Judgment 1. By this application under sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the petitioner seeks quashing of the order dated 6.5.1996 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bagaha in Complaint Case No. 143 of 1996 under sec. 420 of the Indian Penal Code by which the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance and ordered for the issuance of summons to the accused persons including the present petitioner. 2. It appears that a complaint (copy at Annexure-4) was filed by opposite party no. 2 against the present petitioner and four others alleging that an agreement was entered into between H.M.P. Sugar Mill, Bagaha of which the present petitioner is the General Manager in respect of the payment of the price of the sugar cane which was to be supplied by the sugar cane growers to the Mill. It was alleged that relying on that agreement, which was annexed with the complaint, the sugar cane growers supplied sugar cane worth crores of rupees but the petitioner and other co-accused had not made full payment of the last season nor they are making payment according to rules in respect of the sugar cane supplied in the current year. Grievance of the complainant was that the petitioner and other co-accused have committed the breach of the agreement and has not made payment despite the terms contained in the agreement. 3. The learned Magistrate examined complainant and five witnesses and by the statements of those persons he found that the prima facie case against present petitioner and two others have been made out as they had signed on the agreement. Accordingly, he took cognizance against the petitioner and two other co-accused for the offence punishable under sec. 420 of the Indian Penal Code and ordered for issuance of summons to them. Being aggrieved by the said order the present application has been filed. 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this is a case purely of civil nature as the complainant has alleged breach of the terms of contract. He has contended that if any payment has not been made according to the agreement or according to the rules governing the supply of sugar cane agreement then also proper remedy would be either to file civil suit or to proceed under the Bihar Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). He has contended that if any payment has not been made according to the agreement or according to the rules governing the supply of sugar cane agreement then also proper remedy would be either to file civil suit or to proceed under the Bihar Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 5. Chapter V of the Act deals with the provisions for payment of price of cane and other matters. Sec. 43 of the Act lays down that the occupier of a factory shall make such agreements for the payment of price of cane as may be prescribed and be shall be liable to pay the price of cane supplied to the factory. It has been further provided in Clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of sec. 43 that where the occupier, liable under clause (i), makes default in payment of the price for a period exceeding fourteen days from the date of supply of cane to the factory he shall be liable to pay interest thereon at the rate specified in sec. 51 from the date of supply. It has been further provided by sub-section (6) of section 43 that any arrears of the price of the cane with interest thereon, if any, shall be recoverable as Public Demand or arrears of land revenue, Thus, it is evident that there is complete mechanism provided by sec. 43 of the Act for payment of price of cane and for its recovery in case of default made by the owner or occupier of the factory. There is specific procedure provided by the Act for recovery of the price of sugar cane supplied to a factory. Therefore, where any default is made in making payment of the sugar cane so supplied the remedy of the concerned supplier of sugar cane would be under the Act and there would be no question of offence of cheating. In such a case only on account of non-payment of price of sugar cane in accordance with the terms of agreement. Further, there appears to be no initial intention for cheating when the agreement was entered into because part payment appears to have been made by the petitioners factory. In such a case only on account of non-payment of price of sugar cane in accordance with the terms of agreement. Further, there appears to be no initial intention for cheating when the agreement was entered into because part payment appears to have been made by the petitioners factory. The grievance of the complainant in the complaint is that full payment has not been made in respect of the last season according to the agreement nor payment is being made according to rules for the current season. Where there is no initial intention of cheating the offence under sec. 420 of the Indian Penal Code would not be made out. 6. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 has contended that even if the offence under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out the offence for criminal breach of trust would be made out. This contention does not appear to be sustainable. The grievance of the complainant is regarding non-payment of the price of the sugar cane. The money which may be due from the petitioner and the factory cannot be said to have been entrusted by the complainant or suppliers of sugar cane to the petitioner or other co-accused. In absence of any entrustment of the property there cannot be any case of criminal breach of trust and misappropriation. 7. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the grievance raised by the complainant is purely of civil nature for which remedy under sec. 43 of the Act is available. This does not appear to be a case for initiation of criminal proceeding. Initiation of criminal proceeding in such matter would be abuse of the process of court. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate failed to take into consideration the above facts. The impugned order cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. 8. The application is allowed. The impugned order dated 6.5.1996 and further proceedings based on such order are quashed.