JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been preferred by defendant- petitioner before this Court against the order, dated 15.5.1995 passed by Additional Munsif No. 4, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Civil Suit No. 426/80 whereby learned trial Court closed the evidence of the defendant-petitioner. 2. The facts giving rise to the filing of this revision petition, briefly stated, are that the plaintiff-non-petitioner filed a suit for eviction against the defendant-petitioner on the grounds inter alia : (a) default in payment of arrears of rent, (b) substantial damage to the property, (c) subletting of the property, and (d) reasonable and bonafide necessity. Under the provisions of clauses (a), (b), (e) and (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short "the Act of 1950"). The eviction suit was filed by the plaintiff against the defendant in the year 1980. The suit was dismissed in default and restored on 25.4.1989. The plaintiff completed and closed his evidence before the trial Court on 31.10.1992. Thereafter the suit was fixed for recording of evidence of the defendant on 4.1.1992 when no witness was examined on behalf of the defendant. Thereafter the defendant sought several adjournments from the trial Court on one pretext or the other for leading his evidence but the evidence was not produced by the defendant till 15.5.1995 when the trial Court passed the impugned order directing the closure of the defendant's evidence, aggrieved by which this revision petition has been preferred to this Court by the defendant-petitioner. 3. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that after the closure of the plaintiff's evidence on 31.10.1992, the case was fixed for recording the evidence of the defendant's witnesses and on some occasions the Presiding Officer was on leave, while on other occasions the counsel was not present and as such the evidence could not be recorded. It has been further contended by the petitioner that 19.7.1993 was declared holiday and on 20.9.93 the case was fixed for recording the evidence of the defendant on 27.9.93, when the petitioner had submitted an application under Order 16, Rule 1, C.P.C. and the case was fixed for arguments on the stay application on 28.10.93 and 25.11.1993 and the stay application was dismissed on 16.12.93. Thereafter the case was fixed for recording the evidence of the defendant on 6.12.94 hence there has been no default on the part of the petitioner in leading the evidence before learned trial Court and the defence evidence could not be recorded due to above circumstances for which no fault can be attributed to the petitioner. 4. In order to judge the veracity of the statement made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I verified the facts from the certified copy of the order-sheets of the trial Court produced by learned counsel for the non-petitioner at the time of hearing. I have found a great difference in the dates and the dates mentioned by the petitioner in the memo of revision petition do not tally with the dates as recorded in the order-sheets of the trial Court. From the order-sheets it is apparent that the case was fixed for recording the evidence of the defendant for the first time on 4.1.93 when the evidence was not produced and request was made for adjournment and the matter was adjourned to 16.2.93. Thereafter the matter was adjourned for recording the defendant's evidence on 16.4.93, 21.4.93, 17.5.93, 19.7.93, 19.8.93, 27.9.93, 28.10.93, 22.11.93, 25.11.93, 6.12.93, 6.1.94, 18.3.94, 18.5.94, 18.7.94, 1.8.94, 8.9.94, 9.10.94, 20.10.94, 24.10.94, 10.11.94, 9.12.94, 11.1.95, 21.1.95, 22.2.95, 6.3.95, 23.3.95, 4.4.95, 14.4.95 and lastly on 15.5.95 when the impugned order was passed by the trial Court directing closure of the defendant's evidence. Thus, it is apparent from the above that as many as 30 adjournments were repeatedly sought by the defendant-petitioner for leading his evidence and were granted and yet the petitioner deliberately did not lead any evidence before the trial Court with mala fide and ulterior motives of harassing the plaintiff-non-petitioner and surprisingly the trial Court also gave undue latitude to the petitioner by repeatedly adjourning the matter on frivolous grounds for which there are no justifiable reasons on the record. It is a matter of great surprise as to how the petitioner could repeatedly seek adjournments for leading the evidence on one pretext or the other when he deliberately had not intended to lead evidence before the trial Court and the trial Court had shut its eyes to the callous attitude of the petitioner instead of strictly dealing with the petitioner who deserved no leniency at all. 5. 5. I am of the considered opinion that the trial Court is equally guilty for lapses on its part, particularly when there was no justifiable reason to have granted repeated adjournment on several occasions to a party which does not deserve any latitude being given to him in the circumstances as referred to above. The suit for eviction has been pending before learned trial Court since the year 1980 and the plaintiff had closed his evidence on 31.10.92. Thereafter there was apparently no justification for learned trial Court to have granted 30 adjournments frequently on one pretext or the other w.e.f. 4.1.1992 to 14.4.95 when last opportunity was given to the defendant to lead evidence positively by 15.5.95, when too the petitioner had failed to lead the evidence and the evidence of the defendant was closed on the said date vide impugned order against which this revision petition has been preferred as indicated above. 6. It is a matter of great surprise as to how and under what circumstances and in absence of any justifiable and cogent reasons on the record, the trial Court could become a party to the grossly indifferent and callous and illegal attitude of the petitioner who should have been sternly dealt with but the trial Court gave undue latitude to the petitioner who as a result took undue advantage of having committed series of defaults in paying or tendering the arrears of rent of the plaintiff-non-petitioner, particularly when learned trial Court should have seen itself that a clear case for eviction of the defendant-tenant was made out, since under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act of 1950, a decree for eviction can straightaway be passed against the defendant who has committed default in paying or tendering the amount of rent due from him to the landlord for a period of six months consecutively. 7. Admittedly the default has been for a period of 3 years on the part of the defendant on the basis of which a clear case of eviction is made out against the defendant-petitioner. 7. Admittedly the default has been for a period of 3 years on the part of the defendant on the basis of which a clear case of eviction is made out against the defendant-petitioner. As a matter of fact, I am quite surprised to note that a party which is admittedly guilty of gross misconduct by having deliberately not led its evidence before the trial Court during the period of about 3 years as referred to above, how can such a party be so daring to file a revision petition, before this court seeking condonation of delay in depositing the rent as has happened in this case. I am of the opinion that such a party should, on the contrary, be immediately taken to task and should be appropriately punished by suitable orders in this regard, since the law helps the persons who approach the court with clean hands and not the guilty party as has happened in this case. I am further of the opinion that since the defendant-petitioner has clearly violated the provisions of Section 13(i)(a) of the Act of 1950 in neither having paid nor having tendered the rent due from him to the landlord for a period of more than six months, the ground for eviction from the suit premises is clearly made out and the suit deserves to be decreed on this ground alone. I am further of the opinion that since the tenant has not even filed the written statement to the eviction petition till date, no further opportunity should be granted to the defendant-petitioner for filing written statement and his defence against eviction should automatically be treated as having been closed and his defence against eviction deserves to be struck out in accordance with Section 13(5) of the Act of 1950 and the trial Court is accordingly directed to proceed with the hearing of the suit and decide the case as expeditiously as possible and in any case not later than four months from today. 8. I would further like to observe that in view of the false statement having been made by the defendant in the aforesaid revision petition which has been done deliberately with a view to mislead this court and over-reach the process of law, the conduct of the petitioner is deprecated in strongest terms. 8. I would further like to observe that in view of the false statement having been made by the defendant in the aforesaid revision petition which has been done deliberately with a view to mislead this court and over-reach the process of law, the conduct of the petitioner is deprecated in strongest terms. I am fortified in my opinion from the order of this court in the matter of Shiv Sharan Sharma v. Umesh Chandra Kaliwal, 1987(1) Rajasthan L.R. 504 which is an identical matter in which this court took the view that the courts should be strict in granting adjournments. In this case as many as five opportunities were given to the defendant to examine himself and to lead evidence but he failed to do so. In absence of sufficient cause tendered by the petitioner, it was held by this court that the evidence of the petitioner-defendant had rightly been closed by the trial Court and the order of the trial Court was confirmed with the observations that without giving full opportunities or the reasons for which the petitioner had requested for time, it cannot be said that learned trial Court has committed any error of jurisdiction in refusing further time to the petitioner and closing his evidence. Likewise I am of the opinion that the very fact that the petitioner took almost about 3 years for leading evidence on the ground of default in payment of rents under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act of 1950 and which could not be completed till date, the trial Court has rightly passed the impugned order dated 15.5.1995 closing the evidence of the defendant-petitioner by fixing the date for final arguments on 15.7.1995. The impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or infirmity and does not call for any interference by this court. 9. In the result this revision-petition is dismissed with exemplary costs which I assess at Rs. 5,000/-. The trial Court is directed to hear final arguments of the parties on the date fixed and pass orders for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of default under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act of 1950 in accordance with law. 9. In the result this revision-petition is dismissed with exemplary costs which I assess at Rs. 5,000/-. The trial Court is directed to hear final arguments of the parties on the date fixed and pass orders for eviction of the petitioner on the ground of default under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act of 1950 in accordance with law. With regard to other grounds, i.e., reasonable and bonafide necessity, substantial damage to the property and subletting, the trial Court is directed to record necessary evidence of the parties and decide the case expeditiously within a period of four months from today. 10. Before parting with the order, I would like to observe that since the conduct of the Presiding Officer in having given undue latitude to the petitioner in view of several adjournments having been granted to him to lead evidence which too was not led till 14.4.95, the explanation of the Presiding Officer should be called for in this regard by learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur and suitable action be taken. Copy of this order be sent to learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur for immediate compliance.Petition dismissed. *******