RAVI S. DHAVAN, J. The three petitioners, Karan Singh, Ram Singh and Sanwal Singh, have filed this writ petition to challenge acquisition proceedings in pursuance of notifications under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The notification under Sec tion 4 was issued on 7th February 1984. The notification under Section 6 was issued on 3rd May, 1986. These were followed by further notifications. 2. An interim order of the court passed on 9th September 1986 directed that during the pendency of the writ petition the dispossession of the petitioners from three plots No. 164, 179 and 180 situate in village Kishanpur, Pargana and Tehsil Koil, District Aligarh shall remain stayed. 3. This matter has been pending at the High Court for ten years. It was argued before other Division Benches on several occasions. On one occasion, the judgment was reserved, but then the proceedings were reopened for further hearing. Thereafter, the matter was released to be placed before the Court for hearing denovo. From the record, the court notices that the original record of the State of U. P. had been sent for by the earlier Bench. The purpose for which the record had been sent for, this Court would not know. Suffice it to say that with the Standing Counsel possessed of the record, the court enquired whether an award had been rendered in reference to the land acquisition proceedings, or for that matter, which affect the petitioners or the interim order of the Court. Learned Standing Counsel, reported to the Court that in reference to the plots, aforesaid, no award is available on record and this fact is referred to in paragraph 3 of Annexure II to the counter affidavit filed by the Secretary, Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Sahkari Avas Samiti, Aligarh, respondent No. 3. The merits of the acquisition, it is contended on behalf of the petitioners is for a cooperative society which is financially meeting the entire cost of acquisition proceedings for the benefit of its members and constituents. The cooperative society, i. e. , respondent No. 3, is a housing society. The entire land for which land acquisition proceedings were initiated is meant to be distributed amongst the members of the society. The Standing Counsel, in reference to the enquiry of the Court, stated that the State of Uttar Pradesh has not pitched any public funds for the purposes of the acquisition proceedings. The entire land for which land acquisition proceedings were initiated is meant to be distributed amongst the members of the society. The Standing Counsel, in reference to the enquiry of the Court, stated that the State of Uttar Pradesh has not pitched any public funds for the purposes of the acquisition proceedings. The sole question now which is before the Court is whether a housing society could seek aid or the exercise of sovereign powers for the acquisi tion of other peoples property for distribution amongst its members. The answer now is readily available from the decision of the Supreme Court in re. Srinivasa Co. House Building Society v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry & Others. JT1994 (4) SC197. 4. In the matter relating to Srinivasa Co. Housing Building Society (supra), it has been clearly explained that should an acquisition be made in favour of a company for a public purpose, the law permits development of housing and dwelling units as an ancillary to the dominant purpose being a public purpose; for instance setting up of an industry etc. In addition, if public funds have joined the purpose of acquisition even for a housing society, the action may become questionable. If the purpose of acquisition is ultimately to distribute the plots amongst the constituents of the society, the Supreme Court was of the view that this may not be a public purpose and could be interpreted as a colourable exercise of power for use of sovereign powers and utilisation of public funds for the only purpose to acquire other people s land for the only object of distributing it amongst the members whether they are Chartered Accountants or Advocates. 5. In the case before the High Court, the land was acquired for the cooperative society, i. e. , the respondent No. 3, Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Sahakari Avas Samiti, Aligarh. The State has not joined in with public funds in the acquisition proceedings. The balance which remains, is use of sovereign powers in the aid of the society to acquire land and, thereafter, distribute it amongst its constituents or the members of the society. The present case is in a worse situation than the one is which the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in the matter relating to Srinivasa Co. House Building Society (Supra ). 6. The present case is in a worse situation than the one is which the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in the matter relating to Srinivasa Co. House Building Society (Supra ). 6. Candidly, when the Supreme Court case was placed at the Bar, learned coun sel appearing on behalf of the society was at a loss to meet the situation. The state of the record now is that powers of the State were utilised for acquiring land or proper ty of other people. The State of U. P, had not joined in to give it a colour of a public purpose and the acquisition was not ancillary to the dominant purpose of constructing dwelling houses in case the acquisition was made for an industry, its the context of the Act, aforesaid. 7. The acquisition proceedings, thus, are bad. It is for this reason that the record also shows that in between, the cooperative society has been compromising with those who held the property which was subjected to acquisition proceedings as if it was not possessed of the confidence that it may possess the entire land as a conse quence of acquisition. If sovereign powers are utilised for acquiring land, there is no question of any compromise because should the proceedings be in accordance with law as a consequential measure it must culminate in an award and those whose land is acquired are obliged to receive compensation in lieu of acquisition. In the present case, in reference to the petitioners and their plot, there is no award. The academic question is if the acquisition is not for a public purpose and regard being had to the decision of the Supreme Court (supra), could an award yet be rendered? 8. Thus, the High Court leaves the record at this juncture because enough guidelines are available in the decision of the Supreme Court (supra), which, it will be difficult for either cooperative society, aforesaid, or the State respondents to ignore. 9. The petition, thus, succeeds and the interim order of 19-9-1986 preventing dispossession of the petitioners from the Plot Nos. 164, 179 and 180, situate in village Kishanpur, Pargana and Tehsil Koil, District Aligarh, is made absolute. The petitioners shall not be dispossessed except in accordance with law. 10. The writ petition succeeds, and is allowed with costs. Petition allowed. .