e. much after the impugned orders were passed. As such, the present case is not covered by the said item 33. Thus, I am constrained to hold that at the time of passing of the impugned orders, the provisions contained in Sec. 28 of the Shops Act, under which the Assistant Labour Commissioner passed the order contained in Annexure- 1 as well as the provisions contained in Sec. 28 (7) under which the Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal has passed the judgment the validity of which have been assailed, were very much applicable and on that account they cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. 10. However, I do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Gupta as well as that point regarding jurisdiction. If not raised in the Court below by the aggrieved person, cannot be allowed to be raised before the writ Court, By now it is well settled that the point relating to jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of any proceeding including a proceeding under Article 226 and if it is finally found that the Court/authority below have committed error of jurisdication then the entire proceeding would be vitiated being a nullity. A reference can be made to the decision in Kiran Singh V/s. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 S.C. 340 , Sunder Das V/s. Ram Prakash, AIR 1977 S.C. 1201 , Mahadeo Pd. Singh V/s. Ram Lochan, AIR 1981 S.C. 416 . 11. A reference can be made to the decision in Kiran Singh V/s. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 S.C. 340 , Sunder Das V/s. Ram Prakash, AIR 1977 S.C. 1201 , Mahadeo Pd. Singh V/s. Ram Lochan, AIR 1981 S.C. 416 . 11. As regards the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the provisions of the Sastri Award/Settlement in respect of the matters concerning terms and conditions of the services of the employees of the Bank will control the field and bind both the parties under Sec. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act and will prevail over the general law, such as, the provisions of the Shops Act, there appears to be some substance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It cannot be disputed that the Sastri Award under Sec. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act will be binding on all the employees of the Bank. It is also well settled that only in case of any repugnance between the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Shops Act the provisions of the said Act, i.e. the Shops Act will be excluded to the extent the provisions are repugnant to those of the Industrial Disputes Act. A reference in this connection may be made to the decision in the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. V/s. Sri Kishan Bhageria and Ors., reported in (1988-I-LLJ-363) (SC), but at the same time it has been held in the case of Raptakos Brett Company Ltd. V/s. Bihar State Agri. Mktg. Board, reported in 1988 PLJR 830 that it is the duty of the Courts to make efforts to reconcile the provisions of the two Acts in case of alleged repugnance between the Central and State laws rather than declare the provisions of one of the Acts ultra vires on the ground of repugnance. In the present case the learned Counsel for the petitioners has not been able to show that there is any repugnance between the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Shops Act in the matter of election of remedy against the impugned judgment, nor has he been even able to show that under the provisions of the Award the applicability of the Shops Act for redressal of such grievances has been excluded. In the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. V/s. Kishan Bhageria (supra) it has been held that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Shops Act will both apply where no repugnance is found between their provisions and whatever is more beneficial to the employees will be applicable. As such in my opinion the impugned orders cannot be quashed merely on the ground that respondent No. 3 did not avail the remedy under the provisions contained in paragraph 517 of the Award of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Dispute), Bombay on the Industrial Disputes between certain banking companies and their workmen. However, I find substance in the submission of Mr. Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners that the action of the bank in deducting the wages for the period of absence of respondents No. 3 being not by way of punishment penalty and being permissible under the provisions contained in Sub-rule (1) (b) read with Sub-sec. (7) of Rule 18 of the Bihar Shops and Establishment Rules, 1955 the provisions of Sec. 28 of the Shops Act shall not at all be attracted as it only provides for entertaining claim where deductions have been made from the wages of the employees or any payment of wages has been delayed and any sum is otherwise due from the employer to the employee contrary to the provisions of the said Act. It will be useful to quote the relevant extracts from the provisions contained in Sec. 28 of the Shops Act herein below : "28 Claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and partly for malicious or vexatious claims:- - (1) Where contrary to the provisions of the Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employee or any payment of wages has been delayed or any sum is otherwise due from the employer to the employee such employee or any legal practitioner of any authorised agent or any officer of a registered trade union of any inspecting officer may make an application in such manner, within such time, and to such authority as may be prescribed for a direction under Sub-sec. (2). (2) When an application under Sub-sec. (2). (2) When an application under Sub-sec. (1) is entertained the prescribed authority shall hear the application in the prescribed manner and may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which an employer is liable under this Act, direct the refund of the amount deducted or payment of the delayed wages or any other sum to the employee together with the payment of a compensation not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the first case and not exceeding ten rupees in other cases: Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to- (a) A bonafide error or bonafide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person or (b) The occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, such that the person responsible for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising reasonable diligence to make prompt payment, of (c) The failure of employed person to apply or accept payment. (5) A single application may be presented under this section on behalf or in respect of any number of employed persons belonging to the same unpaid group, and in such case the maximum compensation may be awarded under Sub-sec. (2) shall be ten rupees per head. Explanation--Employed persons are said to belong to the same unpaid group if they are borne on the same establishment and if their wages for the same wage period or periods, have remained unpaid after the day fixed by Sec. 23. (6) The authority may deal with any number of separate proceeding applications presented under this section in respect of persons be-longing to the same unpaid group, as a single application presented under Sub-sec. (5) and the provisions of that Sub-sec. shall apply accordingly. (7) An appeal against an order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under Sub-sec. (1) against a direction made under Sub-sec. (2) or Sub-sec. (4) may be preferred in such manner, within such time and to such authority as may be prescribed and such authority shall consider and dispose of such appeals in the prescribed manner (8) Save as provided in Sub-sec. (7), any order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under Sub-sec. (1) or a direction made under Sub-sec. (2) of Subsection (3) shall be final." 12. (7), any order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under Sub-sec. (1) or a direction made under Sub-sec. (2) of Subsection (3) shall be final." 12. From reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is quite clear that the claim in respect of any deduction made from the wages of an employee or in respect of delayed payment of any wages or any sum is otherwise due from the employer to the employee must be related to the provisions of the Shops Act. In other words, only in the case of any of the aforementioned actions being contrary to the provisions of the Shops Act that claim under Sec. 28 will be maintainable and not otherwise. In the present case there is no such allegation of the respondent No. 3 with respect to this alleged claims that the authority in the Bank acted contrary to the provisions of the Shops Act in any manner. 13. The provisions relating to wages under the Shops Act are contained in Sections 19 to 25 of its Chapter V. Sec. 19 deals with the responsibility for payment of wages under the Act. Sec. 20 is in regard to fixation of wage period and Sec. 21 is in regard to extra pay for overtime. Under Sec. 22 an employee who has been allowed leave for not less than five days in the case of child and four days in any other case, shall before his leave begins, be paid the wages due for the period of the leave allowed. Sec. 23 contains the provisions relating to time of payment of wages and Sec. 24 is in regard to wages to be paid in current coins or currency notes. Under Sec. 25 no deductions other than those which may be prescribed shall be made by the employer from the wages of his employee. There is no provision in the Shops Act which provides remedy to raise claim under the said Act with respect to deduction from wages of the employee for his absence from duty or from the place of duty whereby under the term of his employment he is required to work and such absence being wholly or in part of the period, during which he is not required to work. The application under Sec. 28 has to be made in terms of the 22 of the Rules in duplicate in Forms XII, XIII and XVI. Forms XIII and XVI are forms of Group Application and application by an Inspecting Officer or Person authorised to act respectively. Form XII is a form of Individual Application. 14. Thus, from the combined reading of the aforementioned provisions and particularly para 2 of form XII it is evident that grievance by an employee can be raised only with respect to due wages payable under Sec. 19 of the Shops Act, under which employer is responsible for payment of all wages required to be paid under the Shops Act. Thus there cannot be any doubt that no claim arises unless the action of the employer is alleged to be contrary to the provisions of the Shops Act. From the two orders impugned the present writ petition (Annexures 1 and 2) I do not find therein to even suggest that the claim of the employees was contrary to any action of the Bank contrary to the provisions of the Act, nor there is any such finding in either of the said two impugned orders. The claim of the respondents is with regard to deduction of wages for his absence from duty. Thus, it was rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that in the facts and circumstances aforementioned the remedy of the respondent No. 3 against the aforesaid grievances was under the provisions of para 517 (1) of the Sastri Award which provides that "an employee desirous of the redress of a grievance relating to unfair treatment or wrongful exaction on the part of the bank or a superior shall either himself, or through a representative of a registered union, submit a complaint to the manager or any officer appointed by the manager in this behalf, the employees shall also have the right to endorse a copy direct to the head of the department for information. 15. As such, in the facts and circumstances aforementioned, I am constrained to hold that the remedy of the petitioners against the aforementioned grievances was available only under the provisions of the Sastri Award which is binding on him under Sec. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act and not the one before the Authority under the Shops Act. 16. 15. As such, in the facts and circumstances aforementioned, I am constrained to hold that the remedy of the petitioners against the aforementioned grievances was available only under the provisions of the Sastri Award which is binding on him under Sec. 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act and not the one before the Authority under the Shops Act. 16. Further, on merit it has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Assistant Commissioner of labour in the impugned order (Annexure 1) has not discussed about the attendance register of the work order. In the order of the Tribunal contained in Annexure 2 however I find some discussion about the same. I am quite conscious that normaly High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not interfere with the findings of the Courts/authority below on re-appraisal of evidence laid before them. But in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in my opinion the learned Tribunal committed error in holding that the deductions of salary of the respondents for the period July 1, 1980 to July 6, 1980 and August 16, 1980 to September 30, 1980 was not justified. The case of respondent No. 3 before the authority was that he used to attend the Bank and sign his attendance register, but as he was not allotted any work he used to sit idle there, during the period for which he claimed wages. Initially the said period including the one between July 17, to August 14, 1980 but however, the Tribunal found that during the said period respondent No. 3 was on sick leave, for which he had filed application with medical certificate and thus, his claim for payment of wages for the said period was rejected as the authorities found that under Sec. 28 of the Shops Act they were not required to decide whether the employee was entitled to leave or not, for which a different forum has been prescribed and it was for the respondent No. 3 to decide to avail of the forum or not. 17. The case of the petitioners was that for the period from July 1, to July 6, 1980 the respondent had left the Bank for the whole day just after signing the attendance register. 17. The case of the petitioners was that for the period from July 1, to July 6, 1980 the respondent had left the Bank for the whole day just after signing the attendance register. From July 7, 1980 to August 14, 1980 he has absented unauthoritiesdly i.e. without leave and no leave was due which could have been granted to him. August 15, was a national holiday but since respondent No. 3 was absent from July 7, 1980 to August 14, 1980 he was not entitled to pay for August 15, 1980 and from August 16, to September 30, 1980 the respondent left the Bank for the whole day just after signing the attendance register. Thus, it was alleged that respondent No. 3 did not at all work during the above period for which he claimed wages and he was habitual absentee. It was also alleged that the respondent No. 3 never obeyed the instructions issued by the appellant and refused to sign the work allotment order. C.P.W. I who was the head clerk in the same branch, where the respondent was posted and stated in his deposition that the attendance register, pay register and all papers relating to the establishment used to be kept in his almirah, but the register for the period from 1980 January to August 7, 1981 had been lost. 18. According to him, on August 7, 1981 at about 11 A.M. a member of the Bank asked him about the office order regarding work order and when he went to the almirah he did not find it there. When he enquired from the members of the staff he was told that the respondent was looking into the work order and when he enquired from the respondent he was told that after looking into work order that he had placed it in the despatch section since then the work order was not found. The learned Tribunal did not accept the said version of C.P.W. 1 about the respondent handing of the work order as he held the said statement to be hearsay and of no weight because neither the person who told him about it has been named nor examined. The learned Tribunal did not accept the said version of C.P.W. 1 about the respondent handing of the work order as he held the said statement to be hearsay and of no weight because neither the person who told him about it has been named nor examined. The learned Tribunal also did not give any weightage to the statement of C.P.W. 1 as it was made for the first time in the evidence before the authority below and it was not put to the respondent in his cross-examination so that he could have accepted or denied it in his examination. I fail to appreciate this approach of the learned Tribunal with regard to the statement of C.P.W 1 which was very vital in the facts and circumstances of the case. C.P.W. 1 specifically stated in his deposition that he enquired from the respondent about the work order and he told him that after looking into the work order he had placed it in the despatch section and since then that work order was not found. Thus, it is obvious that respondent No. 3 had the access to the work order, which was very important evidence to show that he was allotted work and still he did not work. The learned Tribunal was also not correct in not giving any weightage to the said statement of the C.P.W I it was made for the first time before the authority below and it was not put to the respondent in his cross-examination that he could have accepted or denied it in his evidence. Respondent No. 3 had sufficient opportunity of rebuttal while cross-examination of C.P.W. 1 was done by him, but from the impugned orders/ judgment I do not find that in the cross-examination of C.P.W. 1 on behalf of respondent No. 3 even suggestion was made that he did not have any talk with C.P.W. 1 and/or that he ever told C.P.W I that after looking into the work order, he had placed it in the despatch section. 19. Moreover, C.P.W 2 in his deposition stated that it appears from the register that on the dates the respondent had signed his attendance during the relevant periods but he was not in the office. 19. Moreover, C.P.W 2 in his deposition stated that it appears from the register that on the dates the respondent had signed his attendance during the relevant periods but he was not in the office. This statement of C.P.W. 2 has not been accepted by the learned Tribunal as according to him, it is based upon the remarks made therein of the Branch Manager that the respondent had left office. It is not the case of respondent No 3 that C.F. W. 2 was not in the office during the aforesaid period. Thus, if he stated that the respondent was not in the office during the period in question the same could not have been completely brushed aside by saying that the statement was based upon the remarks of the Branch Manager in the register, when in fact, there appears to be no such statement made by C.P.W. 3. 20. The learned Tribunal has disbelieved the case of the petitioners also because he found it to be strange and probable that respondent No. 3 had been given work order, but without doing the work he left that office or that he signed the attendance and used to absent himself from the place of duty, as no disciplinary action was taken against him. Under Rule 18 of the Rules an employer is entitled to make deduction from the wages of the employee for the absence from duty for which no disciplinary action is required to be taken against the employee. Such an act of an employee may be indisciplined one, but the employer may not in every case consider it desirable to take disciplinary action against him, as making deduction from his wages for his absence may suffice to meet such lapse on the part of the employee. But merely because disciplinary action is not taken against such an employee cannot by itself lead to the conclusion that the employer was not justified in making deduction from wages of the employee for being absent from the place of his duty. Moreover, I find it to be more strange and improbable that the respondent No. 3 as alleged was not given work order for such a long period and yet he did not (sic.) raise any grievances before the higher authority and continued to sit idle in the Bank during the said period in question. Moreover, I find it to be more strange and improbable that the respondent No. 3 as alleged was not given work order for such a long period and yet he did not (sic.) raise any grievances before the higher authority and continued to sit idle in the Bank during the said period in question. This in my opinion sufficiently demonstrates the intention of respondent No. 3 to claim wages even without doing any work and absenting himself from bank after signing the attendence register. The learned Tribunal should not have brushed aside the Attendance Register which was vital piece of evidence on mere probability, particularly when respondent No. 3 did not examine any witness on his behalf who could support his plea that no work was allotted to him by the Manager and that he used to remain present in the Bank throughout the day during the period in question even in the absence of any work. 21. Thus, in the circumstances aforementioned it is difficult to accept the case of respondent No. 3 that after signing the attendance register he was not allotted any work during the period in question. In fact, in the circumstances aforementioned it was a fit case, in which respondent No. 3 deserved punishment for his aforementioned irresponsible and indisciplined act being a bank employee. 22. In such circumstances, in my opinion, both the authorities namely, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were not justified in holding that respondent No. 3 was entitled to receive his wages, as claimed by him for the period July 1, 1980 to July 6, 1980 and August 16, 1980 to September 30, 1980 besides the compensation to the extent of two times of the amount of wages. Accordingly, the impugned orders are quashed. 23. In the result, the writ application is allowed, but without Costs.