Honble KOKJE, J. – The appellant-husband aggrieved by the rejection of application for a decree of divorce preferred this appeal. The parties were married to each other on 30.11.76. There is no issue born out of this wedlock. The appellant-petitioner filed an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the Act) on 23.7.86 seeking a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion and cruelty. It was alleged that the respondent lived with the petitioner for a period of 8,9 months and thereafter deserted him. It was also alleged that she practiced cruelty upon the petitioner by withdrawing from his society and making false allegations of adultery against him. In her reply the respondent admitted that she was not living with the petitioner, but claimed that she has reasonable ground for refusing to live with the petitioner in as much as the petitioner was having illicit relations with one nurse and is not prepared to severe his connections with that lady. It was also pleaded that the petitioner had entered into a marriage with this girl. It has been specifically alleged in the reply filed by the respondent before the trial Court that when the respondent went to live with the petitioner with the petitioners sister Rajrani in Ganganagar in presence of his own sister the petitioner used to live with the nurse and had illicit relations with her. (2). The petitioner examined himself alone in the case and the respon dent examined herself, her father Lokuram, her brother Ravi Kumar and one Banwarilal. On assessment of the evidence the learned trial Court found that none of the grounds for obtaining divorce were proved. The learned Distt. Judge has found that the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Chetandas was not reliable in the face of the testimony of respondent and her witnesses. (3). The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the ground of desertion should be taken as proved as soon as the respondent admitted that she was living separately. According to the learned counsel having admitted living separately the burden was on the respondent to prove the reasonableness of the cause of her living separately. According to the learned counsel the respondent has not been able to prove that the petitioner was living in adultery with one Miss Soama Thomas. According to the learned counsel having admitted living separately the burden was on the respondent to prove the reasonableness of the cause of her living separately. According to the learned counsel the respondent has not been able to prove that the petitioner was living in adultery with one Miss Soama Thomas. It was contended that unless it is proved that the petitioner was living in adultary with said Miss Thomas it could not be accepted that the respondent had reasonable excuse for living separately or for depriving the petitioner of her company. According to the learned counsel for the appellant the respondent has failed to discharge the burden of proof and, therefore, the appellant-petitioner was entitled to a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion by the respondent. The respondent on the other hand contended that it was for the petitioner to prove the ground of divorce under Section 13 of the Act. It was contended that the ground that the respondent has deserted the petitioner cannot be proved unless the petitioner by his evidence excludes the possibility of existance of a reasonable cause for the respondent to live separately. According to the respondent the petitioner has failed in proving a ground on which divorce could be obtained. (4). I have gone through the record and I have heard the learned counsel. To my mind the best evidence in the circumstances could be of the persons living in the neighbourhood of the couple at Sriganganagar from where the desertion is said to have taken place. The evidence of the peti- tioners father and his sister Rajrani was also crutial because it was alleged that these two persons knew of the adulterous behaviour of the petitioner. The question now is who would suffer because of non-examination of these witnesses. (5). The expression desertion in the context of matrimonial law repre- sents a legal conception and is one very difficult to define. The essence of desertion is the forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of the other. The essential ingredients of this offence in order that it may furnish a ground for relief are; (i), factum of separation; (ii) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, animus deserendi. The essential ingredients of this offence in order that it may furnish a ground for relief are; (i), factum of separation; (ii) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end, animus deserendi. It would, therefore, be fallacious to accept the arguments of the appellant that as the factum of separation is admitted desertion stands proved. In this case the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end has not been proved and on the contrary the respondent has been saying that if the appellant severes his connection with Miss Sogama Thomas respondent was ready to return to her husband. This would show that there is no animus deserendi in the respondent living separately from her husband. (6). In Mulla`s Commentary of Hindu Law it has been observed that it is a well established principle that a spouse who withdraws from cohabita- tion for what is described as a good cause or a just cause or an effective cause such as adultery or cruelty cannot be said to be guilty of desertion for in such a case it is the conduct of the offending spouse that is the cause of separation and the spouse who leaves the matrimonial home cannot be said to have acted from any animus deserendi. (7). In Glenister vs. Glenister, (1) Lord Merriman, P. observed as follows :– ``If the wife has so conducted herself as to lead any reasonable person to believe, until she gives some explanation that she has committed adultery, the husband, becoming aware of the facts and honestly drawing that inference and leaving his wife on that ground ought not to be held to have left her without reasonable cause. This principle was approved by Court of Appeal in Allen vs. Allen . (8). Learned counsel for the appellant lastly pressed in to service observations in para 38 of the decision of this Court in Parihar vs. Parihar, (2) to the effect that a marriage in which the parties could not live together any more deserves to be dissolved. However, learned Judge in that case has noted that there is no provision in the Act that a marriage which has broken down irretrievably should be dissolved. The learned Judge went on to refer to some English cases and resort to ingenuity taken by the Judges where justice demanded. However, learned Judge in that case has noted that there is no provision in the Act that a marriage which has broken down irretrievably should be dissolved. The learned Judge went on to refer to some English cases and resort to ingenuity taken by the Judges where justice demanded. However, these observations are only casual and passing in nature because the learned Judge has clearly observed that in the case he was dealing with cruelty by the wife had been established. This cannot, therefore, be an authority to the proposition that wherever a marriage appears to be irretrievably broken to the Judge he may grant divorce even when the ground under Section 13 of the Act has not been proved. Moreover, in Uma Shanker Joshi vs. Rajeswari & Another (3) Single Bench of this Court has clearly laid down that living separately for many years does not supply a ground for divorce and the Court cannot dissolve marriage between the parties on a ground which is not specified in the Act. (9). For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal has no force and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.