JUDGMENT - T.K. CHANDRA SHEKHARA DAS, J.:---The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on probation by the respondent No. 3 in Shri Vasant Vidyalaya English High School, Siolim, Bardez Goa as per the Letter of Appointment dated 15th January, 1987. While he was continuing as such in the academic year 1987-88 there was reduction in the staff strength and, consequently, the petitioner was retrenched from services. The petitioner approaches this Court in this petition with a prayer for reinstatement and other consequential benefits, quashing the order of retrenchment. 2.Heard counsel for the petitioner and also for the respondents. 3.The counsel for the respondents 3 to 5 Shri Thali raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner has an alternative remedy by way of appeal before the Administrative Tribunal and so long as he has not availed of that remedy any relief from this Court by way of writ cannot be granted. He brought to our notice section 22 of the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Act, 1984 read with Rule 83 of the Goa ,Daman and Diu School Education Rules, 1986. Going by these provisions Shri Thali, counsel for the respondents 3 to 5, submits that there is an effective and alternative remedy available to the petitioner. Shri D'Souza, counsel for the petitioner, of course, disputes this position and argues that Rule 83 speaks about termination of a probationer consequent upon disciplinary proceedings whereas in the present case it was a termination on account of the petitioner being a surplus hand which would come under Rule 34 of the Rules. To counter the argument of the petitioner, Shri Thali, counsel for respondents 3 to 5, brought out a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in (Franciscan Sisters of St. Mary and another v. The Administrative Tribunal for Goa, Daman and Diu)1, reported in 1988(4) Bom.C.R. 198 . In that case the Division Bench of this Court had examined whether termination of probationer will come under section 11 read with Rule 83 and whether an appeal will lie to the Administrative Tribunal. The Court observed in paragraph 4 that the Act read with the Rules is a complete Code in itself. The expression used in section 22(e), namely "dismissing, removing from service" is of wider amplitude. It takes in its import all the cases of dismissal as well as termination of service. The Court observed in paragraph 4 that the Act read with the Rules is a complete Code in itself. The expression used in section 22(e), namely "dismissing, removing from service" is of wider amplitude. It takes in its import all the cases of dismissal as well as termination of service. It is well-settled that the relationship of master and servant is created by a bilateral act. Contract of service is continuing in nature and the obligation under the said contract is terminable by following certain defined modes. It is equally well-settled that mere use of polite language instead of peremptory one will not alter the fact. The words 'dismissal', 'termination' or 'removal' as used in sections 11 and 22 are the key words. Termination or removal embraces not merely an act of termination or removal by the employer, but the fact of termination, however produced. With these observation this Court has categorically stated that the termination whatsoever will attract section 11 read with Rule 83. Therefore the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the respondents 3 to 5 is sustainable. The counsel for the petitioner has then contended that at this distance of time merely because there was an alternative remedy, which was not availed of by the petitioner, this Court may not decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. It is true that there is considerable force in the submission, but we fail to see what relief can be granted to the petitioner. 4.As we pointed out earlier the petitioner cannot succeed in this petition as the undisputed fact is that he was the junior most among the staff and as there was a fall in number classes, following the mandate of provisions of section 22 only the petitioner was liable to be retrenched. In that event the petitioner cannot succeed in this writ petition and no relief can be granted. 5.But, however, the counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled to deployment under Rule 34(4) of the Goa, Daman and Diu School Education Rules, Which the Director has got power to deploy him to some other school. But the petitioner did not bring this to the notice of the Director of Education at the appropriate time. However, it is open for the petitioner to approach the Director of Education and request him to deploy the petitioner in some other school. But the petitioner did not bring this to the notice of the Director of Education at the appropriate time. However, it is open for the petitioner to approach the Director of Education and request him to deploy the petitioner in some other school. We hope that, upon receipt of such representation from the petitioner, the Director of Education will consider the case of the petitioner for deployment. With these observations the writ petition is dismissed. Rule discharged in the above terms. No order as to costa. Petition dismissed. ***** 1997(1) Bom.C.R. 681 (PANAJI BENCH) Before: T.K. Chandra shekhara Das R.M.S. Khandeparkar, JJ. M/s. Sardesai Transhippers Pvt. Ltd.....Petitioners. Versus The State of Goa, through the Ministry of Surface Transport and Inland Water, Panaji, Goa and others ....Respondents. Writ Petition Nos. 10 and 202 of 1996, decided on10-7-1996. Inland Vessels Act, 1917, Secs. 8 9---Survey certificate---Refusal to issue---Challenge to refusal of survey certificate of the vessel on the ground that Managing Director of the petitioner company has defaulted in making payment of port charges in respect of his private firm of which he is the partner---Principle of corporate law---Held, company cannot be made liable for the default of the shareholder or the fault of his director individually. In the present case the petitioners contention is that the respondents have no authority either to withhold the survey certificate or to deny carrying out survey of the vessels. The only ground for withholding the survey certificates and denying the survey, as stated in the reply of the respondents is that one M/s. Sardessai Engineering Works, which is a partnership firm, defaulted to make payment to the Port Authorities by way of lease rent, which comes to about Rs. 13,00,000/- and that one Mr. Prakash Dessai, who is the Managing Director of both the petitioners Companies is also the partner of the aforesaid M/s. Sardessai Engineering Works. Therefore, it is contended by the respondent that in all practical purpose, all these Institutions are one and the same and because of the default of the firm, it should be treated as default of the Company and, therefore, it is justified in withholding the survey certificate in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1996 and denying to conduct survey of the vessel in Writ Petition No. 202 of 1996. Court does not consider the objection raised by the State Government to be based on any sound principle of law and reasons. It is a well known principle in corporal law that a share-holder and the Company are two different entities. The company cannot be made liable for the default of the shareholder or the fault of his director individually. Of course, Court is aware that in certain circumstances under the Company Law or under Food Adulteration Act, etc., due to the fault of the Company, sometimes, the Director of the company may be liable, but in any circumstances it is not vice-versa. Therefore, for any remittance to be made by Prakash S. Desai in his individual capacity or as partner of the aforesaid firm/the petitioner Company, of which he is the Managing Director, cannot be made liable and for that reason, the Government is not justified in withholding the survey certificate or denying to carry out survey of the Vessels, in question. For this simple ground, the objection raised by the State Government is liable to be over-ruled. (Paras 3 4) Advocates appeared: V.R. Bhandari, along with Shri V.P. Thali, for the petitioners. G.U. Bhobe, Gov. Adv., for respondents. Per T.K. CHANDRA SHEKHARA DAS, J.:---As a common grievance arise in these two writ petitions, though the petitioners are different, we are proposing to dispose of these matters with a common Judgment. 2.The petitioners are limited companies. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1996 own a barge, called as "MAHAMAYA" and petitioners in Writ Petition No. 202 of 1996 own a barge by name "MAHADURGA". These petitioners Companies, as usual applied for survey certificates under section 9 of the Inland Vessels Act, 1917, enabling them to ply those vessels in the inland waters of Goa. When the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1996 applied for the survey certificate, though the survey was conducted, the certificate was not issued by the authorities, whereas in Writ Petition No. 202 of 1996, the authorities refused to carry out survey of the vessel at all. According to the petitioners, they satisfied all the conditions as stated in section 8 of the Inland Vessels Act and the Masters and the Engineers of these vessels are also certified to be having requisite qualifications. According to the petitioners, they satisfied all the conditions as stated in section 8 of the Inland Vessels Act and the Masters and the Engineers of these vessels are also certified to be having requisite qualifications. Therefore, the petitioners contention is that the respondents have no authority either to withhold the survey certificate or to deny carrying out survey of the vessels. 3.The respondents filed their reply to the writ petitions. The only ground for withholding the survey certificates and denying the survey, as stated in the reply is that one M/s. Sardessai Engineering Works, which is a partnership firm, defaulted to make payment to the Port Authorities by way of lease rent, which comes to about Rs. 13,00,000/- and that one Mr. Prakash Dessai, who is the Managing Director of both the petitioners Companies is also the partner of the aforesaid M/s. Sardessai Engineering Works. Therefore, it is contended by the respondent that in all practical purpose, all these Institutions are one and the same and because of the default of the firm, it should be treated as default of the Company and, therefore, it is justified in withholding the survey certificate in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1996 and denying to conduct survey of the vessel in Writ Petition No. 202 of 1996. 4.We do not consider the objection raised by the State Government to be based on any sound principle of law and reasons. It is a well known principle in corporial law that a share-holder and the Company are two different entities. The company cannot be made liable for the default of the shareholder or the fault of his director individually. Of course, we are aware that in certain circumstances under the Company Law or under food Adulteration Act, etc., due to the fault of the Company, sometimes, the Director of the company may be liable, but in any circumstances it is not vice-versa. Therefore, for any remittance to be made by Prakash S. Desai in his individual capacity or as partner of the aforesaid firm/the petitioner Company, of which he is the Managing Director, cannot be made liable and for that reason, the Government is not justified in withholding the survey certificate or denying to carry out survey of the Vessels, in question. For this simple ground, the objection raised by the State Government is liable to be over-ruled. For this simple ground, the objection raised by the State Government is liable to be over-ruled. 5.In the result, we allow the writ petitions. We direct the respondents in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1996 to issue annual survey certificate to the petitioners in respect of the vessel "MAHAMAYA" bearing registration No. M.R.H. 635, if the petitioners fulfil all the conditions required under the Inland Vessels Act, 1917. We also direct the respondents in Writ Petition No. 202of 1996 to undertake survey of the petitioners vessel "MAHADURGA" bearing registration No. M.R.H. 590 and issue survey certificate if the petitioners fulfil all the conditions under the Inland Vessels Act. 6.Rule in the above two writ petitions made absolute in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. *****