D. P. KUNDU, J. ( 1 ) IN this Writ petition the Writ Petitioner has prayed for, inter alia, a Writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to pay forthwith arrear due amounting to Rs. 85,847. 50 paise which had accrued since September, 1991 to July 1992 in respect of 5 pacca godowns and one office room in the village of Ramnagar, P. S. Mathurapore, Dist. South 24 Parganas. The Writ petitioner also prayed for a Writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to honour the legal obligations arising out of an agreement executed by the respondents on the basis of fair rent fixed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer dated 27-7-1987 which is Annexure 'a' in the Writ petition. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the Writ Petitioner that he is the owner of 5 godowns and office accommodation situated at Ramnagar, P. S. 7 Mathurapore in the District of South 24 Parganas. On 6th July, 1987 Food Corporation of India (For short F. C. I.) decided that because of the strategic position of Mathurapore with its vast riverine areas of Sundarban and in the interest of Public distribution system and also for relief and developmental activities in such vast areas it was necessary to open a Food Storage department in the aforesaid areas and accordingly the FCI took possession of the Writ petitioner's 5 pacca godowns and office space. Further case of the Writ petitioner is that Special Rent Acquisition Collector of South 24 Parganas had assessed the fair rent of the petitioner's 5 godowns and office space and by his Memo No. L. S. (S) 1062, dated 27-7-1987 fixed the fair rent at Rs. 7210/- for 5 godowns and Rs. 255/- for office space, total amounting to Rs. 7465/- per month and communicated such fixation of fair rent to the District Manager, F. C. I. , South 24 Parganas and the Authorities of FCI accepted such fair rent without any objection. It is further case of the Writ petitioner that FCI executed a formal agreement on 15th January, 1988 for an initial period of three years, whereby FCI agreed to pay monthly rent of Rs. 7465/- and also agreed that the Lease created should be determined at the option of Lessee at any time giving one month's notice to the Writ petitioner. 7465/- and also agreed that the Lease created should be determined at the option of Lessee at any time giving one month's notice to the Writ petitioner. The formal agreement has been annexed to the Writ petition as Annexure 'b'. ( 3 ) THE Writ petitioner stated that in spite of taking over possession of the Writ petitioner's 5 godowns and office accommodation, FCI refused to pay the aforesaid agreed sum and compelled the Writ petitioner to approach this Hon'ble High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. At that material time, Umesh Chandra Banerjee, J. being pleased, by order dated 2-8-1991 directed the FCI to pay the entire arrear rent upto August 1991 amounting to Rs. 1,28,460 only within four weeks of the date of the Order and FCI in compliance with the Order passed by the Learned Court dated 2-8-1991 paid to the petitioner by cheque No. 856681, dated 19-9-1991 Rs. 1,24,727. 50 Paise leaving behind arrear of Rs. 3,732. 50 paise. It is the case of the Writ petitioner that thereafter since September, 1991 the arrear had accrued upto July, 1992 to the extent of Rs. 85,847. 50 paise which has not yet been paid by the respondents. The instant case was initiated in the year 1992. ( 4 ) THE respondents filed an affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Sri Benoy Kumar Sarkar affirmed on 4th March, 1993. It appears from the said affidavit-in-opposition (hereinafter referred to as the affidavit) that Sri Benoy Kr. Sarkar at that material time was the District Manager, FCI, 24 Parganas and was well-acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. In paragraph 4 of the said affidavit it was stated as follows :-" (A) The petitioner being the storing agent of F. C. I. had a storage godown of 2500 M. T. capacity. (b) The said godown was hired by FCI and a Lease Deed was executed between the petitioners and the Respondents No. 1. Said lease came into effect from 15-1-1988 for a period of three years at monthly rental of Rs. 7465/- and the said rent was assessed by the Special Land Acquisition Collector, 24 Parganas (S ). (c) The respondent has already paid assessed rent of the said godown upto 30-9-1990. Regarding the payment of arrear rent, the matter is under process and will be clear very soon. 7465/- and the said rent was assessed by the Special Land Acquisition Collector, 24 Parganas (S ). (c) The respondent has already paid assessed rent of the said godown upto 30-9-1990. Regarding the payment of arrear rent, the matter is under process and will be clear very soon. " ( 5 ) IT further appears from Paragraph 8 of the said affidavit that the respondents stated, inter alia, as follows :-"i state that bill submitted by petitioner, are under process and it takes sometime to take approval from the higher authority like Zonal Office and Regional Office of FCI. " ( 6 ) IN Paragraph 7 of the said affidavit the respondents stated that pursuant to the Hon'ble Court's Order the respondents paid to the petitioner some amount of money but the current rent could not be paid "due to some administrative reason. " The respondents did not dispute the amount claimed by 8 the Writ petitioner rather they have clearly admitted that regarding the payment, of arrear rent, the matter is under process and would be clear very soon. As stated earlier the said affidavit was affirmed on 4th March, 1993 but unfortunately, till the end of the year 1995 the respondents did not pay the Writ petitioner his legal due. ( 7 ) AT the time of hearing it was argued on behalf of the respondents that since the liability of the respondents are arising out of contract, the Writ petitioner is not entitled to get any relief in the Writ jurisdiction. According to the respondents, the Writ petitioner could have filed a civil suit for recovery of the arrear rent. ( 8 ) THE respondents relied upon Supreme Court's decision in (a) Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496 and (b) Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. , AIR 1986 SC 1370 in support of their contention that FCI's dealing with the Writ petitioner is a contractual dealing and it is not a matter for public law domain and is not a subject to judicial review. The respondents also referred to another decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. Jagannath Dutta, AIR 1993 SC 1494 . The respondents also referred to another decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. Jagannath Dutta, AIR 1993 SC 1494 . The attention of this Court was drawn to Paragraph 5 of the said Report which reads as follows :-"we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in quashing the impugned notice especially when the terms and conditions of the contract permitted the termination of the agreement by either of the parties. The High Court should not have gone into the question of contractual obligation in its writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Even otherwise the High Court misread the documents on the record and grossly erred in reaching the conclusion that no policy decision was taken by the FCI to terminate the storage agencies in the State of West Bengal. We may refer to some of the documents on the record. " ( 9 ) THE respondent also referred to some other decisions but the main thrust of their argument was centering round the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. ( 10 ) HON'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, AIR 1989 SC 1642 in paragraph 22 of the Report considered Radhakrishna Agarwal's case ( AIR 1977 SC 1496 ) (supra) and Escorts Ltd. 's case ( AIR 1986 SC 1370 ) (supra) and after considering the aforesaid two cases Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 22 of the Report itself observed as follows :-"however, it is not correct position. The Escort's decision reiterated that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State, must be informed by reasons. Indubitably, the respondent is an organ of the State under Art. 12 of the Constitution. In appropriate cases as was observed in the last mentioned decision, actions uninformed by reasons may be questioned as arbitrary in the proceedings under Art. 226 or Art. 32 of the Constitution but it has to be remembered that Art. 14 cannot be construed as a charter of judicial review of State action to call upon the State to account for his actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such action. " ( 11 ) HON'ble Supreme Court in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru S. M. V. S. J. M. S. Trust v. V. R. Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607 in paragraph 21 of the Report observed as follows :-"here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, professor De Smith states : "to be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract. " We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remian flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mamdamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to 9 reach injustice wherever it is found'. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition. " ( 12 ) IN view of M/ s. Dwarkadas Marfatia's case ( AIR 1989 SC 1642 ) (supra) and also Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru's cash ( AIR 1989 SC 1607 ) (supra) the contentions of the Respondents mentioned hereinabove are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. ( 13 ) THE facts and circumstances of the case involved in Food Corporation of India v. Jagannath Dutta ( AIR 1993 SC 1494 ) (supra) are completely different from the facts and circumstances involved in the case at hand. ( 14 ) IT would be helpful, at this stage, to refer to two Supreme Court decisions in (1) State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 647 . At pages 651 and 652, it was, inter alia, observed as follows :-"a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein not logically follows from the various observations made in it. At pages 651 and 652, it was, inter alia, observed as follows :-"a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein not logically follows from the various observations made in it. "on this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 :"now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood, 1898 AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all. " ( 15 ) IT is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. "and (2) Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 1766 , at page 1769 of the Report it was, inter alia, observed as follows : -"it is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts. " ( 16 ) IN view of above, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. Jaganath Dutta ( AIR 1993 SC 1494 ) (supra) has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. " ( 16 ) IN view of above, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. Jaganath Dutta ( AIR 1993 SC 1494 ) (supra) has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. ( 17 ) IN Shrilekha Vidyaarthi v. State of U. P. , AIR 1991 SC 537 in Paragraph 20 of the Report Hon'ble Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as follows :-"applicability of Art. 14 to all executive actions of the State being settled and for the same reason its applicability at the threshold to the making of a contract in exercise of the executive power being beyond dispute, can it be said that the State can thereafter cast off its personality and exercise under dwindled power unfettered by requirements of Art. 14 in the sphere of contractual matters and claim to be governed therein only by private law principles applicable to private individuals whose rights flow only from the terms of the contract without anything more ? We have no hesitation in saying that personality of the State requiring regulations of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Art. 14, does not undergo such a radical change after, the making of a contract merely because such contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirements of Article 14 and contractual obligations are 0 alien concepts which cannot co-exist. " ( 18 ) IN paragraph 21 of the said Report in Shrilekha Vidyaarthi's case ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ) (supra) it was observed, inter alia, as follows:-"this being the philosophy of the Constitution, can it be said that it contemplates exclusions of Article 14 - non-arbitrariness which is basic to rule of law - from State actions in contractual field when all actions of the State are meant for public good and expected to be fair and just ? We have no doubt that Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideal in the preamble. In our opinion, it would be alien to the Constitutional scheme to accept argument of exclusion of Art. 14 in contractual matters. We have no doubt that Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideal in the preamble. In our opinion, it would be alien to the Constitutional scheme to accept argument of exclusion of Art. 14 in contractual matters. The scope and permissible grounds of judicial review in such matters and the relief which may be available are different matters but that does not justify the view of its total exclusion. This is more so when the modern trend is also to examine the unreasonableness of a term in such contracts where the bargaining power is unequal so that these are not negotiated contracts but standard form contracts between unequals". ( 19 ) IN paragraph 22 of the said Report in Shrilekha Vidhyaarthi's case ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ) (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows :-"there is an obvious difference in the contracts between private parties and contracts in which the State is a party. Private parties are concerned only with their personal interest whereas the State while exercising its powers and discharging its functions, acts indubitably, as is expected of it, for public good and in public interest. The impact of every State action is also on public interest. This fact alone is sufficient to import at least the minimal requirements of public law obligations and impress with this character the contracts made by the State or its instrumentality. It is a different matter that the scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. However, to the extent, challenge is made on the ground of violation of Art. 14 by alleging that the impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also falls within the domain of contractual obligations would not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the basic requirements of Art. 14. To this extent the obligation is of a public character invariably in every case irrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition thereto. To this extent the obligation is of a public character invariably in every case irrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition thereto. An additional contractual obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee under Art. 14 of the non-arbitrariness at the hands of the State in any of its actions. " ( 20 ) AS stated earlier, the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition admitted that the lease came into effect from 15-1-1988 for a period of 3 years at a monthly rent of Rs. 7,465 and the said rent was assessed by the Special Land Acquisition Collector, 24 Parganas (South ). The respondents themselves stated that they paid assessed rent of the godowns upto 30-9-1990. The respondents themselves stated in the said affidavit that regarding the arrear rent the matter was under process and would be clear very soon. As stated earlier the said affidavit was affirmed on 4th March, 1993. Even till the end of 1995 the said arrear amount could not be paid by the respondents. Even in course of argument the respondents did not disclose any reason for non-payment of the arrear rent. In the said affidavit also the respondents did not disclose any cogent reason for such non-payment except by saying that the current rent could not be paid "due to some administrative reasons". The above statements of the respondents admitting their liability together with the fact of non-payment of rent for some not cogent administrative reasons proves that the Respondents are acting absolutely arbitrarily, whimsically and in bad faith. The respondents did not act fairly and did not adopt a procedure which is "fair play in action". No reasonable person would have acted in the manner the respondents have 1 acted. The respondents not only acted arbitrarily but also acted unreasonably and abused their power by not paying the arrear rent even during these three years after affirmation of the said affidavit. This arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the respondents, while dealing with the payment of arrear rent to the Writ Petitioner, violate the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 21 ) THE Writ Petitioner in paragraph 8 of the writ petition clearly stated that he and his large family are obsolutely dependent on the income of rent from the said 5 godowns and office accommodation. ( 21 ) THE Writ Petitioner in paragraph 8 of the writ petition clearly stated that he and his large family are obsolutely dependent on the income of rent from the said 5 godowns and office accommodation. Thus by non-payment of due rent, the Writ Petitioner and his family members were deprived of their livelihood by the respondents in utter violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The statements of the Writ Petitioner in paragraph 8 of the writ petition that he and his family members are absolutely dependent on the rent income, have not been specifically denied by the respondents. In Paragraph 10 of the Writ petition it has been stated that the very inaction of the respondents in the matter of non-payment of arrear rent shows their vindictiveness against the Writ Petitioner. ( 22 ) IN F. C. I. v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71 : ( AIR 1993 SC 1601 ), in paragraph 7 of the report Supreme Court, inter alia, observed as follows :-"in contractual spheres as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law : A public authority possesses power only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fair play in action'. " ( 23 ) THOUGH in the said affidavit the respondents did not raise any objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that such writ petition is not maintainable because the obligation of the respondents is arising out of contract, yet in course of argument, as stated earlier, such objection was raised by the respondents. At this stage it is useful to refer to Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. M/s. Graphic Industries Co. , AIR 1995 SC 409 . In paragraph 4 of the said report it was, inter alia, observed as follows :-"the Bench also took the view that what was said in the letter was just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and was inconsonance with the view expressed by this Court. , AIR 1995 SC 409 . In paragraph 4 of the said report it was, inter alia, observed as follows :-"the Bench also took the view that what was said in the letter was just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and was inconsonance with the view expressed by this Court. In Hindustan Sugar Mills v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1981 SC 1681 : (1980) 1 SCC 599 , wherein it was held by this Court that the Central Government should honour its legal obligation arising even out of contract and not deprive a citizen to file a suit. It was reiterated in that judgment that in a democratic society governed by the rule of law, it is the duty of the State to do what is fair and just to the citizen and the State should not seek to defeat the legitimate claim of the citizens by adopting a legalistic attitude but should do what fairness and justice demand. " ( 24 ) ADMITTEDLY F. C. I. is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. ( 25 ) IN view of the discussions made hereinabove the Writ Petitioner is entitled to relief he has claimed for and this Court is also entitled to pass such an order in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 26 ) THE matter may be viewed from another angle also. The respondents admitted in the said affidavit that the Writ Petitioner is entitled to the arrear rent. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of M. P. v. Ranoji Rao, AIR 1968 SC 1053 , in paragraph 6 of the report, inter alia, observed as follows :-"it is obvious that a right to a sum of money is property. " ( 27 ) THEREFORE, the right of the Writ Petitioner to the admitted arrear rent is a property of the Writ Petitioner. ( 28 ) IN Laxmindhar Behara v. Bansidhar Khatei, AIR 1989 Orissa 182, following the above referred Supreme Court's decision, AIR 1968 SC 1053 , it was reiterated that a right to sum of money is property. That being the legal position, in view of the provisions 2 contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law. That being the legal position, in view of the provisions 2 contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The said Art. 300-A imposes a duty and obligation that no person can be deprived of his property save by authority of law, at the same time the said Article creates right in favour of a person that he should not be deprived of his property save by authority of law. Therefore, the respondents are under duty and obligation not to deprive the Writ Petitioner of his property save by authority of law. Unfortunately, neither in the said affidavit nor in course of argument the respondents could point out any provision of law on the basis of which it can deprive the Writ Petitioner of his legal due. Thus, the action of the respondents also violated the provisions of Art. 300-A of the Constitution of India. ( 29 ) AT this stage, the meaning of the words "deprive" and "deprivation" may be looked into. This Court has already arrived at a decision that the Writ Petitioner and his family members have been deprived of their livelihood in utter violation of Art. 21. This Court has also arrived at a decision that the Writ Petitioner has been deprived of his property in utter violation of Art. 300-A. The meaning of the terms "deprive" and "deprivation" are as follows:-""deprive" conveys the idea of taking away that which one has, or withholding that which one may have. To take something from; to keep from acquiring, using, or enjoying something; to take away, end, injure, or destroy. State ex rel. Star Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 60 S. W. 91, 100, 159 Mo. 410, 51 L. R. A. 151, 81 Am. St. Rep. 368. ""even a temporary deprivation of property constitutes a "deprivation" within meaning of Fourteenth Amendment. Rmm v. Landrieu, D. C. La. , 418 F Supp 542, 545. " "temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a "deprivation" in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment due process. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Duval, D. C. Fla. , 392 F Supp 1023, 1035. ""a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a "deprivation" in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Snead v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, D. C. N. Y. , 355 F Supp 764, 770. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Duval, D. C. Fla. , 392 F Supp 1023, 1035. ""a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a "deprivation" in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Snead v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, D. C. N. Y. , 355 F Supp 764, 770. ""a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a "deprivation" in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fuentes v. Shevin, U. S. Fla, (1972) 92 SCt 1983, 1996, 407 US 67, 32 L Ed 2d 556. ""a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a "deprivation" in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parham v. Cortese, U. S. Pa. , (1972) 92 SCt 1983, 1996, 407 US 67, 32 L Ed 2d 556. " ( 30 ) THUS the Writ Petitioner and his family members have been deprived of their livelihood and the Writ Petitioner has been deprived of his property in utter violation of Arts. 21 and 300-A of the Constitution respectively. May be, such deprivation is nonfinal or temporary, nonetheless it amounts to deprivation. It has been discussed at length earlier that the Respondents have also violated Art. 14 of the Constitution by acting arbitrarily, unreasonably, unfairly and by adopting a procedure which is not "fair play in action. " ( 31 ) IN the facts and circumstances stated hereinabove the respondents are directed to pay the Writ Petitioner his all arrear amount of rent within 4 weeks from the date of this order and to pay an interest on the said amount at the rate of Rs. 12 per cent. per annum from the date next to the date of expiry of the lease term till the date of actual payment. Such payment of interest should also be made to the Writ Petitioner within four weeks from the date of this order. The writ petition is allowed as mentioned hereinabove. ( 32 ) BEFORE concluding this judgment, this Court refers to a few lines of the decision delivered by Hon'ble Justice B. L. Hansaria in B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 8 JT (SC) 65. The writ petition is allowed as mentioned hereinabove. ( 32 ) BEFORE concluding this judgment, this Court refers to a few lines of the decision delivered by Hon'ble Justice B. L. Hansaria in B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 8 JT (SC) 65. The relevant lines read as follows : -"it deserves to be pointed out that mere fact that there is no provision parallel to Art. 142 relating to the High Courts, can be no ground 3 to think that they have not to do complete justice and if moulding of relief would do complete justice between parties, the same cannot be ordered. The absence of the provisions like Art. 142 is not material, according to me. "petition allowed.