M. SENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a first appeal arising out of an Order passed on 21-11-1995 in Civil Suit No. 13 of 1995 by the District Judge, East and North, Sikkim at Gangtok ordering for an injunction over the effect of an order of termination of agency or contract. ( 2 ) THE fact of the case, in a nutshell, is that the Plaintiff (Respondent before us) was appointed agent, or in other words agency was awarded in favour of her, for dealing with hides and skins within the State of Sikkim. The agency was for five years with effect from 1-10-1991. Being the lawfully appointed agent of the Government, the plaintiff started purchasing hides and skins from various butcheries within the State of Sikkim and dealing with the same either by selling it to the local utilisers or by way of exporting them under proper permit from the Government. The business was going on till before 5-8-1995. But suddenly on 5-8-1995 the plaintiff found the Remeshwar of Lall Market forcibly taking away about 500 pieces of hides and skins, collected and stored by the plaintiff, from the store room at Majhitar. On being questioned Rameshwar replied that he was doing so under the authority from the Department of Animal Husbandry. Plaintiff brought it to the notice of the Secretary, Animal Husbandry Department on 7-8-1995. In response to the complaint lodged with the Secretary, the Additional Director, Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Service informed the Sub-Divisional Officer, Rangpo and the concerned police stationson 8-8-1995 to maintain peace and tranquillity in the area to enable the plaintiff to carry on his works properly. Simultaneously on the same date the plaintiff got another letter from the Principal Director of Animal Husbandry Department indicating that the agency of the plaintff was terminated retrospectively from 5-8-1995. Simultaneously on the same date the plaintiff got another letter from the Principal Director of Animal Husbandry Department indicating that the agency of the plaintff was terminated retrospectively from 5-8-1995. ( 3 ) ON receipt of the letter of termination the plaintiff issued a notice under Section 80, C. P. C. on the Government on 9-8-1995 and ultimately the suit which has been registered as Civil Suit No. 13 of 95 was filed on 18-5-1995 together with an application for interim order of injunction under Order 39, rules 1 and 2, C. P. C. Because of urgency, leave of the Court was also sought for under Section 80 (2), C. P. C. Some interim order of injunction was passed on the very same date of filing of the suit and application and ultimately on 21-11-1995 the impugned order was passed on hearing both the sides. Being aggrieved by the order this Appeal has been preferred. ( 4 ) IN the suit, written statement was filed on behalf of both the defendants who are the Commissioner-cum-Secretary and the Principal Director of Animal Husbandry Department of the Government of Sikkim. Both of them are the appellants before us. Written objection against the prayer for interim orders of injunction was, however, filed on behalf of Appellant No. 2 only. ( 5 ) IN this appeal we are to see if the Learned District Judge was justified in granting the prayer for temporary injunction. ( 6 ) SOME defects have been pointed out by the Learned Advocate-General at the initial stage of argument for the Appellants. He has mentioned that no substantive prayer for permanent injunction has been made in the plaint. He also points out that the reliefs claimed in the notice under Section 80, C. P. C. and in the plaint vary substantially. 6a. It is the contention on behalf of the Respondent that in the notice under Section 80, C. P. C. the reliefs sought for were for cancellation of the letter of termination of her agency and for compensation for the mischief caused to her on 5-8-1995 and also for costs of the suit. In the plaint she has prayed for a declaration that her agency has been continuing and for a decree for cancellation of the order of termination, for compensation, for cost of the suit and also for interim injunction. In the plaint she has prayed for a declaration that her agency has been continuing and for a decree for cancellation of the order of termination, for compensation, for cost of the suit and also for interim injunction. ( 7 ) THUS we see that in the notice there was no mention of any claim for injunction. It may be noted that the statutory notices are to be construed rather liberally. Eye should be kept to see that a notice leaves no scope for any confusion regarding identity of the party, cause of action and releiefs claimed. Keeping that in view and to avoid too much technicality over statutory notices like one under Section 80, C. P. C. , amendment was made in 1977 introducing sub-section (3) to Section 80, C. P. C. . There it has been noted that names, description etc. of the parties serving the notice should be so as to create no confusion as to the identity of such person. The cause of action and the relief also are to be indicated substantially. Long before the amendment which was effective from 1-2-1977 it was held in decisions like Soulendra Mohan's Case, AIR 1934 Patna 701 that it was not incumbent upon the plaintiff to indicate all forms of relief in detail in a notice under Section 80, C. P. C. . Therefore, this objection does not appear to carry much weight. It is,hence rejected. The Respondent also submits that sufficiency of the notice under Section 80, C. P. C. was not challenged either in the written statement or in the objection raised against the prayer for interim injunction. Plaintiff-Respondent therefore takes the plea that the State has waived the same. It is apparent on the face of the record that sufficiency of the notice under Section 80, C. P. C. was not challenged till before the time of hearing of this Appeal. In such a case plea of waiver of notice has been rightly taken by the Respondent. AIR 1934 Patna 354 (Ram Narayan v. Ram Kishan) and AIR 1959 Rajasthan 126 (FB); State of Rajasthan v. Girdharilal may be referred to in this context. In such a case plea of waiver of notice has been rightly taken by the Respondent. AIR 1934 Patna 354 (Ram Narayan v. Ram Kishan) and AIR 1959 Rajasthan 126 (FB); State of Rajasthan v. Girdharilal may be referred to in this context. ( 8 ) LEARNED Advocate-General referred to the decision in Raman Hosiery v. J. K. Sythetics reported in AIR 1974 Delhi 207 to argue that where permanent injunction has not been sought for in the suit itself, no interim injunction can be granted. The responent, however, contends that hers is not a case where injunction of permanent nature can be sought for. She was capable of claiming her claim and interest over the agency till the end of September, 1996 only and the same has been sought for by her in the form of declaration. What she needed was temporary injunction restraining any attempt to terminate her agency before expiry of its tenure. She, therefore, prayed for an interim injunction to that effect in her plaint and also in her application under Section 39, Rules 1 and 2. Both of which were filed on 11-8-1995 simultaneously. Taking an extreme case in view, the Respondent pleaded that even if relief in the form of injunction was not sought for in the plaint, the Court was within its competence to grant order of injunction to protect the interest of the Respondent (Plaintiff) or to maintain the status quo. L. D. Meston Schoolsociety's Case, AIR 1951 Allahabad 558, at para 12 and Gyano v. Bhim Singh, AIR 1978 NOC 151 (Punj and Har) indicate that when somebody's interest in the subject appears to be at stake, the Court may issue order of injunciton to protect his interest and to preserve the status quo, irrespective of the fact that the suit is for declaration only. ( 9 ) THEREFORE, preliminary objections raised on behalf of the State on the point of competence of the Court to grant order of injunction in such a suit, cannot be accepted. ( 10 ) IT has been contended on behalf of the appellant that there was no contract between the parties in the eye of the law. Section 23 of the Contract Act has been referred to show that the contract between the parties was not under any provision of law and thus it was not enforceable. Hence it was terminated unilaterally without any notice. Section 23 of the Contract Act has been referred to show that the contract between the parties was not under any provision of law and thus it was not enforceable. Hence it was terminated unilaterally without any notice. It has been contended that Rule 7 (2) of the Sikkim (Livestock and Livestock Products Control) Act, 1985 provides that there would be only two types of agencies to deal with hides and skins. One is a Corporation owned or controlled by the Government and the other is a Co-operative Society. Since the so-called agency created in favour of the plaintiff does not come within any of these two categories, the agency cannot be said to the legal. Therefore, it was rightly terminated. The ground given in the letter of termination dated 8-8-1995 is also the same. It appears that sometime in October, 1991 the plaintiff was allowed to lift hides and skins within the State of Sikkim. Rates for procurement of such hides and skins were also prescribed from time to time under Section 3 of the Act. Ultimately on 19-6-1993 the agency of the plaintiff got formal approval for five years from 1-10-1991. The points raised in the letter of termination dated 8-8-1995 is that the agency was given in contravention of Rule 7 (1) and (2) of the Act without any legal agreement between the parties. The agency was neither approved by competent authority nor the letter of appointment was signed by any competent authority and that the agency was created in violation of the main spirit of the Act. ( 11 ) FOR creation of an agency or contract no formal document is required. It may be express or implied and by words and conducts also. Sections 186 and 187 of the Contract Act would be relevant for the purpose. Therefore, the ground that no legal agreement between the parties was there does not stand at all. Regarding the authority of making the appointment, we may find from the formal appointment letter dated 19-6-1993 that it was 'with the approval of the Government. ' What else one may expect from the plaintiff to show that it was granted by lawful authority ? ( 12 ) WE have already noted that one of the pleas for termination is that the agency was granted in contravention of Section 7 (2) of the Livestock Control Act. ' What else one may expect from the plaintiff to show that it was granted by lawful authority ? ( 12 ) WE have already noted that one of the pleas for termination is that the agency was granted in contravention of Section 7 (2) of the Livestock Control Act. It has been urged on behalf of the State that only a Corporation owned or controlled by the Government and a registered Co-operative Society can be appointed as agent. Since the Plaintiff does not come within either of the categories as mentioned in Section 7 (2) of the Act, the appointment must be held to be illegal. The contention of the Respondent in this regard is that she was appointed as authorised agent under Section 7 (1) where an individual may be appointed and so her appointment cannot be cancelled on the plea that she does not come within any of the categories mentioned under Section 7 (2) of the Act. ( 13 ) IT becomes necessary to adjudicate the points of dispute inthis respect, here and now. In other words we should see if 'authorised agent' appearing under Section 7 (1) and 'agent' as appearing under Section 7 (2) are two different categories. A reading of Section 7 (1) indicates that only an authorised agent of the Government can deal in the trade and commerce of hides and skins. Nothing has been elaborated in this sub-section as to who my be appointed as 'authorised agent'. The same has been categorised under Section 7 (2 ). Therefore 'authorised agent' appearing under Section 7 (1) and 'agent' appearing under Section 7 (2) ought to be the same. Section 9 and Section 14 of the Act refer to authorised agent. Nowhere in the Act one finds reference to any rights or duties of any 'agent' simpliciter. In Section 7 (3) of the Act we find 'agent authorised'. We cannot distinguish between an authorised agent and an agent authorised. Any legal dictionary would indicate that a person authorised by the principal to do an for him is the agent. Likewise 'authority' means power or right conferred on a person usually by another to act on his behalf. Whenever any need for interpretation of any point of any statute arises, the grammatical meaning of the term should be given proper important. Likewise 'authority' means power or right conferred on a person usually by another to act on his behalf. Whenever any need for interpretation of any point of any statute arises, the grammatical meaning of the term should be given proper important. Moreover, only that meaning of a term should be accepted which would harmonise with the other provisions or the whole of the statute. Principles laid down in D. Sanjeevayya's Case reported in AIR 1967 SC 1211 and Madanlal Fakirchand's Case reported in AIR 1962 SC 1543 may be referred to in this context. On applying these principles and to give an effective meaning to the terms we hold that 'authorised agent' appearing in Section 7 (1) is the same as 'agent' appearing in Section 7 (2) of the Act. Section 7 (2)is the enabling provision under which the Government is to appoint its agent as contemplated under Section 7 (1) of the Act. ( 14 ) THUS it is apparent that the appointment of the Respondent as an agent of the Government was not strictly according to the Act of 1985. The agency should have gone to any Corporation owned or controlled by the Govenment or to any Co-operative Society and not to any individual like the Respondent. However, the Respondent got the agency and that's too for a fixed period of five years with effect from 1-10-1991. The point remains whether such an agent can be removed from his position suddenly and unceremoniously. ( 15 ) THE order of termination dated 8-8-1995 indicates that when the agency's tenure was to complete within a period of around a year, the Government woke up from its slumber and suddently bent upon to mend the wrong committed by way of granting agency to an individual. Fortunately the Court was provided with the opportunity to go through the departmental file. It gives out a very pathetic account of development at the Governmental level. There is no indication whatsoever in the file or in the pleading that the conduct of the Respondent as an agent was prejudicial to the interest of the State or that the Respondent was guilty of any misconduct. The only grudge of the Government as appears in the file was that he was earning too much money as the prices of hides and skins in the plains had shot up like anything. The only grudge of the Government as appears in the file was that he was earning too much money as the prices of hides and skins in the plains had shot up like anything. It was open to the Government to revise the rate of procurement of hides and skins at Sikkim or to enhance the rates of Government revenue in a manner which would have been beneficial to the Government. But the Government did not do that and preferred to butcher the Respondent. ( 16 ) THERE were several aspirants for entering into such a business and they applied long back to the Government accordingly. But by this time the Government picked up a new man of their choice and wanted to place him with such an agency in a round about manner. This new favoured individual of the Government has been picked up for replacement of the Respondent who was a favoured child of the Government in October, 1991. Therefore, the Government wanted to undo a wrong by committing another wrong. ( 17 ) THIS individual, Rameshwar, was given the new assignment on 3-8-1995. This assignment was also not in the form of appointment as an agent u/s. 7 but by way of some permit issued u/s. 8 of the Act for exporting hides and skins outside the State of Sikkim. One is yet to find out the reason for issuance of such a permit to an individual and an outsider when the authorised agent (Respondent) was available at hand for the said purpose. It would be worth mentioning in this connection that though Section 8 does not indicate that the export business is to be made by authorised agent only, if we read Section 8 in the light of Sections 7 and 9 we would come to the irresistible conclusion that export business can only be done by an authorised agent. More because, u/s. 9 hides and skins are available only to the agent appointed u/s. 7. Therefore, none other than an agent can have the scope to collect hides and skins for export or for any other business. An individual cannot have any scope to collect hides and skins in adequate number for export, as no individual is permitted to slaughter livestock for purpose other than his personal and family. Therefore, none other than an agent can have the scope to collect hides and skins for export or for any other business. An individual cannot have any scope to collect hides and skins in adequate number for export, as no individual is permitted to slaughter livestock for purpose other than his personal and family. ( 18 ) NOW comes that horrifying incident of 5-8-1995 when Rameshwar is alleged to have taken away the stock of hides and skins from the custody of the Respondent. It is obvious that Rameshwar who deposited quite handsome amount of money with the Government for exporting hides and skins had left with no other alternative but to take out the stock from others. ( 19 ) WHEN the Respondent brought (sic) the notice of the incident of 5-8-1995 to the Secretary, Animal Husbandry on 7-8-1995, the Department became conscious and realised that they made a blunder by way of allowing Rameshwar to deal with hides and skins for export purpose from or after 3-8-1995 without appointing him an agent of the Government for the said purpose and before termination of the contract of the Respondent. Hurriedly the Government issued an order of termination on 8-8-1995 and that was done retrospectively from that eventful day of 5-8-1995. ( 20 ) WE take up now the question of illegality of the order of termination. We have already indicated that the manner in which the termination was made overnight did not have the sanction of ethics. Now we would see if it had the backing of law. ( 21 ) WE have already noted that the case does not fall within the purview of Section 23 of the Contract Act. Section 201, Contract Act deals with termination of agency. But this case falls more specifically u/ss. 205 and 206 of the Indian Contract Act. We have seen that in the instant case the immatured revocation has been made neitherfor sufficient cause nor with reasonable notice. For want of either of these the loss sustained by the agent is to be made good with appropriate compensation by the erring principal. But that's not all. Here the principal is the Government and it cannot act like a greedy individual. Moreover, every damage cannot be quantified in terms of money. For want of either of these the loss sustained by the agent is to be made good with appropriate compensation by the erring principal. But that's not all. Here the principal is the Government and it cannot act like a greedy individual. Moreover, every damage cannot be quantified in terms of money. We have already pointed out the circumstances under and the manner in which such a hasty step was taken by the Government. Again, another point hits below the belt. It is the retrospective effect of the letter of termination. Sections 205 and 206 of the Contract Act make provision for compensation for immatured termination without notice. But the law never contemplated termination of an existing contract or agency with retrospective effect. Respondent referred to the decision reported in AIR 1969 Mad 423 (International Oil Company v. Indial Oil Company) and AIR 1990 NOC 87 (Andhra Pradesh) (M/s. Popular Shoe Mart v. Srinivas Rao) to indicate that a renunciation of agency without proper notice is void. To counteract the above proposition Learned Advocate-General referred to the decisions reported in S. L. Kapoor's Case, (1980) 4 SCC 379 : (AIR 1981 SC 136) and Olga Tellis's Case reported in (1985) 3 SCC 545 : (AIR 1986 SC 180 ). We are sorry that neither of these two decisions help the State in any manner so far as the question of illegality of any order of termination for want of notice. ( 22 ) LEARNED Advocate-General took us through the decision of the Supreme Court in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719 : (AIR 1993 SC 276) where the three golden principles for granting of injunction as a discretionary relief have been reiterated. We must discuss the present case in the light of these principles. ( 23 ) THE plaintiff must have a prima facie case or in the language of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision 'there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the Court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for. ( 23 ) THE plaintiff must have a prima facie case or in the language of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision 'there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the Court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for. ' We have already discussed and held that though the old Contract between the Government and the plaintiff was not thoroughly lawful but the manner in which the termination of the contract with retrospective effect was made was absolutely unlawful and should be remedied in the suit. Therefore, this agent goes in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. ( 24 ) THE next point is balance of convenience and inconvenience. In the language of the Supreme Court, 'the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. ' In our case the plaintiff had his infrastructure to continue with the business. There is no allegation of lack of infrastructure, lack of efficiency or dishonesty in the running of the agency. On the face of it, the running business has been attempted to be drastically stopped from functioning without making any alternative arrangement whatsoever. Thus the balance of convenience and inconvenience definitely swings in favour of the plaintiff. ( 25 ) THE third point is the question of irreparable injury which in the language of the Supreme Court 'the Court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial. ' We should bear in our mind that irreparable injury does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be material one, namely one that can be adequately compensated by way of damages. In the instant case, we do not think that the damages already sustained by the plaintiff and likely to sustain afterwards are of such a nature which can be compensated monetarily. Learned Advocate-General referred to the notice u/s. 80, C. P. C. and also to one of the prayers made by the plaintiff in the suit where compensation have been claimed. Learned Advocate-General referred to the notice u/s. 80, C. P. C. and also to one of the prayers made by the plaintiff in the suit where compensation have been claimed. This compensation is for the loss of business for the period from 5-8-1995 to 8-8-1995. But that's not all. A person contemplated to carry on his business till the end of September, 1996 finds an abrupt closure of his business without any fault on his part must be suffering physically, mentally, monetarily, socially and what not. Can such injuries be made good by money only? Moreover, assessment of such damages in terms of money is a complicated job, if not an impossibility. ( 26 ) THUS, we find that there is no material on record to interfere with the decision arrived at by the Learned District Judge. Hence, the appeal is dismissed on contest with costs. Order passed on 21-11-1995 by the Learned District Judge, East and North, Gangtok in Civil Suit No. 13 of 1995 is confirmed. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .