Judgment :- Srinivasan, J. 1. The plaintiff is the appellant. The plaintiff has claimed that it has developed a computer software programme and has a copyright therein. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had infringed the copyright by bringing out a software programme taking the same materials as contained in the plaintiff's programme, but giving a different name thereto. The prayer in the suit is for injunction restraining the defendants from infringing the plaintiff's copyright in its computer software package "SPECIRUM" by sale of pirated copies thereof bearing the name 'PACE' or under any other name whatsoever and also for a preliminary decree directing the defendants to render an account of the profits. Pending the suit, the plaintiff filed an application for interim injunction. The same was granted and the defendants entered appearance contesting the claim of the plaintiff and an application for vacating the injunction was filed by the defendants. 2. In the course of the arguments, the defendants raised an objection as to the maintainability of the suit as well as the application. The defendants contended that the plaintiff had filed the suit under the provisions of the Copyright Act which had not come into force. Certain provisions of the Copyright Act were introduced by Act 38 of 1994. Though the President has given consent therefor, the provision have not been notified and they have not come into force as such. According to the defendants, the suit falls only under the said provisions introduced by the amendment which have not yet come into force and the suit and application are, therefore, not maintainable. 3. The learned Judge has accepted that contention of the defendants and dismissed the application as not maintainable, though he has made an observation that the question whether the suit is maintainable or not is to be decided in the suit. For the purpose of arriving at the conclusion, the learned Judge has relied upon a publication made by the plaintiff after obtaining an order of interim injunction in "The Hindu". In the said publication, the plaintiff has referred to Section 63B of the Copyright Act, 1957 and also reproduced the said Section therein. For the purpose of arriving at the conclusion, the learned Judge has relied upon a publication made by the plaintiff after obtaining an order of interim injunction in "The Hindu". In the said publication, the plaintiff has referred to Section 63B of the Copyright Act, 1957 and also reproduced the said Section therein. Relying upon the said publication, the defendants contended that the plaintiff had always intended to file the suit and had filed the suit only under the provisions of the Copyright Act introduced by the Amendment, which argument has been accepted by the learned Judge. 4. In our opinion, the view expressed by the learned Judge is erroneous. We have been taken through the plaint and we do not find any basis therein to hold that the plaintiff is relying only on the amended provisions of the Act which are yet to come into force. Our attention is drawn to an amendment introduced in 1984 by Act 65 of 1984 with effect from 8-10-1984. The expression "literary work" was amended thereby and after amendment, the definition read as follows:- "literary work" includes tables, compilations and computer programmes, that is to say programmes recorded on any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device, which, if fed into or located in a computer or computer based equipment is capable of reproducing any information. Section 13 of the Act, even before the amendment of 1994 set out the works in which Copyright subsisted. Clause (a) thereof refers to 'original, literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works'. Under Section 14 of the Act, as it stood before amendment of 1994, the meaning of Copyright has been given in Clause (1) as follows:- for the purpose of the Act 'Copyright' means the exclusive right, by virtue of, and subject to the provisions of, the Act (a) in the case of literary, dramatic or musical work, to do and authorise the doing of any of the following acts, namely- (I) to reproduce the work in any material form; (ii) to publish the work; (iii) to perform the work in public ... "5. By Act 38 of 1994, Section 2(O) amended the definition of 'literary work' as including computer programmes, cables and compilations including computer data basis. Thus, the new expression introduced by the amendment Act of 1994 is "Computer data basis" only. Section 13 has not been amended materially for our purpose. "5. By Act 38 of 1994, Section 2(O) amended the definition of 'literary work' as including computer programmes, cables and compilations including computer data basis. Thus, the new expression introduced by the amendment Act of 1994 is "Computer data basis" only. Section 13 has not been amended materially for our purpose. Section 14 has been amended but in substance it is the same. Under clause (b), in the case of a computer programme, the doing of any of the acts specified in clause (a) will amount to copyright within the meaning of the Section. Clause (a) has been the same as it was before the amendment of 1994. Thus, the Act as it stood before the amendment of 1994 applied also to computer programmes and if there was any copyright and infringement thereof with respect to a computer programme, the suit could well be maintained. 6. In the present case, a reading of the plaint shows that the claim of the plaintiff is that with reference to a computer programme, there has been an infringement by the defendants and he is affected thereby. The three sections referred to in the plaint are Sections 51, 55 and 62 of the Act. Section 51 sets out as to when copyright is infringed. The amendment introduced in 1994 has not in any way affected the position as it stood before the said amendment. Sub-clause (1) has not been touched by the amendment of 1994. Under that sub-clause, if any person does anything, the exclusive right to do which is by the Act conferred upon the owner of the copyright, it would amount to infringement. Section 55 has not in any way been amended by the Act of 1994. Section 62 relates to jurisdiction of Court over matters arising under the Chapter and that has also not been amended by the Act of 1994. 7. In our view of the aforesaid facts, we are convinced that the suit as framed is maintainable under the provisions of the Copyright Act, as it stood before the amendment of 1994 was introduced. The fact that the provisions introduced by the amendment have not come into force does not in any way invalidate the suit. 8. Learned counsel for the defendants places reliance on the advertisement made by the plaintiff after obtaining an order of interim injunction from this Court. The fact that the provisions introduced by the amendment have not come into force does not in any way invalidate the suit. 8. Learned counsel for the defendants places reliance on the advertisement made by the plaintiff after obtaining an order of interim injunction from this Court. The advertisement no doubt refers to Section 63B which is only a mistake and that cannot affect the maintainability of the suit, in any manner. As the advertisement has been published only after the grant of an order of injunction, it will not have any effect on the plaint and on the application for injunction already filed in this Court. 9. It is next contended that in the course of arguments, learned counsel for the plaintiff used the expression "data basis", which is found only in the Section after the amendment of 1994. That will also not affect the maintainability of either the suit or the application. Even if the counsel advanced a wrong argument, the Court is not bound thereby and the Court has to decide the question of maintainability of the plaint as it reads. We are of the opinion that in this case, the suit is maintainable under the provisions of the Copyright Act as it stood before the amendment of 1994 and the application for injunction has been wrongly dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability of" * till the final decision of the suit. Anoop Singh, Mr. Manmohan Singh and Mr. H.P. Singh, Advs. for the Plaintiff. Mr. K.K. Mehra with Mr. G.C. Mittal and Anjna Gosai, Advs. for the Defendants he suit. 10. Consequently, we are setting aside the order passed by the learned Judge dismissing O.A.No.270 of 1995 and restore the same to file. 11. However, the question whether an injunction can be granted during the pendency of the suit has to depend on the fact whether there has been an infringement of the copyright claimed by the plaintiff. It is rightly pointed out by learned counsel on both sides that it is a complicated issue and without the help of the experts in computer programmes, it is not possible to come to any particular position even with regard to the prima facie case. In the circumstances, the interests of justice will be best served only by disposing of the application along with the main suit itself. In the circumstances, the interests of justice will be best served only by disposing of the application along with the main suit itself. Both parties must be permitted to let in evidence in support of their case and the Court will be in a position to conclude the acceptability or otherwise of the case of the plaintiff only after such recording of evidence. In the circumstances, we request the learned Judge on the original side to take up the main suit C.S.No.395 of 1995 itself for disposal along with the application and dispose of the same after both parties are given opportunity to adduce evidence. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The application is remitted to the file of the learned Judge for fresh disposal along with the suit. There will be no order as to costs. It is open to both parties to approach the learned Judge on the original side to fix a particular date for the trial of the suit.