Judgment M.Y.Eqbal, J. 1. This writ petition is directed for quashing the order dated 7-12-1984 passed by the Appellate Tribunal Custom, Excise and Gold (Control), New Delhi, in Appeal No. 1656/84-1657/D by which the said Tribunal confirmed the order of the Collector Central Excise (Appeals), Calcutta, pasted In Appeal No. 305/307/B. R. 80 dated 24-9-19S0 refusing the prayer of the petitioner for refund of the excess amount of duty on the hole ground that the application for refund was made beyond the period of six months. The aforesaid orders are Annexures 4 and 5 to the writ petition. 2. The brief facts of the case as set up by the petitioner are as follows: The petitioner, a Public Limited Company, carrying on business of dealing in and selling of Biris. The warehousing is being done of the unmanufactured Biris tobacco rececived from time to time. The warehouses are at Biharsharif and Jhajha where the company received manufactural Biris and the same were being done in the warehouses. The Company was duly licenced under Rule 143 of the Central Excise Rules (hereinafter referred to as "the said Rules") as a warehouse for the purpose of receiving unmanufactured tobacco at Biharsharif and Jhajha and hand-made manufactured biris are covered under the Central Excise Tariff. The said biris are required to be assessed by the proper Central Excise Officers on presentation of applications for removal in Form ARI by the petitioner. The proper Central Excise Officers are required to assess the amount of duty in the assessment memorandum provided in Form ARI. The duty so assessed by the Central Excise Officers has to be deposited in full in authorised Bank. The biris could be cleared from the factory only after the assessed amount in the Bank and the clearance is supervised by the proper Central Excise Officers and on GPI. (Gate passes for duty paid clearance). The gate passes are required to be signed by the proper Officer showing the actual time of clearance from the factory over the dates signature of the proper Central Exoise Officer. The petitioner was required to submit ARl showing the quantity of goods required to be cleared on paymeat of duty. (Gate passes for duty paid clearance). The gate passes are required to be signed by the proper Officer showing the actual time of clearance from the factory over the dates signature of the proper Central Exoise Officer. The petitioner was required to submit ARl showing the quantity of goods required to be cleared on paymeat of duty. The petitioner was also required to intimate the amount and the duty payable to best of his Knowledge and then only the assessment memorandum on ARI form has to be completed by the proper Excise Officer to ensure that only valid duty has been released on the goods required to be cleared from the factory on payment of duty. The amount so assessed has to be deposited in the authorised Bank and on presentation of duty paid document to the proper Central Excise Officer and the proper officer fixes the time for actual clearance and the goods are cleared in the presence of the Central Excise Officer on the basis of the paid duty chalans. 3. Petitioners case was that, on 16-3-1979, it presented two ARIs namely, ARI No. 19/413/79 dated 16-3-1979 for assessment or clearance of 94,92,000 biris, The total amount of duty shown in ARI was Rs. 34,171.20. Another ARI No. 20/414/79, dated 16-3-1979 was for clearance of 3,02,40,000 briris and amount assessed was Rs, 1,08.864.00. According to the petitioner, the rate of duty for both the ARIs was at the rate of Rs. 3.60 per one thousand biris. The total amount of Rs. 143035 was deposed in the State Bank of India, Jhajha Branch, on 16-3-1979 and the clearance of biris was effected. 4. Petitioners further case was that the assessment was made by the proper Central Excise Officer at the rate of Rs. 3.60 per one thousand biria as against the rate of Rs. 2.80 per thousand biris as per exemption notice No. 32/79, dated 1-3-1979. The clearance was to be sought in respect of these two consignments and for which the duty was paid on l6-3-1979. According to the petitioner, the actual amount of duty payable as per Notification No. 32/79, dated 1-3-1979 was Rs. 1,11,249.90. Thus, the petitioner paid excess amount of Rs. 31,785-60 on 16-3-1979 0due to ignorance because the authorities were also not aware of the notification No. 32 of 1979. A copy of the said notification is Annexure-9 to the writ petition. 5. 1,11,249.90. Thus, the petitioner paid excess amount of Rs. 31,785-60 on 16-3-1979 0due to ignorance because the authorities were also not aware of the notification No. 32 of 1979. A copy of the said notification is Annexure-9 to the writ petition. 5. The petitioner, after having learnt about the said notification, filed two applications on 24-12-A979 preferring two separate refund claims in respect of two ARIs in which excess payment was made on 16-3-1979. The Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Patna, rejected the aforesaid two claim applications in term6 of the order dated 10-12-1980 and 9-2-1980 on the sole ground that the petitioner did not file the applications for refund of the claims within six months in terms of Rule 11 of the Central Excise Rules. Copies of the said orders are Annexures-2 and 3 to the writ petition. 6. The petitioner then pereferred an appeal before the Collector. (Appeals), Central Excise, Calcutta, separately against the aforesaid two orders. The Collector also rejected the appeals on 24-9-1980 and confirmed the order passed by the Assistant Collector, The petitioner then went in revision to the Government of India against the said order of the Collector and the said revision applications remained pending for some time. Thereafter when the Custom, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal was set up in the year 1982, these revision applications were transferred to it for disposal which, too, after hearing, rejected the same in terms of the order dated 7-12-1984 which is Annexure 5 to the writ petition. 7. The petitioner has, therefore, come to this Court challenging the validity of the aforesaid order passed by the Collector (Appeals) and Custom, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. 8. A counter-affidavit was filed by the respondents stating inter alia that the Central Excise Officer correctly assessed the duty as the petitioner did not claim for set off under Notification No. 32 of 1979. The petitioner also did not prove to the satisfaction of the appropriate officer at that time that biris in respect of which application for clearance was submitted were manufactured wholly out of unmanufactured tobacco on which appropriate rent of Central Excise Duty has been paid on or before 28-5-1979. It was further stated that the exemption provided under notification was under the certain conditions which were neither fulfilled nor the petitioner made payment under protest. The assessment was also not provisional. It was further stated that the exemption provided under notification was under the certain conditions which were neither fulfilled nor the petitioner made payment under protest. The assessment was also not provisional. Therefore, the refund claimed could not be entertained due to limitation of time as provided under the special statute dealing with subject. It was further stated that Section 11(b)(5) of the Act clearly states that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, provisions of this section shall apply to the claim of refund of any amount collected as duty of excise made on the goods and that goods in respect of which such amount was collected was not excisable or were entitled for exemption from duty and no court shall have jurisdiction in respect of such claims. 9. Mr. Alok Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner assailed the orders passed by the respondent authorities, namely, the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Collector (Appeals), Central Excise, and the Tribunal as wholly illegal and erroneous in law. He submitted that the claim of the petitioner for refund of the excise amount of duty could not have been rejected on the sole ground that the said applications were not filed within six months from the date of deposit. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent authorities did not appreciate the case of the petitioner that the applications for refund were filed well within six months from the date of knowledge about the notification No. 32 of 1979. Learned counsel also submitted that, when the excise amount of duty was assessed by the respondents then the respondents were duty bound to refund the excess amount of duty irrespective of the fact that the applications for refund were filed beyond six months. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, does not dispute that the amount of duty was deposited by the petitioner on 16-3-1979 and the applications for refund were filed on 24-12-1979, i.e. much beyond the expiry of the period of six months. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Shiv Shanker Dal Mills V/s. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 1037 . 10. On the other hand, Mr. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Shiv Shanker Dal Mills V/s. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 1037 . 10. On the other hand, Mr. Ganesh Prasad Jaiswal, Additional Standing Counsel, Central Government, submitted that the respondent authorities have no power to pass any order for refund of the duty on the application for refund which was filed much beyond the expiry of six months. The learned Counsel referring to Section 11-B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, submitted that the provisions is mandatory and the authorities under the Act cannot extend the said period of six months in entertaining such application for refund. The learned counsel relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court namely, M/s. Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. V/s. Union of India and others AIR 1976 SC 638 and Miles India Limited V/s. Assistant Collector of Customs, 1987 (30) ELT 641 (SC) 11. Before appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to notice Secton 11-B of the Central Excises and Salt Act which runs thus "11-B. Claim for refund of duty. (1) Any person claiming refund of any duty of excise may make an application for refund of such duty to Assistant Collector of Central Excise before the. expiry of six months from the relevant date: Provided that the limitation of six months shall not apply where any duty has been paid under protest. (2) If on receipt of any such application, the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, is satisfied that the whole or any part of the duty of excise paid by the applicant should be refunded to him, he may make an order accordingly. (3) Where as a result of any order passed In appeal or revision under this Act refund of any duty of excise becomes due to any person, the Assistant Colector of Central Excise may refund the amount to such person without his having to make any claim In that behalf. (4) Save as otherwise provided by or under this Act, no claim for refund of any duty of excise shall be entertained. (4) Save as otherwise provided by or under this Act, no claim for refund of any duty of excise shall be entertained. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, the provision of this section shall also apply to a claim for refund of any amount collected as duty of excise made on the ground that the goods in respect of which such amount was collected were not excisable or were entitled to exemption from duty and no Court shall have any jurisdiction is respect of such claim." 12. From a bare perusal of the said provision, it is apparent that the application for refund of duty shall be entertained by the Assistant Collector before expiry of six months from the date of deposit. However, proviso to this section provides that such limitation of six months will not apply when the amount of duty was paid under protest. Amittedly, in the instant case, it was not the case of the petitioner that the excise duty was paid by it on 16-3-1979 under protest. 13. In the case of M/s. Madras Rubber Factory Limited V/s. Union of India and others (supra), the claim for refund of duty was under the Customs Act is pari materia to Section 1I-B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Sub-section (1) of Section 27 with its proviso is worth to be quoted. It is as follows : "27(1). Any person claiming refund of any duty paid by him in pursuance of an order of assessment made by an officer of customs lower in rank than an Assistant Collector of Customs may make an application for refund of such duty to the Assistant Collector of Customs before the expiry of six months from the date of payment of duty : Provided that the limitation of six months shall not apply where any duty has beeD paid under protest." 14. While interpreting the said provision, it was held by the Supreme Court that the application filed under the Customs Act beyond the period of six months was rightly rejected by the authorities in view of the fact that the duty was not paid by the assessee under protest. 15. While interpreting the said provision, it was held by the Supreme Court that the application filed under the Customs Act beyond the period of six months was rightly rejected by the authorities in view of the fact that the duty was not paid by the assessee under protest. 15. In the case of Miles India Limited V/s. Assistant Collector, Customs (supra), the apex Court, while interpreting Section 27 (1) of the Customs Act, observed as follows : "After the matter was heard for some time and it was indicated that the Customs Authorities, acting under the Act, were justified in disallowing the claim for refund as they were bound by the period of limitation provided therefor under Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, learned counsel for the Appellant sought leave to withdraw the appeal. He accord their leave to withdraw the appeal but make it clear that the order of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal suffers from no infirmity. If ready the payment of the duty was under a mistake of law, the appellant may seek recourse to such alternative remedy as it may be advised. The ap peal is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn." 16. In view of the admitted position that the amount of duty was deposited by the petitioner in the instant case on 16-3-1979 without any protest and the applications for refund were filed on 24-12-1979, the claim of the petitioner was rightly disallowed by the respondent authorities. 17. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has placed much reliance on the decision reported in AIR 1980 SC 1037 (supra) for the proposition that equitable order can be passed in such circumstances for nfund of the excess amount. In the case before the S upreme Court the fact was that the dealers had paid market fees at the increased rate of SO0/ under Haryana Act No. 22 of 1977, excess ;of 1% having been declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court became refundable to the respective dealers from whom they were recovered by the Market Committee. In that context it was held that where refund of excess amount which was illegally recovered from them was not made, equitable order could be passed directing the authority to refund the amount. In my view, this decision does not help the petitioner. 18. In that context it was held that where refund of excess amount which was illegally recovered from them was not made, equitable order could be passed directing the authority to refund the amount. In my view, this decision does not help the petitioner. 18. Learned dcounsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner lastly submitted that the limitation as prescribed under Section 11-B did not apply to a suit for a writ petition and therefore this Court may issue appropriate direction to the authorities to condone the delay and pass appropriate order for refund of the excess amount of duty paid by the petitioner. I am afraid such a direction can be issued by this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In this regard law is well settled that this Court cannot issue such direction indirectly prohibiting the authorities under the Act to act contrary to law. In a recent decision of Union of India and another V/s. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. under the Customs Act, 1962 the apex Court repealing such submission has held as under (1996) 4 SCC 456 ; "According to these sub-sections, a claim for refund or an order of refund can be made only in accordance with the provisions of Section 27 which inter alia includes the period of limitation mentioned therein Mr. Hidayatullah submitted that the period of limitation prescribed by Section 27 dos not apply either to a suit filed by the importer or to a writ petition filed by him and that in such cases the period of limitation would be three years. The learned counsel refers to certain decisions of this Court to that effect. We shall assume for the purposes of this appeal that it is so, notwithstanding the fact that the said question is now pending before a larger Constitution Banch of nine Judges along with the issue relating to unjust enrichment. Yet the question is whether it is permissible for the High Court to direct the authorities under the Act to act contrary to the aforesaid statutory provision. We do not think it is, even while acting under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power conferred by Articles 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accourdance with law. We do not think it is, even while acting under Article 226 of the Constitution. The power conferred by Articles 226/227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the State act in accourdance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law. In particular, the Customs authorities, who are the creatures of the Customs Act, cannot be directed to ignore or act contrary to Section 27, whether before or after amendment. May be the High Court or a civil court is not bound by the said provisions but the authorities under the Act are. Nor can there be any question of the High Court clothing the authorities with its power under Article 226 or the power of a civil court. No such delegation or conferment can ever be conceived. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the direction contained in clause (3) of the impugned order is unsustainable in law. When we expressed this view during the hearing Mr. Hidayatullah requested that in such a case the matter be remitted to the High Court and the High Court be left free to dispose of the writ petition according to law." 19. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that no relief could be granted to the petitioner which is not permissible under the law. This writ petition, is accordingly dismissed. However there shall be no order as to costs.